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MESSAGE FROM THE PANEL 
This is our Final Report reviewing Australia’s competition policy, laws and institutions.  
The Panel undertook a stocktake of the competition policy framework across the Australian 
economy. Although reforms introduced following the Hilmer Review led to significant improvements 
in economic growth and wellbeing, the Panel believes that renewed policy effort is required to 
support growth and wellbeing now and into the future. To this end, we have reviewed Australia’s 
competition policy, laws and institutions to assess their fitness for purpose. 
Taken together, our recommendations comprise an agenda of reinvigorated microeconomic reform 
that will require sustained effort from all jurisdictions. We believe this commitment is necessary if 
Australia is to boost productivity, secure fiscal sustainability and position our economy to meet the 
challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. 
Given the forces for change already bearing on the Australian economy, delaying policy action will 
make reform more difficult and more sharply felt. An early response will make the reform effort 
more manageable over time, allowing Australians to enjoy higher living standards sooner rather than 
later. 
The recommendations and views expressed in this Final Report draw upon the expertise and 
experience of each member of the Panel. Importantly, we have also had the benefit of hearing from 
a wide cross-section of the Australian community and from participants in all sectors of the economy. 
To support this consultation, the Panel released an Issues Paper on 14 April 2014 and a Draft Report 
on 22 September 2014. 
We met with groups representing consumers and those representing business, both large and small. 
We also met with a variety of individual business people, academics, current and former regulators, 
and governments, including a number of state and territory Treasurers. During May and June 2014, 
Panel members attended business forums around the country organised by representative business 
groups and, during October and November 2014, the Panel hosted public forums to discuss the Draft 
Report. 
The Panel also held a series of workshops during the preparation of the Draft Report and the Final 
Report to discuss particular issues with subject matter experts. Further, on 23 and 24 October 2014, 
we convened a conference featuring international and Australian speakers, and including a series of 
workshops. This conference enabled Panel members to hear a wide range of views on our draft 
recommendations.  
We received almost 350 submissions in response to the Issues Paper and around 600 submissions to 
the Draft Report. All non-confidential submissions are published on our website 
www.competitionpolicyreview.gov.au.1 Around 40 per cent of submissions came from peak and 
advocacy bodies, around 30 per cent from individuals, around 25 per cent from business, and the 
remainder from governments. A wide variety of topics was identified, with the top five issues raised 
most often in submissions to our Draft Report being misuse of market power, retail trading hours, 
road transport, planning and zoning, and supermarkets.  
                                                          
1  In this Report, references to Issues Paper submissions are in the form (sub, page xx) while references to Draft Report 
submissions are in the form (DR sub, page xx). 
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We are aware of other reviews currently in train that are likely to cover sector-specific aspects of 
competition policy, such as the Energy White Paper, the Review of Coastal Trading and the 
Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper. We also note the Final Report of the Financial System 
Inquiry released in December 2014, which included a number of recommendations and findings 
regarding competition in the financial system, and the Review of the National Broadband Network 
released in several tranches throughout 2014, which made recommendations and findings regarding 
telecommunications infrastructure and markets. 
The Australian Government has also commenced a Federation White Paper, asked the Productivity 
Commission to examine the performance of the workplace relations framework and foreshadowed a 
Tax White Paper. Although the Panel has not made detailed recommendations in these areas, in 
some cases we have encouraged these reviews to take account of competition issues. 
Importantly, the recommendations in this Final Report form a significant contribution to the overall 
reform agenda offered by this set of reviews.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Australia has enjoyed continuous economic growth since the early 1990s and weathered the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s without a recession. This performance has led some to question 
whether there is a ‘burning platform’ for a new round of microeconomic reform. 
Evidence presented to the Panel throughout the Review suggests that reform is not only overdue, 
given stalled reform effort in the 2000s, but critical to improving Australia’s productivity performance 
and to sustaining our living standards into the future. 
With Australia’s terms of trade receding from their peak and the boom in mining investment past, we 
must look to productivity-enhancing reforms to underpin rising living standards and to strengthen 
Australia’s fiscal outlook.  
Reinvigorating Australia’s competition landscape is a central element of a new round of 
microeconomic reform. To this end, the Panel examines whether Australia’s existing competition 
policy, laws and institutions remain ‘fit for purpose’, especially in light of the persistent forces for 
change that will shape the Australian economy now and into the future. 
The rise of Asia and other emerging economies provides significant opportunities for Australian 
businesses and consumers but also poses some challenges. A heightened capacity for agility and 
innovation will be needed to match changing tastes and preferences in emerging economies with our 
capacity to deliver commodities, goods, services and capital. We need policies, laws and institutions 
that enable us to take full advantage of the opportunities offered. 
Our ageing population will give rise to a wider array of needs and preferences among older 
Australians and their families. Extending choice and contestability in government provision of human 
services will help people to meet their individual health and aged care needs. 
New technologies are ‘digitally disrupting’ the way many markets operate, the way business is done 
and the way consumers engage with markets. The challenge for policymakers and regulators is to 
capture the benefits of digital disruption by ensuring that competition policy, laws and institutions do 
not unduly obstruct its impact yet still preserve expected safeguards for consumers. 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Competition policy is aimed at improving the economic welfare of Australians. It is about meeting 
their needs and preferences by making markets work properly.  
In the Panel’s view, competition policy should: 
• make markets work in the long-term interests of consumers; 
• foster diversity, choice and responsiveness in government services; 
• encourage innovation, entrepreneurship and the entry of new players; 
• promote efficient investment in and use of infrastructure and natural resources; 
• establish competition laws and regulations that are clear, predictable and reliable; and 
• secure necessary standards of access and equity. 
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Important unfinished business remains from the original National Competition Policy (NCP) agenda, 
and new areas have arisen where competition policy ought to apply. 
Australia’s ageing population will impose greater demands on health and aged care services. 
Establishing choice and contestability in government provision of human services can improve 
services for those who most need them. If managed well, this can both empower service users and 
improve productivity at the same time. 
In the area of human services, the Panel recommends that: 
• user choice should be placed at the heart of service delivery; 
• governments should retain a stewardship function, separating the interests of policy (including 
funding), regulation and service delivery;  
• governments commissioning human services should do so carefully, with a clear focus on 
outcomes; 
• a diversity of providers should be encouraged, while taking care not to crowd out community 
and volunteer services; and  
• innovation in service provision should be stimulated, while ensuring minimum standards of 
quality and access in human services. 
In the area of infrastructure, the Panel recommends reforming road transport by introducing 
cost-reflective road pricing in a revenue-neutral way and linked to road construction, maintenance 
and safety so that road investment decisions are more responsive to the needs and preferences of 
road users. 
Reforms begun in electricity and gas need to be finalised and water reform needs to be 
reinvigorated. 
Anti-competitive regulations remain in place despite significant progress made under NCP. The 
Panel recommends removing regulations governing retail trading hours and parallel imports, and 
removing pharmacy location and ownership rules. The Panel also recommends repealing Part X of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), which exempts liner shipping from the competition 
laws, and reducing restrictions on sea and air cabotage. The Panel recommends that other 
regulations restricting competition be reviewed by each jurisdiction, with particular priority given to 
regulations covering planning and zoning, taxis and ride-sharing, and product standards. 
Australia’s intellectual property regime is a priority for review. The Panel also recommends that the 
current exception to competition law for conditions of intellectual property licences in the CCA be 
repealed. 
Competitive neutrality remains a matter of concern for many stakeholders, including small 
businesses. The Panel recommends that competitive neutrality policies be reviewed and updated 
against best practice and that complaint-handling processes and monitoring be improved. 
Government procurement guidelines and decisions can significantly affect the range of goods and 
services available to consumers. Procurement can also shape the structure and functioning of 
competition in markets. The Panel recommends that promoting competition should be a central 
feature of government procurement and privatisation frameworks and processes. 
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The Panel believes that markets work best when consumers are informed and engaged, empowering 
them to make good decisions. The Panel sees scope for enhancing Australian consumers’ access to 
data to better inform their decisions. 
COMPETITION LAWS 
In guiding our consideration of whether Australia’s competition laws are fit for purpose, the Panel 
asked four questions: 
• Does the law focus on enhancing consumer wellbeing over the long term? 
• Does the law protect competition rather than individual competitors? 
• Does the law strike the right balance between prohibiting anti-competitive conduct and not 
interfering with efficiency, innovation and entrepreneurship? 
• Is the law as clear, simple and predictable as it can be? 
Although the Panel considers that our competition laws have served Australia well, the Final Report 
recommends specific reforms to enhance their effectiveness. 
The Panel finds that section 46, dealing with the misuse of market power, is deficient in its current 
form. It does not usefully distinguish pro-competitive from anti-competitive conduct. Its sole focus 
on ‘purpose’ is misdirected as a matter of policy and out of step with international approaches. 
Section 46 should instead prohibit conduct by firms with substantial market power that has the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition, consistent with other 
prohibitions in the competition law. It should direct the court to weigh the pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive impact of the conduct. 
The Panel recommends a number of changes to simplify and clarify the operation of the law, to bring 
to the forefront the competition policy objectives of the law and to reduce business compliance 
costs. The cartel provisions should be simplified. The price signalling provisions should be removed 
and replaced, by extending section 45 governing contracts, arrangements and understandings that 
affect competition to also cover concerted practices that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
Further, the prohibition on exclusive dealing in section 47 should be repealed. Secondary boycott 
provisions should be retained and effectively enforced. Trading restrictions in awards and enterprise 
agreements (except to the extent they relate to the remuneration, conditions of employment, hours 
of work or working conditions of employees) should be prohibited by the CCA. Merger approval 
processes should be streamlined. 
The Panel also recommends changes to other approval processes, both authorisation and 
notification, and introducing a block exemption power for the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), to reduce costs for business, especially small business. 
Collective bargaining and collective boycott arrangements should be made more flexible and easier 
for small business to use. The ACCC should be proactive in assisting small businesses to seek other 
forms of redress when it decides not to pursue a case on their behalf. 
Appendix A to this Report contains model legislative provisions reflecting many of the Panel’s 
recommendations for reforms to the CCA. 
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COMPETITION INSTITUTIONS 
In assessing Australia’s competition institutions — their current performance and preparedness for 
the future — the Panel has identified a gap in Australia’s competition framework. To fill this gap, 
Australia needs an institution whose remit encompasses advocating for competition policy reform 
and overseeing its implementation. This includes reforms agreed following this Review as well as 
future reforms. 
The Panel recommends replacing the National Competition Council (NCC) with a new national 
competition body, the Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP). This should be an 
independent entity and truly ‘national’ in scope, established and funded under a co-operative 
legislative scheme involving the Commonwealth, States and Territories. 
Where competition reforms result in disproportionate effects across jurisdictions, competition policy 
payments should be made to ensure that revenue gains flowing from reform accrue to the 
jurisdictions undertaking the reform. The ACCP would be responsible for administering payments, 
based on actual reform implementation. 
This new body would be an advocate and educator in competition policy. It would have the power to 
undertake market studies at the request of any government. It could also consider requests from 
market participants to either recommend changes to anti-competitive regulations to relevant 
governments or refer breaches of the law to the ACCC for investigation. 
The Panel recommends that, while the ACCC retain both competition and consumer functions, a 
separate access and pricing regulator be established with responsibility for existing regulatory 
functions undertaken by the NCC and the ACCC. These regulatory functions would include all those 
currently performed by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) but exclude relevant consumer 
protection and competition functions, which would remain with the ACCC. 
The Panel considers that, although the ACCC is a well-regarded and effective body, its performance 
would be strengthened by including a more diverse range of views and experience at the 
Commission level. This can be achieved by introducing part-time Commissioners whose 
commitments beyond the ACCC would broaden the Commission’s perspective, and whose part-time 
status would make them more independent from the day-to-day management of ACCC business. 
The Panel also recommends that Commissioners no longer be designated with specific 
responsibilities, for example, for small business or consumer protection, but that the Commission as 
a whole be required to have regard to all sectors and interests. 
SMALL BUSINESS 
The Panel has been especially mindful of the concerns and interests of small business in the context 
of the Review. Accordingly, this Report contains a number of recommendations relevant for small 
business.  
Recommended changes to strengthen the misuse of market power provision are intended to 
improve its clarity, force and effectiveness so that it can be used to prevent unilateral conduct that 
substantially harms competition. 
The Panel believes that small business needs greater assurance that competition complaints can be 
dealt with. The ACCC can play an important role in connecting small business to alternative dispute 
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resolution services. Developing industry codes with practical and effective dispute resolution 
processes can also help to ensure that small business has access to justice. 
The Panel recommends that the CCA should be reformed to introduce greater flexibility into the 
notification process for collective bargaining by small business. Improved understanding of the 
collective bargaining and collective boycott provisions can also promote their use and potentially 
strengthen the bargaining position of small business in dealing with large business. 
Other recommendations to reform competitive neutrality policy and review regulatory restrictions, 
including standards, occupational licensing, and planning and zoning rules can enable small business 
to compete more effectively. 
RETAIL MARKETS 
Competition in retail markets has been an important focus for the Review, including competition in 
grocery and fuel retailing, regulations on planning, zoning and trading hours, and specific regulations 
such as those affecting pharmacy and liquor retailing. 
The Panel recommends a number of changes that will apply to retail markets to promote 
competition and benefit consumers. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The reform agenda laid out in this Final Report is ambitious, with recommendations to all levels of 
government. Accordingly, the Report provides a ‘road map’ for implementation (see Section 29.3). 
The Panel recognises that individual jurisdictions are already progressing competition policy matters 
and considers that this Review will add momentum.  
A number of the Panel’s recommendations can be implemented by jurisdictions independently of 
each other and may even benefit from a diversity of approaches. To this end, the road map identifies 
recommendations that can be adopted by governments individually. Nonetheless, the Panel 
considers that co-operation and collaboration across jurisdictions generally leads to better outcomes. 
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GUIDE TO THE REPORT 
In Part 1 of this Report, the Panel makes the case for reform and spells out the context for the 
Review, including the main challenges and opportunities facing Australia. 
Part 2 brings together the Panel’s analysis into a set of recommendations to reform competition 
policy, laws and institutions. Competition policy reforms are set out in order of priority so that those 
with the greatest potential benefit to Australians are identified first. 
Recommended changes to competition laws are set out in the order that the provisions appear in the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). 
Recommendations on institutions and governance, small business and retail markets are grouped 
together, and there is a summary of the Panel’s views on implementing the recommendations. 
Parts 3, 4 and 5 analyse competition policy, laws and institutions in greater depth. The 
recommendations have been reproduced in these parts but not always in the same order as they 
appear in Part 2. 
Part 3 explores the competition policy landscape, beginning with the principles underpinning the 
original National Competition Policy (NCP) framework and asking whether revisions or extensions are 
needed in light of the different forces now bearing on the Australian economy. Discussion then turns 
to a suite of specific issues related to competition policy, including unfinished business from the 
original NCP reform agenda and new horizons for competition policy. 
Part 4 explores Australia’s competition laws in detail, beginning with general issues, before moving 
to unilateral conduct, anti-competitive agreements, secondary boycotts and employment-related 
matters, exemption processes, enforcement and finally the National Access Regime. Part 4 examines 
areas some observers claim are deficient and considers whether the laws remain fit for purpose in a 
changing business environment. 
Part 5 assesses Australia’s competition institutions, including the competition regulators, examining 
their current capabilities and preparedness for the future. 
Finally, Part 6 provides a road map to guide implementation of the proposed reforms as well as 
identifying their potential benefits. 
Guide to the Report 
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PART 1 — OVERVIEW 
1 CONTEXT FOR THE REVIEW 
Competition policy, like other arms of government policy, is aimed at securing the welfare of 
Australians. Broadly speaking, it covers government policies, laws and regulatory institutions whose 
purpose is to make the market economy better serve the long-term interests of Australian 
consumers. Properly applied, it can improve the quality and range of goods and services, including 
social services, available to Australians.  
Strengthening the competitiveness of enterprises is a necessary national economic challenge. 
However, competition policy concerns the competitiveness of markets as a whole, not individual 
enterprises. Nonetheless, the disciplines of a competitive market compel efficiencies in business 
conduct, which in turn contributes to the productivity and competitiveness of enterprises. 
Policies that strengthen our competition landscape are crucial for Australia as a small, open 
economy, exposed to competitive forces that originate beyond our borders. Australia’s economic 
development has been propelled by exposure to opportunities elsewhere in the world, with 
Australian living standards reflecting the beneficial impact of international trade in goods and 
services — both exports and imports. 
Exposure to markets beyond Australia widens choice and opportunities, helping to ensure that 
Australia remains an attractive place to live, work, raise a family and run a business. 
During the 1980s and 1990s successive governments opened the Australian economy to greater 
competition by lowering import tariffs, deregulating markets for foreign exchange, admitting foreign 
banks, deregulating domestic aviation and partially deregulating and reforming the waterfront, 
coastal shipping and telecommunications (see Box 1.1). These initiatives widened consumer choices, 
lowered prices and exposed local producers to more intense competition from abroad. 
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Box 1.1: Deepening Australia’s integration with the world 
The 1980s heralded a new era for Australia, with reforms aimed at integrating the Australian 
economy more closely with the world economy. Major components of that agenda included trade 
liberalisation, capital market liberalisation and deregulation of traded services. 
Trade liberalisation — reductions in tariff assistance (begun in 1973) and the abolition of 
quantitative import controls — mainly in the automotive, whitegoods and textile, clothing and 
footwear industries — gathered pace from the mid-1980s. The effective rate of assistance to 
manufacturing fell from around 35 per cent in the early 1970s to 5 per cent by 2000.2 
Capital markets — the Australian dollar was floated in December 1983, foreign exchange controls 
and capital rationing (through quantitative lending controls) were removed progressively from the 
early 1980s and foreign-owned banks were allowed to compete — initially for corporate 
customers and then, in the 1990s, to act as deposit-taking institutions.3 
From the late 1980s, other changes also occurred in infrastructure, such as the partial deregulation 
and restructuring of airlines, coastal shipping, telecommunications and the waterfront.  
 
In the 1990s, the competition agenda broadened to include goods and services not typically exposed 
to foreign competition, like electricity, telecommunications services and rail freight. Many of these 
were supplied locally by public monopolies or government departments. 
In 1995, Commonwealth, state and territory governments agreed to implement a wide-ranging 
National Competition Policy (NCP) built on the recommendations of the Hilmer Review (see Box 1.2). 
The NCP reflected a desire to build on the momentum of earlier reforms by extending the reach of 
choice and competition beyond tradeables to encompass non-tradeable goods and services. 
This was not an exercise in driving competition further into the Australian economy for its own sake, 
but for the longer-term benefits that would flow for Australian living standards. 
These expectations were realised. In 2005 the Productivity Commission (PC) estimated that 
productivity improvements and price reductions flowing from the NCP and related reforms in the 
1990s raised Australia’s gross domestic product (GDP) by 2.5 per cent.4 
                                                          
2  Banks, G 2005, Structural Reform Australian-Style: Lessons for Others?, Presentation to the IMF, World Bank and OECD. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No. 33, Canberra, page XVIII. 
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Box 1.2: National Competition Policy 
In 1995 Australian governments committed to a set of agreements under the NCP, which: 
• extended the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) to previously excluded businesses 
(unincorporated businesses and state, territory and local government businesses); 
• established independent price oversight of state and territory government businesses; 
• corporatised and applied competitive neutrality principles so that government businesses 
did not enjoy a net competitive advantage as a result of public sector ownership; 
• structurally reformed public monopolies to separate out industry regulation and, where 
possible, further disaggregated potentially competitive parts of the monopoly; 
• established a third-party access regime for significant bottleneck infrastructure;  
• reviewed all legislation restricting competition; 
• applied the competition agreements to local government; 
• established the National Competition Council (NCC); 
• imposed conditions on governments seeking to exempt conduct from the competition law; 
and 
• provided financial assistance to the States and Territories conditional on progress 
implementing the NCP. 
 
The impact of the NCP reforms is evident, not just in economic statistics, but in everyday experience. 
For example, prior to the NCP reforms:  
• consumers had no choice of electricity or gas provider — they paid regulated tariffs and 
customer service was poor or non-existent;  
• telecommunications services operated as a monopoly, which only ended in 1992 when 
Australia’s second telecommunications provider, Optus, entered the market; 
• there were price controls and supply restrictions on food products such as eggs, poultry, milk, 
rice, and sugar;  
• retail trading hours were restricted for most stores, with limited trading on weekends; and 
• only lawyers could offer land conveyancing services (conveyancing fees fell by 17 per cent in 
New South Wales when this regulation was repealed, leading to an annual saving to 
consumers of at least $86 million).5 
By contrast, most Australians today can choose among competing providers of gas and electricity 
services, and they can complain to their energy ombudsman if they are unhappy with the service 
rendered. 
Retail trading hours have been substantially deregulated in most States and Territories. Online 
shopping allows consumers access, choice and convenience at any time of the day or night. Australia 
                                                          
5  National Competition Council 1999, National Competition Policy: Some impacts on society and the economy, 
Melbourne, page 9. 
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has more mobile phones than people,6 and consumers can choose among a vast array of phone plans 
from a variety of telecommunications providers. 
These developments highlight how competition underpins so many aspects of Australia’s economy. 
Its importance in Australia’s financial system was recently recognised in the Final Report of the 
Financial System Inquiry (see Box 1.3). 
Box 1.3: Competition in Australia’s financial system 
On 20 December 2013 the Treasurer, the Hon. Joe Hockey MP, released final terms of reference 
and appointed an independent committee to undertake a Financial System Inquiry (FSI), chaired by 
Mr David Murray AO. The FSI was charged with examining how the financial system could be 
positioned to best meet Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic growth. The 
Final Report of the FSI was released on 7 December 2014. 
The FSI considered that competition and competitive markets ‘are at the heart of the Inquiry’s 
philosophy for the financial system … [and] … the primary means of supporting the system’s 
efficiency’.7 The FSI found that: 
• competition in Australia’s financial system is generally adequate at present, but there is 
complacency about the level of competition that exists; 
• high concentration and increasing vertical integration within some parts of the Australian 
financial system have the potential to limit the benefits of competition in future; 
• a number of specific improvements could be made in particular areas, including the capital 
adequacy of authorised deposit-taking institutions, superannuation, regulation of the 
payments system and in relation to new technology; and 
• all regulators involved in the financial system should more clearly explain how they have 
considered the effect of their decisions on competition, and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission’s (ASIC’s) mandate should explicitly include consideration of 
competition. 
The Australian Government has announced that it will respond to the FSI’s recommendations in 
2015, after consulting with industry and consumers. This consultation process will end on 
31 March 2015.8 
REINVIGORATING MICROECONOMIC REFORM 
Australia has enjoyed continuous economic growth since the early 1990s and weathered the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s without a recession. During the Panel’s consultations, this backdrop 
led some stakeholders to question whether there was a ‘burning platform’ for a new round of 
microeconomic reform. 
Evidence presented to the Panel throughout the Review suggests that reform is not only overdue, 
given stalled reform effort in the 2000s, but critical to improving Australia’s productivity performance 
and to sustaining our living standards into the future. 
                                                          
6  Australian Communications and Media Authority 2014, Communications report 2013–14, Melbourne, page 17. 
7  Australian Government 2014, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, Canberra, page xvi. 
8  Hockey, J (Treasurer) 2014, Release of the Financial System Inquiry Report, media release 7 December 2014, Canberra. 
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In the 1990s, Australia benefited from strong productivity growth, reflecting the 
competition-enhancing reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s. As the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2010 regulatory review of Australia noted:  
Increased exposure to international trade during the 1980s and the product market 
liberalisation conducted in the 1990s under the National Competition Policy (NCP) 
framework reduced barriers to entry, and increased competition in the Australian 
economy. This contributed to an impressive surge in productivity in the 1990s ...9  
In the 2000s, the driver of Australia’s rising living standards changed, as a surge in our terms of trade 
and a boom in mining investment took over from productivity growth. In fact, multifactor 
productivity growth (a measure of output produced per unit of combined inputs of labour and 
capital) deteriorated markedly during this time.10 Much of this deterioration coincided with a stalling 
in Australia’s microeconomic reform effort. 
Now that Australia’s terms of trade are receding from their peak and the boom in mining investment 
is past, as a matter of urgency we must look once again to productivity growth to underpin rising 
living standards.  
The case for further microeconomic reform, and particularly competition policy reform is clear. 
Looking ahead, structural change in the Australian economy will continue to subdue average rates of 
growth in productivity. Productivity growth is lower in service sectors, such as aged care and health, 
which are expected to expand, while sectors with higher productivity growth, such as financial 
services, are expected to decline as a share of the economy.11  
Without reform to improve the productivity of our large and growing services industries, Australia’s 
economy will face increasing challenges, affecting not only the choices of our citizens in their 
everyday activities, but also the state of our public finances. Providing the services that users want, 
and delivering them in the way they want, are important elements of making government-funded 
services sustainable. 
Australia must reform its economy, not only to deal with the productivity challenge at home but also 
to take advantage of global developments, to sustain Australia’s capacity to secure rising levels of 
prosperity. 
The industrialisation of developing nations and, in particular, the rise of Asia and the growing Asian 
middle class offer Australia important growth opportunities. Yet, as outlined below, Australia cannot 
assume that the rise of Asia will be an uncontested opportunity. 
Notwithstanding the economic imperatives, it takes time to implement reforms and for their effects 
to materialise. The NCP reforms took many years to be agreed and implemented across jurisdictions 
before the real benefits were fully exploited and our standard of living was materially improved.  
A new microeconomic reform agenda will inevitably take time to be formulated, agreed and then 
implemented. Given the forces for change that Australia already faces, any delay will only make 
                                                          
9  OECD 2010, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Australia 2010, Paris, page 14. 
10  Parkinson, M 2014, Fiscal sustainability & living standards — the decade ahead, Speech to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 
2 April. 
11  Parkinson, M 2014, Challenges and opportunities for Australia over the next decade, Speech to the Association of 
Mining and Exploration Companies, Perth, 2 July. 
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reform more difficult, and more sharply felt. Early action will make the reform effort more 
manageable, allowing Australians to enjoy higher living standards sooner rather than later.  
A ROLE FOR COMPETITION POLICY REFORM 
As previously noted, competition policy reform is vital to achieving the productivity improvements 
necessary for higher incomes and jobs growth, most especially by making goods and services markets 
more competitive. More competitive markets maximise our capacity to adjust rapidly to changing 
circumstances, arising from both global and domestic sources. Strong competition in goods and 
services markets encourages innovation, growth in productivity and average income levels, and 
ultimately the number and quality of Australian jobs. 
More competitive markets also improve our quality of life by delivering greater variety and more 
freedom in our everyday choices. Having more choices open to us, along with greater capacity to 
exercise informed choice, improves our lives, individually as well as communally. Competition and 
choice also help to ensure that our economy is agile, flexible and robust to future challenges and 
opportunities. 
Reform is vital as the Australian economy is beset by ongoing forces for change. Some of these forces 
are long-standing, but others were barely envisaged at the time of the Hilmer Review. For example, 
online digital technologies were in their infancy in the early 1990s, and were only widely adopted 
from the mid-1990s onwards. 
The rise of China was anticipated, following the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, but not really 
established until well into the 1990s. The effect of Australia’s ageing population was again 
anticipated but has only begun to bite economically as the ‘Baby Boom’ generation retires from the 
workforce. 
The Australian Government has established the Competition Policy Review to consider how well 
Australia’s competition policy, laws and institutions are travelling two decades on from the Hilmer 
Review. In particular, to ask how appropriate are current competition policy settings for the 
challenges that face us now rather than 20 years ago? 
Three major forces for change relevant to this Review stand out as influencing the Australian 
economy now and into the foreseeable future, the: 
• industrialisation of developing nations and, in particular, the rise of Asia and the growing Asian 
middle class; 
• ageing of the Australian population and falling workforce participation; and 
• diffusion of digital technologies, with their potential to disrupt established patterns of 
economic activity. 
DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE RISE OF ASIA 
The re-emergence of China and India as global economic superpowers is driving fundamental 
structural change in the global economy. The size and pace of growth in these populous economies is 
shifting the pattern of world economic growth, favouring suppliers of raw materials and energy 
commodities like Australia. 
However, the global shifts are not confined to the Asian region. Many emerging economies in 
Europe, Africa and Latin America also supply raw materials and energy in direct competition to 
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Australia. As the OECD notes, the global economic balance will continue to shift towards current 
non-OECD areas, including many emerging economies, whose economic structure and export profile 
will increasingly match those of the OECD countries. 
The OECD also notes that, to respond to these shifts over time: 
Further reforms to inject dynamism in labour and product markets, combined with 
re-designed intellectual property right policies, will be needed to sustain innovation, 
productivity and employment.12 
This message resonates for Australia in many ways, since we cannot assume that the rise of Asia will 
remain an uncontested opportunity. As we try to secure the benefits of this shift in global economic 
activity, we will face challenges from other nations.  
To date, our supply of raw materials and energy has sustained high levels of income growth for 
Australia. Although their contribution to growth will moderate, exports of commodities to Asia will 
very likely remain strong for years to come. Moreover, the rise of the Asian middle class will present 
new opportunities for Australia, especially in traded services such as education, health and financial 
services.  
The enormous growth in Asian consumption is expected to sustain high levels of infrastructure 
investment, increase consumer demand, and enhance Asia’s economic sophistication and global 
integration. This represents a substantial and broad export opportunity for Australian suppliers of 
commodities, goods, services and capital.  
The benefits of these economic opportunities should reflect in the living standards of everyday 
Australians. A wider array of products and services to choose from, supplied from a variety of 
sources, at prices kept low by competition — domestically and from abroad — will be enjoyed widely 
within the Australian community. 
However, the rise of Asia and other emerging economies puts new pressure and expectations on 
Australia’s domestic systems that were built for a particular economic landscape and at a particular 
time. 
AGEING 
Australia’s population is ageing. The number of Australians aged 75 years and over is projected to 
increase by around four million between 2012 and 2060 — an increase roughly equivalent to the 
current population of Sydney.13 Population ageing will lower expected income growth. As the Baby 
Boom generation retires, the number of working age people relative to those over the age of 65 will 
fall. 
Population ageing will substantially increase demands on the health and aged care systems. 
Australian Government real health expenditure per person is expected to more than double over the 
                                                          
12  OECD 2014, Shifting Gear: Policy Challenges for the next 50 Years, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 24, 
Paris, page 1. 
13  Productivity Commission 2013, An Ageing Australia: Preparing for the Future, Commission Research paper, Canberra, 
page 6.  
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next 40 years, and aged care expenditure per person is expected to more than triple.14 Improving the 
efficiency and responsiveness of these sectors will be crucial to meeting the needs and preferences 
of older Australians with dignity.  
Although the ageing of Australia’s population is well documented, its impact on our competition 
framework has not received much attention. Ageing will see greater demands for choice and 
diversity from Australians over their aged care arrangements, with expectations for new competitive 
and innovative services to meet a widening array of needs and preferences. 
More options, with greater flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness will become the norm, with 
users having an increasing say in the system — instead of providers dictating outcomes.  
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 
New technologies are transforming the way many markets operate, the way business is done and the 
way consumers engage with markets. The internet has already had a significant impact on the 
Australian economy. Australians are typically fast adopters of new technologies (such as smart 
phones), new applications and software tools. This has in turn encouraged internet service providers 
to extend and develop the infrastructure required to access internet services more fully. 
New technologies are also driving changes in sectors such as energy and transport. For example, 
‘smart meters’ allow consumers to access real-time information on energy pricing and usage , while 
smart phone applications allow consumers to compare airfares and hotel rates in real time. 
Technological innovation is lowering barriers to entry across a range of markets. For example, new 
ride-sharing services and providers of short-term accommodation are using digital technologies, 
primarily through smart phone applications, to connect customers and providers in innovative ways 
and in direct competition with incumbent providers. These examples highlight the potential for 
digital technologies to disrupt traditional markets. 
Innovative, competitive new entrants in a market can lower prices to consumers and widen their 
choice of providers. However, they can also raise concerns about consumer safety. The community 
will expect new entrants to challenge existing providers by offering new and better products, while 
still adhering to expected safeguards against doubtful or dangerous market practices. New entrants 
should not be exempt from the need to operate in a safe and reliable way, consistent with 
community expectations. 
Community expectations will demand that all providers (both new and incumbent) compete on the 
basis of the quality, value and responsiveness of the products and services they offer to consumers.  
Changes brought about by digitisation and access to the internet are fostering the growth of 
networks where information and ideas are routinely shared. This ‘spillover’ of knowledge is a 
recognised catalyst of innovation, adaptation and invention — the drivers of growth in the 
‘knowledge economy’. 
The use of technology to foster new markets provides more consumers with access to what they 
want and need, potentially including lower-income consumers. The pervasive presence of knowledge 
                                                          
14  Australian Government 2015, 2015 Intergenerational Report, Australia in 2055, Canberra, Page xvi-xvii. Real health 
expenditure per person is projected to more than double from around $2,800 to around $6,500, while real aged care 
expenditure per person is projected to more than triple from $620 to $2,000. 
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networks and the power of innovation to lift living standards require Australia’s competition policy, 
laws and institutions to be fit for purpose for the digital age. 
FIT FOR PURPOSE 
The Competition Policy Review has been tasked with examining whether Australia’s competition 
policy, laws and institutions remain fit for purpose, especially in light of changing circumstances likely 
to face the Australian economy over the next decade or so. Having a sustainable and durable policy 
framework is important, for current as well as future generations of Australians. 
The Panel identifies six attributes of competition policy as defining its fitness for purpose 
(see Box 1.4). These attributes are the criteria against which we assess Australia’s current 
competition policy, laws and institutions in this Report. In Part 2 we summarise the Panel’s findings 
and recommendations. 
Box 1.4: Fit for purpose 
A competition policy that is ‘fit for purpose’: 
• focuses on making markets work in the long-term interests of consumers; 
• fosters diversity, choice and responsiveness in government services; 
• encourages innovation, entrepreneurship and the entry of new players; 
• promotes efficient investment in and use of infrastructure and natural resources; 
• includes competition laws and regulations that are clear, predictable and reliable; and 
• secures necessary standards of access and equity. 
 
Making markets work in the long-term interests of consumers 
Our competition policy, laws and institutions serve the national interest best when focused on the 
long-term interests of consumers. 
Consumers in this context are not just retail consumers or households but include businesses 
transacting with other businesses. In the realm of government services, consumers can be patients, 
welfare recipients, parents of school-age children or users of the national road network. 
In 1995, the then TPA incorporated an objects clause,15 stating: 
The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of 
competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection. 
A focus on the competitive process, rather than individual competitors, and the interests of 
consumers is a well-established principle of competition policy across the globe. 
In an environment where Australia’s economic structure will continue to evolve in response to global 
forces, and markets become increasingly global, fostering competitive processes in the interests of 
                                                          
15  Section 2 of the former Trade Practices Act 1974. Now section 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  
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consumers becomes an ever-changing and challenging task. Disruptive technologies increasingly 
challenge the way our markets work, and by extension, our existing regulatory architecture. 
As it becomes more challenging and complex to ensure that markets operate efficiently in the 
interests of consumers, we must continue to adhere to fundamental principles but allow flexibility in 
their application. In particular, we must foster the smooth entry and exit of suppliers in response to 
changing consumer tastes, needs and preferences — which means removing or lowering barriers to 
entry (and exit) wherever possible.  
We also need flexible regulatory arrangements that can adapt to changing market participants, 
including those beyond our borders, and to new goods and services that emerge with rapidly 
evolving technology and innovation. Market regulation should be as ‘light touch’ as possible, 
recognising that the costs of regulatory burdens and constraints must be offset against the expected 
benefits to consumers.  
Specifically, we need to allow success to emerge in response to market-driven factors rather than 
prescribing rules that support firms of particular sizes at the expense of others. Doing the latter 
compromises the long-term interests of consumers. Success in the market should be driven by 
consumer interests, not the special interests of suppliers or providers. 
Our competition laws rightly censure anti-competitive trading terms or abuse of market power, but 
such interventions should be targeted and proportionate. Technology can be a game-changer for 
businesses of all sizes and can allow small, nimble firms to compete on a global scale, without any 
prerequisite economies of scale in order to succeed.  
Fostering diversity, choice and responsiveness in government services 
Choice is a powerful dynamic force for improving our lives. Enabling our individual requirements and 
preferences to be expressed through choice encourages governments to adapt their services to 
better serve our needs. 
On the other hand, choice is not about having unlimited options or facing a bewildering array of 
possibilities. It is about having our needs and preferences met easily and affordably, in a timely 
fashion, and at a place and time of our choosing — which may well be outside standard business 
hours. 
Given the size and pervasiveness of government in the Australian economy, as funder, provider and 
regulator, we need to consider new ways to foster diversity, choice and responsiveness in 
government services. 
In the future, Australians will demand more government services, especially in health and education 
as our population ages and life-long learning becomes a more important means of securing 
rewarding employment. These demands are also likely to increase as Australians adjust to a more 
changeable, less certain economic and social environment. 
Designing markets for government services may be a necessary first step as governments contract 
out or commission new forms of service delivery, drawing on public funds. Over time, a broader, 
more diverse range of providers may emerge, including private for-profit, not-for-profit and 
government business enterprises, as well as co-operatives and mutuals. 
If managed well, moving towards greater diversity, choice and responsiveness in government 
services can both empower consumers and improve productivity. 
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Encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship and the entry of new players 
In the coming decades, the technological change we have witnessed in the recent past is likely to 
accelerate, most especially in the field of information and communications technology. The explosion 
in information available to all market participants has both better informed those on the buy-side of 
transactions and allowed those on the sell-side to target their goods and services more accurately. 
The information revolution is just one facet of a rapidly evolving technology landscape. New 
techniques and applications utilising information are fostering new ideas and ways of doing business. 
Such innovations fundamentally challenge existing laws and policies, founded as they often are on 
the premise of a stable and predictable marketplace with known participants. 
Australians eagerly embrace new ideas when they offer us something of value, including innovations 
from new players entering markets like never before. But our existing laws and institutions often 
struggle to keep pace. Sometimes this is the inevitable consequence of an unanticipated shock, but it 
can also be because existing laws and policies have rightly or wrongly instituted some form of 
preferment to incumbent market participants. 
New entry exerts a positive discipline on existing market players, encouraging them to be more 
innovative and responsive to consumer needs. By contrast, locking in long-term preferment risks 
Australia falling behind other countries, as potential new approaches and innovations pass us by. 
Our competition policy, laws and institutions need to be sufficiently adaptable to allow new entry to 
make innovative and potentially lower-cost products and services available to Australian consumers. 
They also need to recognise that new technologies can provide alternative avenues to address the 
needs and concerns of the community rather than falling back on existing and, at times, out-dated 
regulatory frameworks (see Box 1.5). 
A competition policy that is fit for purpose must strike a balance between the long-term benefits to 
consumers of allowing new entrants to establish themselves in a market and protecting the public 
against dishonest or dangerous practices. It requires flexible and adaptable regulatory interventions, 
enabling and requiring new providers to operate within appropriate legal frameworks. 
Box 1.5: Technological versus regulatory solutions to market failure –ride-sharing apps 
Markets may sometimes be inefficient due to information asymmetries. This occurs when one 
party to a transaction has more information about the goods or services on offer than the other. 
This type of problem was first identified by economist George Akerlof, who concluded that the 
presence of information asymmetries could drive down the average quality of goods in a market, 
since sellers of high-quality goods would be unable to distinguish themselves from sellers of 
low-quality goods — and hence would not get a price premium.16 Without a higher price, sellers of 
high-quality goods would withdraw them from the market, driving the average quality down.  
 
 
                                                          
16  Akerlof, G A 1970, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
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Box 1.5: Technological versus regulatory solutions to market failure –ride-sharing apps 
(continued) 
Although markets can develop solutions to overcome information problems, governments have 
also resorted to regulation to help overcome information problems. Examples of such regulation 
include mandatory warranties, mandatory disclosure, and laws prohibiting misleading and 
deceptive conduct. 
However, while regulation can assist in making markets work better, it is not necessarily a 
complete solution. It requires ongoing enforcement and gives sellers that have met a minimum 
standard little incentive to improve. 
Recently, technology has emerged that offers an alternative to regulation in helping to solve 
information problems.  
For example, in the context of personal transport services, Uber and Lyft17 coordinate users and 
providers of ride-sharing services using internet apps where mandatory feedback from both 
customers and operators is used to encourage good service standards and passenger behaviour. 
Such ride-sharing apps, which allow passengers and drivers to post feedback on each other, enable 
drivers and passengers to establish and trade on their reputations. 
However, such innovative solutions to information problems in markets can pose challenges for 
regulators. Where regulation is inflexible, it may prevent markets from responding to innovative 
service offers that do not fit neatly within existing regulated categories. Regulation must be 
reviewed regularly to ensure that it is still required and not inhibiting the emergence of new 
service offerings. 
Promoting efficient investment in and use of infrastructure and natural 
resources 
Australia faces an unprecedented opportunity to thrive over coming decades, as the middle class in 
Asia and beyond burgeons. However, optimising our national interest will require wise and efficient 
investment in and use of our existing and planned physical and electronic infrastructure, and policies 
that maximise the return on our natural resources. 
To improve our standard of living and quality of life, and sustain high income growth, we need to 
move goods and services rapidly and responsively across both our nation and our borders. We need 
to make adequate investment in our land, sea and air transport systems, and telecommunications 
and electronic commerce infrastructure, and ensure they are used efficiently by those who need 
them, when they need them. 
A competition policy that is fit for purpose facilitates mechanisms to signal efficient investment in 
and use of our infrastructure. The original NCP framework introduced price signals to guide 
investment in and use of electricity and gas, and telecommunications networks. Steps forward were 
also made in improving our rail and air infrastructure. But much more remains to be done across all 
transport modes, including roads, and infrastructure more broadly.  
Pricing or other signals that guide allocation of our natural resources towards their highest-value use 
will optimise their potential to support Australian living standards into the future. In this regard, we 
                                                          
17  Lyft ride-sharing services do not operate in Australia. 
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need to ensure that planning, zoning and environmental regulations governing the use of our land 
and other natural resources, including water, are applied sensibly. 
Competition laws and regulations that are clear, predictable and reliable 
Australians expect consumers to be dealt with fairly and on reasonable terms, and businesses to 
refrain from conduct that damages the competitive process (and ultimately consumers). They expect 
laws to be clear, predictable and reliable and administered by regulators (and applied by the judicial 
system) without fear or favour. Our competition law must ensure that market participants, big and 
small, can compete in a way that allows the most efficient and responsive players to thrive. 
These principles are particularly important where market participants differ in their capacity or 
financial means to engage with the legal or regulatory process. Difficulty in accessing justice in 
matters of competition policy or consumer protection can undermine broader confidence in our 
regulatory institutions.  
There is a natural tension between designing specific laws and regulations to deal with problems that 
emerge at a point in time and building in flexibility to cope with changing market circumstances as 
they arise. Laws that are less predictable in their immediate application may nevertheless prove 
more reliable over time as they are adapted through the judicial process to encompass novel 
developments.  
This is especially relevant when new technologies are rapidly altering market conditions faced by 
businesses and consumers. The more tightly specified our laws, the more likely they are to lag behind 
developments in markets and possibly act against the long-term interests of consumers. 
A competition policy that is fit for purpose should enshrine competition law that is sufficiently 
general in its design to accommodate evolving ways of doing business or engaging with consumers, 
but sufficiently reliable and predictable in its application to avoid discouraging innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
Securing necessary standards of access and equity 
Australians expect the benefits and opportunities afforded by a well-functioning market economy to 
be enjoyed widely, not reserved for the privileged few, or those with the necessary information and 
resources to exploit the benefits of choice or responsiveness. For choice to deliver real benefits, 
consumers not only need proper access to information, but it must also be in the right form for them 
to assess it, and they must have the capacity to act on it. 
Access and equity dictate necessary standards and genuine opportunities that all consumers should 
be able to enjoy, making genuine choice, responsiveness and innovation available to all. Many 
government services have not previously been exposed to competition because of concerns about 
the impact on vulnerable consumers, especially in regard to access (usually around pricing but also 
quality) and outcomes that may accentuate inequality. 
Well-functioning markets, governed by policies and laws that are fit for purpose, can help to deliver 
access and equity. When opportunities and choices are limited (through poor market regulation 
and/or government decisions) questions of distributive justice or fairness often arise. Markets that 
cater to a wide range of consumer tastes and incomes can help to promote fair outcomes. However, 
when lower-income or vulnerable consumers are denied basic opportunities and choice, especially in 
their dealings with government, concerns about access and equity become more pronounced. 
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As governments around the world have sought to improve their service delivery, many have explored 
new forms of contracting or commissioning service provision from providers in the private for-profit 
or not-for-profit sectors. As experience with improved contract and market design has evolved, 
important lessons have been learnt and improvements made. There is much of value here from 
which Australian governments can profitably draw. 
A competition policy that is fit for purpose recognises the need for all Australians to share in the 
benefits of choice, responsiveness and innovation, especially but not exclusively in government 
services. 
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PART 2 — FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Review’s Terms of Reference require an assessment of Australia’s competition policy, laws and 
institutions to determine whether they remain fit for purpose, especially in light of the opportunities 
and challenges facing Australia into the foreseeable future. 
In this Part, we summarise the findings of this assessment and set out recommendations to address 
deficiencies the Panel has identified. 
Chapter 2 presents the Panel’s recommendations for priority areas of reform in competition policy. 
These are informed by a set of competition principles attuned to the challenges and opportunities 
likely to face the Australian economy in coming decades. A key lesson from the National Competition 
Policy (NCP) experience is the importance of an agreed framework, which can then be applied by 
governments in their own jurisdictions and adapted to local conditions as necessary. 
A further lesson from NCP is that all reform initiatives cannot be progressed simultaneously. The 
Panel recognises the importance of assigning priorities to reform initiatives so that those with the 
greatest potential benefit to Australians are progressed first. Moreover, priorities will change as 
technology changes — for instance, the development of the National Broadband Network (NBN) and 
mobile telephony infrastructure have meant that access to the ‘unbundled local loop’ (i.e., the 
copper network) is a less significant issue than it was in 1995.  
Competition policy reforms most likely to generate large net benefits are those that: benefit a 
sizeable part of the economy or have deep links to other sectors; remove a significant barrier to 
competition; or subject activities with significant government involvement to greater contestability 
and consumer choice.  
Chapter 3 outlines the Panel’s recommendations for changes to the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (CCA). 
The Panel has viewed reform of the CCA through the lens of fitness for purpose. In some areas, we 
recommend substantive changes to the way the law is drafted. In other areas, our recommended 
changes go to clarifying and simplifying the law.  
On some issues, the Panel finds the law itself fit for purpose but shares concerns expressed by 
stakeholders, especially small business, about access to remedies under the law. 
Chapter 4 outlines the Panel’s recommendations on the institutional structures most likely to sustain 
enduring reform. 
Like the Hilmer Review, we recognise that policy reform will only gain and sustain momentum if it is 
supported by all jurisdictions.  
Australia has been well served by its competition policy institutions, yet this is not sufficient reason 
to retain the framework in its current form. The flagging momentum of competition reform points to 
the need for reinvigoration through strong institutional frameworks.  
The Panel has identified a clear gap in the competition framework: an institution is needed to 
advocate for competition reform and to oversee the implementation of reforms instituted by 
governments in the wake of this Review.  
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Chapter 5 outlines the Panel’s recommendations relating to concerns that small business has raised 
with us. 
Access to remedies has been a roadblock for many small businesses, and the Panel finds that access 
should be improved. We recommend that the collective bargaining framework should be enhanced 
and made more flexible. We also make recommendations on competitive neutrality and regulations 
that can restrict the way small businesses operate. 
Chapter 6 highlights recommendations made in other parts of this Report addressing issues raised 
with the Panel that relate to retail markets, particularly supermarkets. 
Chapter 7 presents the Panel’s views on the best method to implement a national competition 
reform agenda. We also recommend economic modelling of the package of recommendations in this 
Review, which will inform governments’ discussions of policy proposals they will pursue. 
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2 COMPETITION POLICY 
2.1 A SET OF COMPETITION PRINCIPLES 
As originally crafted, the National Competition Policy (NCP) reflected the challenges Australia faced 
more than 20 years ago. The focus of the NCP reforms was on exposing some previously sheltered 
activities to competition and applying a more national approach to competition issues. 
The six elements of competition policy identified in the Hilmer Review18 were: 
• limiting anti-competitive conduct of firms; 
• reforming regulation which unjustifiably restricts competition; 
• reforming the structure of public monopolies to facilitate competition; 
• providing third-party access to certain facilities that are essential for competition; 
• restraining monopoly pricing behaviour; and 
• fostering ‘competitive neutrality’ between government and private businesses when they 
compete.  
The Panel endorses competition policy that focuses on making markets work in the long-term 
interests of consumers. Legislative frameworks should continue to limit anti-competitive conduct of 
firms. However, through its commercial arrangements entered into with market participants, the 
Crown (whether in right of the Commonwealth, state, territory or local governments) also has the 
potential to harm competition. 
The Panel therefore concludes that the anti-competitive conduct provisions of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) should cover government activities that have a trading or commercial 
character. 
Moreover, the Crown’s capacity to enhance or harm competition reaches beyond the scope of the 
CCA and includes a range of policies and regulations. In particular, procurement, which ranges from 
buying goods and services through to public-private partnerships (PPPs) and privatisations, should be 
designed with competition policy in mind. 
The Panel believes that the focus of competition policy should be widened beyond infrastructure 
public monopolies and government businesses, to encompass the provision of government services 
more generally. 
By promoting user choice and encouraging a diversity of providers, competition policy plays an 
important role in improving performance in sectors such as human services. Choice and diversity 
have the potential to improve outcomes for users, especially but not only by stimulating innovation. 
Independent regulation can encourage market entry since it provides a level of certainty about the 
regulatory environment. Similarly, separating the interests of providers from those of funders and 
                                                          
18  Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, page xvii. 
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regulators encourages accountability, innovation and a level playing field between public and other 
providers.  
The Panel believes that declaration and third-party access to infrastructure should only be mandated 
when it is in the public interest. The onus of proof should lie with those seeking access to 
demonstrate that it would promote the public interest rather than on infrastructure owners to 
demonstrate that access would be contrary to the public interest. 
Acknowledging the diverse circumstances of each jurisdiction, the Panel supports the flexibility built 
into the NCP for the Australian Government and state and territory governments to decide how best 
to implement competition principles in their jurisdictions. Competition policy should continue to 
apply explicitly to local government.  
Agreeing a set of principles would guide the Australian Government, state, territory and local 
governments in implementing those aspects of competition policy for which they are responsible. 
The principles in Recommendation 1 broaden the NCP agenda to include all government services in 
trade or commerce and promote the role of choice. 
In applying these principles the Panel endorses a ‘public interest’ test as a central tenet of 
competition policy. The Panel recommends continuing with the NCP public interest test, namely that 
legislation or government policy should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and  
• the objectives of the legislation or government policy can only be achieved by restricting 
competition.  
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Recommendation 1 — Competition principles 
The Australian Government, state and territory and local governments should commit to the 
following principles: 
• Competition policies, laws and institutions should promote the long-term interests of 
consumers. 
• Legislative frameworks and government policies and regulations binding the public or private 
sectors should not restrict competition.  
• Governments should promote consumer choice when funding, procuring or providing goods 
and services and enable informed choices by consumers. 
• The model for government provision or procurement of goods and services should separate the 
interests of policy (including funding), regulation and service provision, and should encourage a 
diversity of providers. 
• Governments should separate remaining public monopolies from competitive service elements, 
and also separate contestable elements into smaller independent business activities. 
• Government business activities that compete with private provision, whether for-profit or 
not-for-profit, should comply with competitive neutrality principles to ensure they do not enjoy 
a net competitive advantage simply as a result of government ownership.  
• A right to third-party access to significant bottleneck infrastructure should be granted where it 
would promote a material increase in competition in dependent markets and would promote 
the public interest. 
• Independent authorities should set, administer or oversee prices for natural monopoly 
infrastructure providers. 
Applying these principles should be subject to a public interest test, such that legislation or 
government policy should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and  
• the objectives of the legislation or government policy can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
For further detail on competition principles, see Chapter 8.  
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2.2 DETERMINING PRIORITY AREAS FOR REFORM 
The Panel recognises the importance of assigning priorities to reform initiatives so that those with 
the greatest potential benefit to Australians are progressed first. 
In determining priority areas for competition policy reform, the Panel has asked five questions:  
• Will this reform help the Australian economy adjust to the forces for change identified in 
Part 1 of this Report? 
• Will this reform promote choice, diversity and innovation in markets for private and/or 
government goods and services? 
• Will this reform help to raise productivity growth and hence Australian living standards over 
time? 
• Will this reform stimulate competition or contestability in markets by lowering barriers to 
entry or exit? 
• Will this reform help to complete unfinished business from the original NCP agenda or address 
specific issues raised in the Review’s Terms of Reference? 
If the answer to one or more of these questions is ‘yes’, then the reform is placed on the Panel’s 
priority list. The remaining sections of this chapter present the Panel’s recommendations in respect 
of each of its priority areas for reform. 
2.3 HUMAN SERVICES 
Access to high-quality human services — including health, education and community services — is 
vital to the lives of all Australians. Good health makes it easier for people to participate in society; 
education can help put people on a better life pathway; and quality community services, including 
aged care and disability care and support, can provide comfort, dignity and increased opportunities 
to vulnerable Australians. 
Given the size of the human services sector (which is set to increase further as Australia’s population 
ages),19 even small improvements will have profound impacts on people’s standard of living and 
quality of life. 
The Panel notes that governments are making significant changes across human services sectors, 
with policies reflecting the unique characteristics of each jurisdiction and the service in question. 
These changes include a clearer focus on user choice and innovation in service delivery. 
As a first step, where governments are involved in human services sectors as a provider, separating 
the interests of both the regulator and policy-maker (including funding) from the interests of the 
provider can help to ensure that decisions are made in the best interests of users. Regulation and 
policy decisions that are independent of government provision can encourage a more certain and 
stable environment, which can in turn encourage a diversity of new providers. 
                                                          
19  Australian Government 2015, 2015 Intergenerational Report, Australia in 2055, Canberra. 
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But governments cannot distance themselves from the quality of services delivered to Australians. 
An ongoing market stewardship function means that governments will retain responsibility for 
overseeing the impact of policies on users. 
The Panel considers that a ‘presumption of choice’ could have significant benefits in many human 
services sectors. Putting users in control of the human services they access — either through direct 
payments, personal budgets, entitlements or choice — drives service providers to become more 
responsive to individual requirements. 
However, the Panel acknowledges that choice is not the only important objective in the area of 
human services. Equity of access, universal service provision and minimum quality are also important 
to all Australians. 
In considering whether it should recommend change in this area, the Panel does not wish to 
discourage or crowd out the important contribution that not-for-profit providers and volunteers 
currently make to the wellbeing of Australians. 
Where governments retain some control over the delivery of human services, a diversity of service 
providers and high-quality outcomes for users can be encouraged through careful commissioning. 
Governments need to allow room for providers to innovate in response to changing user demands, 
and to benchmark the performance of providers, credibly threatening to replace those that do not 
meet the needs of users. 
The Panel recognises that some markets will not have sufficient depth to support a number of 
providers — including, for example, certain services in remote and regional areas. Ensuring access to 
services and maintaining and improving service quality in these cases increases the emphasis on 
well-designed benchmarking of services.  
The Panel is satisfied that deepening and extending competition policy in human services is a priority 
reform. Lowering barriers to entry can stimulate a diversity of providers, which expands user choice. 
Small gains in productivity (driven by competition) in these large and growing sectors of the 
Australian economy have the potential to deliver large gains across the community.  
Reforms in this area can also exert a powerful demonstration effect. If competition produces 
conspicuous improvements in users’ access to and experience of a particular human service, this will 
strengthen the case for reform across a wider range of government services. 
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Recommendation 2 — Human services 
Each Australian government should adopt choice and competition principles in the domain of 
human services. 
Guiding principles should include: 
• User choice should be placed at the heart of service delivery. 
• Governments should retain a stewardship function, separating the interests of policy (including 
funding), regulation and service delivery.  
• Governments commissioning human services should do so carefully, with a clear focus on 
outcomes. 
• A diversity of providers should be encouraged, while taking care not to crowd out community 
and volunteer services.  
• Innovation in service provision should be stimulated, while ensuring minimum standards of 
quality and access in human services. 
When developing implementation plans, governments can expand on these principles to achieve 
their goals. 
For example, in putting user choice at the heart of service delivery, governments should: 
• recognise that users are best placed to make choices about the human services they need and 
design service delivery, wherever possible, to be responsive to those choices; 
• recognise that access to quality services will be a prerequisite for effective choice and that 
accessibility will be particularly important in remote and regional areas;  
• ensure that users have access to relevant information to help them exercise their choices, 
including, where appropriate, feedback from previous users of services;  
• in sectors where choice may be difficult, make intermediaries or purchase advisors available to 
help users make decisions, with policies designed to align the incentives of purchase advisors 
with the best interests of users;  
• ensure that a default option is available for users unable or unwilling to exercise choice;  
• lower financial and non-financial switching costs to enable switching wherever possible — for 
example, users should not ‘lose their place in the queue’ if they switch providers, or need to 
undergo further eligibility assessment; and  
• offer disadvantaged groups greater assistance in navigating the choices they face through, for 
example, accessible communications channels that suit their needs.  
In undertaking their stewardship role, governments should: 
• foster a diverse range of service models that best meet the needs of individuals and the 
broader community; 
• co-design markets with human services providers to build on the trust and relationships that 
already exist between service providers and users; 
• separate their interest in policy (including funding) and regulation from provision;  
• vest rule-making and regulation with a body independent of government’s policy (including 
funding) role;  
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• allow funding to follow people’s choices; and  
• fund community service obligations in a transparent and contestable manner. 
In commissioning human services, governments should: 
• encourage careful commissioning decisions that are sensitive and responsive to individual and 
community needs, and recognise the contribution of community organisations and volunteers;  
• ensure that commissioned services are contestable and service providers face credible threats 
of replacement for poor performance; 
• establish targets and benchmarks for service providers based on outcomes, not processes or 
inputs; and 
• offer financial rewards for performance above specified targets.  
In encouraging a diversity of service providers, governments should: 
• allow independent regulators to license any provider that meets and maintains prescribed 
standards, where minimum standards address quality requirements without raising artificial 
barriers to entry; and/or  
• directly commission services with co-ordination and processes that: 
- avoid monopoly providers developing over time; and 
- specify contracts with duration periods that balance the need to afford providers some 
level of certainty without excluding potential competitors for extended periods of time; 
and 
• in support of their role as market stewards, undertake commissioning that: 
- provides for sufficient information and feedback loops to improve the design and 
targeting of contracts over time, including by identifying the relative strengths of 
different types of service provider;  
- recognises the integrated nature of many human services and their joint role in 
contributing to end-user outcomes, and the relative strengths of different providers in 
different parts of a co-ordinated service supply chain; and 
- is co-ordinated over time, where possible, maximising opportunities for contracts with 
overlapping timeframes and supporting a diversity of providers in the market at any 
point in time. 
In encouraging innovation in service delivery, governments should: 
• encourage experimental service delivery trials whose results are disseminated via an 
intergovernmental process; and 
• encourage jurisdictions to share knowledge and experience in the interest of continuous 
improvement.  
For further detail on human services, see Chapter 12.  
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2.4 TRANSPORT 
Road transport 
Road transport is a major input for business-to-business transactions and, with the rapid growth of 
online purchases, an increasingly important component of end-point sales to consumers. An efficient 
road system is also essential for urban and regional access and amenity. 
Even small changes in productivity in this sector can cascade through the economy, boosting 
productivity and output in other sectors. Also, given the size of the road transport sector, enhanced 
productivity in road transport can deliver large gains to the economy.  
However, roads are the least reformed of all infrastructure sectors, with institutional arrangements 
around funding and provision remaining much the same as they were 20 years ago. 
More effective institutional arrangements are needed to promote efficient investment in and usage 
of roads, and to put road transport on a similar footing with other infrastructure sectors. Lack of 
proper road pricing leads to inefficient road investment and distorts choices between transport 
modes, particularly between road and rail freight. 
The advent of new technology presents opportunities to improve the efficiency of road transport in 
ways that were unattainable two decades ago. Road user charges linked to road construction, 
maintenance and safety should make road investment decisions more responsive to the needs and 
preferences of road users. As in other network sectors, where pricing is introduced, it should be 
overseen by an independent regulator. 
A critical concern of stakeholders, shared by the Panel, is that road pricing should not be an 
additional impost on road users. To ensure any reform is revenue-neutral, indirect taxes and charges, 
such as fuel excise and registration fees, should be reduced as road pricing is introduced. This would 
make the road sector more like other infrastructure sectors, since road authorities would charge 
directly and transparently for road use, and allocate the revenue raised to the network’s construction 
and operating costs. Cost-reflective pricing should lead to better road investment decisions, which 
will make the community and road users better off. 
Recommendation 3 — Road transport 
Governments should introduce cost-reflective road pricing with the aid of new technologies, with 
pricing subject to independent oversight and revenues used for road construction, maintenance 
and safety. 
To avoid imposing higher overall charges on road users, governments should take a 
cross-jurisdictional approach to road pricing. Indirect charges and taxes on road users should be 
reduced as direct pricing is introduced. Revenue implications for different levels of government 
should be managed by adjusting Australian Government grants to the States and Territories. 
Liner shipping (Part X) and cabotage (coastal shipping and aviation) 
The Review’s Terms of Reference (3.3.5) require it to consider whether existing exemptions from the 
competition law and/or historic sector-specific arrangements are still warranted. This includes Part X 
of the CCA, which exempts international liner cargo shipping from certain competition provisions, 
including cartel conduct, contracts, arrangements or understandings that affect competition, and 
exclusive dealing. 
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Liner shipping is a vital mechanism through which goods cross Australia’s borders, both for export 
and import. Many items moved by sea cannot be transported by air because of their weight or 
volume. These include not only finished goods but also intermediate inputs for Australian businesses. 
The importance of international trade to Australia’s economy, and the prospects for stronger growth 
in trade as Asia develops, focus attention on the need for efficient and competitive marine 
transportation. 
Part X of the CCA allows liner shipping operators to enter into agreements among themselves in 
relation to the freight rates to be charged, and the quantity and kinds of cargo to be carried, on 
particular trade routes, and to register those agreements with the Registrar of Liner Shipping (an 
office created under Part X). Registration confers an exemption from the cartel conduct prohibitions 
and sections 45 and 47 of the CCA. Although the test for registering a conference agreement under 
Part X involves assessing the agreement’s ‘overall benefit’ to Australia, it does not expressly require 
assessing its competitive effects. Also, the test is not assessed by the primary competition regulator, 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), but by the Registrar of Liner Shipping. 
No other industry enjoys legislative exemption from Australia’s competition laws. This is despite the 
fact that other industries have similar economic characteristics to the liner shipping industry, 
particularly the international airline industry. If participants in other industries wish to make 
agreements that would otherwise contravene the competition law, they are required to seek 
authorisation from the ACCC. 
The Panel therefore considers that Part X should be repealed and the liner shipping industry should 
be subject to the normal operation of the CCA.  
The ACCC should be given power to grant block exemptions (see Recommendation 39 and 
Section 22.3) for conference agreements that meet a minimum standard of pro-competitive features. 
For example, conference agreements that co-ordinate scheduling and the exchange of capacity, 
while allowing confidential individual service contracts and not involving a common conference tariff 
and pooling of revenues and losses, should be eligible for a block exemption. Other forms of 
agreement that do not qualify for the block exemption, and thereby risk contravening Part IV 
provisions, should be subject to individual authorisation.  
Repeal of Part X will mean that existing liner shipping agreements will no longer be exempt from the 
competition law and some may contravene it. A transition period will therefore be needed to 
establish which agreements qualify for the block exemption and for other agreements to either seek 
authorisation or be modified if needed to comply with the CCA. The Panel considers a transition 
period of two years should be sufficient. 
The Panel is aware that the Australian Government is undertaking a separate review of coastal 
shipping regulations but observes that cabotage restrictions raise the cost and administrative 
complexity of coastal shipping services. The Panel notes that restrictions on air cabotage are stricter 
than shipping cabotage and that the current blanket restrictions are likely to be inefficient. Cabotage 
restrictions that are not in the public interest should be removed.  
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Recommendation 4 — Liner shipping 
Part X of the CCA should be repealed. 
A block exemption granted by the ACCC should be available for liner shipping agreements that 
meet a minimum standard of pro-competitive features (see Recommendation 39). The minimum 
standard of pro-competitive features to qualify for the block exemption should be determined by 
the ACCC in consultation with shippers, their representative bodies and the liner shipping industry. 
Other agreements that risk contravening the competition provisions of the CCA should be subject 
to individual authorisation, as needed, by the ACCC. 
Repeal of Part X will mean that existing agreements are no longer exempt from the competition 
provisions of the CCA. Transitional arrangements are therefore warranted. 
A transitional period of two years should allow for the necessary authorisations to be sought and 
to identify agreements that qualify for the proposed block exemption. 
 
Recommendation 5 — Cabotage — coastal shipping and aviation 
Noting the current Australian Government Review of Coastal Trading, cabotage restrictions on 
coastal shipping should be removed, unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the 
restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the 
government policy can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
The current air cabotage restrictions should be removed for all air cargo as well as passenger 
services to specific geographic areas, such as island territories and on poorly served routes, unless 
it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh 
the costs, and the objectives of the restrictions can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
Introducing an air cabotage permit system would be one way of regulating air cabotage services 
more effectively where necessary. 
For further detail on transport, see Section 11.3. 
2.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Disruptive technologies, especially digital technologies, are a pervasive force for change in the 
Australian economy. New technologies foster innovation, which in turn drives growth in living 
standards. Access to and creation of intellectual property (IP) will become increasingly important as 
Australia moves further into the digital age. 
Australians are enthusiastic adopters and adapters of new technology. We stand to benefit greatly by 
exploiting technology to its full extent in our business production processes and as end-consumers. 
Our IP policy settings should encourage this. 
Nevertheless, an appropriate balance must be struck between encouraging widespread adoption of 
new productivity-enhancing techniques, processes and systems on the one hand, and fostering ideas 
and innovation on the other. Excessive IP protection can not only discourage adoption of new 
technologies but also stifle innovation. 
Given the influence of Australia’s IP rights on facilitating (or inhibiting) innovation, competition and 
trade, the Panel believes the IP system should be designed to operate in the best interests of 
Australians. 
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The Panel therefore considers that Australia’s IP rights regime is a priority area for review. 
Determining the appropriate extent of IP protection is complex. IP rights can help to break down 
barriers to entry but, when applied inappropriately, can also reduce exposure to competition and 
erect long-lasting barriers to entry that fail to serve Australia’s interests over the longer term. This 
risk is especially prevalent in commitments entered into as part of international trade agreements. 
The Panel is concerned that Australia has no overarching IP policy framework or objectives guiding 
changes to IP protection or approaches to IP rights in the context of negotiations for international 
trade agreements.  
Recommendation 6 — Intellectual property review 
The Australian Government should task the Productivity Commission to undertake an overarching 
review of intellectual property. The Review should be a 12-month inquiry.  
The review should focus on: competition policy issues in intellectual property arising from new 
developments in technology and markets; and the principles underpinning the inclusion of 
intellectual property provisions in international trade agreements. 
A separate independent review should assess the Australian Government processes for 
establishing negotiating mandates to incorporate intellectual property provisions in international 
trade agreements.  
Trade negotiations should be informed by an independent and transparent analysis of the costs 
and benefits to Australia of any proposed intellectual property provisions. Such an analysis should 
be undertaken and published before negotiations are concluded. 
The Panel considers it appropriate that commercial transactions involving IP rights, including the 
assignment and licensing of such rights, be subject to the CCA, in the same manner as transactions 
involving other property and assets. 
Subsection 51(3) of the CCA provides a limited exception from most of the competition law 
prohibitions for certain types of transactions involving IP. The exception covers conditions in licences 
or assignments of IP rights in patents, registered designs, copyright, trademarks and circuit layouts 
where, broadly, the condition relates to products that are the subject of the application of the IP 
right. The exception does not extend to the prohibitions relating to misuse of market power and 
resale price maintenance. 
It is important to note that subsection 51(3) does not exempt all transactions involving IP rights from 
competition law; it only exempts certain conditions in a licence or assignment. For example, the 
transfer of IP rights, whether by licence or assignment, which results in an increase in market power 
and a consequential substantial lessening of competition is subject to sections 45 and 50; the 
decision by an IP owner to refuse to license IP rights to another person is subject to the potential 
application of section 46. 
The rationale for excepting conditions in licences or assignments of IP rights is flawed. The rationale 
assumes that the imposition of conditions in licences and assignments cannot extend the scope of 
the exclusive rights granted to the IP owner and therefore cannot harm competition (beyond the 
effect of the original grant of the IP right). In many instances, that will be the case; but in those 
instances the licence or assignment would not contravene the competition law in any event, making 
the exception unnecessary. However, in other instances, the assumption will not apply. In fields with 
multiple and competing IP rights, such as the pharmaceutical or communications industries, 
cross-licensing arrangements can be entered into to resolve disputes that impose anti-competitive 
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restrictions on each licensee. The Panel considers that arrangements of this type should be 
examinable under the competition law. 
In most comparable countries, no equivalent to subsection 51(3) exists. None of the US, Canada or 
Europe provides an exemption from its competition laws for conditions of IP transactions. 
The Panel considers that the IP licensing exception in subsection 51(3) of the CCA should be 
repealed. 
However, as is the case with other vertical supply arrangements, IP licences should remain exempt 
from the per se cartel provisions of the CCA insofar as they impose restrictions on goods or services 
produced through application of the licensed IP.  
IP licensing or assignment arrangements that are at risk of breaching Part IV of the CCA (which covers 
anti-competitive practices), but which are likely to produce offsetting public benefits, can be granted 
an exemption from the CCA through the notification or authorisation processes. 
In addition, the block exemption power recommended by the Panel (see Recommendation 39) could 
be used to specify ‘safe harbour’ licensing restrictions for IP owners. 
Recommendation 7 — Intellectual property exception 
Subsection 51(3) of the CCA should be repealed. 
For further detail on intellectual property, see Chapter 9. 
2.6 REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 
The NCP reforms substantially reduced the amount of anti-competitive regulation. Governments 
made a concerted effort to examine and reform regulation that restricted competition where those 
restrictions were not in the public interest. 
However, the regulation review process, begun under the NCP, has flagged and reinvigoration is now 
needed. Three areas require governments’ attention: 
• initiating a new round of regulatory reviews;  
• priority areas for review (planning and zoning, taxis and ride-sharing, and mandatory product 
standards); and 
• areas for immediate reform action (trading hours, parallel imports and pharmacy).  
A new round of regulatory reviews 
Submissions raise many examples of regulatory restrictions on competition, including product 
standards, taxi licensing, professional and occupational licensing, broadcast media rules, liquor and 
gambling regulation, private health insurance regulation, agricultural marketing rules and air services 
restrictions.  
Cumulatively, such restrictions can have a significant impact on the economy. Many sectors facing 
regulatory restrictions supply critical inputs to other business activities. Accordingly, a new round of 
national regulatory reviews is required. A national approach will provide momentum, impose 
discipline on all jurisdictions, and foster the emergence of a nationally consistent business regulatory 
environment. 
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Rigorous, transparent and independent assessment of whether regulations are in the public interest, 
with the onus of proof on the party wishing to retain anti-competitive regulation, is important to 
ensure that regulations serve the long-term interests of consumers. In that vein, the Panel 
acknowledges submissions expressing concern about excessive deregulation, and accepts that many 
regulations are essential for other policy reasons. We need better regulation rather than no 
regulation at all. 
Opportunities will also arise to examine regulations when reviews are undertaken for other 
purposes. For example, Australian Government reviews in the communications portfolio20 should 
consider the impact of current restrictions on competition in that sector. 
Certain activities can be exempted from the operation of the competition law under Part IV of the 
CCA (apart from the merger laws) through authorisation in Commonwealth, state or territory 
legislation (subsection 51(1) of the CCA). The Panel believes that such jurisdictional exemptions for 
conduct that would normally contravene the competition law should be examined to ensure they 
remain necessary and appropriate in their scope. Any further exemptions should be drafted as 
narrowly as possible to give effect to their policy intent. 
Recommendation 8 — Regulation review 
All Australian governments should review regulations, including local government regulations, in 
their jurisdictions to ensure that unnecessary restrictions on competition are removed.  
Legislation (including Acts, ordinances and regulations) should be subject to a public interest test 
and should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:  
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
Factors to consider in assessing the public interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and not narrowed to a specific set of indicators.  
Jurisdictional exemptions for conduct that would normally contravene the competition law (by 
virtue of subsection 51(1) of the CCA) should also be examined as part of this review, to ensure 
they remain necessary and appropriate in their scope. Any further exemptions should be drafted 
as narrowly as possible to give effect to their policy intent. 
The review process should be transparent, with highest priority areas for review identified in each 
jurisdiction, and results published along with timetables for reform. 
The review process should be overseen by the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy 
(see Recommendation 43) with a focus on the outcomes achieved rather than processes 
undertaken. The Australian Council for Competition Policy should publish an annual report for 
public scrutiny on the progress of reviews of regulatory restrictions. 
For further detail on regulatory restrictions, see Chapter 10. 
                                                          
20  See, for example: Australian Government 2014, Spectrum Review, Australian Government Department of 
Communications, viewed 9 February 2015, 
<http://www.communications.gov.au/consultation_and_submissions/spectrum_review>. 
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Priority areas for review 
The Panel has identified three priority areas that should be reviewed immediately — planning and 
zoning rules, taxi regulation and product standards. Across jurisdictions these will vary in their 
complexity and in their potential benefits, reflecting both the form of the restrictions and the extent 
of reform previously undertaken.  
Planning and zoning 
Land is an important input to the production of goods and services and a source of amenity for 
consumers. Even small policy improvements in this area could yield large benefits to the economy.  
Planning systems by their nature create barriers to entry, diversification or expansion, including 
through limiting the number, size, operating model and mix of businesses. This can reduce the 
responsiveness of suppliers to the needs of consumers. 
Planning regulations should work in the long-term interests of consumers. They should not restrict 
competition unless the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, 
and the objectives of the regulations can only be achieved by restricting competition. Subjecting 
planning regulations to the public interest test will ensure they do not inappropriately limit entry to 
markets.  
Governments around the country recognise the concerns raised by poorly designed planning and 
zoning systems, and reviews are either underway or have recently been completed in a number of 
jurisdictions.  
An opportunity exists to ensure that, when undertaking these reviews or implementing their 
findings, enhanced competition is a central objective. That a number of reviews are already 
underway also provides the opportunity to compare across jurisdictions to determine best practice 
as a basis for updating and improving current requirements.  
An independent body, such as the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) (see 
Recommendation 43), should work with States and Territories to oversee incorporation of 
competition policy principles in planning and zoning rules. The ACCP should also report to 
jurisdictions on progress in implementing these principles. 
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Recommendation 9 — Planning and zoning 
Further to Recommendation 8, state and territory governments should subject restrictions on 
competition in planning and zoning rules to the public interest test, such that the rules should not 
restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restriction to the 
community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the rules can only be achieved by 
restricting competition.  
The following competition policy considerations should be taken into account: 
• Arrangements that explicitly or implicitly favour particular operators are anti-competitive. 
• Competition between individual businesses is not in itself a relevant planning consideration. 
• Restrictions on the number of a particular type of retail store contained in any local area is 
not a relevant planning consideration. 
• The impact on the viability of existing businesses is not a relevant planning consideration.  
• Proximity restrictions on particular types of retail stores are not a relevant planning 
consideration. 
• Business zones should be as broad as possible. 
• Development permit processes should be simplified. 
• Planning systems should be consistent and transparent to avoid creating incentives for 
gaming appeals. 
An independent body, such as the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 43) should be tasked with reporting on the progress of state and territory 
governments in assessing planning and zoning rules against the public interest test. 
For further detail on planning and zoning, see Section 10.1. 
Taxis and ride-sharing 
Reform of taxi regulation in most jurisdictions is long overdue. Regulation limiting the number of taxi 
licences and preventing other services from competing with taxis has raised costs for consumers, 
including elderly and disadvantaged consumers, and hindered the emergence of innovative 
passenger transport services. Regulation of taxi and hire car services should be focused on ensuring 
minimum standards for the benefit of consumers rather than on restricting competition or 
supporting a particular business model. An independent body should oversee the regulations.  
Taxi regulation should be reviewed taking competition into account. Those jurisdictions that have 
undertaken or are undertaking reviews should implement the reforms. 
For further detail on taxi regulation, see Section 10.2. 
Product standards 
Given that product standards (requirements that goods have certain characteristics) can raise 
barriers to entry, especially where they are referenced in law (either directly or indirectly) and 
mandate particular technologies or systems rather than performance outcomes, it is appropriate that 
they be subject to review. Standards that are not mandated by government should also be reviewed 
periodically to ensure they do not restrict competition unnecessarily. For example, an Australian 
Standard that differs unnecessarily from an international standard could limit import competition.  
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For further detail on product standards, see Section 10.3. 
Recommendation 10 — Priorities for regulation review 
Further to Recommendation 8, and in addition to reviewing planning and zoning rules 
(Recommendation 9), the following should be priority areas for review: 
• Taxis and ride-sharing: in particular, regulations that restrict numbers of taxi licences and 
competition in the taxi industry, including from ride-sharing and other passenger transport 
services that compete with taxis. 
• Mandatory product standards: i.e., standards that are directly or indirectly mandated by 
law, including where international standards can be adopted in Australia.  
 
Recommendation 11 — Standards review 
Given the unique position of Australian Standards under paragraph 51(2)(c) of the CCA, Australian 
Standards that are not mandated by government should be subject to periodic review against the 
public interest test (see Recommendation 8) by Standards Australia. 
Areas for immediate reform 
The Panel identifies the following areas for immediate reform, noting that each area was also 
identified and reviewed through the NCP process:  
• restrictions on retail trading hours (see Recommendation 12);  
• parallel import restrictions (see Recommendation 13); and 
• pharmacy ownership and location rules (see Recommendation 14). 
Retail trading hours  
State and territory governments have deregulated retail trading hours to varying degrees over recent 
years. This has generally widened choices for consumers. Yet consumers continue to seek greater 
diversity in how and when they shop, as seen in the rapid take-up of online shopping. 
The growing use of the internet for retail purchases is undermining the original intent of restrictions 
on retail trading hours. When consumers can switch to online suppliers outside regulated trading 
hours, restrictions on retail trading hours merely serve to disadvantage ‘bricks and mortar’ retailers 
relative to their online competitors. 
In any event, as more bricks and mortar stores opt for an online presence to counter this 
disadvantage, the notion of restricted trading hours becomes less meaningful. Customers are already 
deciding when and how they wish to make purchases. Retailers should be given freedom to respond 
by deciding for themselves when to open and close their bricks and mortar stores, referring 
after-hours customers to their online portals. 
Regulation of retail trading hours varies across Australia. The Australian Capital Territory, Northern 
Territory, Victoria, Tasmania and New South Wales have almost completely deregulated retail 
trading hours, whereas Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland retain significant 
restrictions. 
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The Panel believes that deregulation of retail trading hours is overdue, and that remaining 
restrictions should be removed as soon as possible. To the extent that jurisdictions choose to retain 
restrictions, these should be strictly limited to Christmas Day, Good Friday and the morning of 
ANZAC Day. Any public holiday trading restrictions should be applied as broadly as possible to avoid 
discriminating among different types of retailers. 
The Panel notes that a general policy of deregulating trading hours should not prevent jurisdictions 
from imposing specific restrictions on trading times for alcohol retailing or for gambling services in 
order to achieve the policy objective of harm minimisation. As noted in Section 10.4, it is certainly 
not the Panel’s view that promoting competition should always trump other legitimate public policy 
considerations. Instead, regulatory restrictions should be subject to a public interest test to ensure 
that the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the 
objectives of the regulation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
The Panel emphasises that deregulation of trading hours does not mean that retailers are obliged to 
trade 24 hours a day, seven days a week or that all retailers will adopt identical trading hours. Rather, 
deregulation allows retailers to decide for themselves when to open for trade (with the limited 
exceptions noted above), as is currently the case in those jurisdictions where retail trading hours are 
already deregulated. In making this decision, retailers will take into account customer demand and 
other factors such as labour costs, and requirements of tenancy agreements. 
Recommendation 12 — Retail trading hours 
Remaining restrictions on retail trading hours should be removed. To the extent that jurisdictions 
choose to retain restrictions, these should be strictly limited to Christmas Day, Good Friday and 
the morning of ANZAC Day, and should be applied broadly to avoid discriminating among different 
types of retailers. Deregulating trading hours should not prevent jurisdictions from imposing 
specific restrictions on trading times for alcohol retailing or gambling services in order to achieve 
the policy objective of harm minimisation. 
For further detail on retail trading hours, see Section 10.5. 
Parallel import restrictions 
Parallel import restrictions are similar to other import restrictions (such as tariffs) in that they benefit 
local producers by shielding them from international competition. They are an implicit tax on 
Australian consumers and businesses.  
The impact of changing technology and shifting consumer purchasing practices (such as purchasing 
books online) means that some of these restrictions are easily circumvented. However, removing 
remaining parallel import restrictions would promote competition and potentially lower prices for 
consumers.  
Many of the concerns raised in submissions around relaxing parallel import restrictions, including 
concerns about consumer safety, counterfeit products and inadequate enforcement, could be 
addressed directly through regulation and information. The threat of parallel imports may also 
induce international suppliers to re-think their regional arrangements.  
Relaxing parallel import restrictions should deliver net benefits to the community, provided 
appropriate regulatory and compliance frameworks and consumer education programs are in place. 
Transitional arrangements should be considered to ensure that affected individuals and businesses 
are given adequate notice in advance.  
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Recommendation 13 — Parallel imports 
Restrictions on parallel imports should be removed unless it can be shown that: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs ; and  
• the objectives of the restrictions can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
Consistent with the recommendations of recent Productivity Commission reviews, parallel import 
restrictions on books and second-hand cars should be removed, subject to transitional 
arrangements as recommended by the Productivity Commission. 
Remaining provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 that restrict parallel imports, and the parallel 
importation defence under the Trade Marks Act 1995, should be reviewed by an independent 
body, such as the Productivity Commission. 
For further detail on parallel imports, see Section 10.6. 
Pharmacy 
Some ongoing regulation of pharmacy is justified to: uphold patient and community safety; ensure 
pharmacists provide consumers with appropriate information and advice about their medication; 
provide equitable access to medication, regardless of a patient’s wealth or location; and manage 
costs to patients and government. 
The Australian Government’s National Medicines Policy establishes objectives against which 
medicines are provided and regulations set. The current anti-competitive regulations on the location 
of pharmacies, or the requirement (with limited exceptions) that only pharmacists own pharmacies, 
do not appear to serve the objectives of the National Medicines Policy, including the quality of advice 
provided to consumers. Such restrictions limit both consumers’ ability to choose where to obtain 
pharmacy services and suppliers’ ability to meet consumers’ demands.  
Governments do not need anti-competitive regulation to ensure pharmacies meet community 
expectations of safety, access and standard of care. A range of alternatives is available, including:  
• imposing obligations directly on pharmacies as a condition of their licensing and/or 
remuneration; 
• tendering for the provision of pharmacy services in certain rural or remote areas; or  
• a community service obligation, as currently applies to pharmacy wholesaling.  
The Panel accepts that competition between pharmacies is not sufficient on its own to meet the 
access objectives of the National Medicines Policy in rural and remote areas of Australia. The supply 
of medicines in remote areas is already partly conducted through channels other than retail 
pharmacies, including through Aboriginal Health Services. That is unlikely to change, even if the 
current pharmacy location and ownership rules are reformed.  
To secure access to medicines for all Australians, governments should consider tendering for the 
provision of pharmacy services in underserved locations and/or funding through a community service 
obligation. Since access to medicines is less likely to be an issue in urban settings, the rules targeted 
at pharmacies in urban areas should continue to be eased at the same time that mechanisms are 
established to address specific issues concerning access to pharmacies in rural locations. 
The Panel recognises that changes to pharmacy location and ownership rules will have a significant 
impact on the pharmacy sector and that a transition period will therefore be necessary. The Panel 
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also notes that the current Fifth Community Pharmacy Agreement expires on 1 July 2015, and 
negotiations for the next agreement are underway. These negotiations provide an opportunity for 
the Australian Government to implement a further targeted relaxation of the pharmacy location 
rules as part of a transition towards their eventual removal.  
Negotiations will be well underway when this Report is delivered. If changes during the initial years 
of the new agreement prove too precipitate, there should be provision for a mid-term review to 
incorporate easing of the location rules later in the life of the Fifth Agreement. 
The Panel notes that the recent National Commission of Audit also recommended ‘opening up the 
pharmacy sector to competition, including through the deregulation of ownership and location 
rules’.21 
Recommendation 14 — Pharmacy 
The Panel considers that current restrictions on ownership and location of pharmacies are not 
needed to ensure the quality of advice and care provided to patients. Such restrictions limit the 
ability of consumers to choose where to obtain pharmacy products and services, and the ability of 
providers to meet consumers’ preferences. 
The Panel considers that the pharmacy ownership and location rules should be removed in the 
long-term interests of consumers. They should be replaced with regulations to ensure access to 
medicines and quality of advice regarding their use that do not unduly restrict competition.  
Negotiations on the next Community Pharmacy Agreement offer an opportunity for the Australian 
Government to implement a further targeted relaxation of the location rules, as part of a 
transition towards their eventual removal. If changes during the initial years of the new agreement 
prove too precipitate, there should be provision for a mid-term review to incorporate easing of the 
location rules later in the life of the next Community Pharmacy Agreement. 
A range of alternative mechanisms exist to secure access to medicines for all Australians that are 
less restrictive of competition among pharmacy service services providers. In particular, tendering 
for the provision of pharmacy services in underserved locations and/or funding through a 
community service obligation should be considered. The rules targeted at pharmacies in urban 
areas should continue to be eased at the same time that alternative mechanisms are established 
to address specific issues concerning access to pharmacies in rural locations. 
For further detail on pharmacy, see Section 10.7. 
2.7 COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY 
Stakeholders overwhelmingly support the principle of competitive neutrality and call for Australian 
governments to recommit to competitive neutrality policy. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) also recently stated that, among member nations, Australia 
has the most complete competitive neutrality framework, backed by separate implementation and 
complaint-handling mechanisms.  
                                                          
21  Australian Government 2014, Towards Responsible Government - The Report of the National Commission of Audit 
Phase One, Canberra, page xlii. 
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But implementing competitive neutrality remains an area of concern for many stakeholders, 
including small business. The Review’s Terms of Reference also direct it to consider the proper 
boundaries for government in economic activity. 
The Panel considers that competitive neutrality policies should be reviewed and updated. Clearer 
guidelines should be provided on the application of competitive neutrality policies during the 
start-up stages of government businesses and the period of time over which start-up government 
businesses should earn a commercial rate of return. The tests used to identify significant business 
activities should also be reviewed. 
Transparency could also be improved by requiring government businesses to report publicly on 
compliance with competitive neutrality policy and governments to respond publicly to the findings of 
complaint investigations.  
Since each jurisdiction is able to adopt its own approach to competitive neutrality, cross-jurisdiction 
comparisons can be used to determine ‘best practice’ as a basis for updating policies and improving 
current arrangements. 
Competitive neutrality policies benefit consumers in markets where both governments and other 
providers deliver services. This will be especially important in areas where competition policy has yet 
to reach, such as human services. In these areas, getting the right competitive neutrality policy 
settings in place will be crucial to securing the benefits of a diverse range of innovative providers. 
Again, cross-jurisdiction comparisons will help to assess the best ways of achieving competitive 
neutrality in human services markets. Such feedback could be incorporated into guidelines and 
practices.  
Recommendation 15 — Competitive neutrality policy 
All Australian governments should review their competitive neutrality policies. Specific matters to 
be considered should include: guidelines on the application of competitive neutrality policy during 
the start-up stages of government businesses; the period of time over which start-up government 
businesses should earn a commercial rate of return; and threshold tests for identifying significant 
business activities. 
The review of competitive neutrality policies should be overseen by an independent body, such as 
the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43). 
 
Recommendation 16 — Competitive neutrality complaints 
All Australian governments should increase the transparency and effectiveness of their 
competitive neutrality complaints processes. This should include at a minimum: 
• assigning responsibility for investigation of complaints to a body independent of government;  
• a requirement for government to respond publicly to the findings of complaint investigations; 
and 
• annual reporting by the independent complaints bodies to the proposed Australian Council for 
Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) on the number of complaints received and 
investigations undertaken. 
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Recommendation 17 — Competitive neutrality reporting 
To strengthen accountability and transparency, all Australian governments should require 
government businesses to include a statement on compliance with competitive neutrality 
principles in their annual reports.  
The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should report 
on the experiences and lessons learned from the different jurisdictions when applying competitive 
neutrality policy to human services markets. 
For further detail on competitive neutrality, see Chapter 13. 
2.8 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND OTHER COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Government procurement guidelines and decisions can affect the range of goods and services 
ultimately available to consumers. Procurement can also shape the structure and functioning of 
competition in markets.  
Tender documents have traditionally been written in a prescriptive fashion and with an overarching 
focus on value for money. Although risk management and value for money are both important 
considerations, too narrow a focus on these factors can constrain choice, innovation and 
responsiveness in government-commissioned provision of goods and services. 
Tendering with a focus on outcomes, rather than outputs, and trials of less prescriptive tender 
documents could encourage bidders to suggest new and innovative methods for achieving a 
government’s desired result. Education and information sessions can also help a broader range of 
businesses understand the procurement process. 
Competition principles, particularly those promoting choice and a diversity of providers, should be 
incorporated into procurement, commissioning, PPP and privatisation policies and practices. 
Procurement and privatisation policies and practices should also be subject to a public interest test, 
such that policies and practices should not restrict competition unless the benefits of the restrictions 
to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the policy can only be 
achieved by restricting competition. 
Recommendation 18 — Government procurement and other commercial arrangements 
All Australian governments should review their policies governing commercial arrangements with 
the private sector and non-government organisations, including procurement policies, 
commissioning, public-private partnerships and privatisation guidelines and processes.  
Procurement and privatisation policies and practices should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the policy can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
An independent body, such as the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 43), should be tasked with reporting on progress in reviewing government 
commercial policies and ensuring privatisation and other commercial processes incorporate 
competition principles.  
For further detail on government procurement and commercial arrangements, see Chapter 14. 
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2.9 ELECTRICITY AND GAS  
The Panel acknowledges significant progress in the reform of Australia’s electricity and gas sectors. 
However, reforms have not been finalised and the benefits are yet to be fully realised. 
Competition reforms in energy have been a success but have slowed. In Victoria and Queensland, the 
National Energy Retail Law has yet to be applied without major derogations, undermining the 
benefits of a national law. Continuing regulation of retail energy prices by jurisdictions other than 
South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales (though it continues to regulate retail gas prices) 
perpetuates the distortion of price signals and compromises timely investment in energy 
infrastructure. The Panel notes that the Queensland Parliament recently legislated to deregulate 
electricity prices in South East Queensland from 1 July 2015. 
The Panel strongly supports moves towards including the Northern Territory and Western Australia 
into the National Electricity Market, noting that no physical connection is required to do so.  
The Panel also supports a detailed review of competition in the gas sector, echoing the proposal 
within the Eastern Australian Domestic Gas Study, and encourages the Australian Government to 
commit to undertake such a review through the Energy White Paper. 
Recommendation 19 — Electricity and gas  
State and territory governments should finalise the energy reform agenda, including through: 
• application of the National Energy Retail Law with minimal derogation by all National Electricity 
Market jurisdictions; 
• deregulation of both electricity and gas retail prices; and 
• the transfer of responsibility for reliability standards to a national framework administered by 
the proposed Access and Pricing Regulator (see Recommendation 50) and the Australian Energy 
Market Commission (AEMC). 
The Panel supports moves to include Western Australia and the Northern Territory in the National 
Electricity Market, noting that this does not require physical connection. 
The Australian Government should undertake a detailed review of competition in the gas sector. 
For further detail on electricity and gas, see Section 11.1. 
2.10 WATER 
Reform of water has been slower than reform in other sectors. A more national approach to water 
reform may re-establish its momentum.  
If States and Territories implement the principles contained in the National Water Initiative, this will 
help to re-build momentum in water reform in both the rural and urban sectors. The Panel notes 
that, in general, urban water pricing fails to reflect its cost of provision and this is discouraging 
private sector participation in providing urban water. 
The National Water Initiative outlines principles for best-practice pricing of urban water and the 
Panel sees benefit in the ACCP working with state and territory regulators to assist jurisdictions in 
applying those principles, allowing for necessary jurisdictional differences. Following this, the ACCP 
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should work with all States and Territories to develop plans for fully implementing the National 
Water Initiative. 
The Panel expects that, should any of the regulatory functions in water markets be transferred to a 
national framework, the national aspects would be administered by the proposed Access and Pricing 
Regulator (APR). Notwithstanding, States and Territories should retain the option to transfer national 
regulation to the APR or to a suitably accredited state regulator. 
Recommendation 20 — Water 
All governments should progress implementation of the principles of the National Water Initiative, 
with a view to national consistency. Governments should focus on strengthening economic 
regulation in urban water and creating incentives for increased private participation in the sector 
through improved pricing practices. 
State and territory regulators should collectively develop best-practice pricing guidelines for urban 
water, with the capacity to reflect necessary jurisdictional differences. To ensure consistency, the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should oversee this work.  
State and territory governments should develop clear timelines for fully implementing the National 
Water Initiative, once pricing guidelines are developed. The Australian Council for Competition 
Policy should assist States and Territories to do so. 
Where water regulation is made national, the responsible body should be the proposed national 
Access and Pricing Regulator (see Recommendation 50) or a suitably accredited state body.  
For further detail on water, see Section 11.2. 
2.11 INFORMED CHOICE 
Globalisation, competition and technological innovation have expanded the range of businesses from 
which Australian consumers can choose to purchase goods and services. The Panel is also 
recommending that user choice be placed at the heart of human services delivery, and that 
governments further their efforts to encourage a diversity of providers. 
Greater choice can act as a powerful force to drive innovation in markets for goods and services, but 
it also means that consumers need to know more about markets if they are to secure the best deals. 
The Panel believes that markets work best when consumers are informed and engaged, empowering 
them to make good decisions. Empowering consumers requires that they have access to accurate, 
easily understood information about products and services on offer. 
But just providing information is not enough to guarantee good choices by consumers. The ‘right’ 
type of information must also be provided, so consumers can (and want to) act on the available 
information. Insights from psychology and behavioural economics suggest that consumers can have 
behavioural traits that prevent them from making good use of even well-presented information. 
Governments should take account of these findings to ensure that consumers are able to enjoy the 
full benefits of competition and choice. 
Businesses are collecting more and more data, notably through customer loyalty cards, to better 
understand their customers. The Panel sees scope for Australian consumers’ access to data to be 
improved to better inform their decisions. 
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Recommendation 21 — Informed choice  
Governments should work with industry, consumer groups and privacy experts to allow consumers 
to access information in an efficient format to improve informed consumer choice.  
The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should establish 
a working group to develop a partnership agreement that both allows people to access and use 
their own data for their own purposes and enables new markets for personal information services. 
This partnership should draw on the lessons learned from similar initiatives in the US and UK.  
Further, governments, both in their own dealings with consumers and in any regulation of the 
information that businesses must provide to consumers, should draw on lessons from behavioural 
economics to present information and choices in ways that allow consumers to access, assess and 
act on them. 
For further detail on informed choice, see Chapter 16. 
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3 COMPETITION LAW 
3.1 SIMPLIFICATION 
The Panel has asked the following questions in guiding its consideration of whether the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) is fit for purpose: 
• Does the law focus on enhancing consumer wellbeing over the long term? 
• Does the law protect competition rather than protecting individual competitors? 
• Does the law strike the right balance between prohibiting anti-competitive conduct and not 
interfering with efficiency, innovation and entrepreneurship? 
• Is the law as clear, simple and predictable as it can be? 
The Panel supports the general form and structure of the CCA, that is: 
• The law prohibits specific categories of anti-competitive conduct, with economy-wide 
application. 
• Only conduct that is anti-competitive in most circumstances is prohibited per se — other 
conduct is prohibited only if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition.  
• Contraventions of the law are adjudicated by a court, with proceedings able to be initiated by 
a public regulatory authority or through private suit. 
• Business can seek exemption from the law in individual cases on public benefit grounds. 
Recommendation 22 — Competition law concepts 
The central concepts, prohibitions and structure enshrined in the current competition law should 
be retained, since they are appropriate to serve the current and projected needs of the Australian 
economy. 
However, the Panel considers that the competition law provisions of the CCA, including the 
provisions regulating the granting of exemptions, are unnecessarily complex. 
Complex law imposes costs on the economy: direct costs caused by the need for legal advice and 
prolonged legal disputation; and indirect costs caused by business and regulatory uncertainty. 
The competition law provisions of the CCA would benefit from simplification, while retaining their 
underlying policy intent. 
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Recommendation 23 — Competition law simplification 
The competition law provisions of the CCA should be simplified, including by removing overly 
specified provisions and redundant provisions. 
The process of simplifying the CCA should involve public consultation. 
Provisions that should be removed include: 
• subsection 45(1) concerning contracts made before 1977; and 
• sections 45B and 45C concerning covenants. 
For further detail on competition law concepts, see Chapter 17. 
3.2 APPLICATION TO GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN TRADE OR COMMERCE 
As a consequence of the Hilmer Review, the CCA was extended to apply to the Crown, but only 
insofar as the Crown carries on a business, either directly or through an authority of the Crown. 
There are many circumstances in which the Crown (whether as a department or an authority) 
undertakes commercial transactions but does not carry on a business. This is particularly the case in 
procurement, whether for delivering large infrastructure projects or the regular requirements of the 
health or education systems. 
Through commercial transactions entered into with market participants, the Crown (whether in right 
of the Commonwealth, state, territory or local governments) has the potential to harm competition 
(see Recommendation 18). The Panel considers that the Hilmer reforms should be carried a step 
further, with the Crown subject to the competition law insofar as it undertakes activity in trade or 
commerce. 
Recommendation 24 — Application of the law to government activities 
Sections 2A, 2B and 2BA of the CCA should be amended so that the competition law provisions 
apply to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories (including local 
government) insofar as they undertake activity in trade or commerce. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on the application of competition laws to government activities, see Section 14.2. 
3.3 MARKET DEFINITION 
The Panel considers that the competition law provisions of the CCA are correctly focused on conduct 
that damages competition in markets in Australia and that the current definition of ‘market’ (being a 
market in Australia) is appropriate. 
This reflects the object of the law to protect the welfare of Australians. There is no sound reason for 
Australian law to regulate conduct affecting competition in overseas markets. 
However, this should not mean that the CCA ignores forces of competition arising outside Australia 
but which affect Australian markets. Frequently, the sources of competition in Australian markets 
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originate globally, especially as increasing numbers of Australian consumers purchase goods and 
services online from overseas suppliers.  
The definition of the term ‘competition’ in the CCA is important. The CCA has been framed to take 
account of all sources of competition that affect markets in Australia, with the term defined to 
include competition from imported goods and services. 
Nevertheless, given the importance of ensuring that global sources of competition are considered 
where relevant, the current definition of ‘competition’ in the CCA should be strengthened so that 
there can be no doubt that it includes competition from potential imports of goods and services, not 
just actual imports. 
The Panel does not intend that this change would expand market definitions in the competition law 
to include every product and service that could conceivably be imported into Australia, but only 
clarify that the credible threat of import competition is a relevant component of a competition 
analysis. 
Recommendation 25 — Definition of market and competition 
The current definition of ‘market’ in section 4E of the CCA should be retained but the current 
definition of ‘competition’ in section 4 should be amended to ensure that competition in 
Australian markets includes competition from goods imported or capable of being imported, or 
from services rendered or capable of being rendered, by persons not resident or not carrying on 
business in Australia.  
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on market definition, see Section 18.1. 
3.4 EXTRA-TERRITORIAL REACH OF THE LAW 
The Panel considers that the competition law provisions of the CCA ought to apply to firms engaging 
in conduct outside Australia if that conduct relates to trade or commerce within Australia or between 
Australia and places outside Australia. The application of the law in those circumstances ought not to 
depend on whether the firm is incorporated in, or carries on business within, Australia. 
Private actions are also an important part of the competition law framework. The requirement for 
private parties to seek ministerial consent in connection with proceedings involving conduct that 
occurs outside Australia is an unnecessary roadblock to possible redress for harm suffered as a result 
of a breach of Australian competition law. 
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Recommendation 26 — Extra-territorial reach of the law 
Section 5 of the CCA, which applies the competition law to certain conduct engaged in outside 
Australia, should be amended to remove the requirement that the contravening firm has a 
connection with Australia in the nature of residence, incorporation or business presence and to 
remove the requirement for private parties to seek ministerial consent before relying on 
extra-territorial conduct in private competition law actions. Instead, the competition law should 
apply to overseas conduct insofar as the conduct relates to trade or commerce within Australia or 
between Australia and places outside Australia. 
The in-principle view of the Panel is that the foregoing changes should also be made in respect of 
actions brought under the Australian Consumer Law. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on extra-territorial reach of the law, see Section 23.2. 
3.5 CARTELS 
Cartel conduct between competitors is anti-competitive in most circumstances and should be 
prohibited per se. The Panel supports the intent of the cartel conduct prohibitions, including the 
combined criminal and civil sanctions. 
However, the Panel sees significant deficiencies in the current framework of the cartel prohibitions, 
particularly having regard to its criminal sanctions. Specifically, the Panel considers that: 
• The provisions are excessively complex, which undermines compliance and enforcement. 
• The cartel provisions, consistent with Australia’s competition laws generally, should be 
confined to cartel conduct involving persons who compete to supply goods or services to, or 
acquire goods or services from, persons resident in or carrying on a business within Australia. 
• Given the potential for criminal sanctions, the provisions ought to be confined to conduct 
involving firms that are actual competitors and not firms for whom competition is a mere 
possibility. 
• Joint ventures and similar forms of business collaboration should not be subject to cartel 
prohibitions and should only be unlawful if they substantially lessen competition. 
• Similarly, trading restrictions that are imposed by one firm on another in connection with the 
supply or acquisition of goods or services (including IP licensing) should not be subject to cartel 
prohibitions, and should only be unlawful if they substantially lessen competition. 
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Recommendation 27 — Cartel conduct prohibition 
The prohibitions against cartel conduct in Part IV, Division 1 of the CCA should be simplified and 
the following specific changes made: 
• The provisions should apply to cartel conduct involving persons who compete to supply goods 
or services to, or acquire goods or services from, persons resident in or carrying on business 
within Australia. 
• The provisions should be confined to conduct involving firms that are actual or likely 
competitors, where ‘likely’ means on the balance of probabilities. 
• A broad exemption should be included for joint ventures, whether for the production, supply, 
acquisition or marketing of goods or services, recognising that such conduct will be prohibited 
by section 45 of the CCA if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
• An exemption should be included for trading restrictions that are imposed by one firm on 
another in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services (including intellectual 
property licensing), recognising that such conduct will be prohibited by section 45 of the CCA 
(or section 47 if retained) if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
The Panel also considers that the per se prohibition of exclusionary provisions, as defined in 
section 4D, is no longer necessary since, in practice, such conduct is materially the same as cartel 
conduct in the form of market sharing. 
Accordingly, the Panel believes that the prohibition against exclusionary provisions should be 
removed from the CCA. 
Recommendation 28 — Exclusionary provisions 
The CCA should be amended to remove the prohibition of exclusionary provisions in 
subparagraphs 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i), with an amendment to the definition of cartel conduct to 
address any resulting gap in the law.  
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on cartel conduct, see Section 20.1. 
3.6 ANTI-COMPETITIVE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
The Panel considers that, in their current form, the prohibitions against ‘price signalling’ in the CCA 
do not strike the right balance in distinguishing between anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
conduct. Being confined in their operation to a single industry (banking), the current provisions are 
also inconsistent with the principle that the CCA should apply to all businesses generally. 
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The Panel considers that public price disclosure can help consumers make informed choices and is 
unlikely to raise significant competition concerns. Accordingly, the Panel believes there is no sound 
basis for prohibiting public price disclosure, either in the banking industry or more generally.22 
Private price disclosure to a competitor will generally have more potential to harm competition, as it 
may be used to facilitate collusion among competitors. However, private disclosure may be 
necessary under some business circumstances or in the ordinary course of business, particularly in 
connection with joint ventures or similar types of business collaboration. For that reason, a per se 
prohibition has the potential to overreach. 
The Panel considers that anti-competitive price signalling does not need its own separate Division 
in the CCA; rather, price signalling can be addressed by extending section 45 to cover concerted 
practices that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.  
The word ‘concerted’ means jointly arranged or carried out or co-ordinated. Hence, a concerted 
practice between market participants is a practice that is jointly arranged or carried out or 
co-ordinated between the participants. The expression ‘concerted practice with one or more other 
persons’ conveys that the impugned practice is neither unilateral conduct nor mere parallel conduct 
by market participants (e.g., suppliers selling products at the same price). 
The Panel proposes that such conduct would only be prohibited if it can be shown that the concerted 
practice has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. The Panel 
considers that the word ‘concerted’ has a clear and practical meaning and no further definition is 
required for the purposes of a legal enactment. 
The Panel does not consider that the cartel conduct prohibitions should be expanded to include 
concerted practices. The Panel considers that imposing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct should 
require proof of a contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors. 
Recommendation 29 — Price signalling 
The ‘price signalling’ provisions of Part IV, Division 1A of the CCA are not fit for purpose in their 
current form and should be repealed. 
Section 45 should be extended to prohibit a person engaging in a concerted practice with one or 
more other persons that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on anti-competitive disclosure of information, see Section 20.2. 
3.7 MISUSE OF MARKET POWER 
An effective provision to deal with unilateral anti-competitive conduct is a necessary part of the 
competition law. This is particularly the case in Australia, where the small size of the Australian 
                                                          
22  The Panel notes that the prohibition on certain public disclosures also applies to disclosures of a corporation’s 
capacity or commercial strategy. The Report does not deal with these matters separately, since the Panel considers 
that the same issues arise as in the case of public price disclosure. 
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economy frequently leads to concentrated markets. The Panel considers that section 46 can be 
re-framed in a manner that will improve its effectiveness in targeting anti-competitive unilateral 
conduct and focus it more clearly on the long-term interests of consumers. 
The Panel regards the threshold test of ‘substantial degree of power in a market’ as appropriate and 
well understood. In contrast, the ‘take advantage’ limb of section 46 is not a useful test by which to 
distinguish competitive from anti-competitive unilateral conduct. This test has given rise to 
substantial difficulties of interpretation, which have been revealed in the decided cases, undermining 
confidence in the effectiveness of the law.  
Perhaps more significantly, the test is not best adapted to identifying a misuse of market power. 
Business conduct should not be immunised merely because it is often undertaken by firms without 
market power. Conduct such as exclusive dealing, loss-leader pricing and cross-subsidisation may all 
be undertaken by firms without market power without raising competition concerns, while the same 
conduct undertaken by a firm with market power might raise competition concerns. 
Further, the focus of the prohibition on showing the purpose of damaging a competitor is 
inconsistent with the overriding policy objective of the CCA to protect competition, and not 
individual competitors. The prohibition ought to be directed to conduct that has the purpose or 
effect of harming the competitive process. 
The Panel also considers that the supplementary prohibitions, which attempt to address concerns 
about predatory pricing,23 do not advance the policy intent of section 46. 
Accordingly, the Panel proposes that the primary prohibition in section 46 be re-framed to prohibit a 
corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct if the 
conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in that or any 
other market. The proposed test of ‘substantial lessening of competition’ is the same test as is found 
in section 45 (anti-competitive agreements), section 47 (exclusive dealing) and section 50 (mergers) 
of the CCA, and the test is well accepted within those sections. 
Conduct undertaken by a firm with substantial market power can have pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive features. The issue for courts, and for firms assessing their own conduct, is to weigh 
the pro-competitive and anti-competitive impacts of the conduct to decide if there has been a 
substantial lessening of competition. To clarify the law and mitigate concerns about over-capture, 
the Panel proposes that section 46 include legislative guidance with respect to the intended 
operation of the section. Specifically, the legislation should direct the court, when determining 
whether conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a 
market, to have regard to the extent to which the conduct: 
• increases competition in a market, including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, product 
quality or price competitiveness; and 
• lessens competition in a market, including by preventing, restricting or deterring the potential 
for competitive conduct in a market or new entry into a market. 
The proposed reform to section 46 is intended to improve its clarity, force and effectiveness so that it 
can be used to prevent unilateral conduct that substantially harms competition and that has no 
economic justification. 
                                                          
23  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 subsections 46(1AAA) and (1AA). 
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Recommendation 30 — Misuse of market power 
The primary prohibition in section 46 of the CCA should be re-framed to prohibit a corporation 
that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct if the proposed 
conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in that or any other market. 
To mitigate concerns about inadvertently capturing pro-competitive conduct, the legislation 
should direct the court, when determining whether conduct has the purpose, effect or likely 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, to have regard to: 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of increasing 
competition in the market, including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, product quality or 
price competitiveness; and 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening 
competition in the market, including by preventing, restricting or deterring the potential for 
competitive conduct in the market or new entry into the market. 
Such a re-framing would allow the provision to be simplified. Amendments introduced since 2007 
would be unnecessary and could be repealed. These include specific provisions prohibiting 
predatory pricing, and amendments clarifying the meaning of ‘take advantage’ and how the causal 
link between the substantial degree of market power and anti-competitive purpose may be 
determined. 
Authorisation should be available in relation to section 46, and the ACCC should issue guidelines 
regarding its approach to the provision. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on misuse of market power, see Section 19.1. 
3.8 UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT 
Both the business and the wider community expect business to be conducted according to a 
minimum standard of fair dealing. There are sound economic and social reasons for enshrining 
minimum standards of fair dealing within the law. 
The Panel has heard concerns expressed by small businesses and suppliers in respect of behaviours 
of larger businesses in their supply chains. The business unconscionable conduct provisions were 
introduced specifically to address these concerns. 
Enforcing business-to-business unconscionable conduct provisions is an important function of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Panel notes the recent Federal Court 
declarations in two proceedings instituted by the ACCC that Coles engaged in unconscionable 
conduct in 2011 in its dealings with certain suppliers. These cases indicate that the current 
unconscionable conduct provisions are working as intended to meet their policy goals. 
Active and ongoing review of these provisions should occur as other matters arise. If deficiencies in 
the operation of the provisions become evident, they should be remedied promptly. 
For further detail on unconscionable conduct, see Section 19.4. 
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3.9 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
The Panel recognises that some small businesses and consumers have concerns about the impacts 
of price discrimination. However, the former prohibition on price discrimination (contained in the 
former section 49 of the CCA) was found likely to result in price inflexibility, which would undermine 
consumer welfare. 
In relation to international price discrimination, the Panel considers that any attempt to prohibit this 
would face significant implementation difficulties. A prohibition on international price discrimination 
could also have significant negative consequences, ultimately limiting consumer choice. Instead, the 
Panel favours encouraging the development and use of lawful market-based mechanisms to put 
downward pressure on prices. 
Recommendation 31 — Price discrimination 
A specific prohibition on price discrimination should not be reintroduced into the CCA. Where 
price discrimination has an anti-competitive impact on markets, it can be dealt with by the existing 
provisions of the law (including through the Panel’s recommended revisions to section 46 (see 
Recommendation 30)). 
Attempts to prohibit international price discrimination should not be introduced into the CCA on 
account of significant implementation and enforcement complexities and the risk of negative 
unintended consequences. Instead, the Panel supports moves to address international price 
discrimination through market solutions that empower consumers. These include removing 
restrictions on parallel imports (see Recommendation 13) and ensuring that consumers are able to 
take lawful steps to circumvent attempts to prevent their access to cheaper legitimate goods. 
For further detail on price discrimination, see Section 19.3.  
3.10 VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS (OTHER THAN RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE) 
As a general principle, the Panel believes that the CCA should not interfere with trading conditions 
agreed between buyers and sellers in connection with acquiring and supplying goods and services, 
unless those conditions have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition.  
Section 47 prohibits most vertical restrictions only if they have the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. The one exception is third-line forcing. Under the CCA, third-line 
forcing is prohibited per se — that is, regardless of the purpose or effect of the conduct. 
The Panel sees no need for third-line forcing to be singled out from other forms of vertical trading 
conditions and be prohibited per se. As notifications to the ACCC demonstrate, third-line forcing is a 
common business practice and rarely has anti-competitive effects. 
Recommendation 32— Third-line forcing test 
Third-line forcing (subsections 47(6) and (7) of the CCA) should only be prohibited where it has the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
The Panel agrees with the view expressed in many submissions that section 47 is unnecessarily 
complex and therefore difficult for business to understand and apply. The section focuses attention 
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on particular forms of vertical restraints and directs attention away from the central issue — whether 
the restriction is anti-competitive.  
The amendments to section 46 recommended in this Report (see Recommendation 30) will render 
section 47 redundant. Section 45 will apply to all vertical restraints (including third-line forcing) 
included in a contract, arrangement or understanding; section 46 will apply if a corporation refuses 
to supply goods or services because the acquirer will not agree to accept a vertical restraint 
(including third-line forcing). As amended, section 45 and section 46 would apply the same 
competition test as in section 47. 
Section 46 has an additional limitation not expressed in section 47: the prohibition only applies to a 
corporation that has substantial market power. However, this will not limit the effectiveness of the 
law. It is well accepted that vertical restrictions will not substantially lessen competition unless they 
are imposed by a corporation with substantial market power. 
The Panel therefore recommends that section 47 be repealed, simplifying the competition law. 
If section 46 is not amended as recommended, the Panel considers that section 47 should be 
simplified along the lines proposed in the Draft Report. The Panel has included a simplified form of 
section 47 in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. The model form takes account of 
submissions received in response to the Draft Report. 
Recommendation 33 — Exclusive dealing coverage 
Section 47 of the CCA should be repealed and vertical restrictions (including third-line forcing) and 
associated refusals to supply addressed by sections 45 and 46 (as amended in accordance with 
Recommendation 30). 
For further detail on vertical restrictions (other than resale price maintenance), see Section 20.3.  
3.11 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
The appropriateness of a per se prohibition on resale price maintenance (RPM) has been debated for 
many years, both in Australia and overseas. When the per se prohibition was enacted in Australia in 
the mid-1970s, it reflected the law in many comparable jurisdictions. However, over the last 20 years 
some countries — particularly the US and Canada — have moved away from the per se prohibition of 
RPM. Other jurisdictions, including Europe and New Zealand, have retained the per se prohibition.  
At this time, the Panel sees no sufficient case for changing the prohibition of RPM from a per se 
prohibition to a competition-based test. However, it would be appropriate to allow business to seek 
exemption from the prohibition more easily. This could be achieved through allowing RPM to be 
assessed through the notification process, which is quicker and less expensive for businesses than 
authorisation. This change would also have the advantage of allowing the ACCC to assess RPM 
trading strategies more frequently, and thereby provide better evidence as to the competitive effects 
of RPM in Australia. 
A general tenet of the competition law is that companies within a corporate group are treated as a 
single economic entity and are not considered to be competitors. For that reason, the prohibitions in 
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sections 45 and 47 do not apply to trading arrangements entered into between related companies.24 
A similar principle ought to apply to RPM. Currently, there is no exemption for RPM between a 
manufacturer and a retailer that is a subsidiary of the manufacturer. 
Recommendation 34 — Resale price maintenance 
The prohibition on resale price maintenance (RPM) in section 48 of the CCA should be retained in 
its current form as a per se prohibition, but notification should be available for RPM conduct. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
The prohibition should also be amended to include an exemption for RPM conduct between 
related bodies corporate, as is the case under sections 45 and 47. 
For further detail on resale price maintenance, see Section 20.4.  
3.12 MERGERS 
The Panel considers that the current prohibition of mergers that are likely to substantially lessen 
competition in Australian markets is appropriate. 
Concerns have been raised that Australia’s merger law does not give proper consideration to global 
markets within which many businesses compete. Some submissions argue that the term ‘market’ in 
the CCA is defined as a market ‘in Australia’ and that causes the competition analysis to be narrowly 
focused. As noted above (see Section 3.3), although the Panel considers that the CCA correctly 
focuses upon conduct that damages competition in markets in Australia (to protect Australian 
consumers), the CCA has been framed to take account of all sources of competition that affect 
Australian markets. Recommendation 25 is intended to strengthen that principle. 
Although some submissions raise concerns that the ACCC opposes too few mergers, others question 
whether the ACCC’s application of the CCA is constraining Australian businesses from achieving 
efficient scale through mergers to become globally competitive. To compete effectively, businesses 
must continuously pursue economic efficiency. In many industries, efficiency requires scale. 
Businesses may pursue mergers to achieve efficient scale to compete more effectively in global 
markets. 
In many markets in Australia, achieving efficient scale will not substantially lessen competition 
because of the constraining influence of imports. Such mergers are allowed under the CCA. However, 
in some markets, the opposite will be the case: the influence of imports may be weak and unable to 
constrain the resulting market power of the merged businesses. When that occurs, conflicting 
interests emerge: the gain to the businesses that wish to merge through achieving greater efficiency 
against the potential detriment to Australian consumers arising from reduced competition. 
The Panel considers that the CCA has sufficient flexibility to allow such issues to be adjudicated and 
determined by the ACCC or the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal). The merger 
authorisation process applies a public benefit test that covers all potential benefits and detriments, 
including economies of scale. There may be occasions where it is in the public interest to allow a 
                                                          
24  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsections 45(8) and 47(12). 
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particular merger to achieve efficient scale to compete globally, notwithstanding that the merger 
adversely affects competition in Australia. 
Nonetheless, the Panel considers that the administration of the merger law can be improved. 
There is widespread support for retaining the ACCC’s informal merger review process. However, 
strong concerns have been expressed about the timeliness and transparency of the process. 
The Panel considers that it is not sensible to attempt to regulate an informal process which, by 
definition, operates outside any formal legal framework. The flexibility of the informal process is 
widely recognised as being beneficial and should not be interfered with. However, the public interest 
is served by timely merger decisions and by transparency in the public administration of the merger 
law. The Panel sees scope for further consultation between the ACCC and business representatives, 
with the objective of developing an informal review process that delivers more timely decisions. The 
Panel also considers that ex-post evaluations of some merger decisions could be undertaken by the 
proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) (see Recommendation 44) to draw lessons 
for future merger reviews (but not to overturn past decisions). 
The Panel considers that concerns about the timeliness and transparency of merger review processes 
can also be addressed through a more streamlined formal exemption process. The current formal 
exemption processes are excessively complex and prescriptive, being a formal clearance application 
to the ACCC and an alternative authorisation application to the Tribunal. This has deterred the use of 
these mechanisms and fuelled complaints about the way the informal process is applied to large 
mergers that involve contested facts and issues. 
The Panel also considers that, if a more streamlined formal exemption process were introduced, it 
would be preferable for the ACCC to be the first instance decision-maker rather than the Tribunal. 
Having regard to its composition and powers, the ACCC is better suited to investigation and 
first-instance decision making in administering the competition law (including mergers), while the 
Tribunal is better suited to an appellate or review role. 
The Tribunal’s review of the ACCC’s decision should be based upon the material that was before the 
ACCC, but the Tribunal should have the discretion to allow a party to adduce further evidence, or to 
call and question a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason. A full rehearing, 
with an unfettered ability for parties to put new material before the Tribunal, would be likely to 
dampen the incentive to put all relevant material to the ACCC in the first instance, and may lead to 
delays if the Tribunal has to deal with large amounts of new evidence. On the other hand, 
circumstances may arise in which it is reasonable to allow new evidence to be provided to the 
Tribunal. Further, the Tribunal may also consider that it would be assisted by hearing directly from 
witnesses relied on by the ACCC, through questioning by the parties and/or the Tribunal.  
Creeping acquisitions 
Concerns about ‘creeping acquisitions’ typically arise where a business with a substantial degree of 
market power acquires many small competitors over time. 
A legitimate question arises regarding whether, in assessing the likely effect of a proposed merger, 
the merger provisions of the CCA should also take account of the aggregate effect of the 
corporation’s previous acquisitions within, for example, the prior three years. The complicating 
factor is that market conditions may have altered materially over the period chosen. Such a change 
would impose additional costs associated with merger review. On balance, in the absence of 
evidence of harmful acquisitions proceeding because of a gap in the law on creeping acquisitions, 
the Panel does not consider that a sufficiently strong case for change has been made. 
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Recommendation 35 — Mergers 
There should be further consultation between the ACCC and business representatives with the 
objective of delivering more timely decisions in the informal merger review process. 
The formal merger exemption processes (i.e., the formal merger clearance process and the merger 
authorisation process) should be combined and reformed to remove unnecessary restrictions and 
requirements that may have deterred their use. The specific features of the review process should 
be settled in consultation with business, competition law practitioners and the ACCC. 
However, the general framework should contain the following elements: 
• The ACCC should be the decision-maker at first instance. 
• The ACCC should be empowered to authorise a merger if it is satisfied that the merger does not 
substantially lessen competition or that the merger would result, or would be likely to result, in 
a benefit to the public that would outweigh any detriment. 
• The formal process should not be subject to any prescriptive information requirements, but the 
ACCC should be empowered to require the production of business and market information. 
• The formal process should be subject to strict timelines that cannot be extended except with 
the consent of the merger parties. 
• Decisions of the ACCC should be subject to review by the Australian Competition Tribunal under 
a process that is also governed by strict timelines. 
• The review by the Australian Competition Tribunal should be based upon the material that was 
before the ACCC, but the Tribunal should have the discretion to allow a party to adduce further 
evidence, or to call and question a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient 
reason. 
Merger review processes and analysis would also be improved by implementing a program of 
post-merger evaluations, looking back on a number of past merger decisions to determine 
whether the ACCC’s processes were effective and its assessments borne out by events. This 
function could be performed by the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 44). 
For further detail on mergers, see Chapter 18. 
3.13 SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AND EMPLOYMENT-RELATED MATTERS 
The negotiation of employment terms and conditions (remuneration, conditions of employment, 
hours of work or working conditions of employees) has always been excluded from most of the 
competition law provisions of the CCA by paragraph 51(2)(a). The reason for this exclusion is that the 
negotiation and determination of employment terms and conditions is governed by a separate 
regulatory regime, currently contained in the Fair Work Act 2009. The policy rationale is that labour 
markets are not in all respects comparable to other product or service markets. As a general 
principle, the Panel agrees with that view. 
However, two categories of employment-related conduct do not fall within that general exclusion: 
• secondary boycotts, which are prohibited by sections 45D, 45DA and 45DB; and 
• trading restrictions in industrial agreements, which are prohibited by sections 45E and 45EA. 
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Secondary boycotts 
A strong case remains for the CCA to retain the prohibition of secondary boycotts. A sufficient case 
has not been made to limit the scope of the secondary boycott prohibition, nor to broaden the scope 
of the exception for employment-related matters. 
The Panel did not receive compelling evidence of actual secondary boycott activity falling within the 
environmental and consumer protection exception in the CCA. In the absence of such evidence, the 
Panel does not see an immediate case for amending the exception. However, if such evidence arises 
from future boycott activity, the exceptions should be reassessed. 
Some industry organisations, especially in building, construction and mining, believe that public 
enforcement of the secondary boycott provisions is inadequate, a point emphasised in the Interim 
Report of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption.25 Timely and effective 
public enforcement serves as a deterrent to boycott activity and needs to exist both in regulatory 
culture and capability. The Panel believes that the ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with 
increased vigour, comparable to that which it applies in pursuing other contraventions of the 
competition law. 
It would be useful for the ACCC to report the number of complaints it receives about different parts 
of the CCA, including secondary boycotts, and the manner in which the complaints are resolved. 
Further, the Panel sees no reason why the maximum pecuniary penalties for breaches of secondary 
boycott provisions should be lower than those for other breaches of the competition law. 
Recommendation 36 — Secondary boycotts 
The prohibitions on secondary boycotts in sections 45D-45DE of the CCA should be maintained and 
effectively enforced. 
The ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with increased vigour, comparable to that which 
it applies in pursuing other contraventions of the competition law. It should also publish in its 
annual report the number of complaints made to it in respect of different parts of the CCA, 
including secondary boycott conduct and the number of such matters investigated and resolved 
each year. 
The maximum penalty level for secondary boycotts should be the same as that applying to other 
breaches of the competition law. 
Trading restrictions in industrial agreements 
Section 45E of the CCA prohibits a person (an employer) from making a contract, arrangement or 
understanding with an organisation of employees that contains a provision restricting the freedom of 
the employer to supply goods or services to, or acquire goods or services from, another person. 
Section 45EA prohibits a person from giving effect to such a contract, arrangement or understanding. 
The Panel considers that sections 45E and 45EA are important provisions that protect trading 
freedoms. 
                                                          
25  Heydon J. D., AC QC 2014, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption Interim Report, Volume 2, 
page 1106. 
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There appears to be a possible conflict between the intended operation of sections 45E and 45EA 
and the regulation of awards and industrial agreements under the Fair Work Act. This issue has been 
brought into focus by the 2012 decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, Australian Industry 
Group v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 108.  
It appears to be lawful under the Fair Work Act 2009 to make awards and register enterprise 
agreements that place restrictions on the freedom of employers to engage contractors or source 
certain goods or non-labour services. The Panel considers it desirable that this apparent conflict be 
resolved. 
The Panel favours competition over restrictions and believes that businesses should generally be free 
to supply and acquire goods and services, including contract labour, should they choose. Accordingly, 
the Panel considers that sections 45E and 45EA should be amended so that they expressly apply to 
awards and industrial agreements, except to the extent they deal with the remuneration, conditions 
of employment, hours of work or working conditions of employees. 
The Panel considers that the ACCC should be given the right to intervene in proceedings (i.e., to be 
notified, appear and be heard subject to time limits) before the Fair Work Commission and make 
submissions concerning compliance with sections 45E and 45EA. The ACCC and Fair Work 
Commission should establish a protocol to govern these arrangements. 
Further, the present limitation in sections 45E and 45EA, such that the prohibition only applies to 
restrictions affecting persons with whom an employer ‘has been accustomed, or is under an 
obligation’, to deal, should be removed, and the maximum penalty for breaches of these provisions 
should be in line with those for breaches of the rest of the competition law. 
Recommendation 37 — Trading restrictions in industrial agreements 
Sections 45E and 45EA of the CCA should be amended so that they apply to awards and industrial 
agreements, except to the extent they relate to the remuneration, conditions of employment, 
hours of work or working conditions of employees. 
Further, the present limitation in sections 45E and 45EA, such that the prohibitions only apply to 
restrictions affecting persons with whom an employer ‘has been accustomed, or is under an 
obligation,’ to deal, should be removed. 
These recommendations are reflected in the model provisions in Appendix A. 
The ACCC should be given the right to intervene in proceedings before the Fair Work Commission 
and make submissions concerning compliance with sections 45E and 45EA. A protocol should be 
established between the ACCC and the Fair Work Commission. 
The maximum penalty for breaches of sections 45E and 45EA should be the same as that applying 
to other breaches of the competition law. 
For further detail on secondary boycotts, and trading restrictions in industrial agreements, see 
Chapter 21. 
3.14 EXEMPTION PROCESSES 
The exemption processes of authorisation and notification included in the CCA are important. They 
recognise that, in certain circumstances, particular conduct may not harm competition or may give 
rise to public benefits that outweigh any competitive harm. 
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Like much of the CCA, the authorisation and notification procedures have become overly complex, 
which imposes costs on business. Wherever possible, the Panel supports removing unnecessary 
complexity. 
Significant steps can be taken to simplify the authorisation and notification procedures. First, in 
respect of authorisation, it should be permissible to apply for authorisation of a business 
arrangement through a single application and without regard to the specific provisions of the CCA 
that might be contravened by the proposed conduct. 
Second, for both authorisation and notification, the ACCC should be empowered to grant the 
exemption (other than in respect of the per se prohibitions) if it is satisfied that either the proposed 
conduct is unlikely to substantially lessen competition or that the proposed conduct is likely to result 
in a net public benefit. 
Each of these changes would assist in focusing the exemption process on the issues of substance and 
away from technicalities. 
Recommendation 38 — Authorisation and notification 
The authorisation and notification provisions in Part VII of the CCA should be simplified to: 
• ensure that only a single authorisation application is required for a single business 
transaction or arrangement; and 
• empower the ACCC to grant an exemption from sections 45, 46 (as proposed to be 
amended), 47 (if retained) and 50 if it is satisfied that the conduct would not be likely to 
substantially lessen competition or that the conduct would result, or would be likely to 
result, in a benefit to the public that would outweigh any detriment. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
The Panel also considers that the ACCC should be empowered to grant a block exemption in respect 
of specified conduct in particular market conditions. This would enable the ACCC to create ‘safe 
harbours’ for businesses where they engage in conduct that is unlikely to substantially lessen 
competition, and avoid the time and resources required to seek an authorisation or notification. 
Recommendation 39 — Block exemption power 
A block exemption power, exercisable by the ACCC, should be introduced and operate alongside 
the authorisation and notification frameworks in Part VII of the CCA.  
This power would enable the ACCC to create safe harbours, where conduct or categories of 
conduct are unlikely to raise competition concerns, on the same basis as the test proposed by the 
Panel for authorisations and notifications (see Recommendation 38).  
The ACCC should also maintain a public register of all block exemptions, including those no longer 
in force. The decision to issue a block exemption would be reviewable by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal.  
The Panel’s recommended form of block exemption power is reflected in the model legislative 
provisions in Appendix A. 
For further detail on authorisation, notification and block exemption, see Chapter 22.  
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3.15 ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES 
The Panel supports the enforcement regime under the CCA, which confers both public and private 
enforcement rights in respect of the competition law. 
In relation to public enforcement by the ACCC, there appears to be general approval of the severity 
of the sanctions for contravention of the competition law. However, the Panel agrees with the view 
of the ACCC that the current sanction for a corporation failing to comply with section 155 of the CCA 
is inadequate.  
Compulsory evidence-gathering powers under section 155 of the CCA bolster the ACCC’s ability to 
enforce the CCA. The Panel recommends that the fine a court may award for non-compliance with 
section 155 be increased to the same level as the fine for non-compliance with notice-based 
evidence-gathering powers in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. The 
ACCC should also be able to use section 155 to investigate possible contraventions of 
court-enforceable undertakings accepted by the ACCC under section 87B of the CCA.  
Compulsory evidence-gathering powers can also impose a regulatory burden on recipients of 
compulsory notices. The Panel acknowledges concerns raised in submissions about the costs of 
compliance with section 155 notices issued by the ACCC. This is in part due to the increased use of 
technology leading to more electronic material being retained by businesses that may need to be 
searched in order to comply with a notice.  
Means are available to reduce the regulatory burden associated with section 155 notices. First, the 
ACCC should accept a responsibility to frame section 155 notices in the narrowest form possible, 
consistent with the scope of the matter being investigated. Secondly, in complying with a section 155 
notice, the recipient should be required to undertake a reasonable search, taking into account 
factors such as the number of documents involved and the ease and cost of retrieving the 
documents. That requirement could most effectively be introduced into the CCA by a statutory 
defence based on the criteria of a reasonable search. 
Recommendation 40 — Section 155 notices 
The section 155 power should be extended to cover the investigation of alleged contraventions of 
court-enforceable undertakings. 
The ACCC should review its guidelines on section 155 notices having regard to the increasing 
burden imposed by notices in the digital age. Section 155 should be amended so that it is a 
defence to a ‘refusal or failure to comply with a notice’ under paragraph 155(5)(a) of the CCA that 
a recipient of a notice under paragraph 155(1)(b) can demonstrate that a reasonable search was 
undertaken in order to comply with the notice. 
The fine for non-compliance with section 155 of the CCA should be increased in line with similar 
notice-based evidence-gathering powers in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001. 
Private enforcement of the competition law is an important right. However, there are many 
regulatory and practical impediments to the exercise of such a right. It is important to find ways to 
reduce those impediments. 
Section 83 of the CCA is intended to facilitate private actions by enabling findings of fact made 
against a corporation in one proceeding (typically a proceeding brought by the ACCC) to be 
prima facie evidence against the corporation in another proceeding (typically a proceeding brought 
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by a private litigant). Many ACCC proceedings are resolved by a corporation making admissions of 
fact that establish the contravention, but it is uncertain whether section 83 applies to admissions as 
well as findings of fact. 
The effectiveness of section 83 as a means of reducing the cost of private ‘follow-on’ proceedings 
would be enhanced if the section were amended to apply to admissions of fact made by a 
corporation in another proceeding, as well as findings of fact.  
Concerns are expressed in submissions about the impact that extending section 83 to admissions of 
fact could have on the willingness of respondents to co-operate in cartel matters or settle matters 
with the ACCC, compromising the effectiveness of public enforcement of the CCA. The Panel doubts 
that this change to section 83 would materially alter the assessment by a respondent whether or not 
to settle an ACCC proceeding. Amongst other considerations, section 83 merely makes the admitted 
fact prima facie evidence of that fact in the follow-on proceeding. The respondent company remains 
free, should it so choose, to adduce evidence in the follow-on proceeding contrary to the admitted 
fact. 
The proposed amendment to section 83 would remove doubt about its operation in the context of 
factual admissions and reduce the costs and risks of proceedings brought by persons who may have 
suffered loss and damage by reason of admitted contravening conduct. 
Recommendation 41 — Private actions 
Section 83 of the CCA should be amended so that it extends to admissions of fact made by the 
person against whom the proceedings are brought in addition to findings of fact made by the 
court. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
In respect of contravening conduct that occurs overseas, a foreign corporation should be subject to 
Australian competition law regardless of whether it carries on business in Australia. Given that 
competition laws and policies are now commonplace around the world, there is no reason why 
private parties should have to seek ministerial consent before launching a proceeding that involves 
overseas conduct. This is addressed in Recommendation 26. 
The Panel considers that small business needs greater assurance that competition complaints can be 
dealt with. Recommendation 53 deals with small business access to remedies. 
For further detail on enforcement and remedies, see Chapter 23.  
3.16 NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME 
The National Access Regime (contained in Part IIIA of the CCA) was originally established to enable 
third-party access to identified bottleneck infrastructure where it was apparent that economic 
efficiency would be enhanced by promoting competition in markets that were dependent upon 
access to that infrastructure. 
The bottleneck infrastructure identified by the Hilmer Review included electricity wires, gas 
pipelines, telecommunication lines, freight rail networks, airports and ports. Distinct access regimes 
have emerged for these different types of infrastructure, reflecting their distinct physical, technical 
and economic characteristics. Those regimes appear to be achieving the original policy goals 
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identified by the Hilmer Review such that, today, Part IIIA plays only a limited role in regulating that 
bottleneck infrastructure. 
However, the Panel acknowledges that Part IIIA continues to provide a legislative framework upon 
which industry-specific access regimes are based. Part IIIA is both a model and a ‘backstop’. 
Accordingly, Part IIIA has an indirect role in supporting many industry-specific access regimes, even 
though its direct role is only limited. 
The Panel has been told of the potential need for future access regulation of airport and port 
infrastructure. However, imposing an access regime upon privately developed single-user 
infrastructure is more likely to be inefficient than efficient, and impede the competitiveness of 
Australian industry. 
The Panel agrees with the conclusion of the recent Productivity Commission (PC) inquiry that the 
National Access Regime is likely to generate net benefits to the community, but that its scope should 
be confined to ensure its use is limited to the exceptional cases, where the benefits arising from 
increased competition in dependent markets are likely to outweigh the costs of regulated third-party 
access.  
In its report, the PC recommended the following changes to the declaration criteria in Part IIIA: 
• that criterion (a) will be satisfied if access to an infrastructure service on reasonable terms and 
conditions through declaration (rather than access per se) would promote a material increase 
in competition in a dependent market; 
• that criterion (b) will be satisfied where total foreseeable market demand for the 
infrastructure service over the declaration period could be met at least cost by the facility; 
• as an alternative recommendation, that criterion (b) will be satisfied where it would be 
uneconomical for anyone (other than the service provider) to develop another facility to 
provide the service; and 
• that criterion (f) will be satisfied if access on reasonable terms and conditions through 
declaration would promote the public interest. 
The Panel agrees with the PC’s proposed change to criterion (a), but considers that criterion (a) sets 
too low a threshold for declaration. The burdens of access regulation should not be imposed on the 
operations of a facility unless access is expected to produce efficiency gains from competition that 
are significant. This requires that competition be increased in a market that is significant and that the 
increase in competition be substantial. 
The Panel supports the PC’s alternative recommendation in respect of criterion (b). The alternative 
recommendation maintains the current language for criterion (b), while clarifying that duplication of 
the facility by the owner of the existing facility is not a relevant consideration.  
As recently interpreted by the High Court in the Pilbara rail access case, criterion (b) asks a practical 
question whether it would be economically feasible, in other words profitable, for another facility to 
be developed — if it would, the facility is not a bottleneck. The Panel considers that maintaining the 
‘economically feasible’ test for criterion (b) will best promote the competition policy objectives 
underpinning Part IIIA. Under that test, access regulation will only be considered where there is a 
bottleneck problem that needs to be addressed. Absent a bottleneck problem, competition and 
economic efficiency will be advanced if market participants are free to negotiate private 
arrangements concerning access.  
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The Panel considers that re-framing criterion (b) such that it requires an evaluation of whether a 
facility is a natural monopoly suffers from a number of shortcomings. These include that it can be 
trivially satisfied in the case of facilities that have been built with spare capacity and that it requires 
the decision-maker to evaluate least cost solutions in complex industries, burdened by information 
asymmetries where the risk of error is high.  
The Panel supports the PC’s recommendations in relation to criterion (f). 
Decisions to declare a service under Part IIIA, or determine terms and conditions of access, are very 
significant economic decisions where the costs of making a wrong decision are likely to be high. The 
Panel favours empowering the Australian Competition Tribunal to undertake a merits review of 
access decisions, including hearing directly from employees of the business concerned and relevant 
experts where that would assist, while maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review 
process.  
Recommendation 42 — National Access Regime 
The declaration criteria in Part IIIA of the CCA should be targeted to ensure that third-party access 
only be mandated where it is in the public interest. To that end: 
• Criterion (a) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through declaration 
promote a substantial increase in competition in a dependent market that is nationally 
significant. 
• Criterion (b) should require that it be uneconomical for anyone (other than the service 
provider) to develop another facility to provide the service. 
• Criterion (f) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through declaration 
promote the public interest. 
The Competition Principles Agreement should be updated to reflect the revised declaration 
criteria. 
The Australian Competition Tribunal should be empowered to undertake a merits review of access 
decisions, while maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review process. 
For further detail on the National Access Regime, see Chapter 24. 
  
Institutions and Governance 
Part 2 — Findings and Recommendations 75 
4 INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
4.1 A NATIONAL COMPETITION BODY 
Several lessons may be drawn from Australia’s experience of implementing the National Competition 
Policy (NCP): 
• All jurisdictions need to commit to the policy and its implementation. 
• Oversight of progress should be independent and transparent to ‘hold governments to 
account’. 
• The benefits of reform need to be argued and, where possible, measured. 
Governance arrangements to implement reforms must be established in the context of Australia’s 
federal structure. Many of the competition policy reforms outlined in this Report are overseen by 
state and territory governments. Although the Reform of the Federation White Paper may 
recommend changes to the way responsibilities are allocated across the Federation, it is reasonable 
to presume that all levels of government will continue to have a role in implementing competition 
policy reforms. 
All Australian governments must have confidence in the governance arrangements for a 
reinvigorated round of competition policy reform to succeed. 
The Panel believes that reinvigorating competition policy requires leadership from an institution 
specifically constituted for the purpose. Leadership encompasses advocacy for competition policy, 
driving implementation of the decisions made and conducting independent, transparent reviews of 
progress. 
The National Competition Council (NCC), which oversaw the NCP, now has a considerably diminished 
role. It has been put to the Panel that the NCC no longer has the capacity to provide leadership in this 
domain. Recommendation 50 proposes that the remaining functions of the NCC, associated with the 
National Access Regime, be transferred to a new national access and pricing regulator. The NCC could 
then be dissolved. 
The Productivity Commission (PC) is the only existing body with the necessary credibility and 
expertise to undertake this function, given its role as an independent research and advisory body on 
a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. But the 
PC’s work is driven by the Australian Government and, if it were to have the competition policy 
function as well, its legislation and governance would need significant change. 
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is an example of an independent, national 
organisation, operating in an area of state government responsibility that has a governance structure 
supported by the Australian Government and the States and Territories. This is achieved through the 
AEMC’s establishment under state legislation, which is then applied in other States and Territories 
and at the Commonwealth level. The national character of the organisation is further strengthened 
through the composition of the Commission itself, with state and territory Commissioners as well as 
a Commonwealth Commissioner. 
The Panel considers that a new national competition body — the Australian Council for Competition 
Policy (ACCP) — should be established with a mandate to provide leadership and drive 
implementation of the evolving competition policy agenda. 
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The ACCP cannot be accountable to just one jurisdiction but must be accountable to them all. 
Similarly to the AEMC, it should be created by state and territory legislation applied by all 
participating jurisdictions. The ACCP should have a five-member board, consisting of two state and 
territory-nominated members and two members selected by the Australian Government, plus a 
Chair. Nomination of the Chair should rotate between the Australian Government and the States and 
Territories. The Chair should be appointed on a full-time basis and other members on a part-time 
basis.  
Although members would be nominated and appointed by governments, their role should be to view 
competition policy from a national perspective and not to represent jurisdictional interests.  
Recommendation 43 — Australian Council for Competition Policy — Establishment 
The National Competition Council should be dissolved and the Australian Council for Competition 
Policy (ACCP) established. Its mandate should be to provide leadership and drive implementation 
of the evolving competition policy agenda. 
The ACCP should be established under legislation by one State and then by application in all other 
States and Territories and at the Commonwealth level. It should be funded jointly by the Australian 
Government and the States and Territories. 
The ACCP should have a five-member board, consisting of two members nominated by state and 
territory Treasurers and two members selected by the Australian Government Treasurer, plus a 
Chair. Nomination of the Chair should rotate between the Australian Government and the States 
and Territories combined. The Chair should be appointed on a full-time basis and other members 
on a part-time basis. 
Funding should be shared by all jurisdictions, with half of the funding provided by the Australian 
Government and half by the States and Territories in proportion to their population size. 
4.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL BODY 
The ACCP should have a broad role. In particular, the ACCP should advise governments on how to 
adapt competition policy to changing circumstances facing consumers and business. The ACCP should 
therefore develop an understanding of the state of competition across the Australian economy and 
report on it regularly. 
The Panel sees advocacy for competition as a central function of the ACCP. Too often this has fallen 
by default to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), which can be an uneasy 
role for a regulator to fulfil.  
The ACCP should also act as an independent assessor of progress on reform, holding governments at 
all levels to account. Priority areas for reform identified in this Report could form an initial program 
of work for the ACCP. 
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Recommendation 44 — Australian Council for Competition Policy — Role 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy should have a broad role encompassing: 
• advocacy, education and promotion of collaboration in competition policy; 
• independently monitoring progress in implementing agreed reforms and publicly reporting on 
progress annually; 
• identifying potential areas of competition reform across all levels of government; 
• making recommendations to governments on specific market design issues, regulatory reforms, 
procurement policies and proposed privatisations;  
• undertaking research into competition policy developments in Australia and overseas; and 
• ex-post evaluation of some merger decisions. 
The effectiveness of the ACCP could be enhanced by assigning it a market studies function, which 
would create a consistent, effective and independent way for governments to seek advice and 
recommendations on recurrent and emerging competition policy issues.  
Given the potential for conflicts between the ACCC’s investigation and enforcement responsibilities 
and the scope of a market studies function, the Panel believes it is appropriate to vest such a power 
with the ACCP rather than the ACCC. 
The market studies function would have a competition policy focus and complement, but not 
duplicate, the work of other bodies, such as the PC. For example, States and Territories could request 
the ACCP to undertake market studies of the provision of human services in their jurisdiction, as part 
of implementing the principles of choice and diversity of providers set out in Recommendation 2. 
The use of mandatory information-gathering powers can help to ensure that a market study builds an 
accurate picture of the market but, on the other hand, may create an adversarial environment where 
participants show reluctance to co-operate and share information with the market studies body. The 
approach adopted by the PC — inviting interested parties to comment on issues and undertaking 
independent research, with mandatory legal powers as a backstop — appears to achieve desired 
outcomes. 
For further detail on the establishment and functions of the ACCP, see Chapter 25. 
Recommendation 45 — Market studies power 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) should have the power to undertake 
competition studies of markets in Australia and make recommendations to relevant governments 
on changes to regulation, or to the ACCC for investigation of potential breaches of the CCA. 
The ACCP should have mandatory information-gathering powers to assist in its market studies 
function; however, these powers should be used sparingly. 
The NCP recognised that different circumstances across the jurisdictions could lead to different 
approaches to either the scope or timing of reform. In agreeing with this approach, the Panel 
considers that the ACCP should be able to receive referrals from jurisdictions collectively as well as 
individually. 
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This would ensure that each jurisdiction has the freedom to identify its own concerns, while allowing 
the ACCP the flexibility to consider whether those concerns have broader or cross-jurisdictional 
impacts.  
In addition, the Panel considers that all market participants, including small business and regulators, 
should have the opportunity to raise issues they would like to see become the subject of market 
studies. Funding could be set aside in the ACCP budget to undertake studies in addition to those 
referred by governments. The decision would rest with the ACCP as to which of these outside 
requests it might take up, and it would not be obliged to agree to all requests. 
To give the ACCP the capacity to focus on the priorities of governments and market participants, the 
Ministerial Council on Federal Financial Relations would need to oversee priorities and resourcing .  
Recommendation 46 — Market studies requests 
All governments, jointly or individually, should have the capacity to issue a reference to the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) to undertake a competition study of a particular 
market or competition issue. 
All market participants, including small business and regulators (such as the ACCC), should have 
the capacity to request market studies be undertaken by the ACCP.  
The work program of the ACCP should be overseen by the Ministerial Council on Federal Financial 
Relations to ensure that resourcing addresses priority issues. 
For further detail on market studies, see Section 25.6.  
The competition policy environment is not static. New technologies can raise new issues and resolve 
older ones. The Panel considers that governments would benefit from an annual analysis of 
developments in the competition policy environment. 
This would provide more detail on the specific priority issues or markets that should receive greater 
attention. It could also include recommending review mechanisms, particularly for more heavily 
regulated markets, to ensure more burdensome or intrusive regulatory frameworks remain fit for 
purpose. 
Commenting on best practice and international developments would provide opportunities for 
governments to consider whether the outcomes of different approaches to reform in other 
jurisdictions apply within their own. 
Recommendation 47 — Annual competition analysis 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy should be required to undertake an annual analysis 
of developments in the competition policy environment, both in Australia and internationally, and 
identify specific issues or markets that should receive greater attention. 
For further detail on competition analysis, see Section 25.9. 
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4.3 COMPETITION PAYMENTS 
The Panel heard widespread support for the competition payments made by the Australian 
Government to state and territory governments under the NCP to recognise that the Australian 
Government received a disproportionate share of the increased revenue flowing from NCP reforms.  
Although the quantum of the payments was not large compared to total state and territory 
revenues, the Panel consistently heard that their existence provided an additional argument that 
could be used to support reform. However, the Panel was also told that their effectiveness was 
limited by not being applied to the Australian Government nor consistently to local government. 
On the other hand, as noted by the PC, a focus on payments and penalties ‘has from time to time 
almost certainly misled the community as to the main rationale for reform …’26 This appears to 
underlie the observation, made by many stakeholders, that progress with competition policy reform 
waned once competition payments ceased.  
That said, there is a case to be made that the benefits of reform, including any fiscal dividend, should 
be commensurate with the reform effort made. The differing revenue bases of the Commonwealth 
and the States and Territories mean that revenue may not flow in proportion to reform effort. 
The PC should be tasked to undertake a study of reforms agreed to by the Australian Government 
and state and territory governments to estimate their effect on revenue in each jurisdiction. The 
ACCP could then assess whether reforms had been undertaken to a sufficient standard to warrant 
compensation payments. That assessment would be based on actual implementation of reforms, not 
on the basis of undertaking reviews or other processes. 
Recommendation 48 — Competition payments 
The Productivity Commission should be tasked to undertake a study of reforms agreed to by the 
Australian Government and state and territory governments to estimate their effect on revenue in 
each jurisdiction.  
If disproportionate effects across jurisdictions are estimated, competition policy payments should 
ensure that revenue gains flowing from reform accrue to the jurisdictions undertaking the reform.  
Reform effort should be assessed by the Australian Council for Competition Policy based on actual 
implementation of reform measures, not on undertaking reviews. 
For further detail on competition payments, see Section 25.5.  
4.4 COMPETITION AND CONSUMER REGULATOR 
The Panel believes that enforcement of competition policy and enforcement of consumer protection 
matters are complementary and recommends both continue to be administered by one body.  
Having a single body:  
• fosters a pro-market culture;  
                                                          
26  Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Canberra, page 152. 
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• facilitates co-ordination and depth across the functions;  
• provides a source of consistent information to business and consumers about their rights; and  
• provides administrative savings and skills enhancement through pooling information, skills and 
expertise.  
A single body also ensures that the issues of small business are not overlooked, as could be the case 
if the competition and consumer functions were separated into different bodies. 
However, the Panel notes that tensions can also arise between the two functions, so it is important 
that the ACCC continues to maintain an appropriate balance between its competition-related 
regulatory tasks and its role in protecting consumers.  
Recommendation 49 — ACCC functions 
Competition and consumer functions should be retained within the single agency of the ACCC. 
For further detail on ACCC functions, see Section 26.1 
4.5 ACCESS AND PRICING REGULATOR 
The Panel accepts that the functions of competition, consumer protection and economic regulation 
have synergies that can assist the ACCC to perform its functions and allow it to develop both wide 
and deep skills in understanding the operation of markets. 
However, the culture and analytical approach required to regulate an industry differ from those 
typically characteristic of a competition law enforcement agency. There is also a risk that an industry 
regulator’s views about the structure of a particular market could influence a merger decision.  
The Panel therefore sees benefit in focusing the ACCC on its competition and consumer functions 
and separating out its current access and pricing functions into a separate, dedicated regulator. 
Amalgamating all Australian Government price regulatory functions into a single body will sharpen 
focus and strengthen analytical capacity in this important area of regulation. 
The new body would subsume the access and pricing functions of the ACCC including: declaration 
and access arbitration functions under the telecommunications access regime in Part XIC of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA); price monitoring functions under the Water Act 2007; 
and access arbitration functions under the National Access Regime.  
It would also include the functions of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The Panel notes strong 
support, especially in consultation with state governments, for energy regulation to be separated out 
from the ACCC. Including these functions in a new Access and Pricing Regulator would avoid the 
possibility of an industry-specific regulator being susceptible to ‘capture’ by the regulated industry. 
Therefore, the new body should not have responsibility for only one industry. 
The proposed body would also take on the NCC’s functions under the National Access Regime and 
under the National Gas Law, which would allow the NCC to be dissolved. This would result in the 
Access and Pricing Regulator undertaking both the declaration function under the National Access 
Regime and the current ACCC role in arbitrating the terms and conditions, where a facility is declared 
but terms and conditions are not able to be commercially negotiated. 
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The Panel does not foresee any conflict in a single regulator performing both functions and 
anticipates that there may be benefits. The Panel notes that, under the current telecommunications 
access regime (in Part XIC of the CCA), the ACCC performs both the declaration and arbitration 
functions. 
The Access and Pricing Regulator could, over time, assume responsibility for other functions, if and 
when they were elevated into a national framework. For example, submissions propose the rail and 
water sectors as potential candidates for transfer, should States and Territories choose to do so. 
Recommendation 50 — Access and Pricing Regulator 
The following regulatory functions should be transferred from the ACCC and the NCC and be 
undertaken within a single national Access and Pricing Regulator: 
• the telecommunications access and pricing functions of the ACCC; 
• price regulation and related advisory roles of the ACCC under the Water Act 2007 (Cth); 
• the powers given to the ACCC under the National Access Regime; 
• the functions undertaken by the Australian Energy Regulator under the National Electricity Law, 
the National Gas Law and the National Energy Retail Law; 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Access Regime; and 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Gas Law. 
Other consumer protection and competition functions should remain with the ACCC. Price 
monitoring and surveillance functions should also be retained by the ACCC. 
The Access and Pricing Regulator should be constituted as a five-member board. The board should 
comprise two Australian Government-appointed members, two state and territory-nominated 
members and an Australian Government-appointed Chair. Two members (one Australian 
Government appointee and one state and territory appointee) should be appointed on a part-time 
basis. 
Decisions of the Access and Pricing Regulator should be subject to review by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal. 
The Access and Pricing Regulator should be established with a view to it gaining further functions if 
other sectors are transferred to national regimes. 
For further detail on functions of the proposed Access and Pricing Regulator, see Chapter 27. 
4.6 ACCC GOVERNANCE 
The ACCC is established under the CCA as a statutory authority. It is governed by a Chairperson and 
other persons appointed as members of the Commission (usually called Commissioners). Decisions 
are made by the Chairperson and Commissioners meeting together (or as a division of the 
Commission), save where a power has been delegated to a member of the Commission. The 
Commission is assisted by its staff. The Chairperson and Commissioners are appointed on a full-time 
basis, resulting in their performing executive roles — although this isn’t conferred by legislation. 
The Panel considers that the ACCC is a well-regarded and effective body, but its performance would 
be strengthened by including a more diverse range of views and experience at the Commission level. 
This can be achieved by introducing part-time Commissioners whose commitments beyond the ACCC 
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— including, potentially, in business, consumer advocacy and academic roles — would broaden the 
Commission’s perspective. The part-time Commissioners would, of necessity, be non-executive 
members of the Commission, standing apart from the agency’s day-to-day operations. 
The Panel recommends that half of the ACCC Commissioners be appointed on a part-time basis, that 
Deputy Chair positions be abolished and that the Chairperson be appointed on either a full-time or a 
part-time basis. 
The Panel sees no need to continue sectoral Commissioner positions within the ACCC, noting that all 
Commissioners are required to exercise decision-making functions across the range of the ACCC’s 
operations. Furthermore, under section 7 of the CCA, the Minister is already required to consider 
whether nominees have knowledge of, or experience in, consumer protection and small business 
matters for all potential appointments to the Commission. The Panel feels this is sufficient to ensure 
appropriate consideration of sectoral interests in appointments. 
The ACCC should report regularly to a broad-based committee of the Parliament, such as the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, to build profile and credibility for the agency 
as well as subjecting it to direct accountability to the Parliament. 
Recommendation 51 — ACCC governance 
Half of the ACCC Commissioners should be appointed on a part-time basis. This could occur as the 
terms of the current Commissioners expire, with every second vacancy filled with a part-time 
appointee. The Chair could be appointed on either a full-time or a part-time basis, and the 
positions of Deputy Chair should be abolished. 
The Panel believes that current requirements in the CCA (paragraphs 7(3)(a) and 7(3)(b)) for 
experience and knowledge of small business and consumer protection, among other matters, to 
be considered by the Minister in making appointments to the Commission are sufficient to 
represent sectoral interests in ACCC decision-making.  
Therefore, the Panel recommends that the further requirements in the CCA that the Minister, in 
making all appointments, be satisfied that the Commission has one Commissioner with knowledge 
or experience of small business matters (subsection 10(1B)) and one Commissioner with 
knowledge or experience of consumer protection matters (subsection 7(4)) be abolished.  
The ACCC should report regularly to a broad-based committee of the Parliament, such as the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics. 
For further detail on ACCC governance, see Section 26.2. 
Some submissions criticise the ACCC’s use of the media as undermining the perceived impartiality of 
the agency in undertaking enforcement action. Advocating for competition policy would become the 
responsibility of the new ACCP, if established, but the ACCC would continue to communicate with the 
public through the media, including explaining enforcement priorities, educating business about 
compliance, and publishing enforcement outcomes. 
The Panel believes the ACCC should establish, publish and report against a Media Code of Conduct in 
line with the principles laid out in the Dawson Review. This should counter the perception of 
partiality on the part of the ACCC, especially in enforcement actions. 
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Recommendation 52 — Media Code of Conduct 
The ACCC should establish, publish and report against a Code of Conduct for its dealings with the 
media with the aim of strengthening the perception of its impartiality in enforcing the law. The 
Code of Conduct should be developed with reference to the principles outlined in the 2003 Review 
of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act. 
For further detail on ACCC and the media, see Section 26.3. 
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5 SMALL BUSINESS 
Small business makes a vital contribution to Australia’s economy. The Panel has been especially 
mindful of the concerns and interests of small business in the context of the Review. 
During the course of consultations, the Panel met in forums with more than 150 small businesses. 
These meetings supplemented written submissions made to the Review.  
The issues raised in forums and submissions were broad-ranging, including: unequal bargaining 
power in dealing with larger businesses (including concerns about collective bargaining); the 
compliance burden of regulation; and difficulties in competing with (local) government-run 
enterprises, particularly where government is also the rule-maker. 
This Report contains a number of recommendations that address these and other concerns of small 
business. 
Specifically, the Panel proposes changes to strengthen the ‘misuse of market power’ provisions of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) at Recommendation 30, and sets out its views on the 
unconscionable conduct provisions in Section 19.3. We also consider other issues affecting small 
business, such as standards (see Recommendation 11), licensing, planning and zoning (see 
Recommendation 9) and competitive neutrality (see Recommendations 15 - 17) elsewhere in this 
Report. 
In this chapter, we consider access to remedies, collective bargaining and industry codes. 
5.1 ACCESS TO REMEDIES 
Submissions express concern that, for various reasons including resource priorities, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is unable to pursue all small business complaints. 
They further submit that small businesses either lack the time and financial resources to take action 
themselves or are concerned about the impact this might have on their ongoing business 
relationships. 
The Panel notes the report of the Productivity Commission’s (PC’s) review of Access to Justice 
Arrangements, establishment of the Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman, and the 
current proposal to extend unfair contract terms to small business contracts. 
The Panel considers that small businesses need greater assurance that competition complaints can 
be dealt with. Understandably, the ACCC is not able to take proceedings in respect of all complaints 
brought to it. However, the ACCC should place some priority on its response to small business 
complaints concerning the competition law.  
If the ACCC determines that it is unable to pursue a particular complaint on behalf of a small 
business, the ACCC must communicate clearly and promptly its reasons for not acting and direct the 
complainant to alternative dispute resolution schemes.  
Where the ACCC considers a complaint has merit but is not a priority for public enforcement, it 
should take a more active role in connecting small business with dispute resolution schemes. The 
ACCC should also test the law on a regular basis to assure small business that the law is being 
enforced. 
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The Panel supports submissions’ positive comments about the efficacy of the various state and 
Commonwealth small business commissioners, small business offices and ombudsmen services and 
does not consider that a separate tribunal is warranted to deal specifically with competition issues. 
The Panel also endorses a number of recommendations contained in the PC’s Access to Justice 
Arrangements report. 
The Panel considers that, as implementation of a number of small business related recommendations 
do not require legislative change, consultation on these changes could commence following 
agreement by the Australian Government. 
Recommendation 53 — Small business access to remedies 
The ACCC should take a more active approach in connecting small business to alternative dispute 
resolution schemes where it considers complaints have merit but are not a priority for public 
enforcement. 
Where the ACCC determines it is unable to pursue a particular complaint on behalf of a small 
business, the ACCC should communicate clearly and promptly its reasons for not acting and direct 
the business to alternative dispute resolution processes. Where the ACCC pursues a complaint 
raised by a small business, the ACCC should provide that business with regular updates on the 
progress of its investigation. 
Resourcing of the ACCC should allow it to test the law on a regular basis to ensure that the law is 
acting as a deterrent to unlawful behaviour. 
Small business commissioners, small business offices and ombudsmen should work with business 
stakeholder groups to raise awareness of their advice and dispute resolution services. 
The Panel endorses the following recommendations from the Productivity Commission’s Access to 
Justice Arrangements report: 
• Recommendations 8.2 and 8.4 to ensure that small businesses in each Australian jurisdiction 
have access to effective and low cost small business advice and dispute resolution services;  
• Recommendation 8.3 to ensure that small business commissioners, small business offices or 
ombudsmen provide a minimum set of services, which are delivered in an efficient and 
effective manner; 
• Recommendation 9.3 to ensure that future reviews of industry codes consider whether dispute 
resolution services provided pursuant to an industry code, often by industry associations or 
third parties, are provided instead by the Australian Small Business Commissioner under the 
framework of that industry code;  
• Recommendation 11.1 to broaden the use of the Federal Court’s fast track model to facilitate 
lower cost and more timely access to justice; and  
• Recommendation 13.3 to assist in managing the costs of litigation, including through the use of 
costs budgets for parties engaged in litigation.27 
For further detail on small business access to remedies, see Chapter 23 
                                                          
27  Productivity Commission 2014, Access to Justice Arrangements, Inquiry Report No. 72, Canberra. 
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5.2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Submissions broadly support the exemption process for collective bargaining by small business, 
which is designed to recognise unequal bargaining power between parties to a business transaction. 
The process of exemption through notification should be capable of addressing a number of the 
issues raised by small businesses in their dealings with big businesses. 
However, the provisions are not being used as frequently as they might. Various improvements could 
be made, including increasing the flexibility of collective bargaining and improving the framework as 
it relates to collective boycott activities. For example, one change is to enable the group of 
businesses covered by a notification to be altered without the need for a fresh notification to be 
filed. 
Raising awareness of these provisions, including but not limited to raising awareness of 
co-operatives, will promote their use and potentially strengthen the bargaining position of small 
businesses dealing with large businesses. 
Recommendation 54 — Collective bargaining 
The CCA should be reformed to introduce greater flexibility into the notification process for 
collective bargaining by small business.  
Reform should include allowing: 
• the nomination of members of the bargaining group, such that a notification could be lodged to 
cover future (unnamed) members;  
• the nomination of the counterparties with whom the group seeks to negotiate, such that a 
notification could be lodged to cover multiple counterparties; and  
• different timeframes for different collective bargaining notifications, based on the 
circumstances of each application. 
Additionally, the ACCC should be empowered to impose conditions on notifications involving 
collective boycott activity, the timeframe for ACCC assessment of notifications for conduct that 
includes collective boycott activity should be extended from 14 to 60 days to provide more time 
for the ACCC to consult and assess the proposed conduct, and the ACCC should have a limited 
‘stop power’ to require collective boycott conduct to cease, for use in exceptional circumstances 
where a collective boycott is causing imminent serious detriment to the public.  
The current maximum value thresholds for a party to notify a collective bargaining arrangement 
should be reviewed in consultation with representatives of small business to ensure that they are 
high enough to include typical small business transactions. 
The ACCC should take steps to enhance awareness of the exemption process for collective 
bargaining and how it might be used to improve the bargaining position of small businesses in 
dealings with large businesses. The ACCC should also amend its collective bargaining notification 
guidelines. This should include providing information about the range of factors considered 
relevant to determining whether a collective boycott may be necessary to achieve the benefits of 
collective bargaining. 
For further detail on collective bargaining, see Section 22.2. 
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5.3 INDUSTRY CODES 
Codes of conduct play an important role under the CCA by providing a flexible regulatory framework 
to set norms of behaviour. Codes of conduct complement the provisions of the CCA and generally 
apply to relationships between businesses within a particular industry. Codes also provide a 
mechanism to implement industry-specific dispute resolution frameworks. 
The Panel notes that the CCA was recently amended to give the ACCC additional powers to issue 
infringement notices for alleged breaches of industry codes. The first code to incorporate the new 
civil penalties is the new Franchising Code of Conduct, which took effect from 1 January 2015.28 
Experience with administering these new provisions is needed before determining whether they 
should be applied more broadly. 
For further detail on industry codes, see Section 19.4. 
5.4 COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY 
For many small businesses, competitive neutrality persists as an area of concern. Governments often 
have an undue advantage when they compete with small businesses, enabling them to penetrate 
markets more deeply and charge artificially lower prices than private sector competitors. 
The Panel considers that transparency of current competitive neutrality arrangements should be 
improved and obligations on governments not to breach competitive neutrality principles should be 
strengthened. The Panel makes three recommendations in this regard (see Recommendations 
15-17). 
For further detail on competitive neutrality, see Chapter 13. 
5.5 REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 
The ability of small businesses to compete will also be enhanced by a number of the Panel’s 
recommendations to remove regulatory restrictions. 
In particular, the Panel notes that recommendations concerning planning and zoning and a review of 
regulatory restrictions will assist small business (see Recommendations 8, 9 and 11). 
For further detail on regulatory restrictions, see Chapter 10. 
                                                          
28  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2015, New powers for ACCC will strengthen franchising industry, 
media release, 21 January, Sydney. 
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6 RETAIL MARKETS  
Competition in retail markets has been an important focus for submissions and the Review. This 
includes issues relating to how competition is operating in grocery and fuel retailing, regulations on 
planning, zoning and trading hours, and specific regulations, such as those affecting pharmacy and 
liquor retailing. 
Some of these issues are dealt with elsewhere in this Report, which includes specific 
recommendations on planning and zoning (see Recommendation 9) and pharmacy (see 
Recommendation 14). Retail liquor licensing should be reviewed as part of the general process of 
regulatory review (see Recommendation 8).  
6.1 SUPERMARKETS 
A large number of submissions raise issues relating to supermarkets. However, on further 
investigation, most turn out to concern policy and legal issues that apply more broadly than just to 
supermarkets. Accordingly, many of the Panel’s recommendations to deal with these broader issues 
also apply to supermarkets. 
Some small supermarkets allege that the major supermarkets chains misuse their market power, 
including through ‘predatory capacity’ and targeting particular retailers. Suppliers also raise concerns 
about misuse of market power and unconscionable conduct by the major chains.  
The Panel cannot adjudicate instances where breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(CCA) are alleged to have occurred but notes that the CCA generally prohibits conduct that harms the 
competitive process, not individual competitors.  
The Panel recommends strengthening the misuse of market power provisions of the CCA at 
Recommendation 30. The current unconscionable conduct provisions appear to be working as 
intended to meet their policy goals, but active and ongoing review of these provisions should occur 
as matters progress before the courts. In this context, the Panel notes that in December 2014 the 
Federal Court, by consent, made declarations that Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd engaged in 
unconscionable conduct in 2011 in its dealings with certain suppliers in the supermarket sector. 29 
Introducing a properly designed and effective industry code should also assist in ensuring that 
suppliers are able to contract fairly and efficiently. The Panel notes that the Australian Government 
has announced a Food and Grocery Code of Conduct, covering grocery suppliers and binding those 
retailers and wholesalers that agree to sign on to the Code.30 
Removing barriers to entry and other regulatory barriers would strengthen competition in the 
supermarket sector. Planning and zoning restrictions are limiting the growth of new entrants such as 
ALDI and, as the ACCC has identified, more broadly affect the ability of independent supermarkets to 
                                                          
29  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (22 
December 2014) 
30  Billson, B (Minister for Small Business) 2015, Grocery Code to improve relationships between retailers, wholesalers 
and suppliers, media release 2 March, Canberra. 
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compete. The Panel recommends changes to address concerns about planning and zoning rules (see 
Recommendation 9).  
Trading hours restrictions and restrictions preventing supermarkets from selling liquor impede 
competition. The Panel recommends that restrictions preventing supermarkets from selling liquor be 
reviewed as part of a new round of regulation reviews (see Recommendation 8) and that retail 
trading hours be deregulated (see Recommendation 12). 
Supermarket operation has undergone a number of structural changes, including: greater vertical 
integration and use of ‘home brands’; an increase in the range and categories of goods sold within 
supermarkets; and greater participation by supermarket operators in other sectors. 
Like all structural changes, these can result in dislocation and other costs that affect the wellbeing of 
other parties. The move of larger supermarket chains into regional areas can also raise concerns 
about a loss of amenity and changes to the community. 
While the Panel is sensitive to these concerns, they do not of themselves raise issues for competition 
policy or law.  
For further detail on supermarkets, see Section 15.1.  
6.2 FUEL RETAILING 
The Panel makes no specific recommendations in relation to fuel retailing, although a number of 
recommendations are relevant to submissions made in that context. 
Petrol discount shopper dockets are a source of considerable concern, particularly for small 
competitors in the context of grocery and fuel markets. These discounts were up to 45 cents per 
litre31 but are now limited to 4 cents per litre through undertakings to the ACCC.32  
The Panel is not persuaded that consumers are made worse off by, rather than benefitting from, the 
availability of discounts at their current levels. The Panel notes the undertakings accepted by the 
ACCC. Further, the Panel recommends changes to the misuse of market power provisions of the CCA 
(see Recommendation 30), which should assist if future competition concerns emerge in this context. 
Stakeholders express concerns that prices are higher in certain regional areas. On the information 
before it, the Panel does not consider that differences in pricing between regions are explained by 
any clear shortcoming in the competition law or policy. The Panel notes the 17 December 2014 
Direction from the Minister for Small Business to the ACCC issued under the prices surveillance 
provisions of the CCA to monitor ‘prices, costs and profits relating to the supply of unleaded 
petroleum products in the petroleum industry in Australia for three years’.33 This will provide further 
information to assist in assessing any competition concerns in the sector, including in regional areas. 
The Panel expresses no view as to the effect the Informed Sources pricing information sharing service 
has on competition. More generally, the Panel recommends that section 45 of the CCA be extended 
                                                          
31  Sims, R 2013 Thoughts on market concentration issues speech to the Australian Food and Grocery Council Industry 
Leaders Forum, Canberra, 30 October. 
32  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2013, Coles and Woolworths undertake to cease supermarket 
subsidised fuel discounts, media release 6 December, Canberra. 
33  Explanatory Statement, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 — Monitoring of the Prices, Costs and Profits Relating to 
the Supply of Unleaded Petroleum Products in the Petroleum Industry in Australia (09/12/2014). 
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to cover concerted practices which have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
Submissions raise concerns about the New South Wales Government mandate requiring that a 
certain proportion of petrol sold in that State contain ethanol. The Panel considers that this mandate 
should be reviewed as part of the proposed new round of regulation review (see 
Recommendation 8), and repealed unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restriction 
to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the policy can only be 
achieved by restricting competition. 
In relation to the regulation of petrol price display boards, the Panel considers that the case for wider 
regulation to require the undiscounted price (only) to be displayed has not been made. The Panel 
notes that differences in regulations across jurisdictions create a ‘natural experiment’, which will 
provide evidence to assist Ministers in determining whether these regulations have any effect on 
competition and whether they are in the public interest.  
In relation to proposals to introduce a national scheme based on Fuelwatch in Western Australia, the 
Panel considers that further evidence, both of a problem needing to be addressed and of the benefits 
and costs of addressing it in this way, would be necessary before making any decision to proceed. 
For further detail on fuel retailing, see Section 15.2. 
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7 IMPLEMENTATION 
Reforming Australia’s competition policy, laws and institutions represents an ambitious agenda, 
which will require action by all levels of government. Although some recommendations can be 
implemented by jurisdictions acting independently, the Panel believes outcomes will be enhanced 
through co-operation between governments. Competition reform will have economy-wide impacts 
and therefore merits national action. 
To commence consideration of a national competition reform agenda, this Report should be 
discussed with state and territory governments as soon as practicable. This will allow all governments 
to make considered responses, including identifying aspects of the agenda where they see value in 
collaboration. 
Recommendation 55 — Implementation 
The Australian Government should discuss this Report with the States and Territories as soon as 
practicable following its receipt. 
Recommendation 48 is that the Productivity Commission (PC) be tasked with modelling the revenue 
effects in each jurisdiction of reforms agreed by governments in the wake of this Review. However, 
prior to that modelling exercise, the Panel believes that governments would benefit from modelling 
the economic effects of the recommendations in this Review. This modelling will assist governments 
in determining the gains from proposals and the prioritisation of reforms.  
Recommendation 56 — Economic modelling 
The Productivity Commission should be tasked with modelling the recommendations of this 
Review as a package (in consultation with jurisdictions) to support discussions on policy proposals 
to pursue.  
A ‘road map’ in Section 29.3 illustrates recommendations that can be implemented by different 
levels of government. For further detail on implementation see Part 6. 
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PART 3 — COMPETITION POLICY 
In this Part we examine the current state of Australia’s competition policy and test its fitness for 
purpose against the criteria identified in Part 1. 
We identify areas where existing competition policy may not serve the long-term interests of 
consumers, especially in light of the forces for change bearing on the Australian economy. 
The discussion is structured to reflect eight themes as outlined in the diagram below. 
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8 COMPETITION PRINCIPLES 
The environment that led to the Hilmer Review, and then to all Australian governments agreeing to 
the National Competition Policy (NCP), is reflected in a Prime Ministerial statement from 1991: 
The Trade Practices Act is our principal legislative weapon to ensure consumers get the 
best deal from competition.  
But there are many areas of the Australian economy today that are immune from that 
Act: some Commonwealth enterprises, State public sector businesses, and significant 
areas of the private sector, including the professions.  
This patchwork coverage reflects historical and constitutional factors, not economic 
efficiencies; it is another important instance of the way we operate as six economies, 
rather than one.  
The benefits for the consumer of expanding the scope of the Trade Practices Act could be 
immense: potentially lower professional fees, cheaper road and rail fares, cheaper 
electricity.34 (emphasis added) 
The NCP reflected the challenges Australia faced at that time — more than 20 years ago now. The 
focus of the NCP reforms was exposing some previously sheltered activities to competition and 
applying a more national approach to competition issues. 
The NCP was set out in three intergovernmental agreements, which are outlined in Box 8.1. They 
reflected the six elements of competition policy identified in the Hilmer Review:35 
• limiting anti-competitive conduct of firms; 
• reforming regulation which unjustifiably restricts competition; 
• reforming the structure of public monopolies to facilitate competition; 
• providing third-party access to certain facilities that are essential for competition; 
• restraining monopoly pricing behaviour; and 
• fostering ‘competitive neutrality’ between government and private businesses when they 
compete. 
                                                          
34  Hawke, B (Prime Minister) 1991, Building a Competitive Australia, Parliamentary statement, Canberra, 12 March. 
35  Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, page xvii. 
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Box 8.1: National Competition Policy — intergovernmental agreements 
In 1995, Australian governments committed to three intergovernmental agreements: the 
Competition Principles Agreement (CPA); the Conduct Code Agreement; and the Agreement to 
Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms.36 The elements of these 
agreements were: 
• extending the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) to previously excluded businesses 
(unincorporated businesses and state, territory and local government businesses); 
• establishing independent price oversight of state and territory government businesses; 
• corporatising and applying competitive neutrality principles so that government businesses 
do not enjoy a net competitive advantage as a result of public sector ownership; 
• structurally reforming public monopolies to separate out industry regulation and, where 
possible, further disaggregating potentially competitive parts of the monopoly; 
• establishing a third-party access regime for significant bottleneck infrastructure;  
• reviewing all legislation restricting competition; 
• applying the agreements to local government; 
• establishing the National Competition Council (NCC), including funding, appointments and 
work program; 
• imposing conditions on governments seeking to exempt conduct from the competition law; 
and 
• providing financial assistance to the States and Territories, conditional on progress in 
implementing the NCP. 
Although the NCP agreements provided a framework for agreed policies, the States and Territories 
had flexibility in implementing what was agreed. The Panel considers that flexibility continues to be 
important, particularly in the context of a federation where responsibility for reform lies with various 
levels of government. Given the importance of local government in implementing aspects of 
competition policy is sometimes overlooked, this should be explicitly addressed in the future.  
In reviewing the NCP, the Productivity Commission (PC) noted that flexibility provides the 
opportunity for governments to learn from different approaches to reform:  
… flexibility has in turn harnessed the benefits of ‘competitive federalism’ to advance the 
reform process. That is, the NCP framework has provided opportunities for governments 
to learn from the outcomes of different approaches to reform in other jurisdictions.37 
That said, flexibility should not compromise the agreed outcomes of particular reforms. Moreover, 
where different approaches have been adopted by various jurisdictions, best practice approaches to 
implementing competition reforms should be identified.  
Recognising that restrictions on competition can sometimes be desirable, the NCP included a ‘public 
interest’ test as a central component. 
                                                          
36  National Competition Council 1998, Compendium of National Competition Policy Agreements, Second Edition, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 
37  Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report no. 33, Canberra, page 130. 
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As discussed in Part 1, digital technology and increasing globalisation are changing markets and 
consumers’ ability to access markets. Australia also confronts long-term economic challenges, such 
as an ageing population. 
In light of these developments, the Panel believes that the original elements of competition policy 
should be revisited.  
The Crown (whether in right of the Commonwealth, state and territory, or local governments) has 
the potential to harm competition through its commercial arrangements entered into with market 
participants. The Panel, therefore, concludes that the anti-competitive conduct provisions of the 
Competition and Consumer Act (2010) (CCA) should reach beyond government businesses to cover all 
government activities that have a trading or commercial character. This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 14.2. 
Moreover, the Crown’s capacity to enhance or harm competition also includes a range of policies and 
regulations that reach beyond the scope of the CCA. Procurement, which ranges from buying goods 
and services through to public-private partnerships (PPPs) and privatisations, should be designed 
with competition principles in mind. This is discussed in more detail in Section 14.1. 
The Panel also believes that the focus of competition policy should be widened beyond infrastructure 
sectors and government businesses to encompass government services more generally. 
Competition policy plays an important role in improving government performance in sectors such as 
human services by promoting user choice and encouraging a diversity of providers. Choice and 
diversity have the potential to improve outcomes for users, especially but not only by stimulating 
innovation. 
Independent regulation can encourage entry into markets (since it provides a level of certainty about 
the regulatory environment), while separating the interests of providers from those of funders and 
regulators encourages accountability, innovation and a level playing field between public and other 
providers.  
The Panel also believes that declaration and third-party access to infrastructure should be mandated 
only where it promotes the public interest to do so. The onus of proof should lie with those seeking 
access to demonstrate that it would promote the public interest rather than on infrastructure 
owners to demonstrate that access would be contrary to the public interest. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 24. 
Competition principles should be based around the central idea that competition policy, laws and 
institutions should promote the long-term interests of consumers. Responses to the principles, 
outlined in the Panel’s Draft Report, are largely positive. CHOICE notes that a set of principles will 
‘help sustain momentum in reform processes that may take several years … [and] can play an 
important role in ensuring there is a consistent approach to reform across multiple sectors’ (DR sub, 
page 8). 
CHOICE considers ‘competition and consumer choice are means of improving consumer welfare 
rather than objectives in and of themselves’ (DR sub, page 9), while National Seniors Australia 
‘strongly endorses the Review Panel’s call for competition policy to focus on making markets work in 
the long-term interests of consumers’ (DR sub, page 6). 
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In addition, some submissions comment on the importance of the overriding public interest test.38 
Submissions also highlight the risks in applying the principles to human services.39 
The Panel agrees that competition and choice need to be seen as a means to improving wellbeing 
and that caution must be exercised in applying competition principles in the human services sectors. 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 12. In applying competition principles, the Panel endorses 
a public interest test as a central tenet of competition policy. The Panel recommends continuing 
with the NCP public interest test, namely that legislation or government policy should not restrict 
competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the legislation or government policy can only be achieved by restricting 
competition.  
Submissions from Marsden Jacob Associates (DR sub, page 1) and the Pharmacy Guild of Australia 
(DR sub, page 11) take issue with the public interest test set out in the Draft Report, which reflects 
that negotiated as part of the 1995 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Competition 
Principles Agreement under the NCP.  
Marsden Jacob Associates submits that the second limb of the test should not be applied literally, 
and did not appear in the NCC’s 2005 report Identifying a framework for regulation in packaged 
liquor. 40 Instead, the submission suggests the test should be re-worded to substitute the word ‘best’ 
for the word ‘only’ in the second limb. The Pharmacy Guild of Australia similarly proposes that the 
second limb should be changed so that the words ‘most efficient’ replace the word ‘only’. 
The existing public interest test does not put competition above all other considerations, and nor 
should it. However, it does require that the effect on competition always be carefully considered as 
part of the overall assessment of the net public interest, and that the costs of anti-competitive 
regulation should be properly assessed in any cost-benefit analysis. 
In its Identifying a framework for regulation in packaged liquor report, the NCC notes ‘regulation that 
successfully addresses the public interest but also restricts competition can be justified, so long as 
the impact on competition is minimised’41 — illustrating that the test is flexible. The 1995 
formulation of the public interest test was also subsequently re-endorsed by COAG in 2007.42 
The Panel sees no reason for change and recommends that the test continue to be expressed in the 
same way to ensure that regulatory reviews continue to focus on avoiding any restrictions on 
competition. The long-standing COAG test enshrines the correct principle — that competition should 
not be impeded unless it must be, in order to secure the public interest. It also acknowledges the fact 
that competition is not an end in itself — the test should continue to be applied by assessing the 
                                                          
38  See, for example: Australian Local Government Association, DR sub, pages 3-4; and South Australian Government, DR 
sub, page 5. 
39  See, for example: Australian Education Union, DR sub, page 2; CHOICE, DR sub, page 8; and National Seniors Australia, 
DR sub, page 7. 
40  Marsden Jacob Associates 2005, Identifying a framework for regulation in packaged liquor retailing, National 
Competition Council, Melbourne. 
41  Ibid. at Foreword. 
42  Council of Australian Governments 2007, Best Practice Regulation: A Guide for Ministerial Councils and National 
Standard Setting Bodies, Canberra. 
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costs and benefits of the regulation overall (including any impact on competition) in order to meet 
the policy objective. 
Further, in the rare circumstances where the benefit to the public would be maximised by a 
regulation that restricted competition, then the test is flexible enough to allow that option to be 
chosen. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that an overarching set of competition principles will provide direction for 
governments in committing to further competition reform. High-level principles will allow 
jurisdictions the flexibility to implement policies that reflect local conditions. 
These principles should be based around the central idea that competition policy, laws and 
institutions should promote the long-term interests of consumers. 
The Panel reaffirms the principles which underpinned the NCP. However, a new set of competition 
principles should widen the focus of competition policy, laws and institutions to encompass the 
many different ways in which the government can affect competition in markets. The Panel’s 
recommendation contains a set of new principles to which governments should commit. 
In applying these principles, the Panel endorses the ‘public interest test’ as a central tenant of 
competition policy so that legislation or government policy should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the legislation or government policy can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
Implementation 
Formal agreement by governments to the revised set of competition principles should be pursued as 
the initial implementation step. Agreeing a set of principles would guide the Australian Government, 
state and territory and local governments in implementing those aspects of competition policy for 
which they are responsible. 
The principles can be agreed to by each jurisdiction individually and applied through their own 
processes. Ideally, however, the Australian Government and state and territory governments would 
jointly agree to the principles. The Australian Government should seek the agreement of the States 
and Territories within six months of accepting this recommendation. 
As with the implementation of the NCP, the agreements should clearly allow each jurisdiction to 
tailor reforms to meet its own local conditions. 
The mechanisms for reaching agreement between the Australian Government and the States and 
Territories are being considered as part of the Reform of Federation White Paper process. The Panel 
does not therefore recommend any particular mechanism to reach agreement among the 
jurisdictions. However, we believe that agreement should be at the level of the Prime Minister, 
Premiers and Chief Ministers, since the principles apply across the whole of government. 
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Recommendation 1 — Competition principles 
The Australian Government, state and territory and local governments should commit to the 
following principles: 
• Competition policies, laws and institutions should promote the long-term interests of 
consumers. 
• Legislative frameworks and government policies and regulations binding the public or private 
sectors should not restrict competition. 
• Governments should promote consumer choice when funding, procuring or providing goods 
and services and enable informed choices by consumers. 
• The model for government provision or procurement of goods and services should separate the 
interests of policy (including funding), regulation and service provision, and should encourage a 
diversity of providers. 
• Governments should separate remaining public monopolies from competitive service elements, 
and also separate contestable elements into smaller independent business activities. 
• Government business activities that compete with private provision, whether for-profit or 
not-for-profit, should comply with competitive neutrality principles to ensure they do not enjoy 
a net competitive advantage simply as a result of government ownership. 
• A right to third-party access to significant bottleneck infrastructure should be granted where it 
would promote a material increase in competition in dependent markets and would promote 
the public interest. 
• Independent authorities should set, administer or oversee prices for natural monopoly 
infrastructure providers. 
Applying these principles should be subject to a public interest test, such that legislation or 
government policy should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the legislation or government policy can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
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9 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
As discussed in Part 1, disruptive technologies are changing, and will continue to change, Australia’s 
competitive landscape. Technology is expanding the geographic boundaries of markets, digital 
delivery of content is becoming more common and connected technologies are increasingly 
integrated as global communication networks mature. 
Disruptive technologies have put intellectual property (IP) rights in the spotlight. Although IP rights 
can create incentives for innovation and disseminating ideas, they also have the potential to restrict 
market entry by preventing access to technologies. 
In light of technological changes and more general changes to the regulatory environment in which 
investment in creative effort takes place,43 Australia’s IP arrangements should be re-examined. As 
the Chairman of the Productivity Commission (PC), Peter Harris, recently argued: 
... the nature of internet-driven change and related global dependence on software-based 
systems suggests each nation should consider closely how well it is served by current IP 
systems, as these trends take hold.44 
IP rights are a form of intangible property right granted to a creator for something new or original. 
Like other legal property rights, IP rights exclude others from freely using IP, but the exclusive rights 
can be traded or licensed to others.  
IP rights exist in many forms including:  
• patents (inventions and new processes); 
• copyright (over literary, musical and artistic works) and registered designs (designs applied to 
articles such as clothing); 
• trademarks (which distinguish the origin of goods and services); and 
• plant-breeder rights.  
There is no single IP Act. Instead, IP rights are secured by separate, specific statutory regimes; for 
example, the Patents Act 1990 for inventions and the Copyright Act 1968 for literary and artistic 
creations.45 
The underlying rationale for IP rights is to promote new ideas and creations. Competitive markets 
can fail to support an efficient level of innovation because creations and ideas, once known, can be 
copied at little cost. 
Knowledge has ‘public good’ characteristics. It is difficult to exclude others from using new ideas, and 
use by one person has little or no effect on the extent to which it is available to others. These public 
good characteristics of knowledge typically lead to under-investment in research and development 
— the returns to creators will be insufficient to provide incentives for efficient investment in IP 
material. 
                                                          
43  Productivity Commission 2013, Trade & Assistance Review 2011-12, Annual Report Series, Canberra, pages 8 -9. 
44  Harris, P 2014, Competition Policy and Deregulation — Challenges and Choices, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, 
Canberra, page 8. 
45  Productivity Commission 2013, Trade & Assistance Review 2011-12, Annual Report Series, Canberra, page 66. 
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IP regulations attempt to address this ‘free rider’ problem by legally granting exclusive use of the 
protected right to the creator for a specified period.  
IP rights are important for competition and follow-on inventions. They allow firms to derive financial 
benefit from commercially exploiting their inventions and creations (which provides an incentive to 
innovate) and allowing other firms and individuals to use disclosed information about new inventions 
(rather than it remaining secret). 
The community benefits from reducing wasteful duplication of research effort and allowing others to 
build on existing ideas. As the PC notes: 
The issuing of patents may improve efficiency and community welfare by increasing the 
incentives for firms to innovate, which can in turn lead to new, improved or less expensive 
products. (sub, page 7)  
However, IP rights can be used in a way that deters competition and limits consumer choice. For 
example, this could manifest in owners of IP rights extracting excessive royalties from IP licences or 
placing anti-competitive restrictions on knowledge dissemination. This would have adverse knock-on 
effects for innovation. 
As The Australia Institute says: 
While strong IP rights may increase the incentive to put into the [knowledge] pool 
(thereby generating positive externalities) they hamper the ability to take previously 
generated knowledge out of the pool (giving rise to negative externalities). The design of 
the rules is therefore important. (sub, page 20) 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) claims that, in the vast majority of 
cases, granting an IP right will not raise significant competition concerns: 
... rights holders are entitled to legitimately acquire market power by developing a 
superior product to their rivals, and pursuant to the policy purpose of IP regulation, the 
temporary market power from an IP right provides the very incentive to invest in the 
production of new IP. Such innovation is also a key goal of competition law. In this 
respect, IP and the competition law are for the most part complementary, both being 
directed towards improving economic welfare. (ACCC sub 1, page 59) 
However, conflicts between the two policies can occur ‘where IP owners are in a position to exert 
substantial market power or engage in anti-competitive conduct to seek to extend the scope of the 
right beyond that intended by the IP statute’ (ACCC sub 1, page 59). 
The PC submits that the patent system (where not warranted to encourage innovation) can impose 
costs on the community by impeding competition, including through: 
• the accrual of ‘patent portfolios’ — in some cases, firms that accrue patents conduct no 
business other than asserting their patents against other firms — effectively ‘taxing’ other 
firms’ innovations via court cases; and 
• ‘cumulative innovation’, where innovation requires access to multiple patents, there are 
higher costs to innovate because of the need to purchase those patents. The need to access 
multiple patents can lead to ‘hold out’, whereby the owner of a patent holds out for a better 
deal from a potential innovator, which can also serve to discourage innovation. (sub, page 29) 
Therefore, it is a balancing act. As the ACCC says:  
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The extent of any IP rights should balance: (i) on the one hand, the incentives for 
innovation in the creation of IP; and (ii) on the other, the incentives that access to IP 
material provides for efficient use of that IP and for innovation from such use. 
(sub 1, page 58) 
Keeping the balance right in light of technology and market changes is also challenging. For example, 
the widespread dissemination of material through the internet raises issues around copyright and 
related rights in the global context. 3D printing — the ability to translate a digital file into a physical 
object — will also pose challenges. 
As noted by the Big Innovation Centre, 3D printing has dramatically lowered the cost and ease of 
reproducing physical objects. A single 3D printer will be able to copy different products from existing 
designs that are easily and quickly shared over the internet. This means IP is likely to become the 
main method through which some manufacturing businesses can fund the research, development 
and design of physical products. The Big Innovation Centre remarked: 
The disruption caused by 3D printing will put significant strains on government policy. By 
removing barriers between the internet and the physical world, 3D printing will throw up 
significant questions for intellectual property laws, for regulators and for competition 
authorities.46 
9.1 IS THE ‘BALANCE’ RIGHT? 
CHOICE, like some other submitters, suggests that Australia has not got the ‘balance’ right between 
granting IP rights and promoting competition. CHOICE suggests that the balance currently favours 
rights holders rather than consumers: 
... monopolies give rise [to] obvious and well-known problems that ultimately end up 
impacting consumers. For this reason, limitations and exceptions apply to the monopoly 
of intellectual property. CHOICE believes that currently, Australia has not achieved the 
right balance in this regard. 
Many companies operating in the entertainment industry (which obviously depends very 
heavily on copyright) have leveraged the considerable advantage of monopoly rights to 
insulate themselves against the disruptive effects of technological change, in particular 
from the internet. The persistence [of] territorial licensing arrangements (limiting the 
distribution of content based on geographical regions) is testament to the ability of 
industry to resist change. (sub, page 20) 
The Panel considers IP arrangements should be technology-neutral, given the importance of 
innovation for economic growth. A number of submissions argue that IP arrangements do not 
support innovation because they are too technology-specific.47 
Mark Summerfield says: 
The current provisions in the Patents Act and the CCA [Competition and Consumer Act], 
intended to ensure that patents do not unduly deter competition, or limit consumer 
                                                          
46  The Big Innovation Centre 2012, Three Dimensional Policy, Why Britain needs a policy framework for 3D printing, 
London, page 3. 
47  See, for example: Australian Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, sub, page 7; and Google 
Australia, sub, page 18. 
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choice, were not drafted with arrangements such as patent pools, or the evolution of 
global technology standards, in mind. (sub, page 8) 
The Australia Institute recommends a critical examination of patents on items such as software and 
business methods (sub, page 20). The ACCC also notes ‘IP regulation can become quickly obsolete as 
the manner in which IP material is used changes’, citing the abandonment of the Optus TV Now 
service as a casualty of Australia’s current copyright laws (sub 1, page 65). 
However, determining the appropriate ‘extent’ of IP protection is complex — and potentially ever 
changing. If IP rights provide higher rewards than needed to induce an invention, this will reduce the 
invention’s net benefit to the community as a whole and result in a higher share of the benefit going 
to the IP rights’ holder. If there are no substitutes for the idea or invention, the rights’ owner could 
also engage in monopolistic behaviour.  
At issue is how closely tests for allocating IP rights are linked to ‘public benefits’. Innovation could 
occur without IP protection. How long is it appropriate to reward the original creators of 
innovations?  
A recent review of the literature undertaken by the PC found limited incentives for innovation from 
the IP system.48 For example, Hall and Harhoff’s survey of 210 studies found that patents provide 
clear incentives for innovation in only a few sectors: pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical 
instruments and specialty chemicals.49 
Hazel Moir argues ‘it is neither efficient nor effective if patents are granted for inventions that would 
be undertaken absent the patent incentive’ (DR sub, page 2), with the evidence showing that patents 
are most needed where copying is fast and relatively cheap and where initial research and 
development costs are high. Hazel Moir also observes: 
Interestingly, during the period when empirical evidence has mounted showing that 
patents are generally not needed to support industrial innovation, patents have been 
made available over a wider subject matter range and for increasingly less inventive 
‘inventions’. (DR sub, page 2) 
It is important that the extent of IP rights provided by IP regulations be reviewed regularly. As the PC 
said ‘because of the pervasiveness of IP law, it is important that the design, operation and review of 
IP systems be carefully governed’.50 
The extent of IP protection should be based on what is in the best interest of Australians. 
A number of submitters support the Panel’s draft recommendation for a review of the extent of 
intellectual property protection.51 Electronic Frontiers Australia, for example, says: 
While we also recognise that the underlying rationale for IP rights is the promotion of new 
ideas and creations, empirically there is little evidence to demonstrate that IP rights 
actually do this in practice. Furthermore, certain assumptions which underlie the 
                                                          
48  Productivity Commission 2013, Trade & Assistance Review 2011-12, Annual Report Series, Canberra, pages 90-91. 
49  Hall, B and Harhoff, D 2012, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, NBER Working Paper No 17773, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
50  Productivity Commission 2013, Trade & Assistance Review 2011-12, Annual Report Series, Canberra, page 2. 
51  See, for example: ACM Parts, DR sub, page 2; Australian Information Industry Association, DR sub, page 4; Australian 
Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, DR sub, page 2; Business Council of Australia, DR sub, 
page 41; CHOICE, DR sub, page 15; and National Seniors Australia, DR sub, page 10. 
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neoclassical economics basis of much contemporary IP law and policy have been 
disproved by real-life events, particularly in the context of free and open source software 
projects. EFA would thus welcome a consideration of the fundamental principles 
underpinning Australian IP law and policy, and the extent to which IP law and policy do 
what they are supposed to, namely stimulate creation and innovation in society. (DR sub, 
page 2) 
Google Australia strongly supports an overarching review of intellectual property and submits: 
… a modern and flexible copyright regime will become an increasingly crucial element of 
economic policy as Australia transitions to an economy that relies heavily on knowledge, 
innovation, and creativity. (DR sub, page 2) 
However, others question the need for a further review in light of the number of recent inquiries, 
particularly in the area of copyright law reform (including the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) copyright review and the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and 
Communications’ Inquiry into IT Pricing).52 
The Australian Copyright Council argues: 
… the rapid rate at which the digital marketplace is evolving suggests that a further review 
at this time is likely to be premature. … the dynamic state of the market makes it difficult 
to anticipate the long-term interests of consumers. (DR sub, page 3) 
Hazel Moir points to the patent systems as the area most in need of review (DR sub, page 1). 
Some submitters also argue that, if there is to be an IP review, it should have a multi-disciplinary 
approach.53 For example, the Australian Publishers Association says: 
Intellectual property is a complex and contested area of policy, about which there are 
many divergent perspectives, all of which should be comprehended within any wholesale 
review. To provide comprehensive advice to government, any further review would 
benefit from having from the outset a multi-disciplinary approach, encompassing legal 
understanding of this complex corpus juris and a broad economic perspective that covers 
the complex intersection between innovation, entrepreneurship and competition in a 
digital world. (DR sub, page 5) 
The Australian Digital Alliance and the Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, while supporting an 
overarching review of IP, argue that it would be a perverse result if the ALRC recommendation for 
introducing a flexible ‘fair use’ exception to Australian copyright law was delayed by a further review 
of the IP system (DR sub, page 3).54 
The Panel acknowledges the recent number of IP reviews but notes that they are partial 
examinations. We remain concerned that there is no overarching IP policy framework or objective 
guiding changes to IP protection and therefore see a need for an overarching review of IP. 
                                                          
52  See, for example: Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd and Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners’ 
Society, sub, page 3; Communications Law Centre UTS, DR sub, pages 1-2; and Copyright Agency, DR sub, page 3. 
Foxtel strongly disagrees that an IP review is warranted, DR sub, page 8. 
53  See, for example: Australian Copyright Council, DR sub, page 4; and Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, 
page 6. 
54  Australian Law Reform Commission 2013, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Report 122, Sydney. 
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9.2 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN IP RIGHTS AND COMPETITION LAW 
Currently, subsection 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) provides a limited 
exception from most of the competition law prohibitions for certain types of transactions involving 
IP. The exception covers certain conditions in licences or assignments of IP rights in patents, 
registered designs, copyright, trademarks and circuit layouts. The exception does not extend to the 
prohibitions relating to misuse of market power and resale price maintenance.  
A number of submitters, including the PC (sub, page 28) and the ACCC, argue that there is no reason 
why trading arrangements involving IP rights (licensing and assignments) should be exempt from the 
competition law prohibitions in the CCA.55 The ACCC says: 
On the use of intellectual property rights, the CCA should apply in the ordinary way. The 
ACCC recommends that section 51(3) of the CCA should be repealed and that, in general, 
there is no reason to treat intellectual property any differently to other services in 
relation to access. (sub 1, page 58) 
Similarly, iiNet says: 
Many intellectual property licences and other agreements covered by section 51(3) have 
significant impacts on competition in a variety of markets and it is iiNet’s view that it is 
therefore appropriate that the use of intellectual property rights be subject to Part IV of 
the CCA. 
iiNet notes that if the exemption is repealed, authorisation will still be available for 
intellectual property transactions that are caught by the prohibitions in the Part IV but 
provide a public benefit. (DR sub, page 3) 
Australian Industry Group submits that the exemption should be repealed because the ACCC should 
be allowed to regulate anti-competitive conduct in areas where copyright or patents may be used to 
engage in such behaviour. Also, the exemption is not needed to ensure that beneficial IP licensing 
arrangements are lawful (DR sub, page 9). 
In a recent submission to the ALRC Inquiry into Copyright and Digital Economy, the ACCC also argued 
‘it is important that the rights created through IP laws should be subject to competition laws to 
ensure they are pro-competitive rather than anti-competitive in effect or purpose’.56 
The ACCC pointed to the digital environment providing new ways of creating, using and distributing 
copyright materials with commensurate opportunities to improve efficiency and welfare. However, 
copyright materials are increasingly used as intermediate inputs, which increases the potential for 
copyright to have anti-competitive effects. Solutions that are capable of addressing new market 
failures in digital environments (including potentially new forms of collective licensing or copyright 
exchanges) may also raise competition concerns.57 
The ACCC also noted ‘that in other jurisdictions, such as the United States, IP rights are subject to the 
same competition laws as all other property rights. [And] … in these jurisdictions, there has been 
                                                          
55  See, for example: Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, DR sub, page 5; Communications Law 
Centre, UTS, DR sub, pages 3 and 4; and Australian Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee, DR 
sub, page 4. 
56  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2012, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright and the Digital 
Economy Issues Paper, Canberra, page 12. 
57  Ibid., page 6.  
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neither an erosion of IP rights for creators, nor any apparent impact on the incentives for the 
production of copyright material’.58  
Associations that represent IP owners, and IP owners themselves, put a contrary view (AIPPI 
Australia, DR sub, page 1). For example, the Australian Recording Industry Association Ltd says: 
The idea that there is no need for the s 51(3) exemption because IP should be treated like 
any other form of property is simplistic and misleading. The exemptions under s 51(3) 
serve partly as a safety net where broadly defined prohibitions under the Competition 
and Consumer Act would otherwise be too far-reaching. The cartel prohibitions, the 
prohibition against anticompetitive agreements under s 45 and the prohibition against 
exclusive dealing under s 47 are all broadly defined and can easily catch conduct that is 
efficiency enhancing (there is no rule of reason defence in Australia). The exemptions 
under s 51(3) are important because they avoid liability where IP licensing conditions are 
efficiency enhancing. (sub, page 4) 
AIPPI Australia, the Australian national group of the International Association for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property, argues that: 
To repeal section 51(3) and expose dealings by intellectual property holders that are 
within the scope of their monopoly to the full scope of the competition law is inconsistent 
with the rationale for the existence of intellectual property rights. (DR sub, page 7) 
CSIRO points to the value of subsection 51(3): 
… in the context of competition law in Australia, subsection 51(3) is a valuable provision in 
relation to patent licence transactions and that its repeal (without putting in place some 
compensating mechanisms) would be potentially counterproductive to technology 
commercialisation in Australia. (DR sub, page 1) 
Others argue that repealing subsection 51(3) will create uncertainty, add a cost burden on businesses 
and has the potential to give rise to unintended consequences. For example, AIPPI Australia states 
that, although the ACCC acknowledges the majority of cases do not give rise to competition 
concerns: 
… without the protection afforded by section 51(3), it would still be necessary to conduct 
a detailed review of these agreements from a competition perspective to ensure they 
comply with the relevant laws. It is therefore inefficient to subject dealings to competition 
laws where the risk of infringement is negligible.  
Additional uncertainty and complexity would increase transaction costs and reduce post 
innovation returns. (DR sub, page 7) 
The Australian Copyright Council states: 
While such an amendment may ‘tidy up’ the CCA … this amendment could create further 
obstacles and uncertainty for rights holders investing in new business models. In 
particular, we query whether such an amendment would encourage innovation and 
establish competition laws and regulations that are clear, predictable and reliable. 
(DR sub, page 5) 
                                                          
58  Ibid., page 5. 
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The interaction between IP rights and competition law has been reviewed numerous times, including 
by the Hilmer Review, the National Competition Council (NCC) and by the Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee (known as the Ergas Committee). Each of these reviews 
recommended amendments to the exception for IP licences and assignments (Box 9.1). 
The NCC concluded that the original objectives of subsection 51(3) were unclear, although it was 
most likely included to avoid a perceived conflict between IP laws and competition laws. But ‘this 
objective is no longer relevant because it is clear that these two fields of law are compatible and 
consistent with each other’.59 However, the NCC noted that subsection 51(3) may have some 
continuing objectives in the context of: 
• clarifying whether licensing conditions that have the effect of subdividing IP rights may be 
anti-competitive; and 
• providing greater certainty and reduced compliance costs in relation to the licensing and 
assignment of IP.60 
The Ergas Committee considered that IP rights were sufficiently different from other property rights 
and assets to warrant special treatment under the (then) Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). However, 
the existing IP exceptions under subsection 51(3) were ‘seriously flawed, as the extent and breadth 
of the exemptions are unclear, and may well be over-broad’.61 The Ergas Committee was of the view 
that the: 
... exemptions do not provide an appropriate balance between the needs of the 
intellectual property system and the wider goals of competition policy.62 
The then Government accepted the Ergas Committee’s recommendation to rewrite subsection 51(3) 
to allow the competition provisions of the TPA to be applied to IP arrangements that result in a 
substantial lessening of competition. However, no change has been made to the legislation.63 
A recent House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications 
report into pricing of information technology recommended repealing subsection 51(3) of the CCA.64 
The ALRC’s Copyright and Digital Economy Final Report also stated this repeal should be 
considered.65 
                                                          
59  National Competition Council 1999, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Final Report, 
Melbourne, page 166. 
60  Ibid., page 167. 
61  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee 2000, Review of intellectual property legislation under the 
Competition Principles Agreement, Canberra, page 11. 
62  Ibid., page 11. 
63  Attorney-General’s Department, Government Response to the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Recommendations, part 1, viewed 20 February 2015, 
http://arts.gov.au/resources-publications/publications/government-response-advisory-council-intellectual-property-r
ec-0. and Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Canberra, page 284. 
64  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications 2013, At What Cost? IT pricing 
and the Australia Tax, Canberra, page xiii. 
65  Australian Law Reform Commission 2014, Copyright and the Digital Economy Final Report, Sydney, pages 74 and 196. 
Intellectual Property 
108 Part 3 — Competition Policy 
Box 9.1: Reviews of IP and competition law  
The Hilmer Review examined the exceptions for IP rights under the then Trade Practices Act 1974 
(TPA). The Hilmer Review stated that it was not apparent that the exception met the relevant 
policy goal, nor had the Committee been presented with any persuasive arguments as to why IP 
licensing and assignments should receive protection beyond the authorisation process. The report 
concluded that it: 
... saw force in arguments to reform the current arrangements, including the possible 
removal of the current exemption and allowing all such matters to be scrutinised 
through the authorisation process. Nevertheless, it was not in a position to make expert 
recommendations on the matter and recommends that the current exemption be 
examined by relevant officials, in consultation with interested groups.66 
In 1999, the NCC reviewed subsection 51(3) of the TPA as part of the Australian Government’s 
review of legislation that restricts competition under the Competition Principles Agreement.67 The 
NCC concluded that only in rare cases do IP owners have sufficient market power to enable them 
to substantially lessen competition in the markets in which they compete. It recommended that: 
• the exemption in subsection 51(3) be retained, but amended so that it no longer exempted 
horizontal arrangements or price and quantity restrictions; and 
• the ACCC formulate guidelines on the scope of the exemption, and the application of Part IV 
to dealings in intellectual property rights. 
In 2000, the Ergas Committee also reviewed the interaction between IP rights and competition 
policy.68 On subsection 51(3) of the TPA, the Ergas Committee recommended that IP rights 
continue to be accorded distinctive treatment under the TPA and this should be achieved by: 
• amending subparagraph 51(1)(a)(i) of the TPA to list all relevant intellectual property 
statutes, that is any ‘Act relating to patents, trademarks, designs, copyright, circuit layouts 
and plant breeder’s rights’; 
• repealing subsection 51(3) and related provisions of the TPA; 
• inserting an amended subsection 51(3) and related provisions into the TPA to ensure that 
conditions in a contract, arrangement or understanding related to the subject matter of that 
intellectual property statute did not contravene Part IV or section 4D of the TPA — unless 
those conditions were likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition; and 
• the ACCC issuing guidelines to provide sufficient direction to IP right owners to clarify the 
types of behaviour likely to result in a breach of the competition law, and mechanisms for 
parties to seek a written clearance from the ACCC. 
The Panel considers it appropriate that commercial transactions involving IP rights, including the 
assignment and licensing of such rights, be subject to the CCA, in the same manner as transactions 
involving other property and assets. 
                                                          
66  Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, page 151. 
67  National Competition Council 1999, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Final Report. 
Melbourne, pages 11 and 12. 
68  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee 2000, Review of intellectual property legislation under the 
Competition Principles Agreement, Final Report, Canberra, page 19. 
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As many submissions observe, the exemption afforded by subsection 51(3) is confined in two ways: 
• In general terms, the exemption is limited to conditions imposed in licences and assignments 
of IP rights that relate to products created through the application of the IP rights. 
• The exemption does not extend to section 46, which remains applicable. 
Under the current law, subsection 51(3) does not exempt an IP licence and assignment from 
competition law; it only exempts certain conditions in a licence or assignment.  
In most instances, assigning or licensing an IP right to another person will be neutral from a 
competition perspective. The assignment or licence will involve a bare transfer of the exclusive right 
from one person to another. However, on occasions, the transfer may result in the other party 
acquiring substantial control over an area of commerce by reason of the accumulation of IP rights. 
The transfer of IP rights, whether by licence or assignment, is subject to the potential application of 
sections 45 and 50 of the CCA and is not protected by subsection 51(3). 
Likewise, subsection 51(3) does not exempt the decision by an IP owner to refuse to license IP rights 
to another person. Refusals to deal may, on occasions, contravene section 46 of the CCA. 
In contrast, subsection 51(3) does exempt conditions of an IP licence or assignment that relate to 
products created through application of the IP right from all sections of the CCA apart from 
section 46. 
The Panel acknowledges the original rationale for the exemption in subsection 51(3). The subsection 
applies where an owner of an IP right licences another person to commercialise that right, but 
imposes restrictions on the manner in which the commercialisation occurs; for example, quality 
specifications, quantity restrictions or territorial restrictions. If the IP owner were to commercialise 
the right, the owner would itself make decisions about quality, quantity and selling territory. The 
rationale for subsection 51(3) is that the grant of a licence to another person, subject to conditions or 
restrictions that the owner could have imposed upon itself, should not be regarded as 
anti-competitive and should be exempted from the competition law. 
However, the Panel considers that the rationale for subsection 51(3) is flawed. In the relatively 
benign example given, the conditional licence would not substantially lessen competition and would 
not contravene the CCA. Without the licence, the licensee would have been unable to commercialise 
the IP right; therefore, a conditional licence does not restrict the level of competition that would 
have existed but for the licence. Accordingly, on the benign example, the exemption is not required.  
Conversely, there are other circumstances in which a conditional licence can substantially lessen 
competition. In fields in which there are multiple and competing IP rights, such as the pharmaceutical 
or communications industries, cross-licensing arrangements can be entered into to resolve disputes 
but which impose anti-competitive restrictions on each licensee. Subsection 51(3) can operate to 
exempt those arrangements from the competition law. The Panel considers that arrangements of 
this type should be examinable under the competition law. 
Most comparable jurisdictions have no equivalent to subsection 51(3). None of the US, Canada or 
Europe provide an exemption from competition laws for conditions of IP transactions. In those 
jurisdictions, IP assignments and licences and their conditions are assessed under competition laws in 
the same manner as all other commercial transactions. The courts in those jurisdictions distinguish 
between competitively benign and harmful IP transactions, taking account of all relevant 
circumstances of the transaction and the conditions imposed. There is no evidence that this has 
diminished the value of IP rights in those countries. 
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Appendix B summarises the approach to this issue in comparable jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, the Panel considers that the IP licensing exception in subsection 51(3) of the CCA should 
be repealed. 
This position is supported by a range of submitters, including: the Australian Digital Alliance and 
Australian Libraries Copyright Committee (DR sub, page 4); Australian Industry Group (DR sub, 
page 9); CHOICE (DR sub, page 16); National Seniors Australia (DR sub, page 10); Australian 
Communications Consumer Action Network (DR sub, page 5); and Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc 
(DR sub, page 2). 
However, as is the case with other vertical supply arrangements, IP licences should be exempt from 
the per se cartel provisions of the CCA insofar as they impose restrictions on goods or services 
produced through application of the licensed IP. Such IP licences should only contravene the 
competition law if they have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition.  
IP licensing or assignment arrangements that are at risk of breaching Part IV of the CCA (which covers 
anti-competitive practices), but which are likely to produce offsetting public benefits, can be granted 
an exemption from the CCA through the notification or authorisation processes.69 
Concerns expressed in submissions about business uncertainty and increased compliance cost likely 
to arise from repeal of subsection 51(3) do not weigh heavily with the Panel. The competition law, 
and competition policy generally, are of fundamental importance to the welfare of Australians. All 
sectors of the economy should be exposed to and disciplined by the competition law, despite the 
necessary compliance cost that entails. The economic benefits of increased competition almost 
always outweigh the compliance costs.  
Additionally, the block exemption power recommended by the Panel (see Recommendation 39) 
could be used to specify ‘safe harbour’ licensing restrictions for IP owners. As the ACCC notes:  
Should a block exemption provision be introduced, it could be used to clarify the scope of 
permissible conduct relating to the exercise of intellectual property rights, thereby 
providing additional certainty for businesses. (DR sub, page 22) 
The European Commission established a block exemption for categories of technology transfer 
agreements in 2014.70  
A number of submitters argue that it is ‘premature’ to repeal subsection 51(3) given the Panel’s 
proposal to review IP provisions.71 However, the repeal of subsection 51(3) concerns the use of IP 
rights; whereas, the proposed overarching review of IP would examine the extent of IP provisions. 
Hence, the Panel does not consider that the repeal of subsection 51(3) should be delayed. Regardless 
of what the proposed review of the scope of IP provisions recommends, IP rights can still be used in 
an anti-competitive way. 
                                                          
69  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2012, ACCC submission to the ALRC Copyright and the Digital 
Economy Issues Paper, Canberra, page 5.  
70  European Commission, Licensing agreements for the transfer of technology, Commission Regulation (EU) No 
316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to categories of technology transfer agreements.  
71  See, for example: Australian Publishers Association, DR sub, page 6; and Richard Hoad, DR sub, page 2. 
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9.3 IP AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
For individual countries, the optimal design and level of IP rights depends on the extent to which 
they are net importers or exporters of different forms of IP. Australia is a net importer of IP.72 With 
trade and commerce-related aspects of IP crossing national borders, IP has been the subject of 
international treaties. Frameworks influencing Australian IP law, and trade and commerce in IP both 
within Australia and internationally, include: 
• the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; 
• treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization; 
• other dedicated IP agreements falling outside the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
framework; and 
• IP provisions included as part of bilateral and regional trade agreements.73 
As a net importer of IP, and likely to remain so, Australia’s ability to access IP protected by rights 
granted in other countries will be important to ensure that we reap the benefits of the digital 
economy. That said, commitments regarding the extent of IP protection in Australia must also serve 
the best interests of Australians — an issue that should be tested through an independent 
cost-benefit analysis.  
The ACCC (sub 1, page 65), the PC (sub, page 28) and The Australia Institute (sub, page 20) argue that 
caution should be exercised when entering international treaties or agreements that include IP 
provisions. As the PC notes, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between Australia 
and various other countries, including the US, as well as other proposed international agreements, 
such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, are specifically considering intellectual 
property issues (sub, page 28). 
AIPPI Australia notes: 
… intellectual property concerns have on several occasions been given much less 
prominence in negotiations for trade agreements than matters such as agricultural access. 
This is an issue of increasing concern, as the knowledge economy is growing to form a 
larger part of the Australian economy. (DR sub, pages 2-3) 
The PC suggests that Australia has likely incurred net costs from including some IP provisions in trade 
agreements. It points to analysis of extensions in the duration of copyright protection required by the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, which imposed net costs on Australia through 
increased royalty payments.74 As Australia is, and will continue to be, a net importer of IP, these costs 
are potentially significant. 
However, others suggest that the costs and benefits of IP provisions are adequately considered. For 
example, the Communications Law Centre UTS said: 
… we consider that Australian representatives negotiating trade agreements do so with a 
guiding policy (but the necessary flexibility) of achieving what is in the overall best 
interests of Australians. … each agreement represents a negotiated outcome in the 
                                                          
72  Productivity Commission 2013, Trade & Assistance Review 2011-12, Canberra, page 77. 
73  Ibid., page 78. 
74  Productivity Commission 2010, Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Canberra. 
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particular circumstances of the bilateral or multilateral relationship. Intellectual property 
is one matter of concern in each complex and particular negotiation. (DR sub, page 3)75 
Although the Panel acknowledges that trade agreements are necessarily the outcome of a 
negotiation, trade negotiations must be based on an understanding of the costs and benefits to 
Australia of proposed IP provisions. This should be undertaken in an independent and 
transparent way and prior to negotiations being concluded.  
A number of submitters support trade negotiations being informed by an independent and 
transparent analysis of the costs and benefits to Australia of any proposed IP provisions, 
including: Australian Digital Alliance and Australian Libraries Copyright Committee (DR sub, 
page 4); CHOICE (DR sub, page 15); Australian Industry Group (DR sub, page 8); Electronic 
Frontiers Australia (DR sub, page 4); AIPPI Australia (DR sub, page 2); iiNet (DR sub, page 3); and 
Spier Consulting Legal (DR sub, page 4). 
Further to this, the Panel considers that a separate independent review should assess the Australian 
Government processes for establishing negotiating mandates to incorporate intellectual property 
provisions in international trade agreements.  
The Panel’s view  
Given the influence that Australia’s IP rights can have on facilitating (or inhibiting) innovation, 
competition and trade, the Panel considers that the IP system should be designed to operate in 
the best interests of Australians. 
Determining the appropriate extent of IP protection is complex. Given the complexity of the issues, 
there is a case for conducting an independent framework-style IP review. The review should have 
regard to recent reviews of specific aspects of IP, look at competition policy issues, new 
developments in technology and markets and international trade agreements. 
In the majority of cases, granting an IP right is unlikely to raise significant competition concerns. 
That said, IP rights, like all property rights can be used in a manner that harms competition. The 
use of IP rights should therefore be subject to the CCA. 
Independent and transparent analysis of the costs and benefits to Australia of any proposed IP 
provisions in trade negotiations should be undertaken to inform international trade negotiations. 
Implementation 
The Government should task the PC with undertaking a 12-month, framework-style review of IP in 
Australia. Because this recommendation does not require consultation with, or agreement by, the 
state and territory governments, it can be implemented by the Australian Government. The 
increasing pace of change and importance of technological developments to the Australian economy 
suggest that the Review be undertaken as soon as possible. The Panel suggests it should commence 
with 6 months of the Government accepting this recommendation. 
Repealing subsection 51(3) of the CCA should not be delayed pending the outcome of the Panel’s 
proposed PC review of IP provisions. Subsection 51(3) concerns the use of IP rights, not the extent of 
IP provisions, which is the focus of the proposed PC review. It can therefore be repealed at the same 
time as the other recommended changes to the CCA in this Review. 
                                                          
75  See also Australian Copyright Council, DR sub, page 4. 
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Recommendation 6 — Intellectual property review 
The Australian Government should task the Productivity Commission to undertake an overarching 
review of intellectual property. The Review should be a 12-month inquiry.  
The review should focus on: competition policy issues in intellectual property arising from new 
developments in technology and markets; and the principles underpinning the inclusion of 
intellectual property provisions in international trade agreements. 
A separate independent review should assess the Australian Government processes for 
establishing negotiating mandates to incorporate intellectual property provisions in international 
trade agreements.  
Trade negotiations should be informed by an independent and transparent analysis of the costs 
and benefits to Australia of any proposed intellectual property provisions. Such an analysis should 
be undertaken and published before negotiations are concluded. 
 
Recommendation 7 — Intellectual property exception 
Subsection 51(3) of the CCA should be repealed. 
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10 REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS  
Following the introduction of the National Competition Policy (NCP) in 1995, governments made a 
concerted effort to examine and reform regulation that restricted competition where those 
restrictions were not in the public interest. 
Australian laws at the Commonwealth and state and territory level were subject to review for 
anti-competitive impact as part of the NCP reforms, as set out in Box 10.1 below. 
Box 10.1: NCP Legislative Review Program 
In 1995, all Australian governments agreed that legislation (including Acts, enactments, ordinances 
and regulations) should not restrict competition unless it could be demonstrated that the benefits 
of the restriction to the community as a whole outweighed the costs, and that the objectives of 
the legislation could only be achieved by restricting competition.76 
Governments committed to review and, where appropriate, reform all legislation that restricted 
competition by 2000.  
Around 1,800 individual pieces of potentially anti-competitive legislation were identified as part of 
this process, which was later extended to 2005.  
Governments reviewed, and where appropriate reformed, around 85 per cent of their nominated 
legislation and around 78 per cent of ‘priority’ legislation.77 
These assessments were linked to the NCP payments from the Australian Government to the 
States and Territories.  
Regulatory restrictions can limit consumers’ ability to exercise choice and businesses’ ability to 
respond to consumers. They can determine who participates in the market, what they can produce 
and even the standard of the product or service they can provide.  
Regulatory restrictions can affect: who can supply; what can be supplied; and when and where 
supply can occur. While it is not practical for the Panel to examine all existing regulatory restrictions 
on competition, some of the broad categories are detailed below. These are raised in submissions 
and provide examples of areas requiring a reinvigorated program of regulatory review.  
                                                          
76  See clause 5 of the 1995 Council of Australian Governments inter-governmental Competition Principles Agreement. 
See also the discussion on the public interest test in Chapter 8. 
77  National Competition Council 2005, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition 
Policy and related reforms, Melbourne, page xi. 
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The Panel heard that, although much was achieved through regulatory reform, more remains to be 
done.  
Some restrictions applying to particular industries appear to support only a small number of market 
participants and may have perverse effects — such as mandated ethanol usage in New South Wales, 
which may have pushed motorists towards higher-priced premium fuels.78 Similarly, liquor licensing 
rules in Queensland that restrict packaged alcohol sales to holders of hotel licences appear to have 
induced major supermarkets to buy hotel licences, which may have made it harder for smaller 
independent stores to compete.79 
Such regulations are generally not contained in competition law,80 but rather in a multitude of 
Commonwealth, state and territory and local government laws and legislative instruments. Although 
generally intended to serve other public policy purposes (for example, health, safety, standards of 
conduct, consumer protection), regulatory restrictions can nonetheless adversely influence 
competition. For example, they may create barriers to entry, advantaging some businesses over 
others, or reducing incentives to compete.81  
These restrictions can take many forms, including the examples submitted by the Business Council of 
Australia (BCA) in Box 10.2 below. 
                                                          
78  ACCC sub 1, page 40 and section 15.2. 
79  See Deborah Smith, DR sub, page 4 and section 10.4. 
80  Subsection 51(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 provides that all jurisdictions can exempt specific 
conduct from competition laws by way of regulations or legislation. The Acts and Regulations that contain these 
exemptions are listed on the ACCC’s website. ACCC 2015, Exceptions under commonwealth, state & territory 
legislation, viewed 5 February 2015, 
www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/legislation/exceptions-under-commonwea
lth-state-territory-legislation. 
81  OECD 2014, How Can Competition Contribute to the G-20 Commitment to Raise GDP by at Least 2%?, page 2. 
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Box 10.2: Examples of regulatory restrictions on competition provided by the BCA82 
‘Regulation requiring imported cars to be modified to meet Australian-specific car design 
standards, as these differ from those of the US and the EU, restricting the scope for parallel 
imports and importation of second-hand cars. 
Restrictions on the parallel importation of commercial quantities of books by booksellers. 
Concessional excise treatment of domestically produced ethanol while imported ethanol pays full 
excise.  
The displaying of discounted fuel prices on fuel retailers’ price boards is specifically regulated in 
New South Wales and South Australia. 
A restricted number of taxi licences are issued in all states and territories, and competition from 
hire cars is mostly restricted.  
Packaged liquor can be sold by hotels in regional Western Australia on Sunday, but not by 
specialist packaged liquor stores. 
Retail pharmacies can only be owned by pharmacists (whereas no such restrictions exist on 
medical practices in Australia, nor on pharmacies in the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and 
the US). 
Restrictions on pharmacists administering vaccinations and re-issuing prescriptions for long-term 
conditions. 
Genetically modified crops cannot be grown in South Australia and Tasmania (but can be grown in 
all the other mainland States). 
The sale of fresh potatoes is restricted in Western Australia (but nowhere else in Australia). 
Owner driver and independent contractors are subject to industry-specific regulation in Western 
Australia, Victoria and New South Wales (but not other states). 
Compulsory workers’ compensation insurance and third party personal injury transport insurance 
are only available from government monopoly providers in some States.’  
This does not necessarily argue for complete deregulation. The Panel considers the focus should be 
on better regulation. Already, regulation serves the public interest in a range of areas, for example, 
to protect public safety. The goal is to ensure that regulation does not restrict competition, except to 
the extent required to meet other overriding policy objectives. Pro-competitive regulation, combined 
with governments’ general deregulation agendas, will provide a more efficient and effective 
marketplace that offers consumers better value and choice.  
The National Competition Council (NCC), which was tasked with assessing the progress of the review 
process, considers that the NCP legislation review program resulted in a ‘material reduction in 
unwarranted competition restrictions’, but that government self-assessment as the basis of reform 
had been ‘limiting’.83  
                                                          
82  Business Council of Australia, sub, Main Report, Exhibit 6, page 21. 
83  National Competition Council 2005, National Competition Council Assessment of governments’ progress in 
implementing the National Competition Policy and related reforms: 2005, Melbourne, page xii. 
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An independent and transparent process of assessment is more likely to hold all governments to 
account. Importantly, this assessment must examine the outcomes, not just the processes 
undertaken, and this requires a more thorough assessment.  
The NCP regulatory review process relied upon a generic, but limited, set of factors to assess public 
interest. The elements to consider in the public interest will necessarily differ on a case-by-case basis 
and a generic approach is understandable. However, providing governments with industry or 
regulation-specific guidance can also lead to a narrow approach being taken to assess public interest.  
Instead, an independent and transparent process of review can result in a level of public scrutiny 
that ensures that a thorough examination of the public interest takes place.  
The onus of proof in the NCP process was on those wishing to maintain the restriction to 
demonstrate that it continues to serve the public interest. There is no evidence that this produced 
poor outcomes. 
In addition to national reform agendas such as the NCP, and jurisdiction-specific reviews of pieces of 
regulation, governments can introduce processes to manage the stock and flow of regulation over 
time.84  
Clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) requires jurisdictions to review legislation 
that restricts competition, actually or potentially, once every ten years.85 However, as the Australian 
Competition and Consumers Commission (ACCC) submission notes, the impetus for review ‘slowed 
considerably’ once the competition payments ceased in 2006 (sub 1, page 21). 
Although the Australian Government and state and territory governments were signatories to the 
CPA, local governments also have power to make rules that can affect competition (see Box 10.3).  
Box 10.3: Local government and regulatory restrictions 
The 2012 Productivity Commission (PC) report on Performance Benchmarking of Australian 
Business Regulation: The Role of Local Government as Regulator86 discussed local government 
regulation in some detail. 
Local governments often have significant delegated power, which extends beyond formally making 
local laws. In many instances, local governments develop quasi-regulations — including rules, local 
government policies, codes, guidelines, conditions on permits, licences, leases or registrations — 
that can have a similar effect to local laws. 
In that report, the PC found ‘no state government had provided comprehensive training or 
guidance on how to administer and enforce regulation.’ 
 
                                                          
84  In its report on National Competition Policy, the Productivity Commission recommended that all Australian 
governments should ensure that they have in place effective and independent arrangements for monitoring new and 
amended legislation. (Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Arrangements, Canberra, 
page XLVII (Recommendation 9.2)). 
85  Council of Australian Governments 1995, Competition Principles Agreement, (as amended to 13 April 2007), Council 
of Australian Governments, viewed 27 February 2015, www.coag.gov.au/node/52. 
86  Productivity Commission 2012, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: The Role of Local 
Government as Regulator, Canberra, pages 13, 15 and 16. 
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Box 10.3: Local government and regulatory restrictions (continued) 
While exercising its duties, local government may face conflicting roles, which may raise 
competitive neutrality concerns. The PC notes specific examples, including ‘local governments can 
be the providers of certain facilities, such as waste depots and caravan parks, and regulate similar 
facilities provided by the private sector.’ 
The PC notes: 
...for practical reasons it is frequently difficult to remove such conflicts without 
significantly affecting the quality of services ... Transparency, conflict resolution and 
probity requirements are needed to address the potential for these conflicting roles to 
result in compromised decision-making.  
And concludes: 
Since conditions that are applied through approvals and registrations are given less 
scrutiny than conditions contained in local laws, there is greater scope for these 
conditions to impose direct or indirect costs on business and for competition to be 
restricted without being subject to a public interest test.  
Since local government rules can affect competition in much the same way as legislation or 
regulation, they should be made transparently and be subject to the same scrutiny and regulatory 
impact analysis as Commonwealth, state and territory laws and regulations.  
Regulatory impact analysis 
All Australian jurisdictions now have in place regulatory impact analysis procedures. 
Intra-jurisdictional approaches vary in their guidance and application, and there is a specific process 
for national reforms in the form of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) best-practice 
regulation guide.87 Principle 4 of the COAG Principles of Best Practice Regulation adopts the CPA 
legislation review principle that legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be 
demonstrated that:  
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the regulation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
The Panel recognises that regulatory impact analysis is important for managing the flow of 
regulation. We consider that the impact on competition should be an important element for 
consideration in any regulation-making process.  
                                                          
87  Council of Australian Governments 2007, COAG best practice regulation guide, Canberra. 
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The Panel’s view 
Regulatory impact analysis is an important part of policy development for new and amending 
regulations at the Commonwealth, state and territory and local government levels. The 
Competition Principles Agreement test for regulatory restrictions on competition (that legislation 
should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restrictions 
to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the legislation can only be 
achieved by restricting competition) should be retained and promoted as an important part of the 
process, to ensure that all governments consider competition policy on an ongoing basis. 
A NEW ROUND OF REGULATORY REVIEWS 
Regulatory restrictions on competition can have a significant negative impact on the economy. This 
can occur directly, by limiting economic activity in the regulated sector, or indirectly, as many sectors 
facing regulatory restrictions supply significant inputs to other business activities. While competition 
principles are enshrined in regulatory impact analysis frameworks for new regulations, the stock of 
existing regulations is large and needs continual review. 
A rigorous, transparent and independent assessment of whether regulations are in the public 
interest, with the onus on the party wishing to retain anti-competitive regulation, is important to 
ensure regulation serves the long-term interests of consumers. Although NCP reviews and reforms 
made substantial progress in eliminating anti-competitive regulations, not everything was 
considered, and the impact regulations have on competition can change over time.  
Now, more than 20 years since the Hilmer Review, and 10 years after the end of the formal 
regulation review processes that followed, the reform agenda needs reinvigorating. Submissions in 
response to both the Issues Paper and Draft Report provide a range of examples where review and, 
where appropriate, reform are needed. Further, jurisdictions have exempted more than 80 pieces of 
regulation from the operation of the competition law under subsection 51(1) of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). These should also be reviewed to assess whether they are still needed or 
can be made to be less anti-competitive.  
Submissions generally support the Draft Report’s recommendation for a new round of regulation 
review. While a broad range of submitters (particularly business submitters) support a national 
regulation review program,88 some submissions express the view that a national program is not 
needed and that more targeted reviews would suffice.89  
While acknowledging that there is likely to be less anti-competitive regulation than at the time of the 
NCP, the Panel believes it is still an issue requiring national attention. A national approach will 
provide momentum, impose discipline on all jurisdictions, and foster a nationally-consistent business 
regulatory environment. Further, reviews of the impact on competition are also distinct from, but 
complementary to, other ‘red tape reduction’ processes. The Panel is of the view that the factors to 
consider in assessing public benefits and costs should be determined on a case-by-case basis and not 
narrowed to a specific set of indicators. 
                                                          
88  See, for example: Australian Industry Group, DR sub, page 11; Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 
6; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 3; National Seniors Australia, DR sub, page 11; Plastics and Chemicals Industries 
Association, DR sub, page 4; Standards Australia, DR sub, page 4; and Suncorp Group DR sub, page 5. 
89  See, for example: CHOICE, DR sub, page 19; and South Australian Government, DR sub, page 14.  
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The Australian Local Government Association notes that state and territory governments will need to 
‘guide and assist councils in reviewing their regulatory obligations under state and territory laws’ 
(DR sub, page 7). 
The Panel also acknowledges submissions that express concern about excessive deregulation.90 What 
the Panel believes is needed is better regulation, and regulation that does not impede competition, 
rather than deregulation for its own sake.  
The Panel’s view 
The NCP reforms substantially reduced the amount of anti-competitive regulation. However, the 
regulation review process begun under the NCP has flagged and should be reinvigorated on a 
national level.  
Regulations should be assessed against the same COAG-agreed public interest test that was used 
under the NCP reforms from 1995 and later reaffirmed in the 2007 regulatory impact analysis 
framework COAG Best Practice Regulation: A Guide for Ministerial Councils and National Standard 
Setting Bodies (see discussion in Chapter 8). Factors to consider in assessing public benefits and 
costs should be determined on a case-by-case basis and not narrowed to a specific set of 
indicators.  
There will be many instances where some regulation is required, such as for health and safety 
reasons. The Panel is not suggesting there should be no regulation in those situations, but that 
regulation should be as pro-competitive as possible, when considered alongside other policy 
objectives. There is a need for better regulation rather than no regulation at all. 
Maintaining a rigorous, transparent and independent assessment of whether regulations serve the 
public interest, with the onus on the party wishing to retain anti-competitive regulation, is 
important to ensure that changes in regulation improve the wellbeing of Australians.  
The assessment should focus on outcomes achieved and not on processes undertaken. 
Implementation 
Within six months of accepting the recommendation, all jurisdictions should agree to a process for a 
renewed round of regulatory reviews to be undertaken by the Australian Government and state and 
territory governments. State and territory governments would also be responsible for reviewing, or 
assisting reviews of, local government regulations. Where regulatory reviews are already in place, 
such as the Australian Government’s deregulation agenda, competition principles should be included 
as part of those reviews. 
These regulation reviews must be embraced by all jurisdictions either individually or, preferably, 
collectively. The national approach taken under NCP was an important reason why regulation review 
was such a successful reform mechanism. Nationally consistent reforms should be preferred, where 
practical, to minimise regulatory compliance costs for businesses that operate across state and 
national borders. 
The review process should be transparent, with highest priority areas for review identified in each 
jurisdiction and results published along with timetables for reform. Priority reviews should be 
nominated within six months of jurisdictions agreeing to the new round of regulatory reviews.  
                                                          
90  For example, the clear concerns raised in many submissions about any relaxation of restrictions on the sale of alcohol. 
See Section 10.4.  
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The Panel acknowledges that, since the legislation review under the NCP, jurisdictions have 
progressed reform or made pro-competitive changes. This should not dampen the enthusiasm for 
improvement. The priority areas for review will differ between jurisdictions, with each government 
responsible for selecting which regulations to review. However, jurisdictions should work 
collaboratively to learn from the experiences of past reforms.  
The review process should be overseen by the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy 
(ACCP) (see Recommendation 43) with a focus on the outcomes achieved rather than the process 
undertaken. The ACCP should publish an annual report on progress of the reviews. 
The ACCP will provide the forum for all governments to collaborate and share their experiences. It 
should report annually on governments’ progress on undertaking regulatory reviews and 
implementing subsequent reform. 
Recommendation 8 — Regulation review 
All Australian governments should review regulations, including local government regulations, in 
their jurisdictions to ensure that unnecessary restrictions on competition are removed.  
Legislation (including Acts, ordinances and regulations) should be subject to a public interest test 
and should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:  
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
Factors to consider in assessing the public interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and not narrowed to a specific set of indicators.  
Jurisdictional exemptions for conduct that would normally contravene the competition law (by 
virtue of subsection 51(1) of the CCA) should also be examined as part of this review, to ensure 
they remain necessary and appropriate in their scope. Any further exemptions should be drafted 
as narrowly as possible to give effect to their policy intent. 
The review process should be transparent, with highest priority areas for review identified in each 
jurisdiction, and results published along with timetables for reform. 
The review process should be overseen by the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy 
(see Recommendation 43) with a focus on the outcomes achieved rather than processes 
undertaken. The Australian Council for Competition Policy should publish an annual report for 
public scrutiny on the progress of reviews of regulatory restrictions. 
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PRIORITY AREAS FOR REVIEW 
While the regulation reviews should be broad, the Panel considers that planning and zoning rules, 
the regulation of taxis and mandatory product standards (in particular greater acceptance of 
international product standards) are priority areas for review and should be commenced 
immediately.  
Governments should subsequently identify other priority areas as part of the national reform and 
review agenda (see Section 10.4). 
10.1 PLANNING AND ZONING 
Land can be used for a variety of purposes, including residential, industrial, commercial and 
conservation, which can include national parks. However, the unfettered market may not deliver an 
outcome across these various uses that is considered optimal for society as a whole. Hence, 
governments allocate land to particular uses through planning, zoning and development assessment. 
Although submissions note that planning processes are necessary to give the community an 
opportunity to have input into relevant developments (for example, the Queensland Law Society, 
sub, page 3), planning systems can create excessive barriers to entry, diversification or expansion, 
including by limiting the number, size, operating model and mix of businesses. This has the effect of 
making suppliers less responsive to the needs of consumers. 
Planning has been reviewed a number of times, as set out in Box 10.4, with reviews highlighting the 
need to reform planning and zoning rules across jurisdictions to increase competition and improve 
productivity.  
Box 10.4: Planning reviews 
NCP assessments 
The NCC’s 2003 assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the NCP noted that, under 
NCP, governments are broadly responsible for balancing objectives in developing planning 
schemes that are in the public interest.91 
Where legislative restrictions reflect the following principles, the NCC assessed the jurisdiction as 
having met its CPA obligations: 
• Planning processes minimise opportunities for existing businesses to prevent or delay 
participation by new competitors. 
• Jurisdictions considered and, where appropriate, provided for competition between 
government and private providers in planning approval processes. 
 
 
                                                          
91  National Competition Council 2003, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition 
Policy and related reforms: Volume two — Legislation review and reform, AusInfo, Canberra, page 10.2. 
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Box 10.4: Planning reviews (continued) 
All States and Territories except New South Wales and Western Australia were assessed as having 
met their obligations in 2003. 
By 2005 Western Australia was the only State that had not completed the reform activity.92 
ACCC grocery inquiry 
The 2008 ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices for standard groceries found that 
planning and zoning laws act as a barrier to establishing new supermarkets and that ‘little regard is 
had to competition issues in considering zoning or planning proposals.’93  
The report noted that independent supermarkets were particularly affected by impediments to 
new development, given the difficulties they have in obtaining access to existing sites. The ACCC 
received evidence of incumbent supermarkets using planning consultation and objection processes 
to ‘game’ the planning system to delay or prevent potential competitors entering local areas.94 
PC research report into planning, zoning and development assessments 
The PC’s 2011 research report into planning, zoning and development assessments95 found 
competition restrictions in retail markets evident in all States and Territories, and identified the 
following changes to planning and zoning systems that could improve competition: 
• reducing the prescriptiveness of zones and allowable uses, which would allow a wider range 
of businesses and developers to bid for the same land; 
• facilitating more ‘as-of-right’ development processes, where no discretionary action is 
required by the assessment body;  
• eliminating the impact on the viability of existing businesses as a consideration for 
development applications and re-zoning approval;  
• considering impacts on the viability of centres only during the metropolitan and strategic 
planning stages; 
• providing clear guidelines on alternative assessment paths to deal with larger scale and/or 
jurisdictionally significant or sensitive projects (for example, call-in powers of state ministers); 
and 
• accompanying appeal rights with disincentives to discourage their use for anti-competitive 
purposes. 
PC inquiry into the Australian retail industry 
The PC’s 2011 inquiry report, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail 
Industry, found that planning and zoning regulations were ‘complex, excessively prescriptive and 
often anti-competitive’.96 
                                                          
92  National Competition Council 2005, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition 
Policy and related reforms: 2005, Canberra, page 14.39. 
93  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008, Report of the ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail 
prices for standard groceries, Canberra, page xix. 
94  Ibid., pages xix and 194. 
95  Productivity Commission 2011, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning and 
Development Assessments, Research Report, Canberra, pages 277 and 352-355. 
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Box 10.4: Planning reviews (continued) 
The PC’s recommendations included: 
• State, territory and local governments should (where responsible) broaden business zoning 
and significantly reduce prescriptive planning requirements to allow the location of all retail 
formats in existing business zones to ensure that competition is not needlessly restricted. In 
the longer term, most business types (retail or otherwise) should be able to locate in the 
one business zone (PC Recommendation 8.1).  
• Governments should not consider the viability of existing businesses at any stage of 
planning, re-zoning or development assessment processes. Impacts of possible future retail 
locations on existing activity centre viability (but not specific businesses) should only be 
considered during strategic plan preparation or major review — not for site-specific 
re-zoning or individual development applications (PC Recommendation 8.2). 
• State, territory and local governments should facilitate more as-of-right development 
processes to reduce business uncertainty and remove the scope for gaming by competitors 
(PC Recommendation 8.3). 
PC study on relative costs of doing business in Australia 
The PC’s 2014 research report on Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade made 
two findings in this area:97  
• The Australian economy would benefit from further simplification of state and territory 
planning and zoning schemes that expand the supply of retail space by simplifying business 
zones and removing unnecessary restrictions on the allowable use of land within each zone. 
Victoria is leading the way in this space, and should serve as a model for other states and 
territories to follow (PC Finding 6.1). 
• The expected net benefits to the economy from state and territory government planning 
and zoning reforms will only be realised in full if local governments have the resources to 
effectively implement state and territory government policies consistently and as intended 
(PC Finding 6.2). 
Submissions raise a number of planning and zoning issues. The range of issues is broad and cast in 
different ways, but there is general dissatisfaction with the current arrangements. Some of this 
dissatisfaction may reflect individual decisions going against a proponent. However, in other cases, 
structural issues may be the root cause, as reviews like the PC’s research report into planning, zoning 
and development assessments conclude. 
Submissions suggest land use restrictions can pose considerable barriers to effective competition by 
constraining the supply of urban land, concentrating market power and creating barriers to entry for 
new businesses.98 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
96  Productivity Commission 2011, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry, Report no. 56, 
Canberra, page XIV and these findings were based on the Productivity Commission’s assessment from its 2011 
Research Report Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation: Planning, Zoning and Development 
Assessments. 
97  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 28 and Chapter 6. 
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Inflexible restrictions placed on retailers in relation to land use restrictions and costly approval 
procedures are also cited as examples of unnecessary barriers to business entry and expansion 
(Australian Retailers Association, sub, page 9). This issue is particularly relevant for emerging 
providers in the sharing economy. 
In relation to the retail sector, ALDI suggests its expansion has been considerably slower than 
planned on account of regulatory constraints. The retailer says that rigid and overly-prescriptive 
land-use planning and zoning rules have produced a chronic shortage of suitably zoned land for 
small-format supermarkets in many built-up areas. It goes on to state: 
More so than any other country in which it does business, ALDI has found the challenge of 
securing appropriate property holdings in Australia the single most significant brake on its 
expansion. (sub, page 4) 
Given that planning regulation can restrict the number and use of retail sites, it can confer significant 
negotiating power on established landlords and restrict commercial opportunities for others. The 
NSW Business Chamber suggests ‘removing unnecessary constraints on planning and zoning 
regulation would help new development and increase competition in the marketplace’ (sub, page 5). 
The City of Sydney submits that the city’s planning policy framework, which includes planning for 
centres, acts to protect the broader public interest. It suggests that focusing primary retail 
development in mixed-use centres — where they are supported by residential populations, 
complementary businesses and services, and community and transport infrastructure — provides the 
flexibility for existing centres to grow, while allowing new centres to establish. It also suggests that 
clustering activity together allows consumers to shop around in one location, compare products and 
prices, and make more informed decisions, which ultimately drives competition (DR sub, pages 3-4, 
10).  
The PC, on the other hand, argues that land-use regulation that centralises retail activity can be 
either competition-enhancing or competition-reducing, depending on how it is designed and 
implemented by the relevant planning authorities.99 
To this point, National Seniors Australia suggests: 
Not only can planning and zoning restrictions represent significant barriers to competition 
in retail markets, including supermarkets, they may also restrict new entrants to other 
markets of particular relevance to senior Australians, including markets for seniors 
housing eg retirement villages and aged care accommodation. (DR sub, page 11) 
The National Farmers’ Federation notes that the planning permit application process can deter a 
farm from increasing its intensity or efficiency as operational changes may trigger the need to obtain 
a planning permit. It also notes that local planning zones often provide permit exemptions for a 
range of agricultural uses and structures (DR sub, page 6). The South Australian government suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
98  For example, Urban Development Institute of Australia (sub, page 2) noted the new residential zones currently being 
introduced in Melbourne as part of the Victorian Government’s Metropolitan Planning Strategy will place a 
mandatory limit of two dwellings per lot for at least 50 per cent of residential areas in Melbourne. Also that this policy 
has the potential to lock large quantities of valuable urban land into an extremely limited range of uses, and is 
characteristic of planning systems throughout Australia. 
99  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 121. 
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that consideration of ‘fit for purpose’ land-use planning regimes may better assist primary industries 
and regional development (DR sub, page 13).  
Submissions also suggest that another issue is the lack of an economic objective in relation to 
planning. One submission states: 
...planning is not an area of government activity with clear, simple goals (other than 
motherhood statements about ‘building better communities’ and the like), and this leaves 
it ripe for capture by special interests. (Nick Wills-Johnson, sub, page 1)  
The Panel’s draft recommendation to include competition principles in the objectives of planning and 
zoning legislation is supported by a number of submitters.100 For example, Australian Industry Group 
notes:  
Planning and zoning restrictions can risk stifling competition when they fix existing land 
uses — and users over extended periods. Incorporating competition considerations is 
sensible and will potentially reduce the cost, complexity and time taken to challenge 
existing regulations. It is a worthy reform. (DR sub, page 10) 
Other submissions note that economic objectives already exist in planning and zoning regulations. 
They raise concerns about the overload of objectives in planning legislation and whether the draft 
recommendation would just add to complexity.101 
The Western Australian Local Government Association suggests that local governments would agree 
that any ‘excessive and complex zoning’ should be minimised to provide greater clarity for the 
community. However, it also submits that the planning system has been established to protect and 
enhance local communities and should not be seen purely as a market-driven consumer tool (DR sub, 
pages 11-13). 
Other local government associations do not support the draft recommendation.102 They note that 
‘councils have a legislated responsibility to take into account the broader interests of their municipal 
residents’ (Local Government Association of Tasmania, DR sub, page 6).  
Small retailers103 suggest planning and zoning controls are needed to protect competition and local 
communities. Others note that planning and zoning restrictions have been maintained in response to 
concerns that removing restrictions may devastate small business.104 
Master Grocers Australia/Liquor Retailers Australia (DR sub, page 28) and others105 recommend that 
councils have more guidelines on how to take account of competition. They suggest councils should 
                                                          
100  See, for example: ACCC, DR sub, pages 23-24; ALDI, DR sub, page 2; Australian Industry Group, DR sub, pages 10-11; 
Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 20; Australian Retailers Association, DR sub, page 4; Coles 
Group Limited, DR sub, page 5; Large Format Retail Association, DR sub, page 7; Shopping Centre Council of Australia, 
DR sub, pages 5-6; South Australian Government, DR sub, page 13; and Woolworths Limited, DR sub, page iv.  
101  See, for example: Local Government Association of Queensland, DR sub, page 5; National Farmers’ Federation, DR 
sub, page 6; and Peter Phibbs, DR sub, page 3. 
102  See, for example: Australian Local Government Association, DR sub, pages 6-7; and the Local Government Association 
of Queensland, DR sub, page 5. 
103  See, for example: Kepnock Residents Action Group, DR sub, page 11; Santos Retail, DR sub, page 2; and a number of 
IGA supermarkets and individuals. 
104  See, for example: Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 5; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, DR 
sub, page 8; and Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 5. 
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apply a ‘net community benefit test’, which would reflect the desire of the local population in 
determining whether a developer or retail tenant is desirable in a region. Many small retailers say 
they disagree with ‘the principle that more floor space and more entrants in a market equals more 
competition’.106 
Some submissions raise concerns about the Draft Report’s focus on ensuring arrangements do not 
explicitly or implicitly favour incumbent operators,107 with some proposing a neutral formulation to 
ensure that neither new nor incumbent businesses receive a competitive advantage.108 
Local governments, police and community organisations express concern that changes to planning 
and zoning rules could increase the availability of alcohol and the incidence of alcohol-related harm. 
A significant number of submitters urge the Panel to ensure that competition policy does not 
interfere with the rights of state and territory governments to impose controls on the sale of alcohol 
or to limit the trading hours of outlets, the type of outlets (including supermarkets) and the number 
of outlets in the interests of community safety and wellbeing. 109 
Liquor is addressed specifically in Section 10.4. In addition, the Panel notes that although, as a 
general policy, competition should be taken into account as an important part of the planning and 
zoning process, this should not be interpreted as removing any ability for governments to take full 
account of harm minimisation as an objective.  
A number of governments have recognised problems presented by planning rules, with reviews 
either underway, or recently completed in most jurisdictions. For a number of incoming 
governments, reform of planning laws has been a priority. 
Yet, despite the numerous reviews of planning and zoning, implementing reform has been slow.  
That said, while agreeing that progress in implementation has been slow and patchy, the PC notes 
that Victoria is ahead of other jurisdictions in implementing leading practices for planning and zoning 
(see Box 10.5).110 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
105  See, for example: Jean Cowley, DR sub, page 1; Walter Daly, DR sub, page 1; Kepnock Residents Action Group, DR sub, 
pages 10-11; and Ritchies Stores, DR sub, page 3. 
106  See, for example: Santos Retail, DR sub, page 1-2; and a number of IGA supermarkets and individuals. 
107  See, for example: Grain Producers of South Australia, DR sub, page 2; and the Shopping Centre Council of Australia, 
DR sub, page 5. 
108  See, for example: Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 20; and Shopping Centre Council of 
Australia, DR sub, page 5. 
109  See, for example: ACT Policing, DR sub, page 9-10; Australasian Professional Society on Alcohol and other Drugs, DR 
sub, page 2; Australian Health Promotion Association, DR sub, page 1; Brimbank City Council, DR sub, pages 1-2; 
Cancer Council NSW, DR sub, page 2; City of Port Phillip, DR sub, pages 1-2; Foundation for Alcohol Research and 
Education, DR sub, pages 13-15; Hobsons Bay Council, DR sub, pages 1-2; Local Government Association of Tasmania, 
DR sub, pages 6-7; Maribyrnong City Council, DR sub, pages 1-2; McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth, DR 
sub, pages 1-2; Municipal Association of Victoria, DR sub, pages 5-6; National Alliance for Action on Alcohol, DR sub, 
pages 6-7; National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, DR sub, pages 2-3; Planning Institute of Australia, DR sub, page 
5; and VicHealth, DR sub, page 3. 
110  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
pages 124-126.  
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Box 10.5: Examples of planning reforms in Victoria111 
1. Broadening business zones 
In 2013, Victoria reformed business zones by simplifying requirements and allowing a broader 
range of activities to be considered. The previous five business zones have been condensed into 
two broader commercial zones, increasing permissible uses within the zones. The PC expects the 
benefits of the reform to include: more mixed uses and diversity within employment precincts; 
making the property sector more responsive to changes in demand for various business 
types/models; and removing planning barriers to investment. 
2. Simpler permit process 
In September 2014, Victoria introduced VicSmart, a new development permit process for 
low-impact development applications costing less than $50,000. Under VicSmart, the waiting time 
on permit applications has been reduced from 40 to 10 days. Streamlined processes are also being 
introduced at the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal to reduce the time taken and other 
cost burdens associated with decision appeals. 
3. Metropolitan planning strategy 
‘Plan Melbourne’, which is a strategy document for the future development of the city, was 
released for public comment in 2013 and adopted as government policy in 2014. Plan Melbourne 
proposes a less prescriptive approach to planning and zoning through greater use of higher density 
mixed-use zones and the removal of retail floor space and office caps in activity centres. 
The PC notes the need for continuing reform in its 2014 research report, Relative Costs of Doing 
Business in Australia: Retail Trade, but its rationale could equally apply to planning and zoning more 
broadly: 
Continued action by state, territory and local governments in implementing the leading 
practices previously identified by the Commission and others…is needed to ensure that 
the market for retail space is competitive and least-cost, while still achieving the desired 
outcomes of planners in relation to amenity and other community objectives.112 
The Planning Institute of Australia advocates adopting a set of planning system principles across the 
country to provide a framework for the effective operation of planning systems (DR sub, page 4). 
Given that reform is already underway around the country,113 an opportunity exists to make 
comparisons across jurisdictions to determine ‘best practice’ as a basis for updating and improving 
current requirements. 
                                                          
111  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra 
Chapter 6, also Victorian Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 2014, Improving the System, 
Department of Transport Planning and Local Infrastructure, Melbourne, viewed 28 January 2015, 
www.dtpli.vic.gov.au/planning/about-planning/improving-the-system and Victorian Metropolitan Planning Authority 
2014, Plan Melbourne, Plan Melbourne, Melbourne, viewed 28 January 2015, 
www.planmelbourne.vic.gov.au/Plan-Melbourne. 
112  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 133. 
113  For example, the Western Australian Local Government Association (DR sub, page 12) notes a 2010 review of Western 
Australia’s State Planning Policy relating to Activities Centres which led to the removal of the previous cap on 
metropolitan floor space. 
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Box 10.6 sets out an example of how competition can be considered as part of the planning process. 
The Panel endorses this as a good example of the principles that should be considered as part of 
reforming planning and zoning rules. 
Box 10.6: Example of how competition issues can be considered in the planning context 
In 2010, a New South Wales government report114 recommended ways to ensure the planning 
process does not unreasonably restrict competition by inadvertently creating barriers to entry, or 
by discouraging innovative forms of development to emerge. 
The report recommended developing a State Environment Planning Policy covering competition 
policy in planning decisions, including three important clarifications: 
• Competition between individual businesses is not in itself a relevant planning consideration 
(that is, the loss of trade for an existing business is not normally a relevant planning 
consideration and that a planning authority should not consider the commercial viability of a 
proposed development). 
• Restricting the numbers of a particular type of retail store in any local environmental plan or 
development control plan is invalid. 
• Proximity restrictions on particular types of retail stores contained in local environmental 
plans or development control plans are invalid. 
Some comparison work has already been undertaken, for example: 
• An independent advisory forum of government, industry and planning professions, the 
Development Assessment Forum, set out 10 leading practices for jurisdictions to adopt with a 
view to a simpler, more effective approach to development assessment in its 2005 ‘Leading 
Practice Model for Development Assessment’.115 
• The Property Council of Australia’s 2013 report Property Interests: Benchmarks for Queensland 
Planning Schemes contains details of existing planning scheme codes that it considers 
workable and effective examples.116  
                                                          
114  New South Wales Department of Planning and the New South Wales Better Regulation Office 2010, Promoting 
Economic Growth and Competition through the Planning System: Review Report, Sydney. 
115  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 123. 
116  PSA Consulting Australia 2013, Property Interests: Benchmarks for Queensland Planning Schemes, Property Council of 
Australia, Brisbane, page 23. 
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The Panel’s view 
Planning and zoning requirements can restrict competition by creating unnecessary barriers to 
entry. The regulations should encourage competition and not act to limit entry into a market. 
Reform to, or reviews of, planning and zoning are already underway around the country. An 
opportunity exists to make comparisons across jurisdictions to determine ‘best practice’ as a basis 
for updating and improving current requirements. Implementing reform in this area should be 
advanced more quickly than has been the case to date. 
Implementation 
Planning and zoning laws and regulations are the responsibility of state and territory and local 
governments. Within two years, each of these governments should implement reforms to ensure the 
rules do not unnecessarily restrict competition. As part of this process, collaboration across 
jurisdictions can assist in developing ‘best practice’ guidelines that each government can adopt in 
line with its own local considerations. 
The proposed ACCP can provide the forum in which this collaboration can occur — and 
independently assess progress across the jurisdictions.  
Given the numerous reviews of planning and zoning rules in many States and Territories, 
implementation of reform should be able to proceed as a priority. 
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Recommendation 9 — Planning and zoning 
Further to Recommendation 8, state and territory governments should subject restrictions on 
competition in planning and zoning rules to the public interest test, such that the rules should not 
restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restriction to the 
community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the rules can only be achieved by 
restricting competition.  
The following competition policy considerations should be taken into account: 
• Arrangements that explicitly or implicitly favour particular operators are anti-competitive. 
• Competition between individual businesses is not in itself a relevant planning consideration. 
• Restrictions on the number of a particular type of retail store contained in any local area is 
not a relevant planning consideration. 
• The impact on the viability of existing businesses is not a relevant planning consideration.  
• Proximity restrictions on particular types of retail stores are not a relevant planning 
consideration. 
• Business zones should be as broad as possible. 
• Development permit processes should be simplified. 
• Planning systems should be consistent and transparent to avoid creating incentives for 
gaming appeals. 
An independent body, such as the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 43) should be tasked with reporting on the progress of state and territory 
governments in assessing planning and zoning rules against the public interest test. 
10.2 TAXIS AND RIDE-SHARING 
The taxi industry in most States and Territories remains heavily regulated, despite being a priority 
reform area identified under the NCP regulation review program and most subsequent reviews 
recommending substantial reform.117 
Regulations cover minimum quality standards for taxi services, a range of other requirements that 
amount to community service obligations (CSOs), restrictions preventing other services from 
competing directly with taxis and restrictions limiting the number of taxis that can operate.  
Regulations governing quality cover areas such as the age of vehicles, roadworthiness, driver 
presentation and knowledge, as well as access to radio dispatch facilities. These regulations are 
aimed at ensuring minimum standards to promote public confidence that taxis are safe and will 
provide a minimum standard of service. On the whole, they appear to impose little cost on the taxi 
industry and their customers because they do not significantly restrict competition between taxi 
services.  
The taxi industry reports that many additional regulations imposed on it create CSOs that competing 
services do not comply with. For example, Taxi Council Queensland notes that the taxi industry in 
Queensland is required among other things to: 
                                                          
117  National Competition Council 2005, Annual Report 2004-2005, Melbourne, pages 35-36. 
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• provide a booking service for all communities with more than 10,000 residents; 
• provide services on demand, 24 hours per day, for 365 days of the year; 
• accept all reasonable requests, meaning that passengers must be served in sequential order, 
with the exception of wheelchair-accessible taxis, which must give priority to passengers in a 
wheelchair or on a mobility scooter; 
• have taximeters, which are automated for certain tariff times and public holidays, able to apply 
tolls and access fees, with various restrictions to prevent tampering; 
• operate to Minimum Service Levels stipulated in contracts; and 
• operate a lost property service (DR sub, page 4). 
In addition to regulations covering service standards and obligations, most States and Territories also 
restrict the quantity of taxis by requiring each taxi to have a licence and limiting the number and 
types of licences issued.118 This has the effect of limiting responsiveness to consumer demand. There 
is no restriction on the number of taxi drivers. 
New taxi licences are typically issued on an infrequent and ad hoc basis with different sale methods 
in the States and Territories resulting in large variations in sale price. Most people wishing to obtain a 
taxi licence must purchase one from an existing licence holder.  
Although laws that regulate safety and minimum service levels are commonplace in the Australian 
economy, the taxi industry is virtually unique among customer service industries in having absolute 
limits on the number of service providers.  
The Australian Taxi Industry Association considers that: 
… State and Territory Governments cap the supply of taxi licenses (or permits) at levels 
that aim to balance customer convenience and service (for example measurable in terms 
of waiting times) with the viability of taxi drivers’ and operators’ small businesses. This 
leads to supply caps well in excess of normal demand, although less than the number 
required to service peak demand without some acceptable diminution in service level. 
(sub, page 7) 
However, the Panel notes that most service industries face variable demand, and that businesses are 
able to operate without regulation limiting the number of operators.  
The scarcity of taxi licences has seen prices paid for licences at $390,000 in New South Wales and 
$290,000 in Victoria, which indicates that significant economic rents accrue to owners of taxi licences 
and is at odds with the claim that licence numbers are balanced given market conditions.119  
IPART estimates that in New South Wales 15 to 20 per cent of the taxi fare arises as a result of 
restrictions on the number of licences and notes that the passengers who stand to benefit from 
reform include a significant number of lower-income earners, many of whom have limited transport 
options on account of their age or disabilities (sub, page 7).  
                                                          
118  Ibid., pages 35-36. 
119  Australian Taxi Industry Association 2013, Taxi Statistics, State and Territory Statistics as at December 2013. Australian 
Taxi Industry Association, Brisbane, viewed 20 February 2015, www.atia.com.au/taxi%1estatistics/. 
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In each jurisdiction and nationally, the industry has been subject to a series of reviews dating back 
more than two decades.120 However, apart from recent reforms in Victoria (see Box 10.7), there has 
been little reform. The Victorian case demonstrates that change for the benefit of consumers is 
possible.  
Box 10.7: Victorian taxi reforms 
In Victoria, dissatisfaction with taxi costs and service levels led the State Government to undertake 
fundamental reforms, mostly along the lines recommended by the Taxi Industry Inquiry 2012.121  
These reforms include: 
• increased pay and higher standards for drivers under a new mandatory Driver Agreement; 
• improvements to the fare structure including peak and off-peak pricing; 
• cutting the service fee for card payment from 10 per cent to five per cent; 
• regulated fares moving from prescribed fares to maximum fares, providing the ability for 
customers to be offered discounted rates, such as lower fares to the airport; 
• a zoning system — metro, urban (including large regional centres), regional, and country — 
with separate licence fees applying; 
• opening the market, with the Taxi Services Commission issuing new licences as the market 
demands, with a set annual fee for licences—the fee will be lower in regional and country 
areas and for wheelchair-accessible vehicles; 
• applying a new ‘consumer interest test’ to regional and country zones to gauge the benefits 
of new licences for customers; 
• enabling taxis and hire cars to compete for contract work to fill the gaps in public transport 
services; and 
• removing the requirement to offer taxi services on a continuous basis, allowing taxi 
operators to set their own hours.122 
Technological change is also disrupting the taxi industry, with ride-sharing apps, such as Uber, 
connecting passengers with private drivers. Traditional booking methods are also being challenged 
by the emergence of apps such as GoCatch and ingogo.  
The advent of ride-sharing services both in Australia and overseas has been particularly controversial, 
with regulatory agencies questioning their legality and fining drivers,123 notwithstanding public 
acceptance of and demand for ride-sharing services.  
                                                          
120  See, for example: Industry Commission 1994, Urban Transport, Melbourne. 
121  Taxi Services Commission Victoria 2012, Final Report — Customers First: Service, Safety, Choice, Victoria.  
122  Taxi Services Commission Victoria, Taxi and Hire Car Reform, Taxi Services Commission, viewed 30 January 2015 
www.taxi.vic.gov.au/taxi-reform/about-taxi-and-hire-car-reforms. 
123  Thomson, A, 8 May 2014, About 50 Uber drivers have been fined $1700 in crackdown by Taxi Services Commission, 
Herald Sun, Melbourne viewed 10 February 2015, 
www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/about-50-uber-drivers-have-been-fined-1700-in-crackdown-by-the-taxi-service
s-commission/story-fni0fit3-1226910856247; Jackson, E, 16 October 2014, Uber drivers risk fines, Qld govt warns 
Brisbane Times, Brisbane, viewed 10 February 2015, 
www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/uber-drivers-risk-fines-qld-govt-warns-20141016-1177nf.html and  
Grubb, B, 8 May 2014, Victoria government issues $1700 fines to Uber ride-sharing drivers as media gaffe surfaces, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 2014, Sydney, viewed 2 February 2015, 
www.smh.com.au/digital-life/smartphone-apps/victoria-government-issues-1700-fines-to-uber-ridesharing-drivers-as
-media-gaffe-surfaces-20140508-zr6yp.html. 
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National Seniors Australia notes that new technologies are empowering consumers: 
... the digital revolution — including the growing use of mobile telephone applications in 
combination with satellite navigation technologies — is giving rise to opportunities for 
new entrants to break down existing taxi network monopolies, enabling consumers to 
exercise greater choice and receive prompter service. It will be important to ensure that 
these innovations are not stifled by further anti-competitive regulation aimed at 
protecting incumbents. (sub, pages 14-15) 
Taxi Council Queensland considers that taxis and ride-sharing are readily substitutable and should 
therefore be subject to the same rules and obligations. It considers that ride-sharing platforms are 
competing unfairly, since they do not comply with the universal service obligation requirements that 
taxis must comply with: 
These services are illegal de facto taxi services masquerading as a collaborative 
consumption model. (DR sub, page 10) 
and 
… the Henry Tax Review panel believed [universal] service obligations essentially ‘tax’ 
low-cost users who subsidise high-cost users. (DR sub, page 5) 
A regulatory double standard should not be allowed to persist. One option would be to 
review the USO [universal service obligation], in line with the Henry Tax Review panel’s 
recommendation. (DR sub, page 5) 
Conversely, Uber considers that: 
While ridesharing competes with the taxi industry, ridesharing is not a taxi service ... 
Notably, ridesharing trips (as with all services facilitated by platforms such as the Uber 
app) are not anonymous, cannot be hailed on the street, do not use taxi ranks and do not 
have taximeters. (DR sub, page 1) 
A number of state and territory governments have determined that Uber is acting outside current 
industry regulations and issued fines to Uber drivers.124 The Panel does not endorse illegal activity, 
nor encourage new players to ignore or defy relevant laws or regulations. The Panel’s primary 
concern is to ensure that the regulations respond to changes in technology in a way that allows new 
entrants to meet consumer demand, while continuing to ensure the health and safety of consumers.  
Box 1.5 in Part 1 of this Report discusses technological versus regulatory solutions to market failure. 
Although taxi reform is not expected to make a major contribution to national productivity, the 
sector is an important component of metropolitan transport and can be particularly important for 
the mobility of the elderly and those with a disability. More affordable and convenient taxi services 
give consumers options. Significantly, reduced barriers to entry could see more services operate at 
peak times, without needing to operate at off-peak times. 
The Panel considers that the longstanding failure to reform taxi regulation has undermined the 
credibility of governments’ commitment to competition policy more broadly, making it harder to 
argue the case for reform in other areas. The Victorian example demonstrates that change is possible 
and technological disruption suggests that consumer-driven change is inevitable.  
                                                          
124  Ibid. 
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The focus of reform in the taxi industry needs to be twofold: to reduce or eliminate restrictions on 
the supply of taxis that limit choice and increase prices for consumers; and to encourage 
technological change that can benefit consumers. There is also an opportunity for the taxi industry to 
consider a reduction in the current level of red tape that applies to their industry.  
An important element of reforming regulation should be to separate out CSOs currently embedded 
in taxi regulation and fund those CSOs explicitly. This would allow the taxi industry and ride-sharing 
services to compete with each other more effectively.  
The ACT Government recently announced a review of its taxi industry regulation to ensure that it 
adequately protects consumers but is also supportive of new technologies.125 
The Panel’s view 
Taxi industry reform in most States and Territories is long overdue. Many restrictions remain that 
limit competition by creating barriers to entry and preventing innovation. 
The regulatory framework for taxi regulation could be enhanced considerably through 
independent regulators having the power to make determinations (rather than 
recommendations), including on the number and type of taxi licences to be issued. 
Mobile technologies are emerging that compete with traditional taxi booking services and support 
the emergence of innovative passenger transport services. Any regulation of such services should 
be consumer-focused, flexible enough to accommodate technical solutions to the problem being 
regulated and not inhibit innovation or protect existing business models. 
Further regulatory review of the industry is necessary to take account of the impact of new 
technologies. 
10.3 GOODS — STANDARDS 
Restrictions on the sale of goods can come in a range of forms, including through adopting standards, 
both Australian and international. Restrictions on the sale of goods reduce businesses’ ability to 
respond to consumer demand. 
Adherence to standards can be mandated in law (explicitly or through delegated decision making) or 
by voluntary adoption by certain industry participants. When compliance with a standard is 
mandatory, there is a greater likelihood of an anti-competitive effect. 
Standards may be in the public interest for many policy reasons, including health, safety and 
consumer protection. Submissions note that standards can provide efficiencies, address information 
asymmetries and generate cost savings.126 
Standards can also promote competition by facilitating interoperability. For example, having no 
standards for car tyre sizes could limit competition since not all manufacturers would be able to 
produce tyres to fit all car wheels — reducing the scope for efficiencies of scale as well.  
                                                          
125  Rattenbury, S 2015, Taxi review to increase innovation, choice and value, media release, 28 January, Canberra.  
126  See, for example: Australian Industry Group, sub, page 15. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
136 Part 3 — Competition Policy 
However, on occasion, the way standards are adopted or referenced in law provide unnecessarily 
high or differential requirements for goods or services, dampening competition or creating barriers 
to market entry and innovation.  
Submissions provide examples where standards mandated by law can impede growth and 
innovation, including food safety regulation being directed at specific process requirements rather 
than the outcomes for food safety.127 Box 10.8 discusses the role of Standards Australia in accrediting 
standards for goods and services. 
Box 10.8: Standards Australia  
Standards Australia is a non-government body with a memorandum of understanding with the 
Australian Government to accredit Australian Standards for goods and services.  
There are more than 6,800 Australian Standards, the large majority of which are voluntary. Others 
are made mandatory through regulation; some are agreed to be mandatory between parties in 
private contracts.  
Standards Australia requires that all Australian Standards, regardless of who develops them, must 
demonstrate positive net benefit to the community as a whole. One of the required considerations 
is the impact on competition.128 This mechanism provides the opportunity for Standards Australia 
to examine the impact on competition and ultimately the outcomes for purchasers of the goods or 
services, not just the burden on industry.  
In 2012, Standards Australia committed to review, revise, re-confirm, or withdraw all standards 
published more than 10 years ago. It considers that this initiative helped to ensure the catalogue is 
current, internationally aligned, and that the standards are not an unnecessary burden on industry 
(sub, page 4).  
Standards Australia has a policy of adopting international standards129 wherever possible,130 which 
should assist in minimising regulatory barriers to import competition.  
Given that industry collaboration in relation to standards could be considered anti-competitive, 
paragraph 51(2)(c) of the CCA provides that agreements relating to the implementation of Australian 
Standards are exempt from the operation of the competition law.  
The Hilmer Review accepted continuation of the exemption recognising that, generally speaking, 
harmonisation through standards is a good thing, enhancing efficiency, making products more 
substitutable and facilitating development of service industries for standardised goods. However, the 
Hilmer Review also noted the risks of standards raising barriers to entry where they are incorporated 
                                                          
127  For example, Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub, page 19 and Attachment 5, provides examples of regulations 
that impede competition, growth and innovation in the food and grocery sector, including regulation of agricultural 
and veterinary chemicals residue, industrial chemicals, metrology markings and medicines. 
128  Standards Australia, Net Benefit, Standards Australia, Sydney, viewed 2 February 2015, 
www.standards.org.au/StandardsDevelopment/What_is_a_Standard/Pages/Net-Benefit.aspx. 
129  International standards include those developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).  
130  Standards Australia, Net Benefit, Standards Australia, Sydney, viewed 30 January 2015, 
www.standards.org.au/InternationalEngagement/Pages/default.aspx. 
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into legislation and mandate particular technologies or systems rather than performance 
outcomes.131  
No submission suggests removing the exemption from the competition law for collaboration on 
Australian Standards in paragraph 51(2)(c) of the CCA. Differing levels of standards can sometimes be 
required to meet a public policy objective, on account of localised factors such as climatic, 
geographic or technological issues — a point recognised by the World Trade Organisation.132 
Standards can also create significant barriers to competition by restricting substitution. If a product 
or service meets international standards, a strong policy case would be needed for a different 
standard to apply in Australia (particularly if it is to be mandated); otherwise, it may amount to little 
more than a barrier to import competition. Examples of standards that were noted in submissions as 
raising concerns are in Box 10.9 below.  
The Panel notes that COAG has recently agreed to ‘explore adopting, as a general principle, trusted 
international standards or risk assessment processes for systems, services and products, unless it can 
be demonstrated that there is good reason not to’.133 Further, the Australian Government has 
announced its adoption of this principle in its Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda, citing 
regulation of medical devices and chemicals as priority areas that the Government will reform in 
addition to broader consultations.134 The Panel supports these processes. 
Box 10.9: Examples of standards provided in submissions 
Issues raised in submissions Further information 
Standards can provide a strong 
disincentive against new 
competitors entering an industry, 
growing their enterprise or 
diversifying.135  
Examples include:  
• a geosynthetic product imported from Germany that 
meets EU standards still requires re-testing in 
Australia by VicRoads; 
• vehicle air conditioning refrigerant has strict controls 
in Australia, including licensing mechanics that use it, 
whereas the US has no such restrictions; and 
• a new conveyor belt lubricant developed in the US but 
the manufacturer decided against selling it in Australia 
due to costs and delays in the chemicals approval 
process (but is available in NZ, where there is stronger 
recognition of other countries’ accreditation). 
                                                          
131  Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, page 154. 
132  World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, World Trade Organisation, Geneva, viewed 3 
February 2015, www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
133  Council of Australian Governments 10 October 2014, COAG communique, COAG, Canberra, page 3, viewed on 3 
February 2015, www.coag.gov.au/node/521. 
134  Australian Government 2014, Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda Report: An action plan for a stronger 
Australia, Proposal 1 page 31, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, viewed 3 February 2015, 
www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/publication/industry-innovation-and-competitiveness-agenda-report-action-plan-stronger- 
australia. 
135  Hon. John Lloyd PSM, sub, page 8. 
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Box 10.9: Examples of standards provided in submissions (continued) 
Products that do not conform with 
regulatory, Australian or industry 
standards (i.e., non-conforming 
products) can obtain an unfair cost 
advantage over the majority of 
businesses that comply with 
Australian Standards.136 
Localised standards should not be assumed to be necessary 
or desirable per se. If a standard is necessary for other policy 
reasons, such as safety, it should be mandated by 
governments and effectively enforced. 
The costs to the community and 
car buyers of policing regulation of 
safety and environmental 
standards, as well as the risks to 
purchasers of less certain vehicle 
history, outweigh the benefits of 
lower purchase prices.137 
The PC’s inquiry into Australia’s automotive manufacturing 
industry examined import restrictions and standards for 
used vehicles. It concluded: 
The progressive relaxation of restrictions on the 
importation of used passenger and light commercial 
vehicles, within a regulatory compliance framework that 
provides appropriate levels of community safety, 
environmental performance and consumer protection, 
would have net benefits for the Australian community. 
These benefits include lower prices and/or improved 
vehicle features at a particular price point, and greater 
choice for vehicle buyers.138 
Lack of specificity in requirements 
of labelling and country of 
origin-related laws is leading to 
poor information to consumers 
and lower competition.139  
Submissions propose that additional regulation would 
improve the competitive process for certain food and 
beverage products. 
Calls for greater equality and 
consistency in enforcement of food 
standards, regarding imports 
versus domestic products.140  
Submissions are concerned that the more rigorous processes 
being applied to domestic products are affecting 
competition.  
Submissions to the Draft Report generally support both the existence of standards and the need to 
review them periodically to ensure that they remain pro-competitive.141 Standards Australia supports 
the intent of a standards review but notes that comprehensive reviews require consideration of 
supporting technical specifications and other referenced documents.142  
                                                          
136  See, for example: Australian Industry Group, sub, page 16; and National Electrical and Communications Association, 
sub, page 4. 
137  Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, sub, page 3. 
138  Productivity Commission 2014, Australia’s Automotive Manufacturing Industry, Inquiry Report No. 70, Canberra, 
page 129. See also Recommendation 5.4. 
139  See, for example: Cider Australia, sub, page 1; and Griffith and District Citrus Growers’ Association, sub, page 4. 
140  KAGOME Australia, sub, page 11. 
141  See, for example: ACCC DR sub, page 24; Australian Industry Group DR, sub, page 15; Law Council of Australia — SME 
Committee, DR sub, page 9. 
142  Standards Australia, DR sub, page 4. 
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The Law Council of Australia — SME Committee notes concern that large businesses could use the 
adoption of voluntary Australian Standards to unduly raise compliance costs for small business or 
may even have the effect of excluding imports from the market altogether.143 
The Panel’s view 
Australia has a range of restrictions on the supply of goods. As in the provision of services, many of 
them are worthwhile for policy reasons, such as health and safety. However, they can also create 
barriers to entry. Any necessary restrictions on the supply of goods should be implemented in a 
way that does not unduly restrict competition. 
There are also clear examples where different international and domestic standards are 
dampening or distorting import competition — particularly where the domestic standards are 
mandated (directly or indirectly) by law. The Panel supports COAG’s recent decision to examine 
whether international standards can be more commonly accepted in Australia and the Australian 
Government’s recent reforms announced in its Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda. 
Further, the Panel considers that product standards that are directly or indirectly mandated by law 
should be reviewed as a priority. 
The Panel notes that submissions do not support removing the exemption from the competition 
laws, contained in paragraph 51(2)(c) of the CCA, for agreements relating to the implementation of 
Australian Standards. However, as all standards (whether mandated by law or not) have the 
capacity to restrict competition, Standards Australia should periodically review Australian 
Standards against the same public interest test used to assess the competition impacts of 
government regulations (see Recommendation 8). 
Implementation 
Each jurisdiction should review mandatory product standards in its jurisdiction over two years 
following its acceptance of Recommendation 10. These reviews should be co-ordinated at a 
whole-of-government level to determine where such standards are restricting competition and 
whether it is in the public interest to do so.  
Within 12 months of accepting Recommendation 10, state and territory governments that have not 
recently reviewed the regulation of taxis and ride-sharing (including their impact on competition) 
should commence a comprehensive review to identify whether regulatory restrictions on 
competition are in the public interest.  
Restrictions that are identified as not being in the public interest should be removed or amended as 
soon as possible.  
Within 18 months of accepting Recommendation 11, the Australian Government should re-negotiate 
its Memorandum of Understanding with Standards Australia to require periodic reviews of 
non-mandated (i.e., voluntarily adopted) Australian Standards against the public interest test. These 
reviews should be conducted on a staggered, ongoing basis — with Standards Australia being able to 
consult the ACCP (see Recommendation 43) or the ACCC for advice, if it identifies a Standard that 
may be anti-competitive. Where a Standard appears to be anti-competitive, Standards Australia 
should seek advice on any possible improvements from the ACCP.  
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Recommendation 10 — Priorities for regulation review 
Further to Recommendation 8, and in addition to reviewing planning and zoning rules 
(Recommendation 9), the following should be priority areas for review: 
• Taxis and ride-sharing: in particular, regulations that restrict numbers of taxi licences and 
competition in the taxi industry, including from ride-sharing and other passenger transport 
services that compete with taxis. 
• Mandatory product standards: i.e., standards that are directly or indirectly mandated by 
law, including where international standards can be adopted in Australia.  
 
Recommendation 11 — Standards review 
Given the unique position of Australian Standards under paragraph 51(2)(c) of the CCA, Australian 
Standards that are not mandated by government should be subject to periodic review against the 
public interest test (see Recommendation 8) by Standards Australia. 
10.4 OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the priority areas of planning and zoning, taxis and ride-sharing and mandatory 
product standards that the Panel has identified for review, other regulations should be considered as 
part of a national regulation review agenda. Six broad areas that were raised in submissions are set 
out below, noting that this is not an exhaustive list — potential regulatory restrictions on 
competition could arise throughout the economy.  
Services — professional and occupational licensing  
Professional and occupational licensing can promote important public policy aims, such as quality, 
safety and consumer protection. For example, regulations governing the accreditation of health 
professionals are a means of assuring that service quality does not fall below minimum acceptable 
standards. Competition considerations should not override these objectives — but neither should 
they be ignored. 
Licensing that restricts who can provide services in the marketplace can prevent new and innovative 
businesses from entering the market. It can also limit the scope of existing businesses to evolve and 
innovate. As a result, service providers can become less responsive to consumer demand. This 
imposes a cost on consumers without necessarily improving consumer protection. Quantitative limits 
on the number of providers most obviously restrict competition. Examples raised in submissions are 
set out in Box 10.10 below.  
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Box 10.10: Examples of standards restrictions 
Industry Issues raised in submissions 
Medical profession Admission requirements of medical colleges and the accreditation body’s 
unwillingness to accredit new specialties.144 
If medical specialist colleges unduly restrict entry to their professions, this 
has the effect of lessening competition.145 
Using nurse practitioners to perform a range of functions formerly restricted 
to medical practitioners has enabled the delivery of some health services at 
lower cost without increased risk to patients.146 
Building trade While supporting the need for a degree of licensing, the industry147 notes 
that this constrains the market’s ability to provide services. It should only be 
used where the benefits outweigh the costs and where the objectives of 
regulation can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
Legal profession Competition is limited by aspects of the self-regulatory regime. 
Examples include: restrictions on the ability of law schools to offer curricula 
that do not include 11 core subjects; and state law societies both setting 
requirements for, and providing, training and professional development.148  
Submissions also raise concerns regarding transparency, pricing and 
self-regulation. They suggest that either self-regulation by Law Societies and 
Legal Services Commissioners should be abolished and moved to a 
completely independent authority, or a new super-regulatory function 
should be assumed by an existing ombudsman. To encourage the legal 
profession to become more competitive and affordable, a co-ordinated link 
is needed between governments, independent regulators, the business 
community and consumers .149  
Dental 
practitioners 
Inconsistencies and anomalies can result from professional restrictions; for 
example, registered dental practitioners are required to observe advertising 
guidelines, but private health insurers, where they are the owner/operators 
of dental clinics, are not bound by the same requirements.150 
IPART’s submission draws the Panel’s attention to its new licensing framework151 as outlined in 
Box 10.11. 
                                                          
144  Spier Consulting, sub 1, pages 1-2. 
145  National Seniors Australia, sub, page 20. 
146  See, for example: National Seniors Australia, sub, page 20; UnitingCare Queensland, DR sub, page 2. 
147  Housing Industry Association, sub, pages 12-13. 
148  Lynden Griggs and Jane Nielsen, sub, pages 1-2. 
149  Eqalex Underwriting Pty Ltd, sub, page 6. 
150  Australian Dental Association Inc., sub, page 18. 
151  PwC 2012, A best practice approach to designing and reviewing licensing schemes, Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal, Sydney. 
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Box 10.11 IPART’s Licensing Framework 
IPART has examined New South Wales licences and identified those where reform would produce 
the greatest reduction in regulatory burden for business and the community. As part of this 
review, IPART engaged PwC to develop a conceptual framework for licence design.  
Applying the licensing framework can ensure that licensing regimes do not restrict competition 
unless it can be demonstrated that they are the best means of achieving policy objectives.  
Where a licence is necessary, the framework also requires an assessment of whether the licence is 
well-designed, i.e., whether the various aspects of the licensing regime that may restrict 
competition are the minimum necessary.  
The framework requires a regulator to take into account how the objectives of a licence relate to 
its coverage, duration, reporting requirements, fees and charges, and conduct rules. 
IPART has suggested this framework could be used by other New South Wales regulators and in 
other jurisdictions to limit barriers to competition arising from licensing. 
The IPART guidance indicates that, after following the framework: 
• the need for licensing will have been established (Stage 1); 
• the various aspects of the licensing scheme that may restrict competition will be the 
minimum necessary (Stage 2); 
• the licensing scheme will be efficiently administered (Stage 3); and  
• licensing will be the best response to achieve objectives (Stage 4).  
Industry bodies often put professional and occupational licensing in place to promote the ethical and 
quality practices of their professions. This can lead to better consumer outcomes but can also 
dampen competition and raise barriers to entry into those markets.  
During the NCP regulation review process, the NCC stated:  
It is totally unfounded to assume that a professional, simply by virtue of his/her 
qualification, is somehow above the profit motive and therefore should not be subject to 
market competition like all other service providers in our economy.152 
Some progress has been made in eliminating unnecessary restrictions on competition, including 
removing: medical practice ownership restrictions; restrictions preventing lawyers from advertising; 
and lawyers’ monopoly on conveyancing services. Removing conveyancing restrictions is a case in 
point. Previously, regulations prevented non-lawyers from carrying out conveyancing services, even 
though this is largely an administrative service.  
                                                          
152  National Competition Council 2000, Public Interest or Self Interest?, media release 14 August, Canberra. 
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The Panel’s view 
Services will continue to make a growing contribution to economic activity in Australia. It is 
therefore important to remove unnecessary restrictions on service provision — particularly 
barriers to entry and expansion that impede competition. 
Licensing requirements can raise barriers to entry in markets and impose more costs than benefits 
on the community. In a range of areas, the competitive impacts of licensing are not adequately 
considered, either in frameworks or during decision making.  
Professional and occupational licensing has a range of potential restrictions on competition — 
both regulatory and non-regulatory. Although some restrictions are clearly necessary for health, 
safety or consumer protection, others can unduly impede competition, particularly where they 
limit the number of providers.  
Media and broadcasting services 
The media market is highly integrated, incorporating media content delivery platforms, such as 
television broadcasting — which will increasingly include new technologies, such as multicasting via 
the internet — and content delivered via media platforms. 
Ownership and content issues are intertwined and essential elements in the commercial strategies 
adopted by media companies and telecommunications partners. 
Competition and the diversity of competitors in the media market are affected both by explicit 
regulatory interventions and by market developments, particularly in relation to content, which 
require close monitoring to ensure that competition concerns do not emerge. 
Regulatory interventions regarding ownership and content exist to achieve other policy objectives, 
including media ownership diversity and, in the case of broadcasting rules that impose Australian and 
local content requirements, media content that reflects a sense of Australian identity, character and 
cultural diversity. 
These media diversity objectives, which underpin many of the ownership and control rules, are given 
force by the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and administered by the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority. The rules within the Broadcasting Services Act are relatively simple, quantitative 
constraints, which are generally quite clear to existing and potential market participants. 
That said, as hard and fast legislative provisions are built around existing market structures and 
participants at the time legislation is passed, they almost by definition lag developments in a rapidly 
evolving marketplace. The explicit rules also only cover the most influential media services, such as 
those delivered by commercial television broadcasters, commercial radio and associated print 
newspapers. 
A large number of competition issues in the media sector have been slated for review this year, as 
part of the Australian Government’s deregulation agenda. Many media broadcasting issues, such as 
those relating to media control and ownership, are canvassed in a policy background paper released 
by the Department of Communications in June 2014.153 
                                                          
153  For further discussion see Australian Government Department of Communications 2014, Media Control and 
Ownership — Background Policy Paper, Canberra. 
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In addition, the Department of Communications is also conducting a review of current spectrum 
policy arrangements to ease the compliance burden on users and improve accessibility of new 
technologies.154 Spectrum use and access arrangements underpin, among other things, existing 
television and radio broadcasting markets, as well as other uses for the spectrum, such as tablets and 
smartphones, and importantly, essential public and community services. 
These two reviews will likely raise many issues relevant to the competitive environment for media 
and broadcasting services. Both the spectrum review and the consideration of further reforms to 
media ownership will be progressed by the Minister for Communications in 2015. 
Other related media sector issues, such as the anti-siphoning rules, which prevent pay television 
broadcasters from buying the rights to events on the anti-siphoning list before free-to-air 
broadcasters have the opportunity to purchase the rights, are identified as issues for consideration 
by the Australian Government as part of the roadmap for deregulation in the Communications 
portfolio.155  
A number of media content issues may raise competition concerns over time, particularly in relation 
to competition in upstream markets for the provision of content. As technology evolves, and 
partnerships between media platform owners, content producers and telecommunication providers 
strengthen, the capacity to restrict consumer choice or access becomes an issue that competition 
regulators need to monitor closely. 
In Australia, concerns around preferential treatment of content by media owners and 
telecommunications partners appear less pronounced than in some other jurisdictions. However, the 
capacity for dominant players in one market to leverage market power into another market, such as 
media content, is an issue in need of constant monitoring. 
Submissions on the Draft Report argue for more detailed recommendations on media and 
broadcasting to support the existing processes underway by the Minister and the Department of 
Communications. While the Panel welcomes this feedback and support, the Panel considers that its 
view as outlined below represents a sound statement of principles and directions that can support 
further reform in these areas, once the more detailed expert analysis has been undertaken as part of 
the roadmap for deregulation in the Communications portfolio. 
                                                          
154  Turnbull, M (Minister for Communications) 2014, Spectrum Reform to Drive Future Innovation and Productivity, 
media release 23 May, Canberra. 
155  Australian Government, Department of Communications 2014, Communications portfolio: Deregulation Roadmap 
2014, Department of Communications, Canberra, viewed 3 February 2015, 
www.communications.gov.au/deregulation/communications_portfolio_deregulation_roadmap_2014. 
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The Panel’s view 
Regulatory restrictions on media ownership and broadcasting rules are designed to achieve other 
public policy objectives, such as media diversity and support for Australian and local content. In a 
rapidly evolving technology landscape, inflexible regulatory provisions are unlikely to be 
sustainable or remain relevant over time.  
The Australian Government reviews as part of the broader deregulation roadmap planned for the 
Communications portfolio should consider the current impact of the regulatory interventions on 
ownership and control of media and broadcasting services, as well as the impact of rapidly 
evolving communication technologies on competition over time. 
Liquor and gambling 
Liquor retailing and gambling are two heavily regulated sectors of the economy. The risk of harm to 
individuals, families and communities from problem drinking and gambling provides a clear 
justification for regulation. This is reflected in a number of submissions expressing concern that 
changes to the regulation of alcohol sales could increase social harm. 
Regulating access to alcohol with the objective of minimising harm can only be achieved 
by restricting the economic and physical availability of alcohol. This justifies the controls 
that may otherwise be seen as anti-competitive. (National Alliance for Alcohol, sub, 
page 1)156  
However, such regulations also restrict competition and reduce consumer choice.  
The Review received a large number of submissions in relation to liquor157 and several addressing 
gambling. Some submissions support removing anti-competitive elements of liquor licensing regimes. 
However, most oppose any change that would restrict the ability of governments to set trading hours 
or planning and zoning rules in order to address the risk of harm from alcohol. A number of 
submitters consider that regulations relating to alcohol should be entirely exempt from any review of 
regulations against competition principles. 
For example, the National Alliance for Action on Alcohol states: 
The NAAA reiterates the importance of not only maintaining existing restrictions but also 
explicitly preserving the ability of Governments to impose further restrictions on liquor in 
the public interest as and when they consider appropriate. (DR sub, page 7) 
Although the recommendations on trading hours (see Recommendation 12), planning and zoning 
(see Recommendation 9), and regulatory review (see Recommendation 8) are addressed in detail 
elsewhere in this Report, they have each been raised in the context of liquor retailing. Accordingly, 
the Panel wishes to clarify how it intends these recommendations to apply in the context of liquor 
licensing. 
In particular, given the Panel’s view that the risk of harm from liquor provides a clear justification for 
liquor regulation, any review of liquor licensing regulations against competition principles must take 
proper account of the public interest in minimising this potential harm. The Panel agrees with the 
                                                          
156  This submission is endorsed by the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, and the McCusker Centre for 
Action on Alcohol and Youth. 
157  Approximately 40 such submissions were received, many of which referenced or endorsed one or both of the 
submissions from the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education and the National Alliance for Action on Alcohol. 
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many submitters who note that ‘Alcohol, because of its potential to cause harms, is not like other 
products. It is not the same as cornflakes, nor is it similar to washing powder or orange juice’ 
(Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, DR sub, page 6). 
Accordingly, the Panel does not propose that the recommendation to deregulate trading hours for 
sellers of ‘ordinary’ goods and services (see Recommendation 12) should prevent policymakers from 
regulating trading times for alcohol retailing (or gambling) in order to achieve the public policy 
objective of harm minimisation. Similarly, the recommendation that competition be taken into 
account as an important part of the planning and zoning process (see Recommendation 9) should not 
be interpreted as removing any ability for governments, in dealing with planning and zoning, to take 
full account of harm minimisation as an objective. 
Rather, these recommendations mean that restrictions on opening hours, or planning and zoning 
rules, or liquor licensing regimes, or gaming licensing, should not be designed to benefit particular 
competitors or classes of competitors, but only to achieve the stated public policy benefits.  
As noted Chapter 8, submissions in various contexts take issue with the public interest test used in 
NCP and adopted in the Draft Report, namely, that competition should not be restricted unless: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the regulation can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
In the context of liquor, Marsden Jacob Associates submits that the Draft Report fails to recognise 
that the second limb of the NCP test should not be (and for at least the last (2004-05) assessment 
was not) applied literally (DR sub, page 1). 
The Panel does not support a change to the public interest test, and the 2005 review of packaged 
alcohol cited by Marsden Jacob Associates is an example of how the test can be pragmatically 
applied to a sensitive area of regulation.  
Some restrictions on the sale of alcohol (and on gambling) appear to favour certain classes of 
competitors to the detriment of consumers. All regulations must be assessed to determine whether 
there are other ways to achieve the desired policy objective that do not restrict competition. 
However, it is certainly not the Panel’s view that the promotion of competition should always trump 
other legitimate public policy considerations. 
Under the previous NCP review, a number of pre-existing barriers to competition in the sale of 
alcohol were removed, but the extent of reform varied by state and the NCC withheld payments 
from several jurisdictions due to lack of progress in this area.158 There were also changes to gambling 
regulation, but some stakeholders submit that existing regulations continue to unduly restrict 
competition in both sectors. 
For example, in relation to gambling, the Australian Wagering Council calls for a review of the 
Interactive Gambling Act 2001, which prohibits Australian licensed and regulated online wagering 
operators from offering in-play sports wagering, arguing that it is failing to meet its original objective 
of harm minimisation, since technological advances mean that it is now readily bypassed by gamblers 
using offshore websites. 
                                                          
158  National Competition Council 2005, Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing the National Competition 
Policy and Related Reforms: 2005, Melbourne, pages xxvii, xxx, xxxiii, xxxvi. 
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This regulation is … obsolete given the rapid technological changes and increased 
internet-usage … (DR sub, page 3) 
… [this regulation] only impacts the legally licensed and regulated Australian industry 
giving a clear advantage to unregulated and/or illegal overseas operators who will 
continue to offer their services to Australians in a manner that provides little by way of 
consumer protection and harm minimisation … (DR sub, page 3) 
The Australasian Association of Convenience Stores submits that regulation preventing its members 
from obtaining liquor licences is not slowing the growth of the alcohol industry but does inhibit its 
members’ ability to meet customers’ demands and to compete with Coles and Woolworths (sub, 
page 7). 
Ice Box Liquor, which operates 20 stores in regional New South Wales, submits that because ‘liquor 
license applications are made in respect of specific premises and therefore the applicant must 
“control” or have tenure of the property during the full application process … [this] clearly favours 
the larger business (Coles and Woolworths) who can much more readily afford the cost [of] making 
applications, more so of unsuccessful applications’ (DR sub, page 2). 
Three other examples of liquor licensing and gambling regulation restricting competition are 
provided at Boxes 10.12, 10.13 and 10.14 below. It is not obvious to the Panel that these restrictions 
serve the public interest rather than serving the interests of incumbent retailers. This illustrates the 
importance of ensuring that any restrictions are designed to achieve clearly defined policy objectives, 
and then tested to ensure that they are doing so and that they do not have unintended 
consequences that can harm competition. 
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Box 10.12: Queensland takeaway packaged liquor licensing regulations 
Several submissions, including from Master Grocers Australia/Liquor Retailers Australia, AURL 
FoodWorks, and small supermarket operators cite the example of Queensland’s liquor licensing 
regime, under which only premises with a hotel licence may operate detached bottle-shops, as an 
impediment to their ability to respond to consumers and compete with Coles and Woolworths. 
Deborah Smith, a Toowoomba retailer, submits: 
Coles and Woolworths — along with their subsidiary liquor brands — can provide the 
consumer with the “whole meal” solution, offering licenced bottle shops attached to 
their hotel licences within their shopping centres. The Queensland Liquor Act is a real 
barrier to entry for independent supermarket operators, as we are prohibited from 
offering this same service. This market inequality ensures a non-competitive retail 
liquor industry in Queensland. (DR sub, page 4)  
Even those strongly concerned about changes that would increase alcohol availability, including 
the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education (FARE) and the National Drug and Alcohol 
Research Centre, draw attention to problems with Queensland’s liquor laws. As FARE notes:  
[Queensland’s restrictions] prompted Coles and Woolworths to undertake, as 
IBISWorld describes it “… a pub buying frenzy during the last decade in an effort to 
circumvent this legislation. These companies now own … 49 per cent of detached bottle 
shops [in Queensland].” (DR sub, page 20) 
The National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre recommends ensuring public health is given a 
critical place in any assessment of liquor retailing regulations to ensure that alcohol-related harm 
is not increased, but notes: 
The inconsistencies across jurisdictions in who can sell alcohol, and particularly the 
Queensland regulations that require anyone operating packaged liquor outlets also 
requires a pub licence are worthy of review. (DR sub, page 4) 
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Box 10.13: Costco application for liquor licence in South Australia 
On 16 October 2014, the Licensing Court of South Australia declined to grant Costco a licence to 
sell alcohol in its new Adelaide store.159 Costco had applied for a ‘Special Circumstances Licence’, 
since its model for liquor retailing, as used in other Australian and overseas stores, and which 
involves a limited range of premium products stocked within its warehouse together with other 
goods sold only to fee-paying members of Costco, would not meet the requirements of a standard 
licence. 
A competitor, Woolworths, and an industry association, the Australian Hotels Association, 
challenged the application and went to court to object. The Court stated: 
I accept the undoubted attractiveness of the Costco’s proposal. The evidence 
establishes that Costco stores are very popular and no doubt the addition of a facility 
within the store enabling the purchase of first class liquor at competitive prices is 
something that the public can be presumed to want. [paragraph 75] 
However, ultimately the Court considered that Costco’s model for liquor retailing was not 
compatible with South Australia’s licensing requirements and to grant a licence would risk setting 
‘an undesirable precedent’ [paragraph 72]. 
 
Box 10.14: New South Wales restrictions on sale of lottery products 
Under the terms of a 40-year lease of New South Wales lotteries to the Tatts Group from 2010, as 
a transitional measure a five year moratorium was imposed, such that only newsagents and 
convenience stores were permitted to sell lotteries products. 160 
The Panel notes recent proposals to extend this moratorium rather than allow it to expire in 2015. 
The justification advanced for doing so makes no reference to minimising harm to consumers from 
problem gambling, only protecting newsagents from competition.161  
The PC found ‘The risks of problem gambling are low for people who only play lotteries and 
scratchies, but rise steeply with the frequency of gambling on table games, wagering and, 
especially, gaming machines.’162 
Many submissions cite empirical evidence of the harm caused by alcohol and suggest that further 
applying competition policy to the regulation of alcohol retailing would exacerbate this harm.163 
Other parties disagree and submit that various measures of alcohol-related harm have decreased 
over the period since NCP was introduced.164 
                                                          
159  Costco Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd [2014] SALC 55. 
160  Nicholls, S 2015, ‘Treasury warns Labor newsagents plan could cost NSW $760 million‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney. 
161  Constance, A (NSW Treasurer) and Barilaro, J (Minister for Small Business) 2015, Cleaning up Labor’s Lotteries Mess: 
Newsagent Protections Extended in Landmark Deal with Tatts Group, media release 30 January, Sydney, and NSW 
Labor 2015, A Labor Government Will Enact Laws to Protect Local Newsagents, 20 January 2015, lukefoley.com.au 
viewed 3 February 2015, www.lukefoley.com.au/a_labor_government_will. 
162  Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report no. 50, Canberra, page 2. 
163  See, for example: Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, sub; and National Alliance for Action on Alcohol, 
DR sub. 
164  See, for example: Australian Liquor Stores Association, DR sub. 
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The Panel has neither the expertise nor the resources to assess this evidence, nor to analyse the 
costs of harm compared to the costs of reduced competition. Such an investigation is beyond the 
scope of this Review. 
However, the Panel does note that the PC’s 2010 Gambling report suggests there is no simple 
relationship between restricting competition and mitigating harm.165 In fact, the PC noted that the 
anti-competitive effects of current regulations are an important source of consumer detriment. 
Considerable time has elapsed since the NCP reviews of regulation in these areas. Those reviews 
noted the desirability of revisiting these regulations in future to assess their impact and to compare 
outcomes in jurisdictions that have implemented competition reforms with those that have not. 
The Panel’s view 
Liquor retailing and gambling are two heavily regulated sectors of the economy. The risk of harm to 
individuals, families and communities from problem drinking and gambling is a clear justification 
for regulation. 
As with other regulations, liquor and gambling regulations should be included in a new round of 
regulation reviews (see Recommendation 8) to ensure that they are meeting their stated objectives 
at least cost to consumers and are not unduly restricting competition. 
Reviews of these regulations should draw on evidence, including comparing competition and harm 
reduction outcomes from the different approaches adopted across jurisdictions. The public interest 
in minimising harm from problem drinking and gambling should be given proper weight as part of 
any such review. 
The impact of regulatory restrictions on the ability of small businesses to compete should be 
considered as part of such reviews. 
Private health insurance 
Around 47 per cent of the Australian population is covered by private health insurance with hospital 
benefits.166 The Australian Government subsidises the cost of insurance through the private health 
insurance rebate, and a levy is imposed on higher-income earners who are not privately insured. 
However, Medibank Private states that private health insurance is among the most heavily regulated 
industries in Australia, with the regulatory framework bearing on the scope of services covered, 
product design, pricing, discounts and capital requirements (sub, page 12).  
Private health premiums are regulated by the Australian Government Minister for Health, who has 
discretion as to whether to allow insurers to increase their premiums. Funds may only apply to 
increase premiums if their cost structures have increased. 
The recent National Commission of Audit examined these pricing arrangements, finding that they 
remove the incentive for firms to become more efficient, and suggested current arrangements be 
replaced with a system of price monitoring. It also suggested that insurers be allowed to offer a 
                                                          
165  Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report no. 50, Canberra, pages 19-20.  
166  As at 31 December 2013. Private Health Insurance Administration Council 2014, Privately Insured People with Hospital 
Treatment Cover, Canberra, page 5. 
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wider scope of products to consumers, in particular, to cover care in out-of-hospital (primary care) 
settings to assist members managing chronic conditions.167 
The prices of some inputs purchased by private health insurers are also regulated. The price of 
prostheses (medical devices such as cardiac pacemakers and artificial hips) are regulated under the 
Private Health Insurance Act 2007. Applied Medical states: 
As a result of regulatory policy settings which restrict optimal competitive outcomes, 
products listed on the Prostheses List are being sold at prices that are in some cases 
multiple times more expensive than the prices at which they are sold in the public health 
system and in other jurisdictions. Given that the value of total expenditure by private 
health insurers on prostheses was $1.6 billion in 2012, there is scope for very substantial 
efficiencies to be created through the introduction and extension of principles of 
competition to the regulatory structure that underpins the Prostheses List. (sub, page 1)  
Preferred provider arrangements involve customers having lower or no out-of-pocket expenses if 
they consult one of the preferred providers recommended by their insurer. Some submissions 
suggest these types of arrangements can be anti-competitive.168 However, the Panel notes that the 
ACCC has examined preferred provider arrangements, in sectors including health and motor vehicle 
smash repair, and finds that they generally raise no competition concerns.169 
                                                          
167  Australian Government 2014, Towards Responsible Government - The Report of the National Commission of Audit 
Phase One, Canberra, pages 101-102. 
168  See, for example: Australian Dental Association Inc., sub, pages 7-8; Australian Physiotherapy Association, sub, 
pages 3-7; and Optometry Australia, sub, pages 1-2. 
169  For example, the ACCC found in its 2010-11 Private health insurance report that consumers were, on the whole, 
satisfied with preferred provider schemes, and the arrangements were unlikely to contravene the third-line forcing 
provisions of the CCA (page 33). The ACCC has also found that preferred provider schemes for smash repairs have 
resulted in a number of consumer benefits, including lower insurance premiums, lifetime guarantees and repair work 
performed to a high standard: ACCC 2003 Smash repairers/insurance issues paper published, media release 
19 September, Canberra. 
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The Panel’s view 
It is important that consumers have access to products that meet their needs, including in the area 
of private health insurance. 
The National Commission of Audit report suggests there may be scope for ‘lighter touch’ 
regulation of the private health insurance sector, which could encourage innovation and wider 
product availability for consumers. In particular, price regulation of premiums could be replaced 
with a price monitoring scheme and health funds could be allowed to expand their coverage to 
primary care settings. 
The Panel believes that prices should be fully deregulated when competition is deemed to be 
effective. This assessment of effectiveness should be undertaken by the proposed ACCP (see 
Recommendation 43). 
The regulation of prostheses should be examined to see if pricing and supply can be made more 
competitive, while maintaining the policy aims of the current prostheses arrangements. This 
examination should also be led by the ACCP.  
Agricultural marketing 
Agricultural marketing arrangements can create barriers to entry through licensing restrictions and 
weaken incentives for growers to differentiate their products and to innovate. 
The PC’s 2005 Review of National Competition Policy Reforms (see Box 10.15) noted that domestic 
pricing arrangements and import tariffs needed to support the activities of statutory marketing 
authorities provide assistance to producers and are effectively paid for by household and business 
users. Such controls were found often to reduce the scope and incentives for innovation, to the 
detriment of both consumers and producers.170 
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Box 10.15: National Competition Policy reforms to agricultural marketing arrangements 
Under the NCP, the NCC identified the following priority legislation review areas in primary 
industries: barley/coarse grains; dairy; poultry meat; rice; sugar; wheat; fishing; forestry; mining; 
food regulation; agricultural and veterinary chemicals; quarantine and bulk handling.171 
Under the NCP, price and supply restrictions in the agricultural marketing arrangements were 
progressively removed. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Sciences recently 
noted that these reforms have resulted in Australian agriculture being strongly market-oriented, 
with farmers now exposed to competition in domestic and world markets and governments having 
largely removed production and trade-distorting support.172 
However, restrictions still apply in relation to rice in New South Wales and potatoes in Western 
Australia. 
The New South Wales Rice Marketing Board, initially established in 1928 under the Marketing of 
Primary Products Act 1927,173 retains powers to vest, process and market all rice produced in New 
South Wales — around 99 per cent of Australian rice.174 Although a party wanting to participate in 
the domestic rice market must apply to the Board to become an Authorised Buyer, no price or supply 
restrictions apply to rice marketing in New South Wales. 175 The New South Wales Rice Marketing 
Board has appointed Ricegrowers Limited (trading as SunRice) as the sole and exclusive export 
licence holder.176 
The marketing arrangements for rice are subject to regular review and, under the terms of the New 
South Wales Subordinate Legislation Act 1989, a public benefit case must be made for renewal to 
continue. The Act requires public consultation and an assessment of the costs and benefits, with 
legislation not restricting competition unless the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a 
whole outweigh the costs; and the objectives of the regulation can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
The most recent review, in 2012, recommended that vesting be renewed until 30 June 2017, with 
further extension subject to a review to determine that export price premiums relative to other 
international competitors on export markets continue to be achieved. 177  
In Western Australia, licences to grow ware potatoes (i.e., fresh potatoes for human consumption), 
as well as the price, quantity and varieties grown, are all regulated by the Potato Marketing 
                                                          
171  National Competition Council 2003, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition 
Policy and related reforms: Volume one — Overview of the National Competition Policy and related reforms, AusInfo, 
Canberra, page 4.6. 
172  Gray, EM, Oss-Emer, M and Sheng, Y 2014, Australian Agricultural Productivity Growth: Past Reforms and Future 
Opportunities, ABARES research report 14.2, Canberra, page 14. 
173  Rice Marketing Board of NSW, 2015, About the RMB, Rice Marketing Board, Sydney, viewed 28 January 2015 
www.rmbnsw.org.au/about-the-rmb. 
174  Gray, EM, Oss-Emer, M and Sheng, Y 2014, Australian Agricultural Productivity Growth: Past Reforms and Future 
Opportunities, ABARES research report 14.2, Canberra, page 15. 
175  National Farmers’ Federation, DR sub, pages 6-7.  
176  Rice Marketing Board of NSW, 2015, About the RMB, viewed on 12 February 2015 
www.rmbnsw.org.au/about-the-rmb. 
177  NSW Government Trade & Investment Strategic Policy & Economics Division 2012, Review of Rice Vesting by the Rice 
Marketing Board under the NSW Rice Marketing Act 1983, Sydney, page 14. 
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Corporation, which is established under the Western Australian Marketing of Potatoes Act 1946, and 
is a statutory marketing organisation of the government of Western Australia.178 
The Potato Marketing Corporation, not consumers and producers, determines the quantities, kinds 
and qualities of potatoes offered to consumers in Western Australia. In fact, it is illegal to sell ware 
potatoes grown in Western Australia without a licence from the Potato Marketing Corporation. 
The Economic Regulation Authority of Western Australia’s Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in 
Western Australia, released in July 2014, recommended removing the existing restrictions. Overall, it 
estimates that the restrictions on the Western Australian ware potato market have a net cost of 
$3.8 million per annum, equating to a present value of $33.23 million over a 15-year period.179 
Recent media coverage highlights the extent of potato regulation in Western Australia and has 
prompted calls for its removal.180  
Submissions also call for deregulation of Western Australia’s potato industry, with the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (WA) highlighting how the regulation, which dates from Australia’s national 
security regulations imposed during the Second World War ‘has impeded competition in the WA 
potato market, leading to higher prices and lower choice for consumers’ (sub, page 16). The Business 
Council of Australia recommends Western Australia’s potato marketing regulation should be 
considered as part of a legislative review program (sub, page 21). 
The Panel’s view 
Most price and supply restrictions in agricultural marketing have been removed. However, some 
unfinished business remains. For example, restrictions still apply in relation to the export of rice in 
New South Wales and the price, quantity and type of potatoes sold in Western Australia. These 
restrictions raise barriers to entry and impede consumer choice. Governments should resist calls 
for past reforms to be unwound. 
Air service restrictions 
International air services to and from Australia are regulated by air service agreements. These follow 
the processes set out under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, restricting 
airlines to operating within agreements developed by countries on a bilateral basis.181  
                                                          
178  Government of Western Australia 2014, Potato Marketing Corporation of Western Australia website, viewed on 28 
January 2015, www.pmc.wa.gov.au/index.cfm. 
179  Western Australian Economic Regulation Authority 2014, Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in Western Australia: 
Final report, Perth, page 317. 
180  For example: Thompson, B 2015, ‘Spud price tensions boil over‘ The West Australian, 7 January, Perth; Tinney, M 
2015, ‘Potato price war‘, Sunrise, 8 January; Burrell, A 2015, ‘Spud war: rules give grower the chips’, The Australian, 13 
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Air service agreements amount to an agreement with another country regarding which airlines can 
service a particular route. They have the effect of constraining how responsive providers can be to 
consumer demand.  
Complexity is added given other countries’ need to negotiate ‘beyond rights’. For example, for 
Qantas to fly to London via Dubai, Australia needs the United Arab Emirates to negotiate ‘beyond 
rights’ on behalf of Qantas with the UK. Australia therefore uses air service agreements, as do other 
countries, as a negotiating chip to obtain ‘beyond rights’ for Australian flagged carriers in exchange 
for access to the Australian market. 
An Australian carrier granted an allocation of capacity must be designated by Australia before it is 
able to operate an international air service. As a result, air service agreements act to regulate 
capacity and who can service particular international air routes. This has been thought to raise prices 
on some routes. As a consequence, some air service agreements may protect Australian carriers from 
competition or act as barriers to new carriers entering particular markets. 
Other parts of the world have moved to a less regulated approach. For example, within Europe 
international air services effectively operate under an ‘open skies policy’.182 
Australia also has a policy of seeking ‘open skies’ on a bilateral basis, for example, the agreement 
with New Zealand.183  
Unilaterally allowing open skies to Australia would severely disadvantage Australian airlines, so long 
as the bilateral system remains entrenched in the rest of the world.184 The Australian & International 
Pilots Association notes, ‘Australia already has one of the most liberalised air service policies in the 
world’ (DR sub, page 2). 
However, other submissions raise concerns that, while Australia may have a relatively liberalised 
aviation market, air service restrictions are still impeding competition. 
For example, Sydney Airport Corporation considers that air service agreements may act as a 
restriction on competition from foreign carriers in the air services market with broader economic 
implications: 
Delays in bilateral capacity negotiations, which are running behind demand in many key 
growth markets, restrict the level of competition in the market from foreign carriers, 
preventing travellers from accessing Australia in the most efficient and cost effective 
manner. These delays also risk economic and tourism growth, which is highly reliant on 
inbound international visitation. (sub, page 5) 
Similarly, Melbourne Airport considers: 
At a time when the Australian Government is seeking more liberal market access 
arrangements with our key trading partners through bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements, air services agreements that impose the equivalent of quotas on passengers 
and freight are anachronistic. They impose arbitrary constraints on the ability of airlines to 
respond to market demand for additional or new services. (DR sub, page 1) 
                                                          
182  Productivity Commission 1998, International Air Services Inquiry Report, Report No. 2, Canberra, page 59. 
183  See Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development website, The Bilateral System — how international air 
services work, viewed 3 February 2015, www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/bilateral_system.aspx. 
184  Productivity Commission 1998, International Air Services Inquiry Report, Report No. 2, Canberra, page 220.  
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In respect of domestic restrictions, state governments sometimes provide exclusive rights for 
regional airlines to operate on particular routes. Ostensibly, exclusivity is provided to guarantee 
service, as it gives the operator confidence that it can run the route profitably. Regional routes are 
often very lightly patronised, supporting only one operator, i.e., they are natural monopolies. While 
it might be reasonable in these circumstances to restrict competition to guarantee a stable service, 
exclusive rights create the potential for monopoly pricing. 
Virgin Australia notes: 
... the Queensland Government has determined that the Brisbane-Roma route will remain 
regulated and free from competition until at least 2020, notwithstanding that passenger 
numbers grew from just under 40,000 in 2008-09 to over 240,000 in 2013-14. This 
decision cannot be justified from either an economic or public policy perspective. The 
costs of restricting competition on this route will be borne by passengers, in the form of 
higher airfares and fewer travelling options, as well as the economy more broadly, 
including by limiting opportunities for growth in tourism. (DR sub, page 19)  
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that air service agreements should not be used to protect Australian carriers. 
The Australia Government should take a proactive approach on air service agreements to ensure 
sufficient capacity on all routes to allow for demand growth, including by pursuing bilateral open 
skies policies with other countries. This will ensure that agreements do not act as barriers to entry 
in the provision of services to and from Australia. 
Where air service agreements act to restrict capacity, the costs will be borne by travellers through 
higher prices and fewer options, and by the economy more broadly, for example, though lower 
tourism growth. 
Governments should only create exclusive rights for regional services where it is clear that the air 
route will only support a single operator. Where exclusive rights are created, they should be 
subject to competitive tender. 
AREAS FOR IMMEDIATE REFORM 
Although other areas require detailed reviews to determine whether reform is needed, the Panel 
considers that, in the three areas of retail trading hours, parallel imports and pharmacy location and 
ownership rules, the need for reform is well established and long-standing. Those areas, which were 
identified as problematic under the NCP process, still remain today in some jurisdictions. Of course, 
they still require careful and consultative reform processes to minimise the risk of unintended 
consequences.  
The Panel emphasises that it is not proposing total and unfettered deregulation of these areas, any 
more than it is in other areas. Each will have its own particular public interest considerations that 
need to be contemplated carefully along the way. Nevertheless, where there continues to be a need 
for regulation, governments should thoroughly analyse alternative, less anti-competitive ways to 
achieve public policy objectives. 
10.5 RETAIL TRADING HOURS 
Restrictions on retail trading hours impede suppliers’ ability to meet consumer demand. They can 
discriminate among retailers on the basis of factors such as products sold, or retailer size or location. 
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They can also impose costs on consumers by creating inconvenience and congestion. The rules can 
be complex and confusing and create compliance costs for businesses. 
As the PC noted in its 2014 report Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade: 
Restrictions on trading hours lead to reduced consumer convenience and increased travel 
costs, higher capital costs to deal with artificial peaks in shopping activity, greater product 
wastage, lost sales with a likely disproportionate negative impact on the visitor economy, 
and a restricted ability to compete with online retailers. They add complexity to business 
operations that are not necessary nor in the interest of consumers or the state 
economies.185 
Australian governments agreed to review retail trading hours as part of their NCP commitment to 
review legislative restrictions on competition, as outlined in Box 10.16. The outcomes of more recent 
reviews of trading hours are outlined in Box 10.17. 
Box 10.16: Review of retail trading hours under NCP  
Since the mid-1990s, shop trading hours have been deregulated progressively across Australia; 
however, experience varies across the country. The Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, Tasmania 
and the Northern Territory have deregulated trading hours and New South Wales has done so to a 
large extent. In contrast, three States retain significant restrictions: Western Australia, Queensland 
and South Australia. 
The NCC’s 2005 assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the NCP186 noted that all 
governments, except for Western Australia, had substantially liberalised retail trading hours. 
Western Australia was the only jurisdiction to restrict weekday trading hours and to prohibit large 
retailers (outside of tourist precincts) from opening on Sundays. 
As a consequence, the Australian Government deducted 10 per cent of Western Australia’s 
2003-04 competition payments and 10 per cent of its 2004-05 competition payments. 
Since then, retail trading hours in Western Australia have been partially deregulated, and Sunday 
trading was introduced for all shops in the Perth metropolitan area on 26 August 2012.187 This 
brought retail trading hours in Western Australia closer to those in Queensland and South 
Australia. 
 
                                                          
185  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 8. 
186  National Competition Council 2005, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition 
Policy and related reforms, Melbourne, page xxix. 
187  Government of Western Australia Department of Commerce 2012, Sunday Trading, Government of Western Australia 
Department of Commerce, Perth, viewed 30 January 2015, 
www.commerce.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/atoms/files/sundaytradingfactsheet.pdf. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
158 Part 3 — Competition Policy 
Box 10.17: Recent reviews of retail trading hours. 
A number of recent reviews have recommended further deregulating retail trading hours. 
In 2011, the PC found that restrictions on trading hours applied with varying levels of intensity, 
with Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia having the most restrictive regulations. 
The PC recommended that retail trading hours should be fully deregulated in all States, and allow 
trading on public holidays.188  
In its 2014 research report, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, the PC found 
that trading hours’ restrictions are increasingly out of step with changing patterns of work, leisure 
and shopping.189 They impose costs on retailers and reduce consumer welfare. The arbitrary 
boundaries and exemptions found in Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia lead to 
unintended consequences and anomalies, which can disadvantage businesses of all sizes. 
The PC considers that deregulation would: increase economic activity and lower retailers’ cost of 
doing business; increase choice and convenience for consumers; and enhance employment 
opportunities, particularly for younger and older workers and those working part-time or on a 
casual basis.  
In 2013, the Queensland Competition Authority recommended full deregulation of retail trading 
hours. It found that the net potential benefit to Queensland of removing the current restrictions 
was as much as $200 million per annum, and noted that the ‘potential benefits of the reform 
include an increase in retail productivity, more shopping convenience for the broader community 
and lower prices’.190 
In its 2014 report, Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in Western Australia, the Western Australian 
Economic Regulation Authority found no market failure to justify the current restriction on 
competition. ‘As such, consumer choice, rather than government regulation, should determine 
which shops open and when. Retailers will respond to consumer demand by opening when it is 
profitable for them to do so and remaining closed when it is not.’ The Economic Regulation 
Authority recommended deregulating retail trading hours in Western Australia, with the exception 
of Christmas Day, Good Friday and the morning of ANZAC Day.191 
However, a 2007 review of South Australia’s retail trading hours by Alan Moss recommended that 
the current shopping hours be retained, with consideration given to the possibility of a later 
Sunday closing time. Moss found that the existing rules strike a satisfactory balance between the 
competing interests of the various sectors of the retail industry and the larger interests of the 
community, ‘At the end of the day there are more important human activities than shopping.’192 
Retail trading hours are governed by state regulations that vary significantly between and within 
States. Box 10.18 provides examples of some of the existing regulations around the country. 
                                                          
188  Productivity Commission 2011, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry Inquiry, Report 
no. 56, Canberra, Recommendation 10.1, pages XLII and 275. 
189  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
Finding 5.1, page 111. 
190  Queensland Competition Authority Office of Best Practice Regulation 2013, Measuring and Reducing the Burden of 
Regulation, Brisbane, pages 33 and 39. 
191  Western Australian Economic Regulation Authority 2014, Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in Western Australia 
Final Report, Perth, pages 292-293 and recommendation 29. 
192  Moss, A 2007, Report of the 2006–07 Review of the Shop Trading Hours Act 1977, National Competition Council, 
Canberra, page 26. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
Part 3 — Competition Policy  159 
Box 10.18: Examples of current retail trading hours’ restrictions  
Retail trading hours regulations vary considerably across States and Territories.  
The Western Australian Retail Trading Hours Act 1987 specifies the hours that a shop can operate, 
based upon the goods it sells, its location and size. 
• Sunday trading in the Perth metropolitan area was introduced in 2012, with ‘general retail 
shops’193 now able to open between 11am and 5pm on Sundays. 
• ‘Special retail shops’, which include souvenir shops, pharmacies, domestic development 
shops, video shops, duty-free shops, motor vehicle spare parts shops, sports venue shops 
and newsagencies may open from 6 am to 11:30 pm every day of the year but may only sell 
goods prescribed in the regulations. For example, a domestic development shop can sell 
light bulbs but not light fittings, and kitchen sinks but not dishwashers (Woolworths, DR sub, 
page 17). 
• ‘Small retail shops’194, for example, greengrocers, butchers, corner stores and many small 
supermarkets, have no restrictions on their trading hours. 
• Petrol stations have unrestricted operating hours but may only sell goods prescribed in the 
regulations. For example, before 8am on Mondays, they can sell cigarettes but not nicotine 
patches (Woolworths, sub, page 62). 
The Western Australian Retail Trading Hours Act does not apply to restaurants, cafes, takeaway 
food shops, veterinary clinics or retail shops located in public transport areas. 
The Western Australian government introduced special trading rules for the 2014 Christmas 
period, with all ‘general retail stores’ in the Perth metropolitan area able to trade every day but 
Christmas Day from 7am (8am on Sundays, Boxing Day and New Year’s Day) until 9pm weeknights 
(and 6pm weekends, Boxing Day and New Year’s Day).195 
The Western Australian Premier has announced that during 2015 his government would continue 
to address anomalies in the regulation of trading hours.196 However, this will be limited to 
removing a discrepancy that relates to hardware stores, and the Premier has again ruled out 
extending the current opening time of 11am on Sundays.197 
In regional Western Australia, different rules apply. Retailers are unable to trade on Sundays, 
except where location-specific exemptions apply. 
In addition, north of the 26th parallel, which runs from the Northern Territory and South Australian 
border to Shark Bay on the west coast, the Western Australian Retail Trading Hours Act does not 
apply, so retail trading hours are not regulated. 
                                                          
193  General retail shops are defined in subsection 10(2) of the Western Australian Retail Trading Hours Act 1987 as any 
retail shop that is not a small retail shop, a special retail shop or a filling station. 
194  Small retail shops are defined in subsection 10(3) of the Western Australian Retail Trading Hours Act 1987 as shops 
owned by up to six people who operate no more than four retail shops, in which up to 25 people work at any one 
time. 
195  Government of Western Australia, Retail Trading Hours, Department of Commerce, Perth, viewed 28 January 2015, 
www.commerce.wa.gov.au/consumer-protection/retail-trading-hours. 
196  Barnett, C 2015, Western Australian Premier’s Statement to Parliament. 
197  Strutt, J 2015, ‘Sunday trading hours anomalies to be addressed by WA Government’, ABC, 19 February 2015. 
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Box 10.18: Examples of current retail trading hours’ restrictions (continued) 
New South Wales198 currently only has four and a half days where trading is restricted: Good 
Friday; Easter Sunday; ANZAC day prior to 1pm; Christmas Day; and Boxing Day. The restrictions do 
not apply to some retailers, typically small businesses, that are still able to trade on these public 
holidays.  
Trading hours are almost fully deregulated in Victoria and Tasmania, with the only restricted 
trading days being Good Friday, Christmas Day and the morning of ANZAC Day. On these days, only 
exempt stores are permitted to trade. 
In the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, trading hours are almost 
completely deregulated, but many retailers choose not to trade on Good Friday, Christmas Day 
and the morning of ANZAC Day.199 
A number of submissions call for further deregulating trading hours so that in all Australian States 
and Territories only Christmas Day, Good Friday and ANZAC Day morning are restricted trading 
days.200 Submissions also draw comparisons between ‘bricks and mortar’ retailers and online 
retailers, which are not inhibited by restrictions on trading hours.201 Restrictions on retail trading 
hours are seen to handicap physical retailers from competing with online retailing, which can be 
conducted at any time of the day or night, and on any day.202 
For instance, a December 2014 Western Australian survey indicated that 64 per cent of consumers 
intended to shop locally online for Christmas, an increase of 16 per cent over the 2013 figure.203 
Submissions suggest deregulated retail trading hours would enable businesses to compete on a level 
playing field.204 
However, submissions responding to the recommendation in the Draft Report to deregulate 
remaining restrictions on trading hours are divided. The existing rules are described as ‘retail 
apartheid’ by the Shopping Centre Council of Australia (DR sub, page 8). In contrast, during 
consultation meetings, small supermarkets describe trading hours as a ‘weapon’ that can be used by 
those with market power. 
                                                          
198  New South Wales Government, Retail trading in NSW, Industrial Relations, Sydney, viewed on 28 January 2015, 
www.industrialrelations.nsw.gov.au/oirwww/Industries_and_Awards/Retail_industry.page?.  
199  Productivity Commission 2011, Economic Structure and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry Inquiry, Report 
no. 56, Canberra, page 282. 
200  See, for example: Australasian Association of Convenience Stores, DR sub, page 5; Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, DR sub, page 18; Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 16; Business Council of 
Australia, DR sub, page 57; Business SA, DR sub, page 8; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, pages 4-5; Kim Greeve, DR sub, 
page 1; Daryl Guppy, DR sub, page 10; Large Format Retail Association, DR sub, page 9; Myer Holdings Limited, DR 
sub, page 1; Queensland Competition Authority, DR sub, page 1; Shopping Centre Council of Australia, DR sub, page 7; 
and Woolworths, DR sub, page 14. 
201  See, for example: Business Council of Australia, sub, page 28. 
202  See, for example: Shopping Centre Council of Australia, sub, page 7. 
203  Curtin Business School and Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA, December 2014, Curtin Business School — CCI 
Survey of Consumer Confidence, page 4, Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA, Perth, viewed on 28 January 2015, 
http://cciwa.com/docs/default-source/economics/consumer-confidence-results.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
204  See, for example: Chamber of Commerce and Industry WA, DR sub, page 14; and Shopping Centre Council of 
Australia, sub, pages 7-8. 
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Retail workers, unions and religious groups express concerns about deregulation, including that 
employees could lose family time, and days of religious or cultural significance to the community as 
well as being subjected to unwelcome pressure to work on public holidays.205 
Submissions from individuals and small businesses raise concerns that removing restrictions on retail 
trading hours will require retailers to open, particularly on public holidays. Submissions also raise 
concerns about removing penalty rates and that some tenancy agreements may oblige stores within 
shopping centres to open whenever the centre is open. 
Within a major mall, no retailer should feel ‘forced’ into opening beyond the core trading 
hours if that retailer believes it may be unprofitable to open. With penalty rates of two 
and a half times on public holidays, retailers often feel pressure to open when in fact 
because of the high wages costs, that retailer may lose money by opening their store. 
(Australian Retailers Association, DR sub, p5) 
The Panel emphasises that removing restrictions would not require retailers to trade 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week or to adopt identical trading hours. Rather, deregulation allows retailers to decide 
for themselves when to open for trade, as is currently the case in those jurisdictions where retail 
trading hours are already deregulated. In making this decision, retailers will take into account 
customer demand as well as other factors, such as labour costs and requirements of tenancy 
agreements. In jurisdictions where deregulation of trading hours has already occurred, shops are not 
routinely trading 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 
A New South Wales review of retail trading hours in 2012 noted that, in both the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory where retail trading is almost completely deregulated, most 
large retailers choose not to open on Good Friday, Christmas Day or the morning of ANZAC Day.206 
The PC also found that, despite concerns that removing trading hours’ restrictions would create 
extremes in trading hours, it instead provides retailers with greater flexibility, allowing them to more 
closely align opening hours with consumer demand: ‘…retailers are able to open when they consider 
it is in their commercial interests and opening hours reflect consumers’ shopping patterns.’207 
As was the case in relation to the Planning and Zoning reforms (see Section 10.1), a significant 
number of submitters urge the Panel to ensure that competition policy does not interfere with the 
rights of state and territory governments to impose controls on the sale of alcohol, to limit the 
trading hours of outlets, the type of outlets and the number of outlets in the interests of community 
safety and wellbeing. 
Liquor is addressed specifically in Section 10.4. In addition, the Panel notes that a general policy of 
deregulating retail trading hours should not prevent jurisdictions from imposing specific restrictions 
on trading times for alcohol retailing, or indeed for gambling services, to achieve the policy objective 
of harm minimisation. A time restriction on alcohol retailing may satisfy the public interest test when 
                                                          
205  See, for example: Anglican Church Diocese of Sydney, DR sub, pages 1-3; Anglicare Sydney, DR sub, pages 1-3; 
Partnering for Transportation, DR sub, pages 1-3; Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association, DR sub, 
pages 2-3; Sydney Alliance for Community Building, DR sub, page 1; Unions NSW, DR sub, pages 3-9; and a number of 
individuals. 
206  New South Wales Department of Finance and Services 2012, Report of the Review of the Retail Trading Act 2008, 
Sydney, page 12. 
207  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 103.  
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a review is conducted (see Recommendation 8), even though general retail trading hours’ restrictions 
do not. 
Concerns have been raised about employees being forced to work on public holidays, for example, 
Boxing Day in New South Wales. However, retailer Myer notes:  
In our experience there is no shortage of volunteers among team members for work on 
this day due to the attractive penalty rates. We know from our experience that many 
casual workers such as students look forward to the extra income from Boxing Day 
employment. (DR sub, page 4)  
Submissions to the Draft Report from small businesses, particularly small supermarkets in Western 
Australia, South Australia and Queensland, do not support removing restrictions on retail trading 
hours, with some noting that the current restrictions provide them with a degree of protection from 
competition, as they are free to open when other retailers are not.  
My business will lose that last opportunity to impress customers that come in because we 
are open earlier than the majors and the flow on effects are immeasurable. (IGA Walloon, 
DR sub, page 1)  
Though we have busy times similar to the chains, we tend to do better when they are 
closed, either early in the morning or later at night. If the chains have deregulated hours 
then this will decrease our sales dramatically. (Nicks Supa IGA, DR sub, page 1)  
However, the relevant policy question is whether the restrictions are in the public interest, not 
whether they are in the interest of particular competitors. No compelling evidence has been 
presented to the Panel that, in the States and Territories with deregulated retail trading hours, the 
benefits to the community are outweighed by the costs. 
Indeed, many have claimed that the restrictions inhibit retailers’ ability to meet consumers’ needs.208 
The Panel’s view is that the needs of consumers, not of retailers, drive the structure and diversity of 
the retail sector. 
The South Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry notes that, in its 2013 pre-state election 
survey, 73 per cent of respondents supported a move to fully deregulated shop trading hours (DR 
sub, page 8). 
The Panel heard from independent supermarkets that compete by offering a tailored range of 
products or emphasising customer service. The Panel notes that some retailers already choose to 
open on Christmas Day to provide an option for last-minute purchases. 
The Panel also notes that, where restrictions apply to a particular sector or type of business, this can 
result in consumers having less flexibility and choice. The PC found that the evidence does not 
support the claim that deregulating trading hours has a material effect on the structure of the retail 
sector and the viability of small retailers. 
Restrictions on bricks and mortar retailers’ trading hours are increasingly out of step with 
consumer expectations and the rapid growth of online retailing. While these restrictions 
aim to protect smaller retailers, removing trading hours restrictions does not appear to 
have a material impact of the structure of the retail sector. Retaining restrictions also 
ignores the potential for more than offsetting gains for retailers through lowering costs 
                                                          
208  See, for example Myer, DR sub, page 2. 
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and increasing their ability to compete with online retailers, and greater choice and 
convenience for consumers.209 
The take-up of online shopping clearly demonstrates that consumers are demanding more diversity 
in how and when they shop. In recent years, online retail sales have grown more quickly than 
spending at traditional bricks and mortar retailers. In National Australia Bank’s December 2014 
Online Retail Sales Index, online retail sales were estimated to represent around 6.8 per cent of 
spending at bricks and mortar retailers, up from 4.9 per cent in 2011.210 
When consumers can switch to online suppliers outside regulated trading hours, restrictions on retail 
trading hours merely serve to disadvantage bricks and mortar retailers relative to their online 
competitors. In any event, many bricks and mortar retailers are also taking up the opportunity to 
have an online option, which enables them to serve their customers when their stores are closed. 
National Australia Bank estimates that Australians spent $16.4 billion on online retail in the 
12 months to November 2014.211 Customers are already deciding when and how they wish to make 
their purchases. Retailers should be given freedom to respond by deciding for themselves when to 
open and close their bricks and mortar stores, referring after-hours customers to their online portals. 
Submissions raise concerns that removing restrictions will reduce employment in small 
supermarkets. However, the PC found that deregulating trading hours in some jurisdictions increased 
employment opportunities in particular segments of the retail sector. 
The sector is a significant employer and further deregulation of trading hours is likely to 
benefit particularly the youngest and oldest age cohorts, first time job-seekers, and those 
with a preference for part-time or casual work.212 
Box 10.19 relates Tasmania’s experience of deregulating retail trading hours. 
                                                          
209  Productivity Commission 2014, Retailing and dairy manufacturing input costs and policy implications, media release 
10 October, Canberra. 
210 National Australia Bank 2012, NAB Online Retail Sales Index In-depth report, January 2010 — January 2012, National 
Australia Bank, viewed 30 January 2015 http://business.nab.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/norsi-jan-2010.pdf 
and National Australia Bank 2014, NAB Online Retail Sales Index — November 2014, National Australia Bank, viewed 
30 January 2015 
http://business.nab.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Online-Retail-Sales-Index-monthly-update-–
-November-2014-PDF-57KB.pdf. 
211  National Australia Bank 2014, NAB Online Retail Sales Index — November 2014, National Australia Bank, viewed 30 
January 2015, http://business.nab.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Online-Retail-Sales-Index-monthly-update-–
-November-2014-PDF-57KB.pdf. 
212  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 6. 
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Box 10.19: Experience of deregulation in Tasmania 
Prior to 1 December 2002, major retailers and businesses employing more than 250 people were 
prohibited from trading on Sundays, public holidays and after 6pm on Mondays to Wednesdays.  
A review in 2000 found the restrictions could not be justified as being in the public interest. The 
private benefits to selected stakeholders, principally the independent grocery retailers, were 
assessed as being less than the costs imposed on the Tasmanian community as a whole, 
particularly consumers, the restricted supermarket chains and the total retail sector.213 
Tasmanian retail trading hours were deregulated in December 2002, and now all retailers can open 
at any time except Christmas day, Good Friday and the morning of ANZAC day. 
Following deregulation, from January 2003 until June 2006, Tasmania experienced 25 per cent 
growth in retail sales compared with an Australia-wide growth rate of 16 per cent.214 
Despite concerns that deregulation could lead to a loss of employment because of a decline in the 
number of smaller retailers, this was not the case: 
• Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data show that employment in retail trade in Tasmania 
increased significantly, from 23,500 total jobs in November 2002 to 25,500 total jobs in 
November 2003. This represented 8.3 per cent retail jobs growth over the year, which was 
greater than the 4.3 per cent average jobs growth across all Tasmanian industries.215 
• Coles added 280 jobs in Tasmania following deregulation in 2002.216  
• The retail sector remains a significant employer in Tasmania, accounting for 11 per cent of 
all employees.217 
The PC218 noted that recent experience (not limited to Tasmania) shows that relaxing retail trading 
restrictions capitalises on latent consumer demand and allows consumers to shop according to 
their preferences as determined by their work, leisure and family commitments. It also increases 
the scope for businesses to achieve scale economies and reduces red tape. 
The legislation that removed restrictions on trading hours, the Shop Trading Hours Amendment Act 
2002, allows councils to request, at any time, the Chief Electoral Officer to conduct a plebiscite on 
the question of reimposing shop trading restrictions in their municipality. Shop trading restrictions 
on Sundays and public holidays could be reimposed in a municipality should the community 
support them.  
To date no request for a plebiscite has arisen from any local council in Tasmania. 
 
                                                          
213  Workplace Standards Tasmania 2000, Shop Trading Hours Act 1984, Regulatory Impact Statement, page 10. 
214  ACIL Tasman 2006, Review of Retail Trading Hours in South Australia, page 2, Shopping Council Centre of Australia, 
Sydney, viewed 30 January 2015 
www.scca.org.au/Pdf%20links/2006PDFlinks/Subs06/Full%20Subn%20Review%20of%20Trading%20Hours%20Sept%2
006.pdf. 
215  ABS Cat No. 6291.0.55.003 Labour force, Australia. 
216  Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Retail Trade, Research Report, Canberra, 
page 109. 
217  Ibid., page 111-112. 
218  Ibid., page 103 
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The Panel’s view 
Shop trading hours have been progressively deregulated across Australia. However, trading hours 
in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia remain regulated to a greater degree than 
other States and Territories. 
The remaining restrictions create a regulatory impediment to competition by raising barriers to 
expansion and distorting market signals. The Panel believes that consumer preferences are the 
best driver of business offerings, including in relation to trading hours.  
The growing use of the internet for retail purchases is undermining the intent of restrictions on 
retail trading hours, while disadvantaging ‘bricks and mortar’ retailers. This provides strong 
grounds for abandoning remaining limits on trading hours.  
The Panel appreciates the concern of some independent retailers about their ability to compete in 
a deregulated environment. However, the Panel notes that independent and small businesses are 
able to differentiate their offerings to fulfil consumer demands and compete in the face of 
deregulated trading hours. The Panel also notes that, where restrictions apply to a particular 
sector or type of business, this can result in consumers having less flexibility and choice. 
A general policy of deregulation of retail trading hours should not prevent jurisdictions from 
imposing specific restrictions on trading times for alcohol retailing or for gambling services to 
achieve the policy objective of harm minimisation. A time restriction on alcohol retailing may be 
found to satisfy the public interest test when a review is undertaken, even though general retail 
trading hours’ restrictions do not.  
Implementation 
Laws and regulations dictating retail trading hours are the responsibility of state and territory 
governments. The Panel considers that deregulating trading hours should be a priority for those 
States where the tightest restrictions on retail trading hours apply, because there lies the greatest 
potential gain. To this end, Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia should aim to 
complete the reforms within two years.  
Experience in those States and Territories that have already deregulated trading hours provides ‘best 
practice’ for guidance. The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 43) could provide an independent assessment of progress across the jurisdictions.  
Recommendation 12 — Retail trading hours 
Remaining restrictions on retail trading hours should be removed. To the extent that jurisdictions 
choose to retain restrictions, these should be strictly limited to Christmas Day, Good Friday and 
the morning of ANZAC Day, and should be applied broadly to avoid discriminating among different 
types of retailers. Deregulating trading hours should not prevent jurisdictions from imposing 
specific restrictions on trading times for alcohol retailing or gambling services in order to achieve 
the policy objective of harm minimisation. 
10.6 PARALLEL IMPORTS  
An overseas manufacturer can supply goods to different distributors in different countries, license 
the manufacture of goods to different manufacturers in different countries, or both. These supply or 
licensing arrangements may mean that the goods, all of which are genuine, are available for purchase 
in different countries (including Australia) at different prices.  
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Parallel imports refer to genuine goods that are imported into Australia by someone other than the 
licensed or authorised distributor or manufacturer in Australia.219 The Advisory Council on 
Intellectual Property says: 
A concise and exhaustive definition of parallel imports (sometimes referred to as ‘grey’ 
imports) is somewhat elusive. The basic problem is that while trade may be global, and 
brands may be global, trade marks are national and may be owned or used by different 
people in different countries. (DR sub, page 2) 
Parallel imports provide an alternative source of supply, which promotes competition and can 
provide consumers with products at lower prices. Woolworths says that in some instances it:  
… uses parallel import arrangements to deliver lower price products to consumers or to 
negotiate more efficient local sourcing options. (DR sub, page 20) 
CHOICE says: 
Parallel imports play an important role in addressing international price discrimination. 
They create situations whereby over-priced Australian products compete with identical 
cheaper products from overseas. Companies essentially compete with themselves, driving 
prices lower. (sub, page 15) 
Parallel import restrictions are similar to other import restrictions (such as tariffs) in that they benefit 
local suppliers by shielding them from international competition.  
Parallel imports of goods that are protected by certain forms of intellectual property rights are 
currently restricted by legislation. For example, parallel importation of some copyright products is 
restricted under the Copyright Act 1968.220 
The Copyright Act originally prohibited parallel imports except for personal use.221 In 1991, the 
Copyright Act was amended to allow limited parallel importation of books.222 General prohibitions 
regarding parallel imports were removed for sound recordings in 1998 and computer software in 
2003. The general prohibition against parallel imports continues to apply to literary works (other 
than books), dramatic, musical and artistic works, broadcasts and cinematographic films.223  
Because parallel import restrictions shield suppliers from international competition, they can be to 
the detriment of Australian consumers. As the ACCC notes:  
Such restrictions effectively provide an import monopoly to the domestic distributor and 
protect owners of the local IP rights from competition. The restrictions may also enable 
copyright owners to practice international price discrimination to the detriment of 
Australian consumers. (sub 1, page 60) 
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The ACCC also notes that, under the Trade Marks Act 1995, it appears that trade mark owners are 
able to prevent parallel imports of trade-marked goods into Australia by limiting trade mark licences 
to specific territories.224  
Australia’s parallel import restrictions have been reviewed many times over the past few decades 
(Box 10.20).225 Most reviews recommend that parallel import restrictions be removed on the basis 
that removing the restrictions would provide net benefits to the community. For example: 
• A PC report on parallel import restrictions on books found that the restrictions impose a 
private implicit tax on Australian consumers, which is used largely to subsidise foreign 
copyright holders (Box 10.20). 
• A PC report on automotive manufacturing concluded that, in the long term, the progressive 
relaxation of restrictions on the wide-scale importation of second-hand vehicles would have 
net benefits for the community as a whole (Box 10.21).  
Studies assessing the impact of removal of restrictions on parallel imports in New Zealand in 1998 
have also found that the reforms resulted in lower prices for consumers and improved supply.226 A 
recent report commissioned by the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development on the costs 
and benefits of preventing parallel imports concluded that:  
… the available evidence suggests that removing parallel import restrictions tends to 
reduce consumer prices, with few negative consequences for domestic creative effort. 
This suggests that the benefits of removing parallel import restrictions tend to outweigh 
the costs.227 
Box 10.20: Reviews of Australia’s parallel import restrictions 
In 2000, the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (the Ergas Committee) 
looked at parallel import restrictions as part of the Legislative Review Program.228 The Ergas 
Committee concluded that the costs of removing the parallel import restrictions were likely to be 
small relative to the gains to Australia. It also considered that the net income leakage to foreign 
copyright holders flowing from the parallel import restrictions was potentially significant. 
A 2009 PC research report on provisions of the Copyright Act that restrict the parallel importation 
of books found that the restrictions provide territorial protection for the publication of many 
books in Australia, preventing booksellers from sourcing cheaper or better value-for-money 
editions of those titles from world markets. 229 
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Box 10.20: Reviews of Australia’s parallel import restrictions (continued) 
Price comparisons found that, in 2007-08, a selection of around 350 trade books sold in Australia 
were on average 35 per cent more expensive than editions sold in the US (after accounting for the 
effects of GST). In many cases, the price difference was greater than 50 per cent. While noting the 
limitations of price comparisons, the PC said ‘these results … make it clear that, but for the PIRs 
[parallel import restrictions], Australian booksellers could have obtained and shipped many trade 
titles to Australia for significantly less than they are currently charged by Australian publishers’.230 
The PC also found that parallel import restrictions poorly target cultural externalities and much of 
the assistance the restrictions provide does not promote Australian-authored work. PC estimates 
suggest that the additional income flowing overseas is around 1.5 times that retained by local 
copyright holders.  
The PC recommended that Australia’s parallel import restrictions on books be repealed and 
(because of the significant adjustment costs for book producers) that the repeal take effect three 
years after the policy change is announced.  
A PC inquiry into the Australian retail industry found that international price discrimination is being 
practised against some Australian retailers, to the detriment of Australian consumers. The PC 
stated that some Australian retailers have the option of altering their supply arrangements — 
either by putting pressure on existing international suppliers and distributors or changing their 
supply channels. The PC recommended a review of the parallel import restrictions in the Copyright 
Act that prevent retailers from importing and selling clothing or other goods that embody 
decorative graphic images sold with the copyright owner’s permission in another market.231  
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications inquiry 
into IT pricing recommended lifting the parallel import restrictions still found in the Copyright Act, 
and reviewing and broadening the parallel importation defence in the Trade Marks Act to ensure it 
is effective in allowing the importation of genuine goods.232  
A number of submitters question why parallel import restrictions continue to be in force. The 
International Bar Association says: 
The dramatic changes to Australian consumers’ retail shopping practices over the past 
few years, especially through their on-line purchases, has called into question, among 
other things, existing parallel trade policies, both with respect to copyright and trade 
mark legal regimes. (sub, page 10) 
The Australian National Retailers Association argues that the restrictions are another example of 
‘outdated regulations that distort competition amongst retailers’ (sub, page 18), particularly the 
remaining restrictions on books and some clothing items that feature images. Also: 
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Like trading hours, this restriction is becoming increasingly anti-competitive as technology 
tilts the competitive edge in favour of retailers with overseas stores or warehouses which 
can circumvent these restrictions at the expense of local-based retailers. (sub, page 18) 
The Co-Op also describes parallel import restrictions as ‘effectively an anachronism of a pre digital 
age’ (sub, page 2). 
The ACCC, commenting on parallel import restrictions in the Copyright Act, states that it has: 
… consistently held the view that parallel importation restrictions (via legislation) extend 
rights to copyright owners beyond what is necessary to address ‘free riding’ on the 
creation of IP (the economic rationale for establishing copyright in the first instance). The 
ACCC considers that there is no further economic reason to justify a blanket legislative 
restriction on parallel imports. Rather, any arrangements that seek to address a ‘free 
rider’ problem in distribution are not unique to IP, and should be subject to the general 
competition provisions, under which authorisation is available if the arrangements can be 
shown to be in the public interest. (sub 1, page 62) 
In the context of restrictions on imports of second-hand passenger vehicles, Auto Services Group 
questions the rationale for retaining such restrictions, claiming that they:  
… avoid placing undue competitive pressure on local manufacturers. As of 2017, 
manufacturing of passenger vehicles will cease in Australia, which will, in turn, mean that 
all new vehicles sold in Australia will be imported from overseas. The original purpose for 
the restriction of parallel importing of passenger vehicles will no longer apply. 
(DR sub, page 1)  
Submissions also support moving to the New Zealand position, where all restrictions on parallel 
imports caused by statute have been abolished (Professor Allan Fels, sub, page 14). 
Box 10.21: Restrictions on the importation of second-hand vehicles233  
The Motor Vehicles Standards Act 1989 sets out national motor vehicle standards and regulates 
the supply of new and second-hand vehicles being imported into Australia. Under the Motor 
Vehicles Standards Act, applications for approval to place a used import plate (or to sell a used 
imported vehicle without such a plate) can only be made in respect of a single vehicle. The Motor 
Vehicle Standards Regulations 1989 (as amended up to 2012) also prohibits automotive workshops 
from importing more than 100 used vehicles in each vehicle category in a 12-month period.  
The PC’s report on Australia’s Automotive Manufacturing Industry concluded that progressively 
relaxing restrictions on the wide-scale importation of second-hand passenger and light commercial 
vehicles would have net benefits for the community as a whole. However, it noted that this 
relaxation of the restrictions would need to occur within a regulatory framework that provides for 
appropriate standards of quality and information, if it is to meet community expectations and the 
economy-wide benefits are to exceed the costs.  
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Box 10.21: Restrictions on the importation of second-hand vehicles (continued) 
The PC stated that second-hand vehicles should be limited to source countries where vehicle 
design standards are consistent with those recognised by Australia.  
The PC recommended that the new regulatory arrangements for imported second-hand vehicles 
should be developed in accordance with the outcomes of the Australian Government’s review of 
the Motor Vehicles Standards Act and should:  
• not commence before 2018, and ensure that reasonable advance notice is given to affected 
individuals and businesses, such as vehicle leasing companies; 
• be preceded by a regulatory compliance framework that includes measures to provide 
appropriate levels of community safety, environmental performance and consumer 
protection; 
• initially be limited to vehicles manufactured no earlier than five years prior to the date of 
application for importation; and 
• be limited to second-hand vehicles imported from countries that have vehicle design 
standards which are consistent with those recognised by Australia. 
The PC also recommended that the Australian Government remove the $12,000 specific duty on 
imported second-hand vehicles from the Customs Tariff as soon as practicable.234 
However, some submitters do not support removing the remaining restrictions on parallel imports. 
Some argue that there are few remaining restrictions on parallel importation in Australian copyright 
law. For example, the Australian Copyright Council says: 
Consumers already can and do use the Internet to price compare and purchase goods 
from other jurisdictions. The parallel importation laws do not prohibit this. They only 
apply to commercial entities wanting to import stock from other jurisdictions. 
(DR sub, page 5) 
Penguin Random House Australia also claims that the restrictions are not inconsistent with 
competition policy as they ‘relate only to commercial quantities of books’ and the ‘Speed to Market 
Initiative, voluntarily entered into by publishers and retailers in 2012, ensures speed of supply of 
commercial quantities of titles into the Australian market’ (DR sub, page 2). 
However, the Panel considers that, even where personal use exceptions currently exist, there are 
potential benefits from removing remaining restrictions. As the ACCC says: 
… own-use exemptions benefit Australian consumers but may create an uneven playing 
field for Australian businesses (including small businesses) that are not able to parallel 
import on a commercial scale. (sub 1, page 62) 
The report commissioned by the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development by Deloitte Access 
Economics has also argued: 
… even in markets where internet commerce is widespread, individual consumers who are 
purchasing for individual use from foreign parallel import suppliers are likely to face 
higher transaction costs (such as search costs, transport and delivery costs, delays and so 
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on), than domestic retailers, who have a comparative advantage in search, transportation 
and delivery and arbitrage activities. In other words, even where personal use exceptions 
mitigate some of the adverse welfare effects of parallel import restrictions, prices would 
be lower still if the restrictions were removed completely.235 
Others argue that, where restrictions remain, they serve sound policy objectives. For example, the 
Australian Screen Association says:  
Importantly, the restriction on parallel importation of copyright material exists to serve 
the geographical licensing arrangements that must exist in order to enforce exclusive 
rights of copyright holders. (DR sub, page 4) 
In the context of parallel import restrictions on books, it is argued that the restrictions must be kept 
in place to maintain a viable local book and publishing industry.236  
In 2012, Deloitte Access Economics also noted that removing parallel import restrictions on books in 
New Zealand in 1998 ‘had little impact on overall creative effort in the New Zealand book industry’ — 
the number of new New Zealand book titles published annually remained fairly steady between 2005 
and 2008, and that the share of authors in overall employment increased following the changes.237 
The PC report, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Books, also concluded: 
… while removal of the PIRs [parallel import restrictions] should see an increase in 
imported books where these represent better value, it is probable that most Australian 
publishers, including the major publishing houses, would generally adapt to the new 
regime, that Australian stories and content will continue to be demanded and that 
talented and marketable Australian authors would continue to be widely published.238 
Some submitters argue that removing parallel import restrictions will not result in lower prices for 
consumers. The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries states that Australia has one of the most 
competitive new car markets in the world and removing parallel import restrictions on second-hand 
vehicles would not lower prices for motor vehicles (DR sub, pages 1 and 11).239 Queensland Writers 
Centre also claims, ‘it is not certain that removing parallel importation restrictions would result in 
cheaper books’ (DR sub, page 3). 
Reviews consistently conclude that removing the parallel import restrictions will result in lower 
prices for consumers (see Box 10.20). For example, the PC’s report on parallel imports of books 
concluded that parallel import restrictions place upward pressure on book prices in Australia and 
reform of the current arrangements is necessary to place downward pressure on book prices.240  
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The ACCC also reports that, although the effects of parallel import competition on the price of sound 
recordings and computer software (following the removal of the restrictions) have not been formally 
reviewed, periodic price surveys conducted by the ACCC up to the early 2000s suggest that the 
difference between Australian and overseas prices of sound recordings narrowed considerably after 
the importation provisions were repealed.241  
Some submitters raise concerns about removing parallel import restrictions on second-hand 
passenger vehicles into Australia on the grounds of health and safety. They also suggest that an 
increased supply of second-hand vehicles would have a detrimental impact on the environment. For 
example, Ford Australia argues that Australia should continue to focus on encouraging new vehicle 
ownership as: 
… modern vehicles are demonstrably safer and more environmentally friendly. This is in 
stark contrast to allowing greater market access to the importation of questionable, 
secondhand ‘Grey’ vehicles that have been cast off by other advanced economies. 
(DR sub, page 7)  
The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries states, ‘the importation of second hand vehicles is 
inconsistent with government policy objectives in other areas such as road safety and the 
environment’ (sub, page 3). 
However, the PC report on automotive manufacturing concluded that, provided the relaxation of 
restrictions on second-hand vehicle importation was designed to favour the increased supply of 
late-model used vehicles, it could lower average vehicle fleet age and improve average vehicle fleet 
safety and emission standards. The PC also considered that average vehicle standards could improve 
in the new vehicle market if the additional source of competition encouraged vehicle manufacturers 
and importers to improve their product specifications.242 
Some submitters argue that the concerns about health and safety and environmental impacts could 
be addressed through regulatory and compliance frameworks. For example, the Australian Imported 
Motor Vehicle Industry Association considers that: 
All concerns (such as health & safety, and impact to the environment) relating to the 
relaxing of these laws can be easily addressed through regulatory and compliance 
framework and consumer education campaigns (these have been proven and tested for 
the past 25 years in countries such as NZ). (DR sub, page 3) 
RAWS Association supports the removal of parallel import restrictions but with:  
… the use of standards to protect the consumer and ensure the quality of imported 
vehicles, new and used. The Association generally supports harmonisation with 
international standards and in the interim would recommend the recognition of 
International Vehicle Safety and Environmental Standards from jurisdictions that equal or 
exceed the current domestic requirements. (DR sub, page 2) 
The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries argues that, when considering removing parallel 
import restrictions on second-hand cars it is important to be aware that Australia’s climatic and 
environmental conditions are significantly different to other substantial right-hand drive markets, 
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such as the United Kingdom and Japan, and such differences ‘necessitate substantial engineering 
changes to motor vehicles imported into Australia to enable those motor vehicles to perform as 
intended’ (DR sub, page 4). 
The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries also says it has: 
… serious reservations about the government’s resourcing capacity to adequately police, 
at the time of importation and subsequently, the safety of used vehicles including 
compliance with the standards that applied when the vehicle was built and the continued 
compliance with such standards following any modifications or repair. (sub, page 3) 
In line with these concerns, the restrictions on importing second-hand vehicles have largely been 
justified on the basis of consumer protection and road safety, as a way of ensuring that all vehicles 
meet minimum safety standards. However, they have also restricted the importation of used vehicles 
into Australia. As the PC’s report on automotive manufacturing concluded, the benefits of relaxing 
import restrictions on second-hand vehicles are conditional on having an appropriate regulatory and 
compliance framework in place: 
Provided relaxing the import restrictions were undertaken within an appropriate 
regulatory standards and compliance framework, net benefits would arise through lower 
prices and/or improved product specification (vehicle features) as well as increased 
product choice and availability for vehicle buyers, including consumers, businesses and 
government fleet buyers.243 
In New Zealand, to be registered for road use, second-hand vehicles entering the country for the first 
time must pass: 
• border inspection (checks for vehicle and importer identity, odometer reading, and any 
obvious defects or damage);244 
• biosecurity and Customs clearance (vehicles are denied entry if they have missing or 
fraudulent odometers); and 
• entry certification (to demonstrate compliance with applicable New Zealand standards). 245 
The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development is currently reviewing the Motor 
Vehicle Standards Act 1989. The review is looking for ways to reduce regulatory burdens imposed by 
the Act and improve its safety and environmental provisions.246 Commenting on the Motor Vehicle 
Standards Act, the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development states that it: 
 … sets uniform minimum safety and environmental standards for all road vehicles 
entering the Australian market, including those that are imported. The Act restricts 
parallel or other imports of vehicles which are unable to meet these standards. (DR 
sub, page 7) 
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On recommending the progressive relaxation of restrictions on the importation of second-hand 
vehicles, the PC said that the new regulatory arrangements should be: 
• developed in accordance with the outcomes of the review of the Motor Vehicle Standards Act; 
and  
• preceded by a regulatory compliance framework that includes measures to provide 
appropriate levels of community safety, environmental performance and consumer 
protection.247  
The PC also recommended that relaxing restrictions on importing second-hand vehicles should begin 
with vehicles under five years old (since the date of manufacture). It considered that the relatively 
newer second-hand vehicles would be least likely to pose safety, environmental and consumer 
protection concerns. The PC states that second-hand imports should also be limited to vehicles 
manufactured in countries with vehicle design standards that are consistent with those recognised 
by Australia. In addition, the PC recommended accelerated harmonisation of Australian Design Rules 
with relevant standards applying internationally (see Box 10.21).  
Other concerns relating to parallel imports include: 
• counterfeits being mixed with parallel imports; 
• consumer protection concerns where the packaging of the local and imported goods are 
similar, but there is a difference in quality or performance; and 
• impacts on local distributors (such as warranty issues and recalled products). For example, 
consumers of parallel imports may seek a repair or replacement under warranty from the 
licensed distributor in Australia.248 
Australian Food and Grocery Council provides some examples:  
… chewing gum and confectionery products from global brands that have been parallel 
imported require very close label scrutiny to identify that the product is not that of the 
Australian brand owner, and yet it is the Australian brand owner that must carry the costs 
of call centre contacts and product replacement (with Australian brand product) to 
protect brand reputation. There is also little practical recourse to global funding 
arrangements to recompense these costs because the exporting brand owner is often 
either unaware or not the direct seller of the parallel imported product. (DR sub, page 9) 
Australian Industry Group also notes: 
The authorised distributor is responsible for marketing and warranty expenses, while the 
parallel importer does not need to cover these costs and so can undercut on price. On 
occasion, parallel importers can get caught out as they can end up buying counterfeit 
product. (DR sub, page 9) 
Parallel imports may be confused with counterfeit goods — an issue most likely to occur in easily 
replicable goods, such as clothing. However, issues around counterfeiting can be addressed directly 
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by regulation rather than by restricting parallel imports and shielding local suppliers from 
international competition.  
eBay notes that it currently has measures in place to remove counterfeit products so as to safeguard 
consumers. Also, eBay states that it works with law enforcement agencies to ensure appropriate 
safeguards are monitored, reported and enacted (DR sub, page 12). 
Some submitters note that they service or repair products they did not sell because they do not want 
to risk compromising the reputation of their product or brand. Ford Australia says: 
… there exists the potential for significant reputation damage to brands and dealers 
operating legitimately in Australia from consumers who personally import new vehicles 
not sold in Australia but expect them to service and repair these vehicles. A lack of 
replacement parts, suitable diagnostic equipment, specialised tools and trained 
technicians may lead to significant dissatisfaction when consumers have the expectation 
that their vehicle will be maintained and supported by the dealers and brand of their 
vehicle operating in Australia. (DR sub, pages 10-11)249 
Consumer education and information disclosure (together with appropriate regulatory and 
compliance frameworks) are important in ensuring that consumers are aware of the product they are 
buying, their warranty rights and their ability to seek a refund when purchasing products from 
overseas traders. The Australian Automotive Aftermarket Association argues: 
Many of the concerns regarding consumer safety, counterfeit products and inadequate 
enforcement can be addressed through regulation and consumer information. Discussion 
on this matter [parallel imports] is often misinformed and fuelled by exaggerated claims 
of the consequences. (DR sub, page 3) 
The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries has another view: 
Consumer education campaigns are far from pragmatic for a complex technical unit such 
as a motor vehicle as many of the necessary attributes are not identifiable from simple, or 
even complex, observations. Consumer expectations are built from the observation in the 
current Australian market which is supported by the authorised OEM [original equipment 
manufacturer] distributor. To suggest that the changing of the rules to allow parallel 
imports … would see the market respond and brands left undamaged, is fanciful. (DR sub, 
page 11) 
In New Zealand, used vehicles for sale must display a Consumer Information Notice to assist buyers 
in making informed purchasing decisions. Imported used vehicles must display the year of first 
registration overseas, country of last registration before import and whether the vehicle was 
recorded ‘damaged’ at the time of importation.250 
The Panel considers that many of the concerns raised in submissions around relaxing parallel import 
restrictions, including concerns about consumer safety, counterfeit products and inadequate 
enforcement, could be addressed directly through regulation and information.  
                                                          
249  The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries also argues that ‘free riding’ occurs, DR sub, page 8 and attached 
report, Pegasus Economics 2014, Implications of Parallel Imports of Passenger Motor Vehicles. 
250  Consumer Affairs New Zealand, Consumer Information Notice, Consumer Affairs, Wellington, viewed 9 February 2015, 
www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/for-business/compliance/selling-cars-motor-vehicles/mvt-consumer-information-notic
e.pdf/view. See also Productivity Commission 2014, Australia’s Automotive Manufacturing Industry, Canberra, page 
159. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
176 Part 3 — Competition Policy 
Relaxing parallel import restrictions should deliver net benefits to the community, provided 
appropriate regulatory and compliance frameworks and consumer education programs are in place.  
If consumers buy goods without realising that they are parallel imports, there is a concern that 
consumers could be misled and/or brands damaged. By way of illustration, Box 10.22 describes a 
dispute between ALDI and Nestlé Australia relating to parallel imports. The Panel expects that the 
market will respond to these concerns arising from removing restrictions on parallel imports, 
including through making consumers aware of what products they are buying. The threat of 
consumers becoming dissatisfied with particular products and/or brands is also likely to motivate 
international suppliers to rethink their regional arrangements. 
Box 10.22: ALDI’s imports of Nescafé coffee 
In a 2005 notification to the ACCC, Nestlé Australia raised the issue of ALDI selling Nescafé branded 
instant coffee in its stores sourced from overseas suppliers.251 ALDI had previously supplied the 
locally sourced Nescafé ‘Blend 43’, which was its highest selling instant coffee, but submitted that 
it resorted to import-sourcing as a result of uncompetitive local prices and supply difficulties. 
The imported coffee did not have the same formulation and taste as instant coffee supplied by 
Nestlé Australia. Nestlé Australia submitted that consumers may be misled and/or may form 
negative views about Nestlé Australia’s products as a result of drinking the imported coffee. 
ALDI had taken steps, including in-store posters, shelf labels, and stickers on the coffee jars, to 
alert customers to the fact that the imported Nestlé ‘Matinal’ or ‘Classic’ blends were different to 
the locally sourced Nescafé ‘Blend 43’ product. ALDI also provided a satisfaction guarantee. 
However, Nestlé Australia submitted that this disclosure was inadequate to address its concerns. It 
proposed to cease supply of all of its products to ALDI, unless ALDI made further disclosures as 
prescribed by Nestlé Australia and published corrective advertisements. 
The ACCC concluded that ALDI’s disclosure was adequate, noting that ALDI was selling genuine 
Nescafé products manufactured by a Nestlé subsidiary. 
Having regard to internal Nestlé Australia documents it obtained, the ACCC concluded that a 
substantial purpose of Nestlé Australia’s conduct was to lessen competition generated by ALDI’s 
supply of imported Nescafé products, and lessen the likelihood of other supermarkets importing 
Nescafé products, both of which would place downward pressure on prices. 
A number of submissions consider the remaining restrictions on parallel imports should be reviewed: 
• The Law Council of Australia — IP Committee submits that, in light of several significant 
decisions by the courts, it has become difficult to advise clients on what is, or is not, a 
legitimate parallel import. It argues that the parallel importation of trade-marked goods 
should be comprehensively examined to determine the costs and benefits of permitting (or 
not permitting) parallel imports into Australia (sub, page 2). 
• The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property also argues, ‘if policy favours parallel 
importation, serious thought needs to be given to exactly how to make that policy work’ in the 
context of trade marks. It suggests considering the approach found in New Zealand’s Trade 
Marks Act (DR sub, pages 1 and 6). 
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• The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry recommends reviewing the enforcement 
requirements associated with parallel imports (sub, pages 20-21).252 
The Panel’s view 
Parallel import restrictions are similar to other import restrictions (such as tariffs) in that they 
benefit local producers by shielding them from international competition. They are effectively an 
implicit tax on Australian consumers and businesses. The Panel notes that the impact of changing 
technology means that these restrictions are more easily circumvented. 
Removing parallel import restrictions would promote competition and potentially lower prices of 
many consumer goods, while concerns raised about parallel imports (such as consumer safety, 
counterfeit products and inadequate enforcement) could be addressed directly through regulatory 
and compliance frameworks and consumer education campaigns. 
Implementation 
Enforcing restrictions on parallel imports is the responsibility of the Australian Government.  
On the basis that the PC has already reviewed parallel import restrictions on books and second-hand 
vehicles and concluded that removing such restrictions would be in the public interest, the Australian 
Government should, within six months of accepting the recommendation, announce that: 
• parallel import restrictions on books will be repealed; and 
• parallel import restrictions on second-hand passenger and light commercial vehicles will be 
progressively relaxed. 
Transitional arrangements are important to ensure that affected individuals and businesses are given 
adequate notice before parallel import restrictions are removed. As the PC concluded, the immediate 
abolition of parallel import restrictions could impose significant adjustment costs on book producers. 
Timeframes for removing parallel import restrictions on books and second-hand cars should be set 
based on the transitional arrangements recommended by the PC. These include that: 
• repealing the parallel import restrictions on books takes effect three years after the policy 
change is announced; and 
• progressively relaxing restrictions on the importation of second-hand vehicles commences no 
earlier than 2018, having been preceded by the introduction of a regulatory compliance 
framework that includes measures to ensure appropriate levels of community safety, 
environmental performance and consumer protection. 
The Australian Government should also announce an independent review of all remaining provisions 
of the Copyright Act that restrict parallel imports, and of the parallel importation defence under the 
Trade Marks Act, to commence within six months of accepting the recommendation. 
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Recommendation 13 — Parallel imports 
Restrictions on parallel imports should be removed unless it can be shown that: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs ; and  
• the objectives of the restrictions can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
Consistent with the recommendations of recent Productivity Commission reviews, parallel import 
restrictions on books and second-hand cars should be removed, subject to transitional 
arrangements as recommended by the Productivity Commission. 
Remaining provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 that restrict parallel imports, and the parallel 
importation defence under the Trade Marks Act 1995, should be reviewed by an independent 
body, such as the Productivity Commission. 
10.7 PHARMACY 
Pharmacy253 regulation has been the subject of numerous reports and reviews over the past 
20 years, including the 2000 Wilkinson National Competition Policy Review of Pharmacy (required 
under NCP). It has also been examined by the PC254 and, most recently, by the National Commission 
of Audit, which recommended ‘opening up the pharmacy sector to competition, including through 
the deregulation of ownership and location rules’.255 The effectiveness and efficiency of the 
pharmacy location rules was also reviewed in 2010 by Urbis Consultancy in its Review of the 
Pharmacy Location Rules under the Fourth Community Pharmacy Agreement.256 
The Draft Report recommends, ‘the pharmacy ownership and location rules should be removed in 
the long-term interests of consumers. They should be replaced with regulations to ensure access and 
quality of advice on pharmaceuticals that do not unduly restrict competition.’ 
The Review received some submissions supporting this recommendation and others opposing it. 
Some submissions also addressed the question of how governments should determine whether the 
current restrictions are justified. 
The Panel recognises that some pharmacy regulation is justified to: uphold patient and community 
safety; ensure pharmacists provide consumers with appropriate information and advice about their 
medication; provide equitable access to medication, regardless of the patient’s wealth or location; 
ensure accountability for appropriate standards and behaviour by pharmacists; and manage costs to 
patients and governments. 
The policy objectives of the pharmacy ownership and location rules are outlined separately below, 
followed by a discussion drawing on stakeholder arguments about how they have applied in practice. 
The concluding section covers recent developments and recommendations, including transitional 
arrangements. 
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254  Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report no. 33, Canberra. 
255  Australian Government 2014, Towards Responsible Government - The Report of the National Commission of Audit 
Phase One, Canberra, page xlii. 
256  Urbis Pty Limited 2010, Review of the Pharmacy Location Rules under the Fourth Community Pharmacy Agreement, 
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Pharmacy ownership rules 
State and territory legislation limits ownership of community pharmacies to pharmacists, with 
limited exceptions, such as for friendly societies with historical ownership of pharmacies. There are 
also limits in each State (but not the Territories) on how many pharmacies each pharmacist can own. 
These limits vary by State. The ownership rules do not prevent pharmacies owned by different 
pharmacists from operating under a common name and brand, such as Amcal or Terry White. 
As the PC submission to the National Pharmacy Review noted, rationales given in support of the 
ownership restrictions include to: 
• maintain ethical and professional standards in the provision of pharmacy services; 
• provide a greater capacity to enforce professional standards; and 
• promote equitable access to pharmacy services. 257 
Sitting alongside the ownership rules are state and territory regulations governing the licensing of 
pharmacists and pharmacy premises, and the advertising of medicines and poisons. The Panel makes 
no recommendations in relation to these other regulations, but nor does it suggest that they should 
be exempt from consideration as part of the new round of regulation reviews proposed at 
Recommendation 8. Arguably, these licensing requirements, together with measures such as codes 
of ethics enforced by Pharmacy Boards, undergird consumer confidence in pharmacy services 
meeting minimum quality and safety standards. 
The Pharmacy Guild of Australia submits that pharmacies should be seen as agents providing services 
to consumers on behalf of government and that: 
… ownership rules encourage efficiency in the provision of community pharmacy services 
while ensuring that these services are provided to an appropriate quality standard. By 
contracting with independent owner-pharmacists, the Government preserves the strong 
efficiency incentives that exist in franchise relationships. Furthermore, by placing the 
pharmacist and his or her professional reputation at the centre of the distribution 
relationship, a position that the pharmacist stands to lose if quality standards are not met, 
the Government effectively ‘raises the stakes’ for poor quality performance. 
Owner-pharmacists therefore have an enhanced incentive to conduct themselves and 
their pharmacies ethically and professionally, and not risk loss of registration and, 
therefore, loss of value in the pharmacy. 
Additionally and importantly, the ownership rules limit concentration in the supply of 
dispensing services. (DR sub, page ix) 
The Pharmaceutical Society of Australia also supports the pharmacy ownership rules: 
… limiting the controlling interest in the ownership of pharmacy businesses to 
pharmacists promotes patient safety and competent provision of high quality pharmacy 
services and helps maintain public confidence in those services; and limiting the number 
of pharmacy businesses that may be owned by a person or entity helps protect the public 
from market dominance or inappropriate market conduct. (sub, page 7) 
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On the other hand, Chemist Warehouse and Ramsay Health Care submit that the ownership rules are 
redundant and ineffective: 
The societal engagement and relationship is with the dispensing and counselling 
pharmacist. The Australian public forges a bond of trust and respect with the chemist 
whom assists their pharmaceutical needs who in many cases (if not most) is not the store 
proprietor. 
We estimate Guild membership today is around 2000 with about 5400 pharmacies in the 
country. There are about 28,000 pharmacists practising in the country, which suggests a 
very high proportion of customer interactions are with pharmacists working for someone 
else. (Chemist Warehouse, DR sub, pages 2-3) 
…for many years enterprising pharmacists, families of pharmacists (i.e. spouses and 
children), and pharmacist business partners have formed operating alliances that combine 
their personal holdings under State laws, creating loose conglomerates in which each 
member exercises nominal supervision over their personal pharmacy holdings (and 
therefore everyone remains within the legislative boundaries). 
In effect, supposedly professional practices are operating as commercial businesses, using 
the rules to maximise returns and profits rather than give consumers the best possible 
professional service. 
In our view, if these restrictions are so easily got around by entrepreneurial pharmacists 
acting more like business tycoons they are pointless, make a mockery of ownership rules 
excluding non-pharmacists, and should be removed. (Ramsay Health Care, DR sub, page 6) 
No analogous ownership rules apply to GP practices, and the Panel is unaware of any evidence that 
this absence of regulation compromises high professional standards of care and accountability in the 
provision of primary medical services. 
The Panel also notes that, in every State and the Northern Territory, certain companies, viz., Friendly 
Society Pharmacy companies, have historically been allowed to own pharmacies and continue to do 
so. The Panel sees no reason to believe, nor does any submitter suggest, that these companies 
provide pharmacy services less ethically or professionally than do owner-pharmacists. 
Pharmacy location rules 
The Australian Government’s National Medicines Policy establishes objectives against which 
medicines are provided and regulations set. This is a co-operative endeavour to bring about better 
health outcomes for all Australians, focusing especially on access to and quality use of medicines.258 
The National Medicines Policy has the following central objectives: 
• timely access to medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals and the community can 
afford; 
• medicines meeting appropriate standards of quality, safety and efficacy; 
• quality use of medicines; and 
• maintaining a responsible and viable medicines industry.259 
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Since 1990, the remuneration pharmacists receive for dispensing Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(PBS) medicines on behalf of government, and regulations governing the location of pharmacies, 
have been negotiated in a series of Australian Community Pharmacy Agreements between the 
Australian Government and the Pharmacy Guild of Australia. These Agreements also govern 
remuneration for in-pharmacy programs and services as well as community service obligation (CSO) 
arrangements with pharmacy wholesalers. 
The pharmacy location rules specified in the current Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement 
require a pharmacist to obtain approval from the Australian Government to open a new pharmacy or 
to move or expand an existing pharmacy.260 Box 10.23 provides a brief history of the location rules. 
Box 10.23: Australian Community Pharmacy Agreements and location rules — a brief history261 
The first Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement was signed in 1990. Since then, there have 
been five agreements, each lasting five years. At the time of the first Agreement (1990-1995), 
there was concern that there were too many pharmacies on a population basis and that they were 
unevenly distributed, with clustering in some urban areas but a significantly lower 
pharmacy-to-population ratio in rural and remote areas.  
The first Agreement set out a new remuneration framework and rules to address these concerns. 
The rules primarily focused on relocating, closing and amalgamating existing pharmacies. It also 
specified requirements to be met before additional pharmacies would be approved, including that 
the proposed relocated pharmacy be at least 5km from the nearest approved pharmacy and satisfy 
an assessment of community need. 
The second Agreement (1995-2000) maintained pharmacy location restrictions, both in respect of 
assessing community need before establishing a new pharmacy and satisfying primarily 
distance-based criteria for relocated pharmacies. 
The third Agreement (2000-2005) relaxed the location requirements for both new and relocated 
pharmacy approvals, particularly in rural and remote areas. It also introduced financial incentives 
to establish new pharmacies in rural locations. 
New rules under the fourth Agreement (2006-2010) facilitated pharmacy relocation into some 
medical and shopping centres as well as into single pharmacy towns and high-growth, 
single-pharmacy urban areas. 
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Health Act 1953 to extend the Pharmacy Location Rules to 30 June 2015, Canberra, page 5.  
260  Australian Government Department of Health 2014, Pharmacy Locations Rules Applicant’s Handbook, Canberra. 
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Box 10.23: Australian Community Pharmacy Agreements and location rules — a brief history 
(continued) 
The fifth Agreement (2010-2015) retained the location rules from the fourth Agreement, pending 
the outcome of an independent review of the Rules (the Urbis Review).262 
The fifth Agreement is due to expire on 1 July 2015 and to be replaced by a sixth Agreement, the 
terms of which are currently subject to negotiation. 
The complexity of the pharmacy location rules has led the Australian Government Department of 
Health to prepare a 56-page Handbook, which the Department issues to applicants to convey the full 
requirements of the location rules.263 
The Pharmacy Location Rules include provisions for establishing a new pharmacy or relocating an 
existing pharmacy. These include four rules for existing pharmacists wishing to expand or contract an 
existing pharmacy, relocate a pharmacy up to 1km by straight line, or within the same facility (as 
defined by the location rules) or within the same town, and seven rules for pharmacists wishing to 
open a new pharmacy. Generally, a new pharmacy may not open within a certain distance of an 
existing pharmacy (usually either 1.5 or 10 kilometres depending on the location), with some 
exceptions, including for pharmacies located within shopping centres, large medical centres or 
private hospitals.  
These rules apply differently depending on the distance to the nearest existing pharmacy, the 
number of supermarkets in a town, and/or the number of medical practitioners in the area. 
A pharmacy must also not be located within, or directly accessible from, a supermarket, where a 
supermarket is defined as ‘a retail store or market, the primary business of which is the sale of a 
range of food, beverages, groceries and other domestic goods’. This referenced range of goods 
means that it is the type of store in which a person could do their weekly shopping from fresh food 
(for example, dairy, meat, bread), pantry items, cleaning products, personal care items and other 
household staples (for example, laundry pegs, plastic food wrap). 
This definition prevents pharmacists from opening stores within or adjoining a supermarket where 
there is direct access to the pharmacy from within the supermarket, but it does not prevent 
pharmacists from expanding their ranges to include many of the products sold by supermarkets. 
Barbara Packer submits that her Pharmacy in Stafford, Brisbane is also an IGA X-press store that 
seeks ‘… to give our customers the convenience they need of buying pharmaceutical products, 
prescriptions and convenience groceries before the other larger supermarkets are open’ (DR sub, 
page 1). In this example, customers are able to access the professional assistance of a qualified 
pharmacist and to have medicines dispensed by a qualified pharmacist while these functions are 
co-located with a grocery retailer. Commenting on this example, the Pharmacy Guild said, ‘We don’t 
support pharmacies in supermarkets but this is different because the supermarket is owned by a 
pharmacist not a corporate entity…We don’t think that is double standards’.264  
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The location rules and their rationale 
Submissions from the Pharmacy Guild, Symbion, Australian Friendly Societies Pharmacies Association 
and the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia, as well as a number of individual pharmacists and small 
business representatives, support the current arrangements. They argue that the pharmacy location 
rules are achieving better outcomes than could be achieved under a different regulatory regime. For 
example, the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia submits: 
The location provisions facilitate access to pharmacies by all segments of the population. 
(sub, page 4) 
The website for the current (fifth) Community Pharmacy Agreement states, ‘To ensure that all 
Australians have access to PBS medicines, particularly in rural and remote areas, Pharmacy Location 
Rules (the Rules) have been a feature of all five Community Pharmacy Agreements [since 1990].’265 
The Pharmacy Guild also commissioned a consultancy report, which it says: 
... demonstrates that community pharmacy provides an enviably high level of access not 
only to metropolitan consumers but also to consumers in regional areas, to older 
consumers and to consumers in areas of socio-economic disadvantage. (DR sub, page iv)  
However, Chemist Warehouse submits that, far from ensuring access to pharmacy services, the 
location rules reduce the ubiquity of pharmacies by preventing Chemist Warehouse members and 
other pharmacists from opening new outlets wherever they choose (DR sub, page 2). Chemist 
Warehouse also submits that evidence from European countries, where similar pharmacy location 
rules have been reformed, shows that pharmacies, particularly those in regional locations, are 
unlikely to close if regulation is relaxed to allow competitive entry of new pharmacies (DR sub, 
page 4). 
Pharmacy location rules restrict competition in pharmacy services. The Panel received several 
submissions complaining that the location rules were responsible, at least in part, for a proposed 
medical practice at Ingham in Queensland not proceeding.266 These submitters say that the inclusion 
of a pharmacy was integral to the proposal’s commercial viability but that, due to an incumbent 
pharmacist relocating one of two existing pharmacies within 500 metres of the proposed medical 
practice, the application to open a new pharmacy as part of the medical practice was denied.  
The Panel cannot adjudicate the facts of this particular case but accepts that the location rules limit 
the options available to those wishing to open a new pharmacy, or to move an existing pharmacy, 
and thereby restrict competition. 
There are no analogous location rules for GP practices. The Pharmacy Guild submits: 
The absence of regulations for GPs has clearly not enabled equitable access to health care 
services for all Australians, while the lack of success of different incentive programs in 
encouraging medical professionals to move to regional, rural and remote Australia 
suggests that devising effective mechanisms to achieve this objective is problematic. (DR 
sub, page 22) 
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Although there are challenges in ensuring access to GP services in rural Australia, possible alternative 
means of addressing those challenges exist that do not restrict competition. The Panel sets out some 
possible alternatives below.  
Recent developments relevant to pharmacy ownership and location rules 
The Pharmacy Guild submits that pharmacy ownership and location regulations were reviewed in 
2000 under NCP and that any further review is therefore unnecessary (sub, page 6). However, the 
Panel notes that considerable time has elapsed since then, and there have been a number of 
significant developments in the meantime.  
For example, the introduction, and subsequent expansion, of Price Disclosure arrangements for PBS 
medicines has lowered the prices the Australian Government pays for key medicines closer to those 
actually paid by community pharmacies, with a significant downward impact on the incomes of 
community pharmacies. Changes were also made to the location rules as part of the fifth Australian 
Community Pharmacy Agreement (2010-2015) following the Urbis Review.267  
In 2011, the location rules were amended and, through a targeted easing of existing regulations, 
simplified. Relocating an existing pharmacy was no longer required in order to establish a pharmacy 
in shopping centres, large medical centres, private hospitals and one-pharmacy towns. This made it 
easier and cheaper to establish a pharmacy in such circumstances and provided greater flexibility to 
respond to community need.268 
In October 2014, the Australian Government Department of Health completed a 
post-implementation review of the 2010 decision to renew the pharmacy location rules, since a 
Regulation Impact Statement was not prepared at the decision-making stage (see Box 10.24).269 
Box 10.24: Post-implementation review of the 2010 pharmacy location rules  
In October 2014, the Australian Government Department of Health completed a 
Post-implementation review of the 2010 decision to renew the pharmacy location rules.270 
The post-implementation review notes that the basis of the decision to extend the location rules 
‘was to ensure Australia continues to maintain a viable and sustainable network of community 
pharmacies approved to supply PBS medicines and pharmacy health services funded under the 
Fifth Agreement’ (page 4). 
The Review concluded that the policy objectives of the location rules are consistent with the broad 
objectives of national health policy, in particular, the National Medicines Policy, which has timely 
access to medicines as one of its four key pillars. 
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Box 10.24: Post-implementation review of the 2010 pharmacy location rules (continued) 
The Review examined three possible alternative approaches that might be adopted in place of the 
location rules. These were: 
• targeted easing of the existing rules;  
• remuneration-based incentives and disincentives; and  
• complete deregulation of pharmacy location decisions. 
The Review listed a fourth alternative approach but did not examine it in detail, viz., the Australian 
Government directly tendering for the delivery of PBS medicines and pharmacy services. 
Taking into account the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered, the Review concluded 
that: 
... while there remains a net benefit to consumers and pharmacy owners from the 
retention of the Rules from the Fourth Agreement, additional benefits can be achieved. 
These benefits, particularly in relation to consumers and in the government 
administration of the Rules, could be realised through the targeted easing of the Rules 
… (page 30) 
Under this option, the restrictions of the Rules would be further relaxed to provide 
greater opportunity to establish new pharmacies. Such amendments would address 
emerging or ongoing issues and provide greater flexibility to respond to community 
need for access to PBS medicines. They would also take into account the changing 
business environment and health care policy priorities ... (page 22) 
In addition to these developments, different business models have emerged in the pharmacy sector 
since 2000, including specialist and online pharmacy models and discount groups that operate on a 
larger scale, such as Chemist Warehouse.  
Increasingly, pharmacy business models involve selling a much wider range of products, extending 
beyond health and personal care-related products to include gifts and home consumables. The 
rationale for pharmacy location rules relates only to their role in dispensing prescription (particularly 
PBS) medications. There are no location rules governing the sale of non-prescription medications, let 
alone gifts and home consumables. 
There is also a clearer understanding of how well other primary healthcare providers operate 
without anti-competitive location and ownership restrictions. For example, ownership of medical 
practices is not limited to GPs, nor are GP practices prevented from locating in close proximity to one 
another.  
Stakeholders also point to the experience of partial deregulation in other jurisdictions as providing 
new evidence about the merits of location and ownership rules.  
Chemist Warehouse cites an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
review that assessed the impacts on competition of pharmacy sector deregulation in several 
European countries. Chemist Warehouse submits that the OECD review271 found: 
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 Accessibility of medicines to consumers increased due to the establishment of 
new pharmacies and the extension of opening hours. 
 Price decreases were observed in many countries — including a dramatic 42 per 
cent decrease in retail pharmacy prices in Denmark. No country reported 
increases. (sub, page 6) 
However, the Pharmacy Guild submits that this summary seriously misrepresents the conclusions of 
the OECD Review (sub, pages 19-20). 
The Panel considers that evidence of the outcomes of partial deregulation in overseas jurisdictions 
provides useful guidance for policymakers about the gains that may be available. 
Alternatives to current ownership and location rules 
The current ownership and location regulations impose costs on consumers directly and indirectly by 
erecting barriers to entry to the market for dispensing PBS medicines. The Post-implementation 
Review also noted the following ‘cost impacts’ arising from the location rules: 
• possibly reduced geographical access to pharmacies in urban areas; 
• the potential for higher cost non-PBS medicines, reflected in higher profits to existing 
pharmacists; and 
• an administrative impost for pharmacists who want to relocate or expand.272 
In their submissions to the Draft Report, the Consumers Health Forum, National Seniors Australia, 
Chemist Warehouse, and Professional Pharmacists Australia call for changes to the ownership and 
location rules: 
The end result of limiting competition and guaranteeing income has been to create a 
significant problem in community pharmacy that is leading to poor health outcomes, a 
stifling of innovation and the taxpayer not receiving value for money. (Professional 
Pharmacists Australia)273 
The Northern Territory Government also supports removing the pharmacy ownership and location 
rules (DR sub, page 5). 
A range of other options are available to governments seeking to secure the access, community 
service and other objectives of the present ownership and location rules.  
The Panel notes that supply of medicines in remote areas is already partly conducted through 
channels other than retail pharmacies. For example, under the Remote Area Aboriginal Health 
Services Programme, clients of approved remote area Aboriginal Health Services receive PBS 
medicines directly from the Aboriginal Health Services at the point of consultation, without the need 
for a normal prescription form — and without charge.274 
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It is also open to government to secure its policy objectives by imposing obligations directly on 
pharmacies as a condition of their licensing and/or remuneration, noting that the Australian 
Community Pharmacy Agreement already imposes certain obligations for services that pharmacists 
provide.  
Another alternative model is funding a CSO to achieve specific policy objectives. Such a mechanism 
currently operates in pharmaceutical wholesaling (see Box 10.25). The Australian Government uses 
the CSO Funding Pool to directly target its policy outcome of timely access to the full range of 
medicines for all Australians. Notably, it does so without imposing ownership or location restrictions 
on pharmaceutical wholesalers. Further, the Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement also 
includes provisions to fund ‘Specific Programs’ including for medication management, rural support, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander access, and research and development.275 
Box 10.25: CSO Funding Pool for pharmaceutical wholesalers276 
The aim of the CSO Funding Pool is to ensure that all Australians have access to the full range of 
PBS medicines, via their community pharmacy, regardless of where they live and usually within 24 
hours. 
The CSO Funding Pool financially supports pharmaceutical wholesalers to supply the full range of 
PBS medicines to pharmacies across Australia, regardless of pharmacy location and the relative 
cost of supply.  
Under these arrangements, payments are provided directly to eligible wholesalers (known as CSO 
Distributors) who supply the full range of PBS medicines to any pharmacy, usually within 24 hours, 
and that meet compliance requirements and service standards. These payments are over and 
above those made directly to pharmacists to cover the cost of supply from the wholesaler.  
Community service objectives in the retailing of pharmaceuticals could be recognised and funded via 
a CSO pool in a similar way, particularly for dispensing PBS medicines and providing other 
in-pharmacy services in remote and rural locations. This could also occur through a tender 
arrangement. 
As in other contexts, the use of trials and/or a staged approach to easing and replacing the existing 
rules would be beneficial in pharmacy regulation. This gives existing providers time to adjust their 
business models and to trial and test for unintended outcomes (both positive and negative). 
The Government’s own Post-implementation Review recommends a targeted easing of the location 
rules. The Panel agrees that this would increase competition to the benefit of consumers, while 
relaxing the rules gradually would address any concerns about their removal at a single stroke. 
Chemist Warehouse proposes possible measures to address the perceived risks of removing the 
location and ownership rules. These include: imposing a ‘fit and proper person test’ for pharmacy 
ownership; establishing a licence fee to address concerns about the risk of predatory entry to ‘clear 
the market’; and retaining a 1-2 kilometre limit on moving an existing pharmacy to address concerns 
that pharmacies would move away from rural areas to cities (DR sub, page 7). 
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Ramsay Health Care proposes that, to reassure the Australian public that dispensing medicines and 
providing other professional pharmacy services is motivated first and foremost by the best 
healthcare interests of Australians (rather than commercial or other objectives), Wilkinson’s 
complementary recommendation 4 be adopted. This recommendation proposed establishing a 
statutory offence, with appropriate and substantial penalties for individuals and corporations, of 
improper and inappropriate interference with a pharmacist in the course of his or her practice (DR 
sub, page 9). 
Regulatory Restrictions 
Part 3 — Competition Policy  189 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel accepts that, given the key role of pharmacy in primary healthcare, ongoing regulation 
of pharmacy is justified and needs to remain in place. However, current regulations preventing 
pharmacists from choosing freely where to locate their pharmacies, and limiting ownership to 
pharmacists and friendly societies, impose costs on consumers.  
Further, developments in Australia strengthen the case for repealing the present arrangements 
and replacing them with new regulations that better serve consumers and are less harmful to 
competition. There is also evidence of overseas experience to draw upon. 
Recent developments include the rise of discount pharmacy groups and online prescriptions as 
well as the accumulation of evidence about the effects of deregulation in other Australian health 
sectors, in particular, general practice medicine. Further changes to the location rules would 
represent a continuation of steps already taken towards relaxation. This would be consistent with 
the findings of the Post-implementation Review that further targeted easing of the rules could 
deliver additional benefits. 
Accordingly, the Panel considers that present restrictions on ownership and location are 
unnecessary to uphold the quality of advice and care provided to patients. Further, it is clear that 
such restrictions limit both consumers’ ability to choose where to obtain pharmacy products and 
services, and providers’ ability to meet consumers’ preferences. 
The Panel also notes that the current Fifth Community Pharmacy Agreement expires on 
1 July 2015, and negotiations for the next agreement will be well under way when this Final Report 
is delivered to the Australian Government. These negotiations provide an opportunity for the 
Government to implement a further targeted relaxation of the location rules, as part of a 
transition to their eventual removal. 
If changes during the initial years of the new agreement prove too precipitate, there should be 
provision for a mid-term review to incorporate easing of the rules during the life of the next 
agreement. 
Competition between pharmacies is not sufficient on its own to meet the access objectives of the 
National Medicines Policy, most especially in rural and remote areas. The supply of medicines in 
remote areas is already partly conducted through channels other than retail pharmacies, including 
through Aboriginal Health Services. That is unlikely to change even if the current pharmacy 
location and ownership rules are reformed. 
However, a range of alternatives to the current pharmacy ownership and location rules exist to 
secure access to medicines for all Australians that are less restrictive of competition among 
pharmacy service providers. In particular, tendering for the provision of pharmacy services in 
underserved locations and/or funding through a community service obligation should be 
considered. 
Since access to medicines is less likely to be an issue in urban settings, the rules for urban 
pharmacies could be eased rapidly at the same time that rural location mechanisms are 
established. 
Implementation 
Reform of pharmacy ownership and location rules will involve the Australian Government and state 
and territory governments.  
Pharmacy location rules arise from the Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement between the 
Australian Government and the Pharmacy Guild. Accordingly, the negotiations for and 
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implementation of the next Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement, due to commence in July 
2015, provide the opportunity to introduce transitional arrangements towards the eventual removal 
of location rules. Such transitional arrangements may explicitly recognise CSO aspects of pharmacy.  
Pharmacy ownership rules arise from state and territory legislation. The Panel considers that, within 
two years of Governments accepting the recommendation, these rules should be removed and 
replaced with regulation that achieves the desired policy outcomes without unduly restricting 
competition. It is likely that transitional arrangements would be an integral part of any such change. 
If alternative mechanisms are introduced for underserved locations, the rules that effectively apply 
only to urban pharmacies could be eased rapidly at the same time that mechanisms to ensure access 
in rural locations are established. 
Recommendation 14 — Pharmacy 
The Panel considers that current restrictions on ownership and location of pharmacies are not 
needed to ensure the quality of advice and care provided to patients. Such restrictions limit the 
ability of consumers to choose where to obtain pharmacy products and services, and the ability of 
providers to meet consumers’ preferences. 
The Panel considers that the pharmacy ownership and location rules should be removed in the 
long-term interests of consumers. They should be replaced with regulations to ensure access to 
medicines and quality of advice regarding their use that do not unduly restrict competition.  
Negotiations on the next Community Pharmacy Agreement offer an opportunity for the Australian 
Government to implement a further targeted relaxation of the location rules, as part of a 
transition towards their eventual removal. If changes during the initial years of the new agreement 
prove too precipitate, there should be provision for a mid-term review to incorporate easing of the 
location rules later in the life of the next Community Pharmacy Agreement. 
A range of alternative mechanisms exist to secure access to medicines for all Australians that are 
less restrictive of competition among pharmacy service services providers. In particular, tendering 
for the provision of pharmacy services in underserved locations and/or funding through a 
community service obligation should be considered. The rules targeted at pharmacies in urban 
areas should continue to be eased at the same time that alternative mechanisms are established 
to address specific issues concerning access to pharmacies in rural locations. 
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11 INFRASTRUCTURE MARKETS 
The energy, water and transport sectors provide critical inputs to the Australian economy. Applying 
competition policy to these infrastructure markets significantly affects the choices available to and 
prices paid by consumers for almost all goods and services consumed in Australia. By helping to 
reduce the cost of infrastructure services, the National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms increased 
choice across the economy. 
These reforms remain important. The Business Council of Australia nominates removing cabotage 
restrictions, finalising energy reform, recommitting to water reform and starting a process to 
introduce cost-reflective road pricing as priorities (DR sub, page 7). 
Twenty years ago, infrastructure markets were characterised by vertically integrated, 
government-owned monopolies that were not responsive to changes in consumer tastes or needs.  
For example, electricity consumers across Australia were limited to one tariff from one company; 
whereas, consumers can now access sites like www.energymadeeasy.gov.au to assist them to choose 
among a range of offers. This degree of consumer choice and empowerment was almost 
non-existent when Hilmer reported in 1993. Box 11.1 outlines the electricity sector as a case study of 
reform. 
The extension of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA)) 
to government businesses, along with competitive neutrality policy, structural reform of government 
businesses (including the separation of natural monopoly from contestable elements, privatisation, 
the move to cost-reflective pricing), and third-party access arrangements for infrastructure services 
have all left their mark on Australia’s infrastructure markets. 
Although most infrastructure markets have been substantially reformed, the Panel has heard 
numerous examples that suggest progress has been patchy, the degree of reform differs among 
sectors and much more needs to be done to provide greater choice and better service levels for 
consumers and businesses across the economy. 
Structural reform 
In most sectors, structural reform and separating monopoly from contestable elements has been 
heavily pursued. In the electricity market, generators have been separated from networks and sold. 
Competition in retailing has been introduced, and monopoly networks have been subject to price 
regulation by independent regulators. Networks have also been privatised in some jurisdictions. 
Reform in gas markets has followed a similar path to electricity, with competition introduced to 
wholesale gas markets.  
Structural separation was extensively pursued in rail. The main interstate freight network was 
brought together under the ownership of the Australian Rail Track Corporation, while above-rail277 
freight operations have been privatised. Jurisdictions have access regimes in place for regional freight 
lines. Although competition in above-rail services has emerged on some routes, on many others 
volumes have been too low to support competitive entry. Parts of the rail freight sector face strong 
                                                          
277  ‘Above-rail’ means those activities required to provide and operate train services such as rolling stock provision (i.e. 
trains and carriages), rolling stock maintenance, train crewing, terminal provision, freight handling and the marketing 
and administration of the above services. 
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competition from road transport. The major ports have also been reformed with port authorities 
now typically acting as landlords for competing service providers rather than directly providing 
services. 
Although competition was introduced in telecommunications, the dominant fixed-line provider, 
Telstra, was privatised without being structurally separated. Instead, reliance was placed on 
providing third-party access to Telstra’s fixed-line network. On the face of it, this has seen less 
fixed-line retail competition in telecommunications than might have been expected. Dissatisfaction 
with access arrangements also led Optus to build its own hybrid fibre-coaxial network. 
Over time, changes in technology have strengthened competition in telecommunications. Data 
rather than voice is now the dominant form of demand in the market, and wireless technologies 
compete effectively with fixed-line technologies in many applications. 
Applying the CCA to government businesses and introducing competitive neutrality requirements for 
all significant government businesses were also integral to making government businesses more 
commercially focused (for more detail on competitive neutrality, see Chapter 13). This enabled 
private businesses to compete alongside government-owned businesses.  
Today there are many privately owned electricity generators competing alongside the remaining 
government-owned generators. Private operators have also entered the market in rail, with most rail 
freight services now privately owned and operated. 
In contrast, there has been little private investment in urban water supply, except for desalination 
plants.278 These plants rely on government contracts and are shielded from demand risk. To the 
extent that roads have been privately provided, this has occurred through direct government 
contracting. 
Similarly, public transport services are either provided directly by government businesses or through 
contracting out. Restrictions remain on the private provision of public transport services. For 
example, bus operators in New South Wales providing a public transport service less than 40 
kilometres in length must have a contract with the New South Wales Government.279 
Privatisation 
Since the Hilmer Review, governments have increased the role of the private sector in infrastructure 
markets. Government ownership of infrastructure assets has been greatly reduced through 
privatisation in most infrastructure sectors. In the electricity and gas markets, some jurisdictions 
have already privatised or are in the process of privatising generation, retail and network assets. In 
telecommunications, assets have been fully privatised, although the NBN is now being built by an 
Australian Government-owned company. There have also been a number of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), particularly in urban roads and water. 
All the major airports have been privatised through long-term leases. The Australian Government has 
also privatised its airline. In rail, above-rail freight operations have been privatised, as have many 
regional freight lines. However, the Australian Rail Track Corporation remains an Australian 
Government-owned corporation. In contrast, in the water sector there has been little consideration 
                                                          
278  Productivity Commission 2011, Australia’s Urban Water Sector, Canberra, pages 42-45. 
279  IPART, sub 1, page 9. 
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given to privatising dams and the water reticulation network. Similarly, privatisation has not been 
pursued in the roads sector to any extent, although there have been some privately built toll roads. 
The increased role of the private sector in infrastructure has brought considerable public benefit. 
Governments have been able to redirect resources from asset sales into, for example, human 
services, and retail competition has emerged in many markets. Privatisation has also delivered more 
efficient management of assets and investments have been more responsive to changes in market 
demand. For example, airports have been increasing capacity as demand dictates. 
The New South Wales Government’s Electricity Prices and Services: Fact Sheet 11280 shows the 
movement in average annual real electricity network prices being lower in jurisdictions where 
network assets have been privatised (Victoria and South Australia) compared to those where they 
have not (such as New South Wales and Queensland). Further evidence of the benefits of 
privatisation is provided by the Australian Energy Regulator’s (AER) November 2014 Electricity 
distribution network service providers Annual benchmarking report.281 The report found ‘the state 
wide average indicates that the Victorian and South Australian distributors appear to be the most 
productive’. Victoria and South Australia are the only States to have privatised their distribution 
businesses. 
EnergyAustralia notes that there are distortions or inefficiencies caused by government ownership: 
... a policy tension is created where Governments continue to own generation and 
network assets creating the potential to influence policy positions to the detriment of 
customers and/or taxpayers through unnecessarily high reliability standards or 
intervention in natural commercial processes. The NEM [National Electricity Market] has 
developed as a robust market with significant private investment and Government policy 
has the ability to significantly shape how investment is made. (sub, page 7) 
The issue of how to privatise effectively is demonstrated by port infrastructure, where it is important 
to ensure that the regulatory regime can sufficiently influence port authority activities to constrain 
monopoly power. While some ports, particularly bulk ports, may have only a few large customers 
that can exert countervailing power, others may have significant market power in the absence of 
effective regulation. 
The ACCC also cites anecdotal evidence suggesting ports are being sold or considered for sale with 
restrictions on competition in place to enhance sale prices. It notes: 
Privatisation of port assets can raise issues of efficiency where monopoly rights are 
conferred by state governments, with no consideration to the prospect for competition 
and/or the need for economic regulation. This has the potential to result in lost 
efficiencies and/or higher charges which may be hard to remedy after the assets are sold. 
(sub, page 38) 
Sydney Airport serves as another example where privatisation occurred with a monopoly right in 
place, namely, a first right of refusal to operate a second Sydney airport (ACCC sub 1, 
page 36).Although the Australian Government may have achieved a higher sale price, this has come 
at the longer-term cost of a less competitive market structure. 
                                                          
280  New South Wales Government 2014, Electricity Prices and Services: Fact Sheet 11 NSW Government, Sydney, viewed 
6 February 2015 www.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/miscellaneous/fact_sheet_11.pdf. 
281  Australian Energy Regulator 2014, Electricity distribution network service providers Annual benchmarking report, 
Melbourne, page 6. 
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Pricing reform and access 
Pricing reform and the move to cost-reflective pricing has been pursued extensively in most 
infrastructure markets, driving efficiency and allowing markets to offer more consumer choice; for 
example, through facilitating retail price competition. 
Benefits from pricing reform in infrastructure sectors arise through encouraging better use of 
existing infrastructure, which can delay the need for infrastructure investment. Where cost-reflective 
pricing is present, consumer demand will also provide a more accurate guide to infrastructure 
investment. This increases the likelihood that such investment is efficient and responds to actual 
changes in demand and consumer preferences. These factors lower the cost and increase the 
responsiveness across markets to the benefit of consumers. It also means governments can better 
target assistance to vulnerable consumers in those markets, reducing the burden on taxpayers.  
Pricing reform has generally been pursued through deregulating prices where markets are 
sufficiently competitive, while subjecting the monopoly parts of markets to price oversight, direct 
price regulation and access regimes. For example, in the electricity market, wholesale prices are 
deregulated as are retail prices in some jurisdictions, while network prices are subject to pricing 
determinations. 
Similarly, in telecommunications markets, prices for mobile and retail services are deregulated, but 
Telstra’s fixed-line network is subject to pricing and access determinations. Airports and ports are 
subject to prices oversight and a range of other regulatory tools, which can be used to prevent 
monopoly pricing. Access declarations remain available as a regulatory tool for airports and ports, 
but for the most part have not needed to be pursued. 
In contrast, in water and in roads there has been little progress introducing pricing that reflects the 
actual cost of use on the network, such as time and location charging. Investment in those sectors is 
either funded directly from budgets or by users across the network rather than from users according 
to the costs they impose on the network. Roads in particular have also been subject to investment 
bottlenecks. 
Box 11.1: Electricity as a case study 
Reform of the electricity sector is often considered a success, and the lessons are likely to prove 
instructive for other sectors. The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) notes: 
Energy markets in the Eastern States are generally characterised by competitive 
wholesale and retail markets. This is due in large part to a history of successful 
structural and institutional reform that created the framework for competition to 
develop. (sub, page 1) 
Electricity is provided to most of Australia through the National Electricity Market (NEM), which 
includes all jurisdictions apart from the Northern Territory and Western Australia. The sector is 
broken into the competitive wholesale and retail markets, on the one hand, and the distribution 
and transmission networks on the other. 
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Box 11.1: Electricity as a case study (continued) 
The AEMC points out in its National Electricity Market: A Case Study in Successful Microeconomic 
Reform282 that there were a number of factors to that success: 
• the material problems were defined and clear reform objectives were set;  
• reform took high-level political drive, provision of time, energy and, according to many 
reform participants, financial incentives;  
• strategies were developed to enhance confidence in the reforms;  
• strong and appropriate support structures were established with key stakeholder 
participation; 
• the pace of the reform allowed for effective consultation across all stakeholders; and 
• getting the industry structures right was key for effective competition. 
The way forward 
The importance of further reform in infrastructure is clear: the Panel considers that infrastructure 
reforms are incomplete, even in the sectors where most progress has been made. The Panel 
recognises some hard-won gains in the infrastructure sectors, but reform needs to be finalised where 
it is flagging or stalled.  
Furthermore, in some sectors very little progress has been made. Consumers are seeing significantly 
cheaper air travel as a result of reforms to the aviation sector. In contrast, there has been little 
progress in attempting to introduce cost-reflective pricing in roads and linking revenue to road 
provision. As a consequence, there is criticism that new roads are being built in the wrong places for 
the wrong reasons, while too little attention is paid to getting more efficient use of existing road 
infrastructure.283 
The Panel outlines in the remainder of this part where it has identified further reforms that should be 
undertaken in the infrastructure markets. 
                                                          
282  Australian Energy Market Commission 2013, National Electricity Market: A Case Study in Successful Microeconomic 
Reform, Sydney, page 6. 
283  See for example, City of Whittlesea sub, pages 1-2. 
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The Panel’s view 
Reform of Australia’s infrastructure markets has generally served consumers well, creating a 
greater diversity of choice and ability to negotiate prices in utilities and transport compared to two 
decades ago. 
However, further benefits could be harnessed through finalising the application of those reforms 
and extending further reforms.  
Well-considered contracting out or privatising remaining infrastructure assets is likely to drive 
further consumer benefits through comparatively lower prices flowing from greater discipline on 
privatised entities. Governments need to approach privatisation carefully, ensuring that impacts 
on competition and consumers are fully considered and addressed. 
Where monopoly infrastructure is contracted out or privatised, it should be done in a way that 
promotes competition and cost-reflective pricing. Maximising asset sale prices through restricting 
competition or allowing unregulated monopoly pricing post sale amounts to an inefficient, 
long-term tax on infrastructure users and consumers. 
11.1 ELECTRICITY AND GAS 
Electricity 
Electricity has seen significant reform as part of the NCP agenda, increasing choice for consumers. 
However, recent hikes in electricity prices have caused concern among consumers and businesses 
(see Box 11.2). Further reform must ensure that future price increases are no greater than necessary. 
National Seniors Australia notes:  
Firstly, priorities should include the more important unfinished NCP reforms, in particular 
those that:  
 address unprecedented recent growth in household energy and water bills … (sub, 
page 4) 
Australian Industry Group submits: 
The Federal and State Governments have already formally recognised the importance of 
this reform to consumers in the COAG Energy Market Reforms Plan (2012). Ai Group 
would urge the Federal Government to prioritise the implementation of this, and the 
other reforms contained in the Plan, as important contributions to enhancing competition 
in the energy sector. (sub, page 41) 
The Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) Energy Market Reforms from 2012284 referred to by 
the Australian Industry Group, include: 
• deregulating retail prices, to ensure efficient and competitive retail energy markets for the 
benefit of consumers and the energy sector alike; 
• ensuring consistent national frameworks, including applying the National Energy Retail Law, 
which is designed to harmonise regulation of the sale and supply of energy to consumers; and 
                                                          
284  Council of Australian Governments 2012, COAG Energy Market Reform — Implementation Plan, COAG, Canberra, 
viewed 9 February 2015, www.coag.gov.au/node/481. 
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• developing a national regime for reliability standards delivering the right balance for 
consumers between security of supply and costs of delivery through the development of a 
national regime. 
The Panel supports finalisation of these reforms. In relation to retail price regulation, the Energy 
Retailers Association of Australia submits: 
Much of the increase in energy prices over recent years has been due to higher cost 
factors outside retailers’ control. It was often viewed that regulating prices would protect 
those consumers most in need. Yet price regulation does not operate to protect hardship 
customers because of the hardship they are facing. Similarly, price regulation cannot 
protect hardship customers from being disconnected. Using retail price regulation to 
artificially suppress retail prices only delays an inevitable price increase in the future and 
can make increases worse than they otherwise might have been. (sub, page 12) 
The Panel also notes concerns raised in submissions, such as EnergyAustralia’s (sub, page 8), that 
inconsistent application diminishes the benefits from a harmonised National Energy Retail Law 
(sometimes referred to as the National Energy Customer Framework or NECF). These benefits include 
reduced costs to business and consumers, and improved choice through lowering barriers to energy 
retailers operating across state and territory borders. 
The Queensland Competition Authority notes: 
So far, the NECF has commenced in all states, except Queensland and Victoria. No state 
has adopted the NECF without variations. While some variations may have been 
considered necessary to reflect the particular circumstances in that state, the higher costs 
of retailers complying with additional obligations and the potentially negative impacts on 
competition should be carefully considered against the benefits. Nevertheless, in this case 
partial harmonisation may be better than the status quo. (sub, page 8) 
The AEMC, in its 2014 Retail Competition Review, found that the state of competition for small 
customers varies across the NEM and enforced the need to finalise the above reforms to improve 
competition. The AEMC recommended that jurisdictions: 
• consider options for raising awareness of the tools available for comparing energy offers 
to improve customer confidence in the market; 
• ensure concession schemes are delivering on their intended purpose in an efficient and 
targeted way; 
• continue to harmonise regulatory arrangements across jurisdictions to minimise costs, 
including implementing the National Energy Customer Framework; and 
• remove energy retail price regulation where competition is effective.285  
While reliability standards are not currently set through a national framework, the Panel notes work 
is underway to move towards one.286 Other regulatory provisions may usefully be transferred to the 
national framework as well. Origin Energy notes: 
... there are other examples of cross sector regulation that have a significant bearing on 
energy market participants, such as the various state regimes for licensing. Multiple 
frameworks increase the regulatory burden for all market participants and ultimately raise 
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costs for consumers. Therefore, achieving framework consistency should be a policy 
priority. (sub, page 2) 
The Panel sees significant benefit in a national framework for reliability standards, noting the link 
between jurisdictional reliability standards and recent price increases. This is demonstrated in 
Box 11.2, which outlines the drivers of recent electricity price increases. 
Box 11.2: Electricity prices — a failure of competition policy? 
A common concern raised through consultation was the impact of electricity price rises on 
business and consumers. Often stakeholders felt the price rises were the result of privatisation; 
many others felt it was because of the application of competition policy. 
The AEMC undertakes annual pricing trend reports, most recently reporting in 2014 on expected 
price trends over the three years to 2016-17. Nationally, the AEMC projected residential electricity 
prices to fall in 2014-15 in most States and Territories, following the removal of the carbon tax. 
The extent of this decrease varies between jurisdictions, as the savings are offset by changes in 
other supply chain components that make up electricity prices. 
The AEMC noted that, in 2015-16 and 2016-17, prices are expected to show modest declines or be 
stable across most States and Territories. This trend is being driven by subdued wholesale energy 
costs and lower network prices. Network prices are expected to fall in response to reduced 
financing costs and declining growth in peak demand. 
The report notes that the average residential electricity price in 2014-15 consisted of: 
• 50 per cent regulated network costs, which includes costs associated with building and 
operating transmission and distribution networks, including a return on capital. This was the 
main component of the average electricity bill; 
• 8 per cent renewable energy target and state and territory feed-in tariff and energy 
efficiency schemes ; and 
• 40 per cent competitive market costs, which includes wholesale energy purchase costs and 
the costs of the retail sale of electricity. 
The AEMC’s report on 2011-12 electricity prices identified network costs as the main driver of 
upward pressure on retail prices at that point. The anticipated stabilisation has been borne out in 
the new report. The increases in network prices largely reflected the costs of replacing and 
upgrading the network infrastructure. 
A number of processes are underway to improve the efficiency of regulated network costs. For 
example, new rules made by the AEMC in November 2012 have given the Australian Energy 
Regulator greater discretion and more tools to determine efficient costs and revenues when 
undertaking network regulatory determinations. 
The AEMC has finalised a rule change process on the way distribution network businesses set their 
network tariffs. The AEMC considered how distribution businesses can be encouraged to set 
network tariffs in a more cost-reflective manner in undertaking this rule change. 
Rather than finding that competition has contributed to price increases, the report notes that 
competition in retail markets has allowed consumers to access better deals on price. Policies in 
most NEM jurisdictions allow for market-based prices and consumers in those States have been 
able to save by shopping around for the best deal and switching from regulated offers. 
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Box 11.2: Electricity prices — a failure of competition policy? (continued) 
For example, the AEMC estimates that consumers in Queensland could save 7 per cent if they 
changed from a regulated tariff to a market offer.287 When competition reforms are finalised, such 
as the full implementation of the National Energy Retail Law, this should further mitigate future 
price increases. 
The Panel sees scope to go further than the previously agreed reforms to develop competition in the 
sector. For example, the Energy Networks Association writes that it:  
… strongly supports the transfer of economic regulatory functions under the National 
Electricity Law and National Gas Law and Rules from the WA Economic Regulation 
Authority and NT Utilities Commission to the Australian Energy Regulator, and the 
consistent application of the third-party access pricing rules (in particular, Chapters 6 and 
6A of the National Electricity Rules, and the National Gas Rules) to energy networks in WA 
and NT. (sub, page 7) 
Despite strong arguments — mostly on the basis of geography and high transmission losses — for the 
Western Australian and Northern Territory markets not to be physically joined to the National 
Electricity Market, the benefits of those jurisdictions adopting the national legislative and 
institutional frameworks can be realised without physical connection. The Panel notes and supports 
moves underway for this to occur.  
For example, the Northern Territory Government ‘has committed to adopting the national 
framework for the regulation of electricity networks which will see greater alignment of 
arrangements with those operating in the National Electricity Market, including transfer of economic 
regulation of networks from the Territory’s Utilities Commission to the Australian Energy Regulator 
and implementing a phased transition to adopting the National Electricity Law and Rules’ (DR sub, 
page 3). 
Alinta Energy notes that it: 
… is broadly supportive of the suggestion put forward in the Draft Report that there may 
be benefits to the Western Australia (WA) and the Northern Territory energy markets in 
adopting the NEM legislative, institutional and market arrangements in their relevant 
jurisdictions. This would potentially reduce overall market operational and governance 
costs, promote greater regulatory consistency and remove unnecessary barriers to entry 
into other energy markets across Australia for retailers. (DR sub, page 1)  
Alinta Energy goes on to note: 
The current Electricity Market Review being undertaken by the WA Government has 
involved broad consideration of whether the existing framework and arrangements 
remain appropriate, including the underlying wholesale market design and institutional 
arrangements. Specifically, its remit has included considering whether the NEM 
arrangements should be adopted which overlaps with the recommendation made by the 
Draft Report. (DR sub, page 2) 
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The Panel agrees that Western Australia and the Northern Territory should consider adopting the 
national framework and urges the Western Australia Electricity Market Review to consider the 
benefits of doing so. 
Gas 
Reform in the gas sector has largely mirrored that in the electricity sector. The 2014 Eastern 
Australian Domestic Gas Study (the Study),288 which examined the market in detail, found that 
effective competition in wholesale gas markets is linked to access to efficiently priced gas 
transportation, processing and storage services — which in turn relies on a combination of efficient 
price signals and regulatory arrangements.  
The Study notes that this has worked well to date, with a consistent build and re-development of 
infrastructure to meet growing demand in recent years. However, it also flags significant changes in 
the market and notes changes that could be made in the regulatory and commercial arrangements to 
address gas supply. 
The Study summarises options for government consideration, including addressing regulatory 
impediments to supply, improving title administration and management, jointly facilitating priority 
gas projects and improving access to and co-operation on pre-competitive geoscience.  
The Study also indicated that a review into competition in the gas market is an option to consider. 
This was echoed by EnergyAustralia in its recommendation:  
The Commonwealth Government request that the Productivity Commission conduct a 
high level coordinated review of market design, gas market competition, the direction and 
structure of the existing trading and related financial markets, and the suitability of 
carriage models for pipeline regulation. (sub, page 6) 
The Energy Green Paper289 states:  
An ACCC Price Inquiry into the eastern Australian wholesale gas market, under Part VIIA of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, or a Productivity Commission review, could 
examine the levels of competition in the eastern gas market. Such an inquiry could inform 
consumers about future market conditions and opportunities to increase competition in 
the upstream market, including opportunities to remove unnecessary regulation, and 
issues that may limit wholesale market competition.  
The Panel considers the White Paper should go further than the Green Paper and commit to a review 
examining, among other things: barriers to entry in the gas market; whether access regimes are 
working effectively to encourage upstream and downstream competition; and regulatory and policy 
impediments to Australia’s gas market operating efficiently.290  
                                                          
288  Department of Industry and the Bureau of Resource and Energy Economics 2014, Eastern Australian Domestic Gas 
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289  Australian Government 2014, Energy White Paper: Green Paper, Canberra, Page 45.  
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The Panel’s view 
Energy sector reform remains important, since energy is a critical input to other sectors of the 
economy. Increasing competition in energy will help place downward pressure on energy prices to 
the benefit of consumers. 
Reform of the electricity and gas sectors is well progressed compared to other sectors, but it is 
unfinished. Reforms COAG committed to in December 2012 are still not complete. 
Examples of previously agreed reforms that should be finalised are the National Energy Retail Law 
implementation (designed to harmonise regulations for the sale and supply of energy) and retail 
price deregulation. The Panel notes with concern changes to the template legislation some 
jurisdictions have made in applying the National Energy Retail Law and observes that this will 
detract from the originally intended benefits.  
Further benefits may be realised in the electricity and gas sectors from transferring more 
functions, such as reliability standards and licensing arrangements, to the national regime. 
Competition benefits may also be realised from greater integration of the Western Australia and 
Northern Territory energy markets with the National Electricity Market, noting this does not 
require physical interconnection. 
The Panel notes the findings of the Eastern Australian Domestic Gas Market Study that 
competition is largely working, but that further monitoring of the market may be needed, as it is 
currently in a transitional phase. The Panel supports a further, more detailed review of 
competition in the gas sector as proposed in the Study and in the Energy Green Paper. 
Implementation 
The Australian Government should commit to a detailed review of competition in Australian gas 
markets, to commence within six months of accepting the recommendation. 
States and Territories should finalise previously agreed electricity market reforms within two years, 
with progress monitored by the Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP). 
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Recommendation 19— Electricity and gas  
State and territory governments should finalise the energy reform agenda, including through: 
• application of the National Energy Retail Law with minimal derogation by all National Electricity 
Market jurisdictions; 
• deregulation of both electricity and gas retail prices; and 
• the transfer of responsibility for reliability standards to a national framework administered by 
the proposed Access and Pricing Regulator (see Recommendation 50) and the Australian Energy 
Market Commission (AEMC). 
The Panel supports moves to include Western Australia and the Northern Territory in the National 
Electricity Market, noting that this does not require physical connection. 
The Australian Government should undertake a detailed review of competition in the gas sector. 
11.2 WATER 
Water sector reform has not progressed as far as electricity reform and, perhaps as a result of the 
absence of a national framework, has been more piecemeal. Each jurisdiction has made progress, but 
none could be said to have fully realised the potential consumer choice and pricing benefits from 
reforms in the sector. 
The Panel notes comments in the Report of the Independent Review of the Water Act 2007 that 
arrangements for the Murray-Darling Basin in the Water Act 2007 will not be rolled out fully until 
2019. The Panel supports the view that ‘Australian and Basin State governments and their agencies 
need to work together to clearly and transparently communicate how reforms are being 
implemented’. 291  
Under the 2004 National Water Initiative, governments committed to best-practice water pricing. In 
2011, the Productivity Commission (PC) identified economic efficiency as the overarching objective 
for urban water pricing.292 The PC considered that equity issues are best dealt with outside the urban 
water sector through, for example, taxation and social security systems. 
Notwithstanding this (and other) reports, the National Water Commission (a body that provides 
advice to the Council of Australian Governments on water and was announced in the 2014-15 Budget 
to be abolished)293 found that a failure to implement pricing reforms meant that jurisdictions were 
not realising the full intended benefits. 
The National Water Initiative encompasses the objectives of two reforms: independent economic 
regulation; and the institutional separation of service providers from the regulatory and policy 
functions of governments. However, in the Panel’s view, neither of these objectives have been met 
on a nationally consistent basis. Both reforms are important to delivering efficient pricing where 
there is a natural monopoly or where markets are not well developed. The National Water 
                                                          
291  Australian Government 2014, Report of the Independent Review of the Water Act 2007, Canberra page x. 
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Commission notes294 that it continues to support independent economic regulation and institutional 
separation as important complements to pricing reforms. 
PwC identified a number of drivers for reform in the water sector in its 2010 report (prepared for 
Infrastructure Australia), Review of Urban Water Security Strategies.295 They are: 
• Drought and climate change. In the past decade, rainfall and inflows to water storages in 
southern Australia have been considerably lower than long-term averages.  
• Higher than expected population growth. In September 2008, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics updated its projections for the States and capital cities based on the results of the 
2006 census.  
• A legacy of under investment in water infrastructure. Until recently, expenditure on water 
infrastructure to service urban populations has been relatively small (compared to other 
essential services) due to a combination of capital/funding constraints, political constraints to 
the construction of new dams and the belated recognition of a changing climatic pattern.  
• Inadequate institutional structures and management arrangements. The scale of changes in 
water demand and rainfall are such that some States are not sufficiently equipped to respond 
to achieve adequate levels of urban water security and consumer choice.  
Pricing that better reflects the cost of provision may address these concerns by increasing incentives 
for the private sector to invest in water infrastructure. This would allow the market to better address 
issues related to meeting increased demand. The Australian Water Association notes:  
In order to attract private investment the regulation of the water sector will need to 
change. There is a desperate need for consistency of economic regulation across all states 
and territories to attract long-term private investment. (DR sub, page 2) 
The Panel agrees, noting that governments have been slow to respond to changing demand for 
water, and to put in place incentives for sufficient investment (either private or public). The PwC 
report also states, ‘Most jurisdictions can point to ongoing pricing reform, and it is important to 
acknowledge that phased implementation is a justifiable policy’ (page 59).  
Major ‘overnight’ changes to water prices would impose a considerable economic shock on 
individuals and businesses, whose capacity to change water-use behaviour in the short term is 
limited. Unfortunately, institutional inertia and the lack of political acceptability and public 
understanding of reforms are also impediments to progress.  
IPART notes: 
... there is significant scope to reform the water sector. (sub, page 14) 
Postage stamp pricing reflects the average cost of servicing a given area (eg, Sydney 
Water’s area of operations). The National Water Initiative (NWI) pricing principles allow 
postage stamp pricing, but state a preference for differentiated prices in specific areas. 
However, postage stamp pricing remains NSW government policy. (sub, page 17)  
                                                          
294  Ibid., page xiv. 
295  PwC 2010, Review of Urban Water Security Strategies, Sydney, Page 9. 
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IPART further notes that it is: 
... important to develop nationally consistent principles in relation to competition and 
private sector participation in the water market, similar to the reform of water 
entitlements from the 2004 National Water Initiative. (sub, page 20) 
This view is supported by Infrastructure Australia in its National Infrastructure Plan.296 The Plan states 
that Australia’s water industry has a complex regulatory structure, with each State and Territory 
having its own economic regulator. In comparison, the UK has one water regulator to serve 60 million 
people. The Panel has proposed creating an Access and Pricing Regulator (see Recommendation 50) 
which may reduce this complexity should States and Territories refer national water functions to it. 
The Panel’s view 
Progress in the water sector has been slower than reforms in electricity and gas. 
The National Water Initiative set out clear principles which, if fully implemented, would better 
reflect the cost of providing water, promote greater private involvement in the sector and 
establish more rigorous economic regulation. Those principles remain appropriate and state and 
territory governments should continue to progress their implementation. 
The Panel believes that the ACCP (see Recommendation 43) can play a role in improving pricing in 
jurisdictions through working with state and territory regulators to develop a national pricing 
framework, with potential application to all jurisdictions. 
Implementation 
Further reform in the water sector is the responsibility of States and Territories. All jurisdictions 
should develop timelines to implement the principles of the National Water Initiative within six 
months of the ACCP developing pricing guidelines. 
The ACCP should develop best-practice pricing guidelines in consultation with state and territory 
regulators. 
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Recommendation 20 — Water 
All governments should progress implementation of the principles of the National Water Initiative, 
with a view to national consistency. Governments should focus on strengthening economic 
regulation in urban water and creating incentives for increased private participation in the sector 
through improved pricing practices. 
State and territory regulators should collectively develop best-practice pricing guidelines for urban 
water, with the capacity to reflect necessary jurisdictional differences. To ensure consistency, the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should oversee this work.  
State and territory governments should develop clear timelines for fully implementing the National 
Water Initiative, once pricing guidelines are developed. The Australian Council for Competition 
Policy should assist States and Territories to do so. 
Where water regulation is made national, the responsible body should be the proposed national 
Access and Pricing Regulator (see Recommendation 50) or a suitably accredited state body. 
11.3 TRANSPORT 
Aviation 
All major Australian airports have been privatised either through outright sale or through 50-year 
leases.297 Airports tend to have strong natural monopoly characteristics. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework applying post-privatisation is important to ensure 
appropriate prices and quality of service.  
In 2011, the PC reported on the regulation of airport services, concluding that: airports’ aeronautical 
charges, revenues, costs, profits and investment look reasonable compared with airports overseas, 
which are mostly non-commercial; and existing safeguards have seldom been used — including 
Part IIIA access declarations. There has also been significant investment at airports, which as a result 
have not suffered bottlenecks compared to other sectors.298 
The PC noted that capital city airports possessed significant market power and found that price 
monitoring data since 2002-03 showed substantial price increases at most of the monitored airports. 
However, taken in context, price increases did not indicate systemic misuse of market power.299 
The increase in prices has, however, raised concerns with users. The Board of Airline Representatives 
Australia notes: 
While the industry has achieved large improvements in productivity, international 
aviation in Australia is facing significant cost pressures from the prices associated with its 
‘aviation infrastructure’ (jet fuel supply, airports, air traffic management and fire services), 
which will have consequences for air travel affordability and the economic growth the 
industry generates. (sub, page 3) 
                                                          
297  With a 49-year extension available. 
298  Productivity Commission 2011, Economic Regulation of Airport Services, Canberra, Finding 4.1, pages XX, XLVI. 
299  Ibid., Finding 7.2, page XLVIII.  
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Despite substantial regulation in place constraining the market power of airports, an opportunity for 
promoting competition was lost when Sydney Airport was privatised. When it was sold in 2002, the 
Australian Government provided the acquirer with the right of first refusal to operate a second 
Sydney airport. The ACCC notes that the right of first refusal confers a monopoly to Sydney Airport 
over the supply of aeronautical services for international and most domestic flights in the Sydney 
basin. While including this right increased the sale price, it likely had an anti-competitive impact on 
the aviation sector (sub 1, page 36). 
The Australian Airports Association considers that land use planning and other restrictions limit the 
ability of smaller airports to compete with larger ones (sub, page 5). 
Other issues raised in submissions include the lack of competition between jet fuel suppliers at 
airports and the cost of services provided by Airservices Australia.  
The Board of Airline Representatives Australia notes that international airlines operating to Australia 
pay some of the highest ‘jet fuel differentials’ globally (sub, page 7).  
In relation to services provided by Airservices Australia, the Board of Airline Representatives Australia 
notes that the existing structure of Airservices’ prices encourages inefficiency in the aviation industry 
and distorts competition, both between regional airports and with other modes of transport (sub, 
page 4). The Panel notes the PC has recommended that the Australian Government conduct a 
scoping study to investigate efficiency gains and other merits of privatising some or all of the 
business activities of Airservices Australia, including reviewing its capital expenditure program.300 
A number of submissions raise the potential need for access regulation at Australian airports. This 
issue is discussed in Chapter 24. 
The Panel’s view 
The price monitoring and ‘light-handed’ regulatory approach in aviation appears to be working 
well overall. However, if prices continue to increase as fast as they have been, that would raise 
concerns and may warrant a move away from light-handed regulation for individual airports. 
Although the regulatory framework for airports appears to be working well, airport privatisation 
could have been handled better. A significant opportunity for greater competition was lost as a 
result of Sydney Airport being privatised with the new owner given first right of refusal to operate 
the second Sydney Airport. 
Privatising in a way that restricts competition may result in a higher sale price, but it comes at the 
long-term cost of a less competitive market structure. 
Competition in jet fuel supply and the pricing structure for services provided by Airservices 
Australia should be a focus of further reform efforts in the sector. 
Ports 
Port reform has resulted in the corporatisation of ports in all States and the Northern Territory. Most 
major ports have moved to a landlord model, where the authority is involved in providing core 
activities only and more contestable elements, such as stevedoring, dredging and towage, are 
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provided by private contractors.301 Some ports have been privatised while others remain in 
government hands. 
Declaration of harbour towage services was repealed in 2002, as the industry was deemed 
sufficiently competitive.302 
Stevedoring activities remain declared services and subject to price monitoring by the ACCC. The 
most recent report by the ACCC, Container stevedoring monitoring report no. 15, highlights that 
competition in the sector is increasing and past reform focused on improving productivity has been 
successful, with users benefiting through lower real prices and better service levels.303 
However, the ACCC notes that returns in the industry remain persistently high, suggesting more 
investment in capacity and greater competition may be needed.304 This raises the question of 
whether port authorities are giving sufficient consideration to the need to foster greater competition 
through making land available for new entrants. New terminals are opening in Brisbane and Sydney 
and one is in prospect for Melbourne. However, as Hutchison Ports Australia notes, for its entry to 
occur: 
... governments had to decide to develop and offer extra land for a new operator and 
Hutchison needed to submit a winning bid and invest hundreds of millions of dollars 
establishing new terminals. (sub, page 2) 
As with airports, an important issue when privatising ports is ensuring the regulatory regime can 
sufficiently influence port authority activities to constrain their monopoly power. Some bulk ports 
may have only a few large customers that can exert countervailing power, but others may have 
significant market power in the absence of effective regulation. This creates the potential for 
monopoly pricing in the absence of effective post-sale regulation.  
An example of the former is the Hunter Valley coal chain, which brought together 11 coal miners, 
four rail haulage providers and three terminals to optimise the coal export chain in the Hunter 
Valley.305 Most city container ports are likely to fall into the latter category, with neither shipping 
lines, stevedores nor shippers having the countervailing power and/or the incentive to effectively 
constrain the port authority or each other. 
The ACCC also cites anecdotal evidence suggesting ports were being sold or considered for sale with 
restrictions on competition in place to enhance sale prices (sub, page 37). The ACCC notes: 
Privatisation of port assets can raise issues of efficiency where monopoly rights are 
conferred by state governments, with no consideration to the prospect for competition 
and/or the need for economic regulation. This has the potential to result in lost 
efficiencies and/or higher charges which may be hard to remedy after the assets are sold. 
(ACCC sub 1, page 38) 
                                                          
301  Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Canberra, page 15. 
302  Ibid., page 15. 
303  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2013, Container stevedoring monitoring report no. 15, Canberra, 
page viii. 
304  Ibid., page ix. 
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The Panel considers that land leased at ports to terminal operators and other service providers 
should reflect the opportunity cost of that land rather than the ability of the port authority to charge 
monopoly prices. 
The recent policy focus has largely been on infrastructure provision at the ports and in the port 
surrounds rather than the regulatory framework. For a port to operate effectively, road and rail links 
also need to be optimised. Better use of ports is linked to improvements in land-use planning as well 
as pricing of other transport modes.306 
A number of submissions raise the potential need for access regulation at privatised ports in the 
future. This issue is discussed in Chapter 24. 
The Panel’s view 
Significant reform of ports has been achieved, which has benefited users. Nonetheless, various 
participants in many of the port services chains have significant market power. Regulators and 
regulatory frameworks need to recognise this, including through the application of pricing 
oversight and, if necessary, price regulation.  
Leasing costs at ports subject to price regulation should aim to reflect the opportunity cost of the 
land and not the ability to extract monopoly rents. The latter represents an inefficient tax on 
consumers and business. 
As with other privatisations, port privatisations should be undertaken within a regulatory 
framework that promotes competition and prevents monopoly pricing, even though this may 
result in a lower sale price. 
Cabotage (coastal shipping and aviation) 
Australia has a policy of reserving coastal shipping for locally flagged vessels, although 
foreign-flagged ships may carry cargo and passengers between Australian ports after being licensed 
to do so. 
Significant changes were made to the process of licensing foreign vessels under the Coastal Trading 
(Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012. 
This process is intended to grant Australian ships the opportunity to argue that they are in a position 
to undertake voyages proposed to be undertaken by foreign vessels, and therefore foreign vessels 
should not receive licenses. This represents a form of protection for Australian-registered ships. 
On 8 April 2014, the Australian Government announced separate Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development-led consultations on coastal shipping regulation.307 In view of the separate 
Government process to consider possible reforms to coastal shipping, the Panel has not examined 
this issue in detail.  
However, the Panel has received many submissions arguing that changes made under the Coastal 
Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act have raised the cost and administrative complexity of 
coastal shipping regulation without improving its service or provision. 
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This is highlighted by the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association that notes: 
... one of the key regulatory impediments in Tasmania is the lack of competition and 
demarcations surrounding coastal shipping. 
These onerous regulations result in the 420 km distance across Bass Strait being the most 
expensive sea transport route in the world. (sub, page 8) 
The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development notes: 
A review into coastal shipping regulation is currently underway by the Australian 
Government, with a view to revising or reversing measures that hinder the 
competitiveness of Australia’s shipping services. (DR sub, page 7) 
Similar to coastal shipping, Australia also prevents foreign-flagged airlines from picking up domestic 
passengers on a domestic leg of an international flight. The Panel received representations during its 
visit to Darwin that aviation cabotage prevents domestic passengers from embarking on 
foreign-flagged international flights that transit through Darwin. 
For example, a foreign-flagged flight originating in Malaysia and travelling to Darwin and then on to 
Sydney cannot embark domestic passengers for the Darwin to Sydney leg, yet an Australian 
international carrier flying the same route could embark passengers for the Australian leg. 
Air cabotage restrictions in Australia are stricter than those in shipping. Generally foreign-flagged 
ships can apply for permits to engage in coastal shipping where there is no Australian-flagged vessel 
to undertake the task, but this is not available to foreign-flagged airlines. 
Lateral Economics notes: 
Banning foreign carriers everywhere is a blunt instrument for assisting domestic operators 
who care mainly about protecting their east coast custom. (DR sub, page 4) 
The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development considers that reducing restrictions on 
air cabotage could compromise safety. 
The Draft Report’s proposal is likely to be seen as winding back some of the safety 
arrangements applicable to domestic aviation. (DR sub, page 5) 
However, it is not clear what additional safety considerations emerge from allowing flights that are 
already transiting Australia or allowed to fly to Australia to embark domestic passengers or cargo. 
As Lateral Economics notes: 
While no supranational body exists for ocean travel, safety, security, environmental 
standards for air travel are already set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. 
Expectations and legal frameworks around labour conditions for foreign workers servicing 
short stay planes are also less contentious than for longer stay coastal ships. (DR sub, 
page 5) 
The Panel sees considerable benefits flowing from removing air cabotage restrictions for remote and 
poorly served domestic routes and regards the current blanket air cabotage restrictions on 
foreign-flagged carriers as inefficient. 
Consideration should be given to removing cabotage restrictions for all air cargo, and for passengers 
for specific geographic areas, such as island territories, and for poorly served routes. One way this 
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could be achieved is through a permit system, allowing foreign carriers to carry domestic cargo or 
passengers on specific routes for a defined period of time. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that reform of coastal shipping and aviation cabotage regulation should be a 
priority. 
Consistent with the approach the Panel recommends for other regulatory reviews, the Panel 
considers that restrictions on cabotage for shipping and aviation should be removed, unless it can 
be demonstrated that the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the 
costs and the objectives of the policy can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
This approach should guide the current Australian Government consultation process in relation to 
coastal shipping. 
The Panel sees considerable benefits flowing from removing air cabotage restrictions for remote 
and poorly served domestic routes and regards the current blanket air cabotage restrictions as 
inefficient. 
Implementation 
Within 12 months of accepting the recommendation, the Australian Government should identify 
remote and poorly served routes on which air cabotage restrictions could be removed for passenger 
services. Within two years of accepting the recommendation, cabotage restrictions that are not in 
the public interest could be removed on these routes for air passenger services as well as for air 
cargo. Cabotage restrictions on coastal shipping that are not in the public interest should also be 
removed following the current Australian Government review.  
A permit system could be used if needed to monitor and regulate foreign-flagged air services 
operating domestically. 
An independent body, such as the proposed ACCP (see Recommendation 43), should report on 
progress in reducing cabotage restrictions. 
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Recommendation 5 — Cabotage — coastal shipping and aviation 
Noting the current Australian Government Review of Coastal Trading, cabotage restrictions on 
coastal shipping should be removed, unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the 
restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the 
government policy can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
The current air cabotage restrictions should be removed for all air cargo as well as passenger 
services to specific geographic areas, such as island territories and on poorly served routes, unless 
it can be demonstrated that the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh 
the costs, and the objectives of the restrictions can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
Introducing an air cabotage permit system would be one way of regulating air cabotage services 
more effectively where necessary. 
Rail freight 
In the rail sector, the NCP reforms focused on the structural separation of the interstate track 
network from above-rail operations. This included forming the Australian Rail Track Corporation and 
developing access regimes and regulatory bodies. Networks have been declared under the National 
Access Regime or equivalent state-based regimes. Open access was also applied sporadically to 
related rail assets, such as bulk handling assets, intermodal terminals, coal ports and grain export 
facilities. 
At a national level, the objectives set by the original NCP have been largely met. The application of 
price controls and the oversight of regulators appear to have addressed concerns about possible 
monopoly pricing. Regulatory regimes have generally promoted competition and entry has occurred 
in some access-dependent markets. 
Issues raised in submissions include: the complexity of access issues, with some above-track 
operators having to contend with multiple access regimes to provide a single rail service; that 
structural separation has been imposed in areas where above-rail competition has not and is unlikely 
to emerge; and that vertically integrated railway operators can discriminate anti-competitively 
against above-rail competitors. 
In relation to access regimes, Asciano notes: 
Asciano operates its above rail operations under six different access regimes with multiple 
access providers and multiple access regulators. This multiplicity of regimes adds costs 
and complexity to rail access for no benefits, particularly as many of the access regulation 
functions are duplicated across states. (DR sub, page 7) 
The value of structural separation of track from above-rail operations is more contentious. Aurizon 
considers that costs of structural separation may pose an additional impost in an industry that 
struggles to compete with road transport. Aurizon notes: 
The fundamental economic problem for the interstate rail network is a lack of scale, which 
manifests as an inability to compete effectively with road transport. (sub, page 39)  
While rail track may be considered a natural monopoly, intermodal competition can act as an 
effective constraint. This has reduced the need for heavy-handed regulation in much of the rail 
sector. 
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However, other stakeholders contend that important parts of the rail freight industry are not 
competitively constrained by road. Asciano notes: 
Rail networks predominantly carrying coal, for example, in the Hunter Valley and Central 
Queensland, are not competitively constrained by road. The nature of the product (i.e. 
volume and weight) means that the freight task cannot be met by road. In this situation 
the track providers have significant unconstrained monopoly power. (DR sub, page 10) 
And 
... a constant concern is the lack of constraint upon the vertically integrated monopolist’s 
ability to anti-competitively discriminate against its above rail competition such as 
Asciano. (DR sub, page 11) 
Australian Rail Track Corporation considers: 
Structural separation has been successful at promoting competition on the interstate 
network, since the reforms of the 1990’s there has been around 25 operators enter the 
market, three have exited and 15 have consolidated into four main operators. (DR sub, 
page 2) 
The Panel’s view 
Rail reform has been relatively successful and proceeded at a reasonable pace. Many rail freight 
tasks face significant competition from road freight, which has made efficiency-enhancing reforms 
relatively palatable. 
Structural separation of track from above-rail operations has increased competition and 
innovation in the sector, improving rail’s efficiency to the benefit of consumers. However, 
regulators and policymakers should be pragmatic about structural separation of railways, 
recognising that on some low-volume rail routes vertical integration may be preferable. This may 
be particularly so where road freight offers effective competition. 
Policymakers should look to reduce the number of access regimes and regulators in the rail sector 
as far as possible as excessive complexity imposes costs on users. 
Where rail operators are vertically integrated, access regimes need to have strong 
non-discrimination provisions and effective compliance and enforcement to promote competition 
in above-rail operations. 
Road transport 
Australia is highly reliant on its road network for the efficient movement of goods and people both in 
cities and the regions. More than 70 per cent of domestic freight is transported by road.308 
Australia’s road transport industry has historically operated in a diffuse regulatory and funding 
framework, which has imposed significant costs on some road users. Government involvement in the 
road transport sector covers licensing, access rules, safety regulation and road construction, 
maintenance and safety.  
The pace of road reform in Australia has been slow compared to other reforms of transport and 
utilities. This is partly due to roads and road transport being traditionally administered through 
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government departments, while airlines, airports, and rail have been operated by public companies. 
Roads have also been seen as public goods, administered by a large number of authorities at the 
Commonwealth, state and territory and local level, and it has not been widely accepted that a public 
utility-style organisation could charge directly for them. 
As a consequence, the Australian Government and state and territory governments have shown 
reluctance to explore more direct charging arrangements for roads. Instead, road users are subject to 
general revenue-raising taxes such as fuel excise, registration and licence fees and other taxes such 
as stamp duties and the luxury car tax. As a result, road investment decisions are made in the 
absence of price signals about road network use that would indicate where increased capacity is 
warranted.309 
To date, heavy vehicles, being a significant contributor to road damage over time, have been the 
main focus of road-charging reforms. The current heavy vehicle charging regimes use a combination 
of registration fees and fuel-based charges to recover cost on average and do not reflect the actual 
cost to the road network of an individual vehicle. Moreover, taxes and charges on road users in 
general are not directly linked to the provision of roads.310 
By contrast, other natural monopoly sectors, such as electricity and water, are independently 
regulated to identify efficient costs and prices, with fixed and use-based charges used to fund the 
provision of the service.311 
Several submissions raise the lack of effective institutional arrangements to support efficient 
planning and investment in the roads sector. 
The Australian Automobile Association considers: 
... changes to the current public infrastructure governance model are now well overdue 
and should be at the forefront of the Government’s response to this review or more 
appropriately, through response to the Productivity Commission’s review into public 
infrastructure. The AAA supports any governance model that bolsters the link between 
consumer demand and investment in an economically efficient way while taking into 
consideration equitable access to infrastructure. A move to user pays system for roads 
will lead to greater efficiency and fairness for motorists, so long as existing indirect 
taxation is reduced. (DR sub, page 2) 
The Business Council of Australia recommends: 
Governments should promote efficient investment and use of road transport 
infrastructure through adoption of broad-based user charging, as part of comprehensive 
tax reform and reform of Commonwealth and state funding arrangements. (sub, 
Summary Report, page 15) 
Lack of proper road pricing distorts choices among transport modes: for example, between roads and 
rail in relation to freight, and roads and public transport in relation to passenger transport. Aurizon 
notes that the lack of commercial viability of much of the rail freight industry is: 
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... exacerbated by the lack of competitively neutral pricing for heavy vehicle freight 
transport on national highways and arterial roads, despite Federal, and State Government 
policy advocating the shift of long-haul freight from road to rail for economic and social 
policy reasons. (sub, page 4) 
Lack of proper road pricing also contributes to urban congestion, which is a growing problem in 
Australia’s capital cities.312 With road users facing little incentive to shift demand from peak to 
off-peak periods, greater road capacity is needed. As IPART notes: 
During peak periods of demand, roads are allocated through queuing which imposes a far 
greater cost to road users and the economy than would an effective pricing mechanism. 
(sub, page 22)  
A large number of submissions to the Draft Report come from individuals who consider that existing 
roads should not be subject to tolls on the basis that they ‘have already been paid for’. The Panel 
considers that roads need to be viewed as a network, since pricing decisions on any road can have 
implications for other roads. Further, maintenance, traffic and safety improvements to existing roads 
consume a significant proportion of road budgets and need to be funded just as new road 
construction must be funded. 
Importantly, direct road pricing need not lead to a higher overall financial burden on motorists since 
existing indirect taxes should be reduced as direct charging is introduced. Road authorities would be 
subject to prices oversight and independent pricing determinations in similar fashion to monopoly 
networks in other sectors. As the revenue from direct charging increases and is channelled into road 
funds, direct budget funding for road authorities should be reduced. 
Modelling undertaken by Infrastructure Partnerships Australia suggests that rural and regional 
drivers will benefit most from a move to replace indirect charges with cost-reflective direct road user 
charges. This is because rural and regional drivers typically pay large amounts in fuel excise while 
imposing little cost on the network in the form of congestion or road damage.313 There is also a case 
for part of the road network to be funded from Community Service Obligations (CSOs), which is likely 
to favour rural and regional residents.314 
The Panel draws a distinction between current tolling arrangements, which are for the most part 
designed to facilitate private financing of roads, and cost-reflective road pricing, which is designed to 
provide signals to users and road providers.315 Imposing tolls on new roads but not on existing roads 
creates distortions and inequities among road users. Tolls do not provide a signal about which roads 
are most heavily used and therefore where additional investment is most needed. 
The Panel recommends that proper investment and demand management signals for the road 
network should be the long-term goal. A shift to more direct charging for roads should be pursued in 
a way that reconfigures current revenues and expenditures to deliver the best results for road users 
                                                          
312  The Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics estimates the costs of road congestion in Australian 
capital cities to have been $9.4 billion in 2005 and projected to more than double by 2020; see Bureau of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 2007, Estimating urban traffic and congestion cost trends for 
Australian cities, Canberra. 
313  Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2014, Road Pricing and Transport Infrastructure Funding, Sydney, page 9. 
314  Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Canberra, page 159. 
315  For an extensive discussion of road pricing see Infrastructure New South Wales 2012, Pricing Congestion in Sydney, 
Sydney. 
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and the community rather than as an additional tax impost. This will build public confidence in the 
reform.  
Technologies are available that allow greater use of cost-reflective pricing (i.e., a regulated price that 
estimates the cost of providing the road). Revenue generated from road pricing should be used for 
road construction, maintenance and safety. This would make the provision of roads more like the 
provision of other infrastructure, since road authorities would charge directly for their use and 
allocate the revenue raised towards the operating and construction costs of the road network. As the 
PC notes in its recent report on infrastructure: 
The adoption of a well-designed road fund model or a corporatised public road agency 
model is paramount to delivering net benefits from the funding and provision of roads. In 
the future, road funds may be able to consider direct road user charges, which would 
facilitate more effective asset utilisation and more rigorous assessment of new 
investments.316 
Consult Australia considers: 
… a comprehensive debate regarding the full application of road user charging, including 
the development of a national scheme, is long overdue in Australia. Reliance on 
traditional fuel excise as the key revenue tool to fund infrastructure is internationally 
recognised as having limited longevity, with diminishing reserves and increased fuel 
efficiency curtailing revenues. An infrastructure funding regime based on fuel taxes has no 
sustainable future. (DR sub, page 2) 
Importantly, greater use of cost-reflective pricing linked to road provision holds the prospect of both 
more efficient use of road infrastructure as well as more efficient investment based on clearly 
identified demands. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development notes: 
The Department is of the view that road investment and pricing reform is the next area of 
major economic reform for Australia, reflected by activities already included in the 
current reform agenda. (DR sub, page 1) 
Considerable work has been undertaken by the Heavy Vehicle and Investment Reform project to 
progress both user-charging and institutional reform. 317 The project identified the necessary 
elements of an integrated charging, funding and investment framework and the processes needed to 
successfully implement the reforms. The framework includes: 
• planning and expenditure reforms to encourage better investment decisions in Australia’s road 
network; 
• funding reforms to link revenue raised from road users to road investments and reduce 
reliance on taxation at a local, state and territory and Commonwealth level through the annual 
budgetary process; 
• better investment in the road network to provide more access for high-productivity vehicles; 
• an appropriate system of accountability through economic regulation to ensure that charges 
are set so as to promote efficient and sustainable use of the road network; and 
                                                          
316  Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Canberra, page 21. 
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Infrastructure Markets 
216 Part 3 — Competition Policy 
• charging that is fair, transparent and sustainable and reflects the costs road users impose on 
the network.318 
The challenge is now to agree on a model of implementation. 
Given the size and importance of the road transport industry for the economy, and the importance of 
efficient road use and provision for urban and regional amenity and consumer wellbeing, much 
greater progress needs to be made in this area. 
This policy shift will require co-operation from all levels of government. As road pricing is introduced 
by the States and Territories, the Australian Government should reduce excise and grants to the 
States and Territories. This would allow the reform to be fiscally neutral. 
The Panel’s view 
Reform of road pricing and provision should be a priority. Road reform is the least advanced of all 
transport modes and holds the greatest prospect for efficiency improvements, which are 
important for Australian productivity and community amenity. 
Technologies are available that allow for more widespread application of cost-reflective pricing in 
roads, taking into account location, time and congestion. Revenue raised through road pricing 
should be channelled into road funds to promote more efficient road use and investment. 
Co-operation from all levels of government will be needed to ensure that road pricing does not 
result in an additional impost on road users. 
Implementation 
Introducing road pricing to fund road provision is a long-term reform that requires community 
confidence in the benefits to be gained.  
Governments should make a long-term commitment to transform the road transport sector to 
operate more like other infrastructure sectors. Infrastructure providers should bill users directly for 
usage and base investment decisions on their economic value, supplemented by government CSO 
payments where necessary.  
As an initial step, road funds could be set up separately to governments’ general budgets to increase 
transparency around road funding. Fuel taxes and other indirect taxes levied on road users should be 
hypothecated to these road funds. Over time, as direct road charges increase, these taxes should be 
reduced. Australian Government grants to the States and Territories should also be adjusted in line 
with the fall in Australian Government revenue from fuel excise.  
Within 12 months of agreeing to this recommendation, a working group of Australian Government 
and state and territory transport and treasury officials should be commissioned to develop pilots and 
trials. This working group will advise governments around: choosing technologies to allow mass 
time-of-use and location-based charging; creating road funds and directing revenues to these funds; 
and reforming road authorities to restructure their operations along the lines of other infrastructure 
network providers.  
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The proposed ACCP (see Recommendation 43) should report on progress in road transport reform as 
part of its annual competition policy assessments. 
Recommendation 3 — Road transport 
Governments should introduce cost-reflective road pricing with the aid of new technologies, with 
pricing subject to independent oversight and revenues used for road construction, maintenance 
and safety. 
To avoid imposing higher overall charges on road users, governments should take a 
cross-jurisdictional approach to road pricing. Indirect charges and taxes on road users should be 
reduced as direct pricing is introduced. Revenue implications for different levels of government 
should be managed by adjusting Australian Government grants to the States and Territories. 
Public transport 
Public transport reforms have not been pursued as part of competition policy. Public transport 
governance systems vary from State to State and city to city. However, public transport is mostly 
owned and operated by government. Where the private sector provides substantial operations (for 
example, private bus operators, taxis and hire car services), these are often regulated or licensed by 
governments.  
The experience in Victoria serves as an example of public transport reforms that have ultimately 
delivered significant benefits despite some initial problems. In the early 2000s urban rail, tram and 
country passenger rail operations were privatised. However, within a few years most of the 
operators needed to be bailed out by the Victorian Government. Despite significantly improved 
service levels and increased passenger satisfaction, overestimates of patronage built into the bids 
meant that the subsidies agreed to under the contracts were insufficient to keep the operators 
solvent.319 
Although the Victorian Government needed to bail out operators, it did not retake ownership of 
services. Train, tram and bus services continue to be operated privately and managed through 
complex contractual arrangements that provide incentives to maintain and improve service quality. 
Applying the lessons learned from other sectors to public transport could see greater use of 
contracting out, privatisation or franchising, subject to a regulatory regime imposing safeguards to 
maintain service levels. Through careful contracting, service levels and choice can be maintained or 
improved. Bus services are likely to be contestable and, although governments may wish to mandate 
a minimum level of service, they should not restrict other providers from entering the market. 
The Panel’s view 
Extending NCP principles to public transport could see more franchising and privatisation of 
potentially competitive elements of public transport, stronger application of competitive neutrality 
principles and removal of regulation that limits competition. This holds the prospect of providing 
services more efficiently and improving service levels. 
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12 HUMAN SERVICES 
The lives of Australians are immeasurably richer when they have access to high-quality human 
services. The human services sector covers a diverse range of services, including health, education, 
disability care, aged care, job services, public housing and correctional services. 
Good health makes it easier for people to participate in society. Education can help put people on a 
better life pathway; quality community services, including aged care and disability care and support, 
can provide comfort, dignity and increased opportunities to vulnerable Australians. 
Given the size of the human services sector, which is set to increase further as Australia’s population 
ages,320 even small improvements will have profound impacts on people’s standard of living and 
quality of life. As Australian Unity notes: 
Without fundamental change to the health and aged care systems, the ageing of 
Australia’s population will mean a future of greater government-managed care and 
increased rationing of health services. Fundamental change must revolve around the 
greater adoption of market economy ideals including a focus on consumer, rather than 
producer, interests. Competition reform is a critical component. (DR sub, page 4) 
Governments at all levels have traditionally played an important role in delivering human services. A 
number of human services serve important social objectives (for example, equal access to education 
and health services) and users of human services can be among the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged Australians. Because of these characteristics, the scope to use competition or 
market-based initiatives may be more limited than in other sectors. 
Despite the complexity of many human services markets, there is growing interest, both in Australia 
and overseas, in opportunities to make use of competition-based instruments to secure better 
outcomes for users of human services and better value for money. As the ACCC states: 
There is scope for greater competition in human services, the potential benefits of which 
may include lower prices, greater efficiency in service provision, greater innovation and 
improved consumer choice. (sub 1, page 8) 
In many human services, choice and diversity of service providers already exist, for example, general 
practitioners, dentists, physiotherapists, private hospitals and private schools. In recent years, 
governments have also introduced choice in areas such as disability and aged care.  
Panel discussions with States and Territories also highlighted innovative approaches to delivering 
human services, with policies reflecting the unique characteristics of each jurisdiction and the service 
in question (see Section 12.1). 
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A number of submissions to the Draft Report support the principles identified in the Panel’s Draft 
Recommendation on human services321 that: 
• user choice should be placed at the heart of service delivery; 
• funding, regulation and service delivery should be separate;  
• a diversity of providers should be encouraged while not crowding out community and 
voluntary services; and  
• innovation in service provision should be stimulated while ensuring access to high-quality 
human services. 
However, some submitters note that changes in human services require a cautious approach, due to 
the unique challenges of implementing choice and competition in the diverse human services sector, 
and the impact on people’s lives if changes are poorly implemented.322  
Some submissions and feedback from consultations note that the Panel’s discussion of the 
separation of funding, regulation and service delivery in human services in the Draft Report could 
have been more nuanced. In particular, the Panel is urged to acknowledge that governments will 
continue to play a role as market stewards, even where they no longer provide services (see National 
Disability Services, DR sub, page 2).  
The importance of access for users to appropriate data and information in human services is also 
stressed in feedback. These issues are discussed separately in Chapter 16 on ‘Informed choice’. 
12.1 EVOLVING APPROACHES TO HUMAN SERVICES 
The Panel recognises that Australians’ experiences of human services vary significantly between 
jurisdictions and across sectors and sub-sectors. As the Joint Submission from Regional Victorian 
Not-for-profit agencies notes: 
Human services does not really describe a single sector at all. It is a variety of sub-sectors, 
where both supply and demand differ dramatically. (DR sub, page 3) 
Differences across jurisdictions and between sectors (and sub-sectors) mean that a variety of 
approaches is needed to improve people’s experience of human services. As the Joint Submission 
from Regional Victorian Not-for-profit agencies notes ‘Because the availability of and access to 
services differs so dramatically it is hard to design a one-size fits all approach’ (DR sub, page 3). 
Over time, governments have played an ever larger role in determining which human services are 
supplied, how much is supplied (through the budget process) and in delivering many of the services 
as well. However, all Australian jurisdictions have also gone some way towards including choice and 
competition principles into various human services sub-sectors. 
                                                          
321  Submissions that generally support the principles include: ACCC, DR sub, page 17; National Disability Services, DR sub, 
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The Business Council of Australia notes: 
Most governments in Australia have already started to introduce competition into the 
delivery of some areas of human services … They are giving consumers more choice, 
taking regulation out of government departments and giving it to independent authorities  
... Each area of human services is different and each jurisdiction is at varying stages of 
reform in these sectors. (DR sub, page 8) 
The concept of best practice in service delivery has also changed. Alford and O’Flynn conclude in 
their book, Rethinking Public Service Delivery: 
In the post-war era, when services were delivered by the governments’ own employees, 
the quest was to make them work more efficiently, so managerialist reforms… were the 
keys to better government. In the 1980s, the answer changed. Better and cheaper 
government would come from handing public services over to private enterprise, in a new 
era of contractualism — separating purchasers from providers, and subjecting providers 
to classical contracting and competitive tendering. By the turn of the twenty-first century, 
the answer changed again. More integrated and responsive public services would come 
from greater collaboration — between government agencies, private firms and 
non-profits ...  
In fact, none of these waves of reform eliminated what had come before. Rather, each 
phase overlaid its predecessor, so that today, public managers deal with a whole variety 
of external providers, through an array of relationships… It may be that there is a new 
public sector reform panacea waiting in the wings. But…we offer a different answer: there 
is no ‘one best way’. Instead, the new world of public service delivery is one where there 
are different ways for different circumstances.323 
Panel discussions with States and Territories highlighted innovative approaches to human services 
delivery, with policies reflecting the unique characteristics of each jurisdiction and the service in 
question. 
Box 12.1 provides some examples of these innovative approaches to improving human services 
delivery across Australian jurisdictions through: designing contracts to focus on user demand and 
outcomes (rather than outputs or inputs); governments partnering with not-for-profit providers and 
communities to deliver services; and using new forms of financing, such as social benefit bonds.  
Governments have also moved towards directly funding users to purchase services. Box 12.2 
provides examples of these innovative approaches. 
  
                                                          
323  Alford, J and O’Flynn, J 2012, Rethinking Public Service Delivery, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, page 254. 
Human Services 
Part 3 — Competition Policy  221 
Box 12.1: Innovations in human services delivery  
Jurisdictions across Australia have developed human services delivery models that better reflect 
outcomes desired by service users and local communities.  
Australia has a long tradition of using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver infrastructure 
projects. More recently, PPPs have been used to improve human services delivery outcomes. The 
Western Australian Economic Regulation Authority notes that newer PPPs are a: 
... mechanism to introduce incentives for a greater level of private sector innovation 
and contestability into government services and associated infrastructure delivery.324 
The West Australian Joondalup Health Campus PPP, which is the largest health care facility in 
Perth’s Northern suburbs, provides 24-hour acute care from an integrated public and private 
campus. Established in June 1996, it is operated by Ramsay Health Care — Australia’s largest 
private hospital operator. The hospital treats public patients on behalf of the State Government 
under an outcomes-based contract.325 
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia notes that the Joondalup Health Campus is ‘widely 
considered to be one of the nation’s best examples of a successful healthcare PPP’,326 achieving 
consistent ‘A’ ratings in reviews conducted by the Western Australian Department of Health’s 
Licensing Standards and Review Unit.327 Joondalup offers innovative services, responding to user 
feedback by introducing an online patient admission system in late 2013. 
South Australia is using a PPP framework for the new Royal Adelaide Hospital328, and the New 
South Wales Government PPP for the new Northern Beaches Hospital includes clinical and other 
services for public patients under a contract with the New South Wales Government (New South 
Wales Government sub, page 24).329 
Governments are also working with communities and not-for-profit providers to design service 
delivery systems that meet the needs of local communities. Under the Australian Government’s 
Communities for Children initiative,330 non-government organisations are funded as ‘Facilitating 
Partners’ to develop and implement a whole-of-community approach to early childhood 
development in consultation with local stakeholders. Examples of services delivered under this 
initiative include home visits, early learning and literacy, and child nutrition. A national evaluation 
of Communities for Children found: 
                                                          
324  Western Australia Economic Regulation Authority 2014, Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in Western Australia: 
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Box 12.1: Innovations in human services delivery (continued) 
The number and strength of networks increased, as did trust and respect between 
service providers … Facilitating Partners have been most effective when the 
non-government organisations they represent have been well-known in the community 
… Having a community focus has enabled service delivery to be flexible to meet the 
needs of the community.331 
The Western Australian government partners with local community groups through its Delivering 
Community Services in Partnership Policy. This policy moves away from input funding and funds 
not-for-profits for achieving outcomes and sustainable prices. It seeks to improve outcomes for all 
Western Australians by building partnerships between the public and community sectors in policy, 
planning and delivery. 
Governments also use new funding channels to increase the reach of social programs. The New 
South Wales Government has partnered with the private and community sectors to develop two 
social benefit bonds: 
• with UnitingCare Burnside for the New Parent Infant Network (Newpin) bond; and 
• with a consortium of The Benevolent Society, Westpac and Commonwealth Bank. 
These programs are initially funded by private investors, who receive a return on their investment 
if improved social outcomes are achieved. 
Newpin is a child protection and parent education program that works with families to enhance 
parent-child relationships. The social benefit bond has allowed UnitingCare to expand and enhance 
its existing program. An early evaluation of the program recognises that much has been achieved 
in a short timeframe, including: 
• Newpin staff working more closely as a team, translating to better continuity of care for 
families, more informed practice, and a greater focus on priority needs; 
• formalising family assessments, planning and reporting processes, creating a more 
transparent basis for action and tracking progress over time — which is energising and 
motivating for both staff and parents; and 
• introducing more comprehensive data capture and reporting, forming a stronger basis for 
reflecting on and improving practice.332 
In Victoria, the Homelessness Innovation Action Projects have supported innovative approaches to 
tackling homelessness. In Stage One the government selected 11 projects to be delivered by 
private organisations based on their ability to provide a new approach to service delivery in the 
area of homelessness, with a focus on prevention and early intervention. 
After a comprehensive and independent evaluation of the project performance the seven projects 
that demonstrated the best outcomes for clients were funded to continue to Stage Two. These 
included a project linking employment, housing, and personal support programs for vulnerable 
young people; and a regional outreach project for elderly homeless people.333 
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Box 12.2: Examples of direct user choice 
With the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme334 (NDIS) over the next five 
years, disability service providers will move from being contracted by governments to being 
registered providers with the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA). Funding for disability 
support will follow individual service users rather than service providers, allowing individuals to 
choose the providers from whom they wish to receive services. Individuals electing to receive 
direct payments for purchasing their support (subject to a risk assessment) will not be restricted to 
choosing providers registered with the NDIA. 
This builds on previous work undertaken by the States to personalise disability care and support. 
For example, in Queensland the ‘Your Life, Your Choice’ disability support initiative allows eligible 
Queenslanders to participate actively in planning and delivering their own disability support and 
services. The South Australian Government submission also notes: 
Prior to the Australian Government’s announcement of the NDIS, the South Australian 
Government had already commenced a transition towards individualised funding for 
clients, including self-management, in order to allow people with disability to have 
choice and control over their own support packages. (DR sub, page 8) 
In the area of dental services, both New South Wales and Queensland have introduced voucher 
schemes for citizens who are eligible for publicly funded dentistry. These vouchers can be 
redeemed at private dental practices, providing more accessibility and choice for users. In 
Queensland, the dental voucher scheme has reduced the number of people waiting more than two 
years for dental procedures from 62,513 to zero.335  
The Australian Government is providing consumer-directed Home Care Packages for older 
Australians who want to remain in their own home but need some assistance with transport, 
domestic chores or personal care. Under these packages, government provides funding to users 
who have the right to use their budget to purchase the services (within the scope of the program) 
they choose. Users enter into a contract with home care providers to deliver the services. An 
advocate can represent the user in this process, if desired. 
There are a large number of government approved home care providers across the States and 
Territories, including for-profit and not-for-profit, religious and non-denominational bodies. Users 
may choose to ‘top up’ their packages by purchasing additional care and services through their 
home care providers.336 
12.2 GOVERNMENTS AS STEWARDS 
Innovation in the design and management of human services receives cautious support in 
submissions, including from organisations that supply human services to the most vulnerable 
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members of the community.337 However, they stress that the Panel’s approach should not be seen as 
bolstering simplistic arguments for privatisation or contracting out of public services, nor giving 
comfort to a philosophy of ‘private good, public bad’. 
The Panel heard two particular notes of caution expressed through consultations and in submissions.  
First, governments cannot distance themselves from the quality of services delivered to Australians. 
Policy in human services cannot simply be set and then forgotten. It needs to evolve over time in 
response to user experience with different approaches to service quality and access. 
Second, although changes in human services can often be urgent, they should not be rushed. There 
are complex issues that will take time to work through so that people’s lives, particularly those facing 
disadvantage, are not unduly or unhelpfully disrupted. 
For example, Western Australia began work to reform disability care and support services well in 
advance of the NDIS being introduced. Western Australia’s disability system has ‘evolved through 
25 years of bipartisan reform and funding growth’ to a place where it is recognised for its focus on 
‘individualised funding, on developing local relationships and for the support provided to people 
through the network of local area coordinators’. 338 Even after 25 years, Western Australia continues 
to refine its disability services system, with a focus on giving people with disability, their families and 
carers genuine choice and control in their lives. 
These notes of caution emphasise the need for governments to retain a stewardship role in the 
provision of human services. 
This will have some similarities with the ongoing stewardship role of government in other sectors, 
such as the electricity market. Governments have established both an energy market operator to 
keep energy services delivered and a separate rule-maker to change the way the energy market 
operates over time so that it continues to meet the long-term interest of consumers. In reforming 
the electricity market, governments have recognised the role of a strong consumer protection 
framework in building confidence in the market. 
Good stewardship is important in human services since human services can be just as essential to 
many Australians, especially those facing disadvantage, as access to electricity in securing the quality 
of their daily lives. As the National Disability Services submission states: 
Establish a market stewardship function: Where governments apply choice and 
competition principles in the field of human services there is a corresponding 
responsibility to invest in overseeing the impact of the policy on the market. Governments 
must also respond to findings and as required, adjust funding, investment in sector 
development and regulation settings. (DR sub, page 2) 
Market stewardship is about governments’ overall role in human services systems. Australia’s 
systems of human services cover policy design, funding, regulation and provision — and they also 
reflect our federal structure. Across many human services, the policy responsibility for human 
services lies with the States and Territories; however, the Australian Government has some leverage 
through financial grants and Council of Australian Governments (COAG) processes. For example, tied 
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grants made to tertiary education institutions give the Australian Government an ongoing and 
dominant role in university policy. 
Stewardship relates not just to governments’ direct role in human services but also to policies and 
regulations that bear indirectly on human services sectors. For example, the Productivity Commission 
(PC) identified planning restrictions as affecting the provision of child care services in Australia.339 
Given the importance of human services to the everyday lives of Australians, policies and regulations 
that indirectly affect human services must be subject to review, including against a public interest 
test as set out in Recommendation 8. 
Market co-design 
In fostering a diverse range of service models that meet the needs of individuals and the broader 
community, governments can benefit from working collaboratively with non-government human 
services providers to effectively ‘co-design’ the market, incorporating the services that users are 
demanding and how they might be best delivered. 
As the South Australian Government notes: 
... co-design of human services is an emerging policy direction in human services delivery 
... Co-design refers to the involvement of consumers of services, as well as other partners 
such as service providers and non-government organisations (NGOs), in the design of 
human services. (DR sub, page 7) 
There are advantages for governments in partnering with community organisations to design and 
deliver services. The Joint Councils of Social Service Network notes, ‘Community organisations are 
usually embedded within the communities they serve, creating trust’ (DR sub, page 2). 
Collaboration in the design and delivery of human services will be particularly important where users 
have an ongoing relationship with their service provider built on mutual trust. While some human 
services are ‘transactional’ in nature (for example, a knee replacement operation generally does not 
require a patient to have an ongoing relationship with a surgeon), many others are ‘relational’, 
meaning that users benefit from continuity of service provision from a trusted and responsive 
provider. 
Jesuit Social Services states: 
A transactional approach to human services simply won’t work when it comes to people 
leaving prison or state care, young people living with mental illness or drug and alcohol 
issues, refugee or newly arrived migrant communities, or Aboriginal communities. 
Instead, services are at their best when they comprise longstanding and sophisticated 
networks made up of people, places and institutions that are grounded in relationships of 
trust. (DR sub, page 4) 
A necessary first step in co-design is to articulate the desired impact or change. Governments can 
work with service providers and prospective users to discuss their needs and the best strategies to 
meet those needs. This allows co-design to play an important part both in policy formation and in the 
actual delivery of services. 
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One example of the results from a co-design approach is the ‘Family by Family’ program currently 
operating in Adelaide and in Mount Druitt, New South Wales. This program aims to reduce the 
number of families in need of crisis services and help to keep kids out of the child protection system. 
The Australian Centre for Social Innovation, a not-for-profit agency, spent 12 months working with 
service users to co-design a program that would enable them to make changes in their lives. The 
resulting program takes a ‘peer to peer’ approach. The not-for-profit agency provides training and 
coaching to families that have overcome challenges, such as debt and addiction, so they can mentor 
and assist families that are still struggling.340 In its first year of evaluation, most families participating 
in Family by Family met their goals, with 90 per cent of families saying things were ‘better’ or ‘heaps 
better’.341 
Ways of funding human services 
Funding is and will continue to be the most important part of both human services policy and 
governments’ role as market stewards. The Panel makes no recommendations regarding overall 
levels of funding for human services — funding decisions are a matter for governments and are 
generally determined through budgetary processes. However, funding levels and methods can have 
important implications for choice, diversity and innovation in human services markets. 
Funding decisions centre on setting the bounds of services that will be paid for or subsidised by 
governments and structuring the funds that flow from the government to users or providers. While 
some human services are block-funded, others have ‘entry criteria’ that qualify an individual for 
funding associated with a level of service. Policymakers may change entry criteria from time to time; 
for example, to better reflect changing demographics. 
The NDIS rollout required an initial policy decision as to who will qualify for public disability funding. 
During the launch period (July 2013 to 30 June 2016), individuals qualify if they are in a launch 
location, are the right age for that location and meet either the disability or early intervention 
requirements.342 
As a general policy, wherever possible, funding should follow user choices to ensure that providers 
are rewarded when meeting, and being responsive to, user preferences. 
Although some human services funding is transparent and directly related to a specific service — for 
example, Medicare provides a direct benefit to patients when they visit a GP — other types of 
funding is less transparent. 
Several submissions point to traditional methods of funding community service obligations (CSOs) as 
typically lacking transparency. A CSO is a service that provides community or individual benefits but 
would not generally be undertaken in the normal course of business. Many human services are 
expected to be available on a universal basis, which is a CSO. Government providers may be required 
to fulfil CSOs or the government may contract with private providers to deliver CSOs on its behalf. 
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IPART points out: 
... providers are often required to absorb the cost of CSOs into their operating budgets, 
often involving non-transparent internal cross-subsidies … because CSOs are not directly 
funded by the government, agencies have to overcharge for some of their other services 
in order to cover the costs of their CSOs … This in turn can lead to the restriction of 
competition in otherwise contestable areas so the internal cross-subsidies can be 
maintained. (sub, pages 4-5) 
More transparent CSOs can improve diversity and choice. Where there are significant CSOs, potential 
suppliers may not be able to match the cost structure of public providers, which can limit the private 
and not-for-profit providers entering the market. On the other hand, providers tasked with delivering 
CSOs may become unsustainable as the ‘higher prices needed to fund the subsidy to CSOs can be 
undercut by competitors that only supply those users which generate profits’.343 
By making CSOs transparent and funding them directly, important community services can continue 
while leaving room for new providers to enter and offer other innovative services. 
Separating policy-making from regulation and service provision 
In the Draft Report, the Panel recommends separating funding from regulation and provision of 
human services. Separating funding, regulation and provision of human services need not involve any 
reduction in government funding. However, it will involve introducing greater independence into 
service regulation and the potential for competition into service delivery. 
This is underpinned by the notion that good market stewardship delivers clarity about whose 
interests the government is serving when it acts. In many human services sectors in Australia, there 
are still instances where the government develops policy, block funds, regulates and provides 
services through the one organisation. 
Some submitters note actual or potential difficulties with separating functions in human services. For 
example, the Australian Education Union states, ‘there should not be a separation between funder 
and provider of service delivery’ (sub, page 2) and adds that separating these functions may lead to 
increased costs to users and issues of access and equity (sub, page 3). 
The New South Wales Government also notes, ‘In some cases, however, the separation of funding, 
regulation and service provision roles may bring unintended consequences if incentives and roles are 
not appropriately aligned’ (DR sub, page 16-17). 
While the potential challenges associated with separation must be recognised, separating policy 
(including funding) and regulation decisions from provision can ensure that providers have greater 
scope to make decisions in the best interests of users and that policy settings do not give special 
preference to public providers. 
Many States, including New South Wales and South Australia, have recently separated public TAFE 
providers from policy functions in vocational education and training. As South Australia’s former 
Minister for Employment, Higher Education and Skills noted: 
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This separation [of policy from provision] allows the department to focus on driving 
[policy] reforms and make independent decisions regarding the availability of funding for 
training, a crucial element of this increasingly competitive sector.344 
TAFE New South Wales notes that, in response to its recent separation from the New South Wales 
Department of Education and Communities, ‘Becoming a separate agency again will give us greater 
opportunity to adapt and respond to our changing customer needs.’345 Further, the PC has observed 
that, where a regulator and provider are the same entity, regulators ‘often find ways of favouring the 
arms of their own businesses’.346 
Regulation that is independent of any provider (including government providers) can help to 
encourage entry into service delivery markets by ensuring all providers operate on a ‘level playing 
field’— leading to greater choice, diversity and innovation in service provision. 
With regard to separating policy (including funding) from regulation, the OECD has noted: 
A high degree of regulatory integrity helps achieve decision-making which is objective, 
impartial, consistent, and avoids the risks of conflict, bias or improper influence ... 
Establishing the regulator with a degree of independence (both from those it regulates 
and from government) can provide greater confidence and trust that regulatory decisions 
are made with integrity. A high level of integrity improves outcomes.347 
The submission from National Disability Services discusses challenges that arise from insufficient 
distance between the regulator and policymakers, including that ‘there can be a tendency for 
bureaucracies to create unwieldy regulation in response to risk which reduces the effectiveness of 
service providers’ (DR sub, page 4). 
Box 12.3 describes the role of the NDIA as an independent regulator in the disability care and 
support sector. 
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Box 12.3: Disability care and support regulator 
The NDIA is a statutory agency whose functions include delivering the NDIS.  
The NDIA assists participants in the NDIS to develop plans with individualised packages of support, 
which include the reasonable and necessary support directly related to meeting a participant’s 
ongoing disability support needs. These plans are reviewed regularly and can be modified, for 
example, when a participant’s circumstances and needs change. 
The NDIA (through its CEO) has a range of decision-making powers under the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 including: 
• access decisions — assessing whether a person meets the access criteria to become a 
participant in the NDIS; 
• planning decisions — for NDIS participants, approving and reviewing plans, including the 
reasonable and necessary supports that will be funded or provided through the NDIS; 
• registered provider decisions — approving persons or entities to be registered providers of 
supports under the NDIS; and 
• nominee decisions — appointing a nominee for certain NDIS participants who need 
assistance in developing and managing their plan. 
In its Disability Care and Support Report, the PC argued that the type of individualised assessment 
of participants undertaken by the NDIA is ‘an essential element of avoiding … chronic 
underfunding’.348 
The design of the NDIS is intended to ensure that the NDIA is able to change individual plans 
quickly and efficiently when required. 
 
The Panel’s view 
High-quality human services can significantly improve peoples’ standard of living and quality of 
life. Particularly with Australia’s ageing population, the size and importance of the human services 
sector will increase into the future. 
Governments cannot distance themselves from the quality of human services delivered to 
Australians — they will continue to have an important role as market stewards in human services 
sectors, including through policy and funding decisions. 
In undertaking their stewardship role, governments should: 
• foster a diverse range of service models that best meet the needs of individuals and the 
broader community; 
• co-design markets with human services providers to build on the trust and relationships that 
already exist between service providers and users; 
• separate their interest in policy (including funding) and regulation from provision; 
• vest rule-making and regulation with a body independent of government’s policy (including 
funding) role; 
• allow funding to follow people’s choices; and 
• fund community service obligations in a transparent and contestable manner. 
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12.3 EXPANDING USER CHOICE 
Traditionally, governments have decided which human services would be delivered, in what 
quantities and to whom. One result of this practice was that individual needs were rarely reflected in 
the standard service offering. 
The PC points to some important reasons for expanding choices for people who use human services. 
• There is a social expectation that people should be able to run most aspects of their lives. 
• Users will have different and changing preferences about what matters in their lives, and these 
are not easily observable by others. 
• Lack of choice can result in poorer quality and more expensive services, and less diversity and 
innovation. In contrast, user control of budgets creates incentives for suppliers to satisfy the 
needs of users, given that they would otherwise lose their business. That in turn typically leads 
to differentiated products for different niches.349 
In many instances, users (rather than governments or providers) are best placed to make appropriate 
choices about the human services they need. 
Providing users with a direct budget may allow them to effectively exercise choice. However, there 
will not just be one model of user choice. For example, in school education effective choice may 
come down to making sure that schools are able to respond to the needs and demands of families in 
the local community. This could be achieved by providing more autonomy to the school 
decision-makers, such as allowing principals to hire teachers with special skills or qualifications (for 
example, teaching English as a second language) to meet the needs of students and families in the 
community. 
Box 12.4 provides examples of the benefits of choice in aged care from the perspective of service 
users.  
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Box 12.4: Benefits of choice — aged care examples 
The Brotherhood of St Laurence released a paper350 on user choice in aged care services, which 
surveyed some of the advantages aged care users have enjoyed from increased choice. 
Overall, aged care users found that having control of funds meant that service providers became 
more responsive to their individual requirements. This increased the bargaining power that users 
had with service providers, case managers and other professionals. 
The paper provided some examples of choice: 
• One man employed someone to fetch a meal from his local pub after rejecting ‘meals on 
wheels’. In another case, a user employed a support worker who cooked meals of the 
person’s choosing. 
• An aged care user applied funding to purchasing assistive technology, such as sensors that 
automatically switched on a light when the person got out of bed and a lifeline alarm to 
summon help in case of a fall. 
• One group of users of mixed ages living independently in their own flats pooled their 
funding to buy services, giving them greater purchasing power. 
• Aged care users also benefited from being able to choose their support workers rather than 
being assisted by pre-assigned agency staff, who often rotate through their positions. One 
user stated: 
Direct payments give me control. I now have a say in what I eat and drink, what I do 
and when I do it. I can choose carers that can help me to live my life. I can have 
continuity instead of a different carer every day.351 
There are various approaches to expanding user choice in human services. The UK Government has 
decided to put user choice at the heart of service delivery across the board, accepting a presumption 
that user choice will generally be the best model (discussed in Box 12.5). 
An alternative approach is to analyse services market-by-market, extending choice gradually into 
selected human services as appropriate. 
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Box 12.5: UK reform of public services  
The UK has gone further than Australia in introducing competition and choice into the delivery of 
public services. The Open Public Services White Paper352 proposes five principles for modernising 
the UK’s public services.  
• Increasing choice wherever possible — which means putting people in control, either 
through direct payments, personal budgets, entitlements or choice. Where direct user 
control is not possible, elected representatives should have more choice about how services 
are provided. 
• Decentralising to the lowest appropriate level — where possible, this will be individuals; 
otherwise to the lowest-level body, such as community groups or neighbourhood councils. 
• Opening service delivery to a range of providers — high-quality services can be provided by 
the public sector, the voluntary sector and the private sector. This means breaking down 
regulatory or financial barriers to encourage a diverse range of providers. It also means 
transparency about the quality and value for money of public services so that new providers 
can enter and challenge under-performers. 
• Ensuring fair access — government funding should favour those with disadvantage. 
• Accountability to users and to taxpayers. 
Different public services have different characteristics. The White Paper identifies three categories 
of public services and more detailed principles for each type of public service.  
1. Individual services: 
• funding follows people’s choices; 
• robust framework of choice in each sector; 
• publishing key data about public services and provider performance; 
• target funding at disadvantage (for example, a ‘pupil premium’ paid to schools that take on 
disadvantaged students); 
• license individual providers through a relevant regulator; and 
• access to redress, including through an ombudsman. 
For specific services, users have a legal right to choose and must be provided with choices by law. 
For example, when GPs refer health services users to medical specialists, they must offer a 
shortlist of hospitals or clinics among which the users can choose.  
2. Neighbourhood services: these are services used by the community collectively, such as local 
libraries and parks. In line with the principle of decentralising to the lowest appropriate level, the 
UK is looking to encourage higher levels of community ownership. 
  
                                                          
352  UK Government 2011, Open Public Services White Paper, The Stationery Office, Norwich. 
Human Services 
Part 3 — Competition Policy  233 
Box 12.5: UK reform of public services (continued) 
3. Commissioned services: these are services where user choice is unlikely to work as a model, for 
reasons such as: 
• the service is a natural monopoly; 
• the service is being provided for people who are not able to make the appropriate choices 
themselves (such as drug rehabilitation); or 
• there are security-related or quasi-judicial issues (such as the court system or planning 
laws). 
In this case, the UK has decided to switch the default from the government providing the service to 
the government commissioning the service from a range of providers — and to separate 
purchasers from providers to encourage innovation. 
Should user choice be applied to every human service? 
Different factors make it easier or harder to apply user choice to particular services. A user choice 
model might not be right for every service. The traditional block-funding approach, where the user is 
a passive recipient of services often from one provider, may remain appropriate in some 
circumstances. The Panel recognises that access to quality services will be a prerequisite for effective 
choice and that accessibility will be particularly important in remote and regional areas. 
The diagram below provides high-level guidance on some of the features that may determine the 
suitability of user choice for particular human services. 
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The application of user choice to human services 
Easier to apply user choice           Harder to apply user choice
Nature of the market
Competitive range of providers           Somewhat competitive/contestable Natural monopoly
Complexity of service
Simple, or good information available                                             Highly complex outputs 
to guide users or intermediaries                                                               and uncertain outcome
Nature of the transaction
Repeat transaction One-off or urgent transaction
Capacity constraints
Low Very high
Switching costs or transaction costs for users
Low Very high
Government specifications on service delivery
Performance-based standards which allow for                 Highly prescriptive standards with limited ability
innovation and product differentiation                         for suppliers to compete on price or quality
 
 
Sometimes the market will be a natural monopoly, which can only support one supplier or where the 
government achieves efficiencies by being the only supplier or purchaser. For example, the 
Australian Government is currently the sole purchaser of Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
subsidised pharmaceuticals, which may achieve lower pharmaceutical prices.  
In situations where the service is highly complex and there are uncertain outcomes, it may be more 
difficult to apply user choice; for example, providing support services to people who are experiencing 
multiple sources of disadvantage. 
It will be easier to apply user choice to a repeat or ongoing transaction (for example, choice of 
in-home disability support) rather than to a one-off transaction. In addition, users who are in a 
catastrophic situation, such as requiring emergency surgery, may not have the capacity to exercise 
choice. 
Capacity constraints are a broader issue in human services since the number of places that can be 
offered may restrict user choice. For example, not all children can go to the same school and not all 
emergency patients can be treated in the same hospital simultaneously. If choice leads to an excess 
of demand over supply, some way of managing demand will be needed. This may lead to constrained 
choice or queuing, which may nevertheless still be a better outcome for users than no choice at all. 
On the other hand, allowing for user choice, particularly in areas where the government was 
previously the main or sole service provider, opens up the possibility that some providers will not 
attract enough customers to survive. Provider failure is a normal part of providing goods and 
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services. Moreover, if providers face no credible threat of exit when they underperform, the full user 
benefits of provider choice are unlikely to be realised. Part of governments’ stewardship role 
includes making arrangements for service continuity in case of provider failure. 
It will be easier to apply user choice where users can easily switch between service providers. User 
choice may not lead to efficient or competitive outcomes where there are financial costs (for 
example, increased travel costs associated with a new provider) or non-financial costs (for example, a 
child may be unwilling to change schools on account of the loss of his or her social networks). 
Wherever possible, governments should take steps to lower switching costs, so users can easily 
switch to a provider better placed to meet their needs. For example, users should not ‘lose their 
place in the queue’ if they switch providers, nor need to undergo further eligibility assessment. 
If governments wish to exercise tight control and set prescriptive standards over the products or 
services provided to users, the usual benefits of competition — diversity of product, innovation and 
price competition — are unlikely to materialise. In these cases, it may be more efficient for 
governments to remain sole providers of the service or to pursue joint ventures or managed 
competition models with non-government providers. 
Limits to user choice in human services 
In some circumstances, users may not be in the best position to choose the appropriate service, and 
hence another model (for example, government choice or service provider choice) may be more 
appropriate. 
Some vulnerable users are less able to exercise choice. In other cases, users may view choice as a 
burden they do not wish to bear, suggesting that a ‘default option’ should always be available. There 
also may be cases where choice is limited, such as in rural and remote locations. 
Special consideration is also needed to empower people with multiple disadvantages or severe 
disadvantage to exercise effective choice. Even when presented with perfect information, severely 
disadvantaged users may lack the confidence or experience to choose the best pathway to meet 
their needs. 
The Joint Councils of Social Service Network notes: 
... some people experiencing poverty and inequality are placed at a significant 
disadvantage in exercising choice in market-based mechanisms. Factors influencing this 
disadvantage include mental or chronic illness, unemployment, insecure housing or 
homelessness, and income inadequacy or insecurity. (DR sub, page 9) 
The consequences of users making the wrong choice in certain contexts can be very severe. As the 
Consumers’ Federation of Australia notes: 
... the risk of making a ‘wrong’ choice in health or education can have significant 
long-term consequences … it is not appropriate or fair to pass on those risks [to users] in 
the absence of an appropriate, and high standard, safety net in public services. (sub, 
pages 8-9) 
In different circumstances, choice may need to be balanced against other factors, including access to 
high-quality services and social equity. For example, in school education, a recent OECD report 
found: 
School systems with low levels of competition among schools often have high levels of 
social inclusion, meaning that students from diverse social backgrounds attend the same 
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schools. In contrast, in systems where parents can choose schools, and schools compete 
for enrolment, schools are often more socially segregated.353 
Someone will always be making a choice about what service is provided to users: governments, 
service providers (for example, doctors), purchase advisors or users themselves. The question is how 
best to match the choices made with the needs and preferences of users of human services. 
User information in human services 
In order to choose what is right for them, users must be able and willing to gather and process the 
right information. Ideally, this information should be freely available, aggregated (for example, on a 
single website), easy to interpret and access, and relevant to the users’ needs. Users should have 
access to objective, outcomes-based data on available services, and/or to feedback from previous 
users of the service — noting that this may raise issues of privacy and misinformation. 
CHOICE highlights: 
... the importance of better information on factors that matter to consumers, in forms 
that they can use, in any extension of competition within health and education. This will 
require government to ensure that suppliers make base data available, in usable formats. 
(sub, page 27) 
Box 12.6 describes some of the websites that provide users with information on health and school 
services. 
Box 12.6: Human services user information systems 
Health information: Some national Australian databases of health information (for example, 
myhospitals.gov.au), publish comparative data on hospital performance, including average waiting 
times and infection risks. Health service users can also visit ahpra.gov.au to check that their health 
practitioner is registered and check whether he or she has been reprimanded or has conditions 
imposed on his or her right to practice. 
The UK has gone even further. The national website, NHS choices, provides extensive health 
information to health service users in an accessible format. Information includes: services offered 
by individual health professionals; their risk-adjusted patient mortality rate; and user reviews of 
health services. 
When data on individual consultant treatment outcomes were first provided, the National Medical 
Director of NHS England noted: 
This is a major breakthrough in NHS transparency. We know from our experience with 
heart surgery that putting this information into the public domain can help drive up 
standards. That means more patients surviving operations and there is no greater prize 
than that.354  
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Box 12.6: Human services user information systems (continued) 
School information: myschool.edu.au enables parents and carers to search detailed profiles of 
Australian schools simply by entering a school’s name, suburb or postcode. It contains data on 
factors including academic achievement (as measured by the NAPLAN national testing), school 
finances and a mapping function to show a school’s location along with other schools in the same 
area. The site now has six years of data available, which parents and carers can use to compare a 
particular school’s progress with that of schools serving similar student populations. It is widely 
used, with over 1.2 million visitors in 2013.355 
Disadvantaged individuals and groups may need greater assistance in navigating the choices they 
face. This can include providing information through accessible communication channels that suit 
individual users’ needs.  
Where complexity is high, there can be a role for ‘mediated choice’, such as using purchase advisors 
(for example, a GP to assist in choosing a surgeon), or where the individual is not in a good position 
to make a choice (for example, a relative to assist in choosing care for a dementia sufferer). 
Where a purchase advisor is used, the incentives facing the advisor must be aligned with those of the 
user. The purchase advisor should not have financial or other incentives to over-service the user (for 
example, by referring them for unnecessary health tests) or to refer the user to one particular service 
provider. 
Mediated choice could also be facilitated through community co-ordinators. For example, Western 
Australia’s disability care and support program includes a role for Local Area Co-ordinators. 
Co-ordinators are located throughout Western Australia and have local knowledge to help advocate, 
plan, organise and access the support and services people with disabilities need. Each Co-ordinator 
works with between 50 and 65 people with disability, providing support that is personalised, flexible 
and responsive.356 
Information systems can also play an important role in helping service providers better understand 
their strengths and weaknesses. Service providers can use feedback and data to improve their own 
performance, leading to more responsive services and better overall outcomes. An example from the 
US is presented in Box 12.7. 
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Box 12.7: Service providers and feedback systems 
Since 1990, the US State of New York has publicly released risk-adjusted outcomes for patients 
undergoing coronary artery bypass graft surgery, with the goal of enhancing the quality of care for 
heart surgery patients. 
The collection and release of this information involves collaboration between hospitals and 
doctors involved in cardiac care as well as the New York State Department of Health and the New 
York State Cardiac Advisory Committee. The program promotes improved outcomes not just 
through service user knowledge but also through competition between hospitals and surgeons. 
New York State Department of Health’s 2008 — 2010 evaluation of the program notes: 
The overall results of this program of ongoing review show that significant progress is 
being made. In response to the program’s results for surgery, facilities have refined 
patient criteria, evaluated patients more closely for pre-operative risks and directed 
them to the appropriate surgeon. More importantly, many hospitals have identified 
medical care process problems that have led to less than optimal outcomes, and have 
altered those processes to achieve improved results.357 
American news outlets also reported in 2012 that, since the program began, the death rate for 
bypass surgery has dropped around 40 percent, and continues to fall.358 
An important aspect of any feedback system is that providers should not be able to ‘game’ the 
system. Although the New York State program reports risk-adjusted outcomes (i.e., the reported 
data are adjusted to take account of each patient’s specific health profile), several media outlets 
report that high-risk patients are often turned away by doctors who fear that the patient may 
affect their outcomes score.359 
Governments or other providers must therefore ensure that data systems avoid creating 
opportunities for providers to protect their ratings by turning away those most in need. 
Australian governments already collect and store significant amounts of data on various human 
services, including health and education. Careful release of existing data, with particular attention to 
ensuring that the information is not ‘gamed’, could play an important role in helping users make 
informed choices and helping providers to deliver responsive and high-quality services. 
Informed choice is discussed more broadly in Chapter 16. 
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The Panel’s view 
User choice in human services, as in other areas, can provide benefits to users and promote 
diversity and innovation in service delivery. 
The UK has a ‘presumption of choice’ operating across most public services, and has adopted 
high-level choice principles. The Panel considers that, in a federation such as Australia, it would be 
useful for all governments to agree on common principles to guide the implementation of user 
choice in human services. 
The Panel’s view is that the Australian Government and state and territory governments should 
agree on choice principles and that user choice should continue to be implemented in Australian 
human services markets, beginning with markets where choice is most easily established. 
In putting user choice at the heart of service delivery, governments should: 
• recognise that users are best placed to make choices about the human services they need 
and design service delivery, wherever possible, to be responsive to those choices; 
• recognise that access to quality services will be a prerequisite for effective choice and that 
accessibility will be particularly important in remote and regional areas; 
• ensure that users have access to relevant information to help them exercise their choices, 
including, where appropriate, feedback from previous users of services; 
• in sectors where choice may be difficult, make intermediaries or purchase advisors available 
to help users make decisions, with policies designed to align the incentives of purchase 
advisors with the best interests of users; 
• ensure that a default option is available for users unable or unwilling to exercise choice; 
• lower financial and non-financial switching costs to enable switching wherever possible — 
for example, users should not ‘lose their place in the queue’ if they switch providers, or need 
to undergo further eligibility assessment; and 
• offer disadvantaged groups greater assistance in navigating the choices they face through, 
for example, accessible communications channels that suit their needs. 
12.4 COMMISSIONING SERVICE DELIVERY 
Although it is possible to introduce user choice into many human services, including aged care and 
disability care and support, in other human services governments will continue to play a role in 
commissioning services on behalf of users. 
Over recent years, governments have looked at different approaches to commissioning human 
services. Approaches have evolved from early, less sophisticated attempts at competitive tendering 
towards approaches reflecting contestability and some degree of user choice (see Box 12.1). 
Consultations with, and submissions from, human services providers emphasise the value of social 
capital and community service contributions that providers can bring to their relationships with 
service users. These ‘value added’ services can be overlooked in traditional tender processes. 
For example, the Joint Councils of Social Service Network notes: 
Competitive price tendering undermines the integration and coordination of services; 
favours larger, more established services over smaller agencies and community groups; 
and measures efficiency in terms of low cost, when the measurement of social and 
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economic outcomes requires a far more nuanced approach and a capacity to identify 
preventive benefits over long-term periods. (DR sub, page 13) 
As in Australia, tendering decisions in the UK have historically focused on cost and value for money, 
which may come at the expense of care and relationships. A 2014 UK report on the future of the 
home care workforce presented findings about the impacts of commissioning practices. It found: 
[home care] is not organised nearly as well as it could be and it appears designed to keep 
caring professional relationships from forming between workers and those they care 
for ... 
[home care is an] inflexible system that is defined by specific tasks and little continuity 
among care workers ... 
No one would have designed commissioning to achieve the state of care we have now, 
but incremental changes to drive down price and the need to be able to monitor care 
contracts has meant that the time and task commissioning [commissioning that focusses 
on inputs, such as time spent with a user, or outputs, such as tasks completed, rather than 
outcomes] is where we have ended up.360 
Contestability and commissioning 
Australian jurisdictions have begun to focus on more innovative and collaborative methods of service 
delivery. As the New South Wales Government states: 
There are more significant benefits from competition and innovation when governments 
take a less prescriptive approach to service delivery reform. This can allow greater 
adaptability and flexibility … the focus should be on specifying desired outcomes and 
ensuring space for innovation. (sub, page 27)  
The New South Wales Government submission to the Draft Report says:  
... a truly contestable system provides the competitive tension that ensures the provider is 
always incentivised to cost effectively provide the best service to the customer. There is a 
broad range of service delivery models which can underpin a truly contestable system … 
including: 
 Keep-and-improve: applying contestability to government service provision by 
benchmarking it against potentially alternative service providers… 
 Recommissioning: redesigning previously outsourced or privatised services to 
improve outcomes 
 Payment by results: paying providers based on outcomes rather than inputs or 
outputs… 
 Public-private joint ventures: allows the technical expertise of the public sector to 
be brought together with the commercial and managerial expertise of the private 
sector ... (DR sub, pages 17–18) 
Newer approaches to commissioning focus more on collaboration and contestability rather than 
strict competitive tender processes. A paper on contestability in the UK health system noted: 
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In recognition of the limits of competition, managers and doctors have moved 
increasingly to establish collaborative arrangements in which purchasers and providers 
work together on a long term basis ... 
… the stimulus to improve performance which arises from the threat that contracts may 
be moved to an alternative provider should not be lost. The middle way between planning 
and competition is a path called contestability. This recognises that health care requires 
cooperation between purchasers and providers and the capacity to plan developments on 
a long term basis. At the same time, it is based on the premise that performance may 
stagnate unless there are sufficient incentives to bring about continuous 
improvements.361 
Contestability necessarily includes performance management, such that service providers face 
credible threats of replacement for poor performance. This requires careful management by 
governments, who must balance performance management with the need to give providers 
certainty. 
The commissioning cycle recognises that assessing needs and priorities (including the unique 
priorities of each jurisdiction or local community) and monitoring and reviewing services are both 
important and necessary steps in commissioning for service delivery. 
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The Commissioning Cycle362 
 
 
 
Moves to introduce greater contestability in human services commissioning need to be approached 
with care. In many cases, service providers will need to undergo significant cultural change to adapt 
to new methods of commissioning. In the context of the NDIS, National Disability Services notes ‘An 
example of cultural change is that disability providers lack marketing skills’ (DR sub, page 2). 
Governments will need to work with existing providers to build capacity and ensure that they can 
continue to offer high-quality services that meet user needs during the transition to new forms of 
service delivery. 
Contracting for outcomes 
Contracting for outcomes is an important method that allows governments to engage with service 
providers to directly meet user needs. 
Contracting for outcomes may require significant investment by government agencies in specifying 
what the desired outcomes are. This may involve a cultural shift for both government agencies and 
service providers. The Joint Councils of Social Service Network notes ‘Too often public services are 
delivered ... without a clear and articulated set of outcomes to be achieved’ (DR sub, page 7). 
An outcomes focus allows service providers to suggest different approaches for achieving the desired 
result rather than having to demonstrate specific activities, tasks or assets. It allows potential 
providers to offer new and innovative service delivery methods and helps to encourage a diverse 
range of potential providers. 
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Governments have used contracting for outcomes for some time. As the National Employment 
Services Association notes: 
There has long been an emphasis on outcomes in employment services. However, in the 
2015 model, there is a strengthened focus on outcomes and longer term (26 week) 
outcomes payments. (DR sub, page 6) 
Contacting for outcomes also needs to recognise that different users may need different levels of 
care or support. For example, the National Employment Services Association notes the different 
payment levels for employment placement outcomes, ‘For a 26 week outcomes the range of 
payment is between $3,400 (Stream A) and $11,000 (Stream C: hardest to place)’ (DR sub, page 6). 
In some cases, innovation and high-quality user outcomes can be encouraged by offering financial 
rewards for performance above specified targets. For example, in the New South Wales social benefit 
bonds program, discussed in Box 12.1, private investors receive a return on their investment if 
agreed social outcomes are achieved. The New South Wales Government is now building on the 
success of social benefit bonds with a range of social impact investments, which bring together 
capital and expertise from the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. These initiatives aim to 
deliver better outcomes in areas such as managing chronic health conditions and supporting 
offenders on parole to reduce their levels of re-offending.363 
Contracting for outcomes can also allow governments to recognise and reward the social capital and 
value-add that community organisations bring to service delivery. 
For relational services, a stable and predictable regulatory environment, including through 
sufficiently long contracts, will be important in the contracting and procurement phase. Moving away 
from very short-term contracts allows service providers to invest in necessary infrastructure, systems 
and ‘front line’ staff. The Western Australian Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy 
(discussed in Box 12.1) encourages a move to longer-term contracts (up to five-year terms) to 
‘provide funding certainty ... and minimise transition and re-bidding costs’.364 
Even simple steps by governments commissioning services can make an important difference to 
human services providers and their ability to be responsive to user needs. The Joint Councils of Social 
Service Network suggests: 
... service procurement processes should include better notification and greater clarity; 
and tendering timelines should allow sufficient time for collaboration, the formation of 
consortia and innovative service design. (DR sub, page 7) 
As with any other method of service delivery, great care is needed when moving to outcomes-based 
contracting. For example, if the provision of a certain education service is commissioned based on 
students successfully completing a course, this may lead to providers passing students who have not 
effectively met the course requirements. 
In many cases, it may be preferable to commission services using a carefully specified blend of 
outcomes and outputs. 
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The Panel’s view 
In the past, contracting for the provision of human services was often achieved through 
competitive tendering. However, tendering can focus on price at the expense of other factors, 
including fairness and responsiveness to individual needs. 
More recently, governments have begun to trial innovative approaches to commissioning that give 
providers greater scope to meet user needs, while allowing governments to step in and remove 
poor performers. 
By commissioning the provision of human services with an outcomes focus, governments can 
encourage a diversity of provider methods and types, which can have important benefits for users 
in relation to choice, adaptability and innovation. 
In commissioning human services, governments should: 
• encourage careful commissioning decisions that are sensitive and responsive to individual 
and community needs, and recognise the contribution of community organisations and 
volunteers;  
• ensure that commissioned services are contestable and service providers face credible 
threats of replacement for poor performance; 
• establish targets and benchmarks for service providers based on outcomes, not processes or 
inputs; and 
• offer financial rewards for performance above specified targets.  
12.5 DIVERSITY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS  
Having a diversity of service providers is not a goal in and of itself, but it can lead to more choice for 
service users and more efficiency in service delivery due to increased competitive pressures. 
The Panel notes that diversity in the provision of human services offers a number of potential 
benefits. For example, the National Employment Services Association notes ‘diversity is critical to job 
seeker and employer choice, and provides for the creation of specialist expertise to be targeted to 
individual cohorts’ (DR sub, page 5). 
As noted in the Reform of the Federation White Paper on Roles and Responsibilities in Health, the 
existence of multiple providers, including smaller providers, can be beneficial. It can enhance 
competition and allow small providers to respond flexibly to local issues.365 
Although the Panel favours encouraging diversity in provider methods and types, it recognises that 
some markets may not have sufficient depth to support a number of providers — for example, 
certain services in remote and regional areas. Providing access to services and regulation to maintain 
and improve service quality will be an important implementation issue, even in the absence of 
competitive pressures. 
Also, where there are economies of scale, good quality services may best be achieved by having a 
few large providers. For example, in some highly specialised health services, having ‘centres of 
specialisation’ can avoid duplicating infrastructure and machinery, allowing medical specialists to 
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practice frequently and collaborate to sharpen and extend their skills. In such situations, competitive 
pressures could still be maintained by having competition for the contract to supply the services or 
by benchmarking the quality of service provided. 
In Australia, many human services, including health, education and social housing are delivered by a 
range of public and private for-profit and not-for-profit providers. The Panel is conscious of the 
current diversity of human services providers and does not underestimate the contribution currently 
made by the private sector and non-government organisations.  
The UK has again gone further than Australia in its Open Public Services White Paper, which 
establishes a policy principle to open service delivery to a range of providers. This means that: 
... high-quality services can be provided by the public sector, the voluntary and 
community sector or the private sector … That means breaking down barriers, whether 
regulatory or financial, so that a diverse range of providers can deliver the public services 
people want, ensuring a truly level playing field between the public, private and voluntary 
sectors. It means being totally transparent about the quality and value for money for 
public services so that new providers can come in and challenge under-performance.366 
In recommending a greater diversity of providers in human services, the Panel does not wish to 
diminish, discourage or crowd out the important contribution made by the not-for-profit sector and 
volunteers to the wellbeing of Australian users of human services. 
Human services providers 
The delivery of human services is widely seen as a responsibility of government. Yet, in practice, few 
human services are delivered exclusively by government. 
In some instances, including in early childhood education and hospital care, private for-profit and 
not-for-profit providers operate in the same market as governments, offering similar services and 
increasing the range of user choice. 
Increasingly, services are being delivered outside the government sector. The significant changes in 
the disability services sector are a recent example of this development. As the ACCC points out: 
Despite the historical role of government in providing human services, a degree of 
competition already exists in many human services markets. This includes competition 
between private hospitals, doctors, secondary schools and vocational training providers, 
to name but a few examples. (sub 1, page 68) 
Government, not-for-profit and private for-profit providers are likely to have different strengths. 
There is a place for all of these different types of providers in human services markets. 
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Government providers 
One of the features of the competition reforms at the time of the National Competition Policy (NCP) 
was a change in the organisational arrangements for government providers of infrastructure services. 
Rather than being provided by government authorities, electricity and water entities were set up as 
Government Business Enterprises, which were more independent of Ministers but subject to clearer 
objectives and overseen by a board of directors. 
Part of the reason for the Government Business Enterprise form in utilities was that it largely 
replicated the corporate for-profit form of competitors that were emerging in markets such as 
electricity. As the non-government organisational forms in human services markets are more 
complex (they include for-profit and different types of not-for-profit), developing a single model for 
government providers is unlikely to be practical. 
Rather, government reforms to the provision of human services have focused on an expanded role 
for the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. In many human services sectors, particularly in aged care 
and disability care and support, governments have encouraged not-for-profits and charities to play 
an important role in meeting user needs. 
For-profit providers 
The private, for-profit sector makes up a large part of service provision in some human services 
markets, including aged care and child care (see Box 12.8). 
Box 12.8: For-profit provision of human services in Australia 
Private hospitals service around 40 per cent of hospital inpatients.367 Around 60 per cent of private 
hospitals operate on a for-profit basis.368 
General practitioner, allied health and dental services are largely delivered by the for-profit sector. 
In child care, around 70 per cent of long-day care is provided by the for-profit sector.369  
The private for-profit sector provides 36 per cent of residential aged care.370 
Private prisons hold around 18 per cent of prisoners in Australia.371 
For-profit providers can bring particular strengths to human services markets. They are likely to face 
stronger incentives to minimise cost, including through adopting new technologies and innovative 
methods of service delivery. This may improve the diversity of providers and service offerings in 
human services markets and increase the efficiency of government expenditure. 
Users have been willing to place their trust in for-profit providers, with high levels of confidence and 
satisfaction recorded in relation to for-profit providers, such as local GPs.372 
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Concerns have been raised that for-profit providers are likely to ‘cherry pick’ the lower-risk or more 
profitable users.373 Policy design needs to be sensitive to this issue. For example, policy can include 
measures such as: limiting the amount of control service providers have over which customers they 
can accept; or designing the scheme to reward service providers on a ‘value added’ basis (for 
example, providing greater rewards to job service agencies that find jobs for long-term unemployed 
people). 
Not-for-profit providers 
In its report on the Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector, the PC observed: 
[Not-for-profits] have long been part of the Australian community landscape, 
encompassing both secular and non-secular organisations … 
The most recognised part of the sector is involved in human service delivery, including 
community services, education and health … More recently, the sector is being viewed as 
a means to address social disadvantage. [Not-for-profits] are generally viewed as more 
trustworthy than government or business, and hence, worthy of support.374 
The Panel recognises that the not-for-profit sector makes an enormous contribution to the lives of 
Australians. In 2006-07 the sector accounted for 4.1 per cent of GDP (excluding the contribution of 
volunteers), employed close to 890,000 people and utilised the services of some 4.6 million 
volunteers.375 
The Panel is concerned to preserve and enhance this contribution, while advancing diversity, 
innovation and choice in human services. As National Disability Services notes: 
Increased competition would be counter-productive if it undermined the ability of 
not-for-profit disability support services to cooperate and collaborate, particularly in 
relation to community development and the production of social capital. (sub, page 3) 
Mutual providers 
The Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals and the Australian Public Service Mutual Task 
Force have released Public Service Mutuals: A Third-way for delivering public services in Australia 
White Paper (White Paper) on public service mutuals that seeks to explore an alternative where 
co-operatives and mutuals play an expanded role in delivering human services. 
A public service mutual is: 
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An organisation … whereby members of the organisation are able to be involved in 
decision-making, and benefit from its activities, including benefits emanating from the 
reinvestment of surpluses.376 
The White Paper suggests public service mutuals deliver several benefits, including that they can: 
• Increase organisational diversity in public service markets. 
• Harness the ethos and professionalism of public service employees and unleash their 
entrepreneurialism. 
• Increase consumer choice and control. 
• Stimulate public service innovation.377 
The White Paper notes that: 
... innovation through consumer, employee or enterprise ownership structures can help 
address issues in areas such as disability, aged care, affordable housing and employment 
services.378 
In the case of disability care and support, the White Paper discusses potential advantages of mutuals, 
including: purchasing co-operatives being used for rural and Indigenous groups and other people 
with common equipment or treatment needs; and staff-based co-operatives being used in areas 
where staff attraction and retention have proven problematic.379 
Although public service mutuals are not common in the provision of human services in Australia, 
there is evidence of mutuals working with communities to deliver human services. The recent Interim 
Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform to the Minister for Social Services provides an 
example:
Westfund Health Insurance, which operates throughout Australia, [reinvests] its profits 
into healthcare. As a result its members have access to state of the art dental clinics which 
has taken the stress off public dental service provision.380 
Public service mutuals now play a significant role in some other jurisdictions, including the UK where 
there has been concerted effort through public policy levers and capacity-building activities to 
establish and expand public service mutuals. 
As user needs and preferences continue to evolve, public service mutuals could play a greater role in 
meeting individual and community needs, possibly in conjunction with other significant government 
initiatives. Indeed, the White Paper suggests that NDIS trial sites could prove ideal for piloting a 
disability staff co-operative. 381 
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The role of government in fostering diversity 
As discussed in Section 12.3, in many human services, users benefit from direct choice and control. In 
these instances, a range of diverse providers and provider types can be an important factor in 
ensuring that users have access to meaningful choice. 
Minimum quality standards will be important in most aspects of human services, even where users 
have access to good information. Standards must be set to balance necessary quality requirements 
without raising artificial barriers to entry — so that new entrants can offer innovative and responsive 
services to users. 
Where direct user choice is not possible, governments can play an important role in encouraging 
diversity through commissioning processes and decisions. Where they directly commission services, 
governments can: specify contracts with duration periods that do not exclude potential competitors 
for extended periods of time; and institute processes that avoid allowing monopoly providers to 
develop over time. 
Governments have experience with encouraging a diversity of providers through commissioning 
processes. For example, diversity was a key consideration for the Job Services tender, with the 
former Department of Employment and Workplace Relations noting, ‘Job seekers and employers 
would benefit from the diversity in provider type, philosophy and approach to employment services 
by choosing a provider that suited them best.’382 
Contestability is also an important factor in structuring contracts. As discussed in Section 12.4, 
performance may stagnate unless there are sufficient incentives to bring about continuous 
improvement. Governments can introduce contestability through benchmarking incumbent 
providers against potentially alternative service providers. 
Governments should encourage diversity through promoting low barriers to entry for new providers, 
while maintaining appropriate quality standards. Low barriers to entry could be promoted through 
allowing independent regulators to license any provider that meets and maintains prescribed 
standards. This is the case under the NDIS model, where the NDIA fulfils the role of regulator. 
Government contracts could be co-ordinated and designed so that particular services are 
commissioned, where possible, with overlapping timeframes. This can allow different providers to 
enter the market at different points in time (and/or retain some attachment with the market), 
supporting a diversity of providers. 
Commissioning should also provide for sufficient information and feedback loops to improve the 
design and targeting of contracts over time, including by identifying the relative strengths of different 
service provider types. 
Users may require access to different types of human services as part of dealing with complex issues, 
such as chronic or mental illness. Governments should recognise the integrated nature of many 
human services markets and their joint role contributing to end-user outcomes. This will require 
understanding the relative strengths of different providers in different parts of a co-ordinated service 
supply chain. It may be appropriate to have one provider co-ordinating services for an individual, or 
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alternatively to put the individual in contact with a diverse range of providers, depending on the 
circumstances. 
The Panel’s view 
Many human services are delivered by a range of public, private and not-for-profit providers. Each 
type of provider makes an important contribution to individual users of human services and to the 
broader community. 
Governments may have significant influence over the diversity of providers in human services, 
particularly through commissioning arrangements. 
Recognising the beneficial impact on innovation and user responsiveness that arises from a 
diversity of providers, governments should encourage diversity by: 
• allowing independent regulators to license any provider that meets and maintains 
prescribed standards, where minimum standards address quality requirements without 
raising artificial barriers to entry; and/or 
• directly commissioning services with co-ordination and processes that: 
- avoid monopoly providers developing over time; and 
- specify contracts with duration periods that balance the need to afford providers 
some level of certainty without excluding potential competitors for extended periods 
of time; and 
• in support of their role as market stewards, undertake commissioning that: 
- provides for sufficient information and feedback loops to improve the design and 
targeting of contracts over time, including by identifying the relative strengths of 
different types of service provider;  
- recognises the integrated nature of many human services and their joint role in 
contributing to end-user outcomes, and the relative strengths of different providers in 
different parts of a co-ordinated service supply chain; and 
- is co-ordinated over time, where possible, maximising opportunities for contracts with 
overlapping timeframes and supporting a diversity of providers in the market at any 
point in time. 
12.6 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES  
Like any changes to public policy, implementing changes to human services needs to be well 
considered. Human services have a lasting impact on people’s lives and wellbeing, increasing the 
importance of ‘getting it right’ when designing and implementing policy changes. 
The PC notes: 
Experience with market-based instruments in human services (and other sectors) in 
Australia suggests that such mechanisms often require refinement over time to promote 
improved outcomes. (sub, page 37) 
National Disability Services similarly notes that reform of human services, including introducing 
choice and competition, ‘must be introduced slowly with ongoing monitoring’ (DR sub, page 1). 
Human Services 
Part 3 — Competition Policy  251 
Policy changes in this area have often been implemented via a staged process, sometimes involving 
trials or pilot schemes, with feedback from such trials being used to refine the program. Western 
Australia’s continued work to refine its disability care and support, 25 years after it was first 
introduced, demonstrates the benefits of measured implementation with careful monitoring. 
Human services reform must focus not just on users but also on providers, whose ability to respond 
positively to policy change will be an important factor in ensuring that Australians continue to enjoy 
access to high-quality human services. 
Through consultations and submissions, the Panel heard representations from many human services 
providers noting that reform often involves cultural adjustment by providers. Governments, through 
retaining a market stewardship function, can play an important role in assisting providers to adjust to 
cultural change, including through introducing reform that progresses at an appropriate pace. For 
example, Catholic Social Services notes ‘Governments need to develop sector adjustment policies so 
that the professional capability of the sector is not jeopardised by the introduction of competition 
policy’ (DR sub, page 2). 
Post-implementation reviews are an important part of monitoring the impacts of reforms. Box 12.9 
describes the post-implementation review of the Job Network competition reforms. 
Box 12.9: Assessing the outcomes of competition — example from Job Network 
The PC reviewed383 the impact of the Job Network reforms, and drew some general lessons for 
areas where government purchases services. Although the overall impact of these reforms was 
positive, the PC made specific recommendations for improving some implementation issues. 
Choice and information 
With the advent of competition in the market, most job seekers could choose from a number of 
providers in their area. However, the PC found that only around one in five job seekers were 
making an active choice. Providing accurate and relevant information would enhance user 
engagement and improve choice. In addition, once a job seeker was allocated to a provider, he or 
she was generally not permitted to switch providers.  
Tendering versus licensing 
The move from a monopoly provider to a tendered market did result in some benefits. However, 
tendering can be complex and expensive, and it might also result in an excessive focus on price, 
ultimately leading to a lower quality of service. The PC recommended that a licensing system could 
be more appropriate, which would allow any agency that met and maintained the prescribed 
standards to provide services at the going prices. 
Regulation 
In the job services market, the PC found that regulatory oversight imposed excessive compliance 
burdens, undermining the desirable flexibility of the system. The PC recommended adopting a risk 
management approach to contract monitoring based on minimum necessary surveillance to 
ensure accountability and achievement of specified goals. 
Box 12.10 describes a UK post-implementation review of choice reforms, which had a particular focus 
on how the most disadvantaged users were exercising their new right to choice. 
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Box 12.10: The UK experience — Barriers to Choice Review384 
In 2013, the UK undertook a review to examine how people were using the choices they had been 
given in human services, with a particular focus on how choices were used and valued by the most 
disadvantaged. 
The review’s main were: 
• Around half the population were exercising choice. 
• The three top factors that people considered when choosing were the location (55 per cent), 
quality (15 per cent) and reputation (15 per cent) of the service. 
• There was strong public support for being able to choose, but around one-third of the 
population found choice difficult. 
• The biggest barriers to choice were a combination of access and information — people 
without access to computers or cars were at a double disadvantage when it came to 
exercising choice. 
• People were generally happy with the service provided, including in situations where they 
had no choice. 
The report proposed some improvements to the UK’s choice-based system, including: 
• The system should give more power to service users, especially disadvantaged groups — it 
was found that these groups were less comfortable about exercising choice, more frustrated 
by bureaucratic barriers and more affected by difficulties like transport. 
• It should be simple and easy for users to switch providers without ‘losing their place in the 
queue’ or having to undergo further assessments of eligibility. 
• Users should have a right to request flexible service delivery (for example, to talk to 
consultants on the phone or to study a different combination of subjects at school), and 
providers unwilling or unable to accommodate requests would be obliged to explain why 
not. 
• Disadvantaged groups should be given more assistance with navigating the choices before 
them, since many do not use the internet and may be bewildered by choice — there was a 
need for better information about available choices, and access to face-to-face advice to 
assist users to interpret the information. 
The review concluded that, although competition between rival service providers is a very 
important element of choice, the choice agenda needed to be broader. The focus should be on 
treating service users with dignity and respect and treating them as equal partners in the delivery 
of services. 
The Panel recognises that reform in human services sectors can seem slow, but that the ultimate goal 
of improving the lives of Australians makes pursuing reform both important and worthwhile. 
Potential issues with implementation do not mean that competition reforms in human services 
should be abandoned. In his review of government service sector reform, Peter Shergold noted: 
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A culture of innovation needs to be actively encouraged. Risk should be managed 
prudently by a willingness to pilot, demonstrate and evaluate new approaches. In the 
public arena, as elsewhere, any innovation carries risk of failure. In the design of 
community services, there should be a willingness to trial often, fail early, and learn 
quickly from mistakes. At present too much public innovation involves frontline 
employees finding workarounds to heavily prescribed processes.385 
The Panel favours an environment where individual jurisdictions work together and share lessons 
learned in an effort to encourage high-quality user outcomes. The process for working together need 
not be prescriptive. The Panel notes comments from the New South Wales Government: 
... governments could consider developing their own frameworks for reform ... alongside 
this, there could be some merit in jurisdictions crafting a high-level agreement on reform 
principles as it could drive reform within jurisdictions and could align the efforts of 
jurisdictions to build deeper and more competitive national markets. (DR sub, page 16) 
Results and feedback from trials or pilot schemes can be disseminated via an intergovernmental 
process. Through encouraging communication and knowledge sharing among jurisdictions, 
continuous learning can be factored into human services delivery models. 
The Panel’s view 
Implementing changes to human services needs to be well considered and will require refinement 
over time to promote high-quality user outcomes. 
Governments can progressively introduce change through trials or pilot schemes. 
Although any change may result in implementation issues, the Panel considers that potential 
issues with implementation ought not to mean that competition reforms in human services should 
be abandoned. 
Feedback and lessons learned from trials can be disseminated via an intergovernmental process 
that encourages jurisdictions continuously to improve service delivery. 
In encouraging innovation in service delivery, governments should: 
• encourage experimental service delivery trials whose results are disseminated via an 
intergovernmental process; and 
• encourage jurisdictions to share knowledge and experience in the interest of continuous 
improvement.  
Implementation 
Within six months of accepting the recommendation, the Australian Government and state and 
territory governments should each develop an implementation plan reflecting the unique 
characteristics of providing human services in its jurisdiction. This plan should be founded on the 
guiding human services principles as well as the more detailed points set out in ‘The Panel’s view’ 
boxes throughout this chapter. Although jurisdictions can undertake this work independently, 
collaboration among jurisdictions may confer significant benefits. 
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Jurisdictions should then each nominate trial or pilot projects based on the human services principles 
within 12 months of accepting the recommendation. Each government should work with the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP, see Recommendation 43) to discuss areas of overlap 
or areas where collaboration may lead to better user outcomes. Once the trials and pilots are 
completed, the ACCP should report on the outcomes.  
A significant factor in the current environment is the reconsideration of the roles and responsibilities 
of the Australian and state and territory governments through the White Paper on the Reform of the 
Federation and the White Paper on Reform of Australia’s Tax System (the White Papers). 
The level of government with lead responsibility for policy in each market for human services will 
need to align with outcomes of the White Papers. 
Recommendation 2 — Human services 
Each Australian government should adopt choice and competition principles in the domain of 
human services. 
Guiding principles should include: 
• User choice should be placed at the heart of service delivery. 
• Governments should retain a stewardship function, separating the interests of policy (including 
funding), regulation and service delivery.  
• Governments commissioning human services should do so carefully, with a clear focus on 
outcomes. 
• A diversity of providers should be encouraged, while taking care not to crowd out community 
and volunteer services.  
• Innovation in service provision should be stimulated, while ensuring minimum standards of 
quality and access in human services. 
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13 COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY  
13.1 WHAT IS COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY?  
The concept of competitive neutrality is broad. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) recently defined competitive neutrality as occurring: 
… where no entity operating in an economic market is subject to undue competitive 
advantages or disadvantages.386 
Competitive neutrality can be affected by ownership, institutional form or the specific objectives of 
entities.  
The rationale for pursuing competitive neutrality is to improve the allocation of the economy’s 
resources and to improve competitive processes. Governments compete with the private sector in a 
variety of markets. If governments enjoy undue advantage relative to other players, this can result in 
them having lower costs than private sector competitors.  
Government ownership can result in undue advantage if one or more of the following apply to their 
business activities:  
• tax exemptions or concessions (for example, relating to income tax, payroll tax, land tax or 
stamp duty); 
• cheaper debt financing reflecting the lower credit risk of governments;  
• the absence of a requirement to earn a commercial return on assets; and 
• exemptions from regulatory constraints or costs.  
As part of the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA), all Australian governments undertook to 
apply competition principles to government business activities. The objective of competitive 
neutrality, as expressed in the CPA is:  
… the elimination of resource allocation distortions arising out of the public ownership of 
entities engaged in significant business activities: Government businesses should not 
enjoy any net competitive advantage simply as a result of their public sector ownership.387 
Competitive neutrality covers the behaviour of government businesses, not policy or other 
government decisions that affect markets or competition. 
Each jurisdiction has developed its own competitive neutrality policy, guidelines and 
complaint-handling mechanism (some are handled by independent units; others by regulators or 
departments).388  
Although there is some variation, the policies require government business activities to charge prices 
that fully reflect costs and to compete on the same footing as private sector businesses in terms of 
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taxation, debt, regulation and earning a commercial rate of return. The principle of competitive 
neutrality does not extend to competitive advantages arising from factors such as business size, skills, 
location or customer loyalty. As the Victorian Government Competitive Neutrality Policy states: 
Competitive neutrality policy measures are designed to achieve a fair market environment 
without interfering with the innate differences in size, assets, skills and organisational 
culture which are inherent in the economy. Differences in workforce skills, equipment and 
managerial competence, which contribute to differing efficiency across organisations, are 
not the concern of competitive neutrality policy.389 
Competitive neutrality arrangements apply to significant government businesses, where the benefits 
from doing so outweigh the costs, and not to non-profit, non-business activities (see Box 13.1). The 
threshold test used for identifying ‘significant’ business activities varies across the jurisdictions.  
Box 13.1: Significant government business activity  
The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office asks two questions to 
determine whether government entities are operating a significant business activity.390  
Question 1: Is the entity conducting a business?  
a) Does it charge for goods or services (not necessarily to the final consumer)? 
b) Is there an actual or potential competitor (either in the private or public sector), noting that 
purchasers are not to be restricted by law or policy from choosing alternative sources of 
supply?  
c) Do managers of the activity have a degree of independence in relation to the production or 
supply of the good or service and the price at which it is provided?  
If the answer is yes to all these questions, then the entity is conducting a business.  
Question 2: Is the business significant?  
The following business activities are automatically considered significant for the purposes of 
competitive neutrality policy: 
• all government business enterprises and their subsidiaries; 
• all Australian Government companies; 
• all business units; 
• baseline costing for activities undertaken for market-testing purposes; 
• public sector bids over $10 million; and 
• other government business activities undertaken by prescribed agencies or departments 
with a commercial turnover of at least $10 million per annum. 
Competitive neutrality arrangements apply to significant business activities but only to the extent 
that the benefits of the arrangements to the community outweigh the costs. 
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Applying competitive neutrality involves separating commercial from non-commercial activities of 
governments. As the OECD says:  
An important aspect in addressing competitive neutrality is the degree of corporatisation 
of government business activities and the extent to which commercial and 
non-commercial activities are structurally separated. Separation makes it easier for the 
commercial activities to operate in a market-consistent way, but may not always be either 
feasible or economically efficient.391 
The CPA states that significant government business enterprises (classified as Public Trading 
Enterprises and Public Financial Enterprises under the Government Financial Statistics Classification) 
should adopt (where appropriate) a corporatisation model and impose similar commercial and 
regulatory obligations as those faced by private sector businesses. 
For other significant business activities undertaken by agencies as part of a broader range of 
functions, the CPA suggests that the same principles should be applied or agencies should ensure 
that prices charged for goods and services reflect the full costs of service delivery (see Box 13.2).  
Box 13.2: Corporatisation, commercialisation and full cost-reflective pricing  
A range of measures have been adopted to achieve competitive neutrality, including 
corporatisation, commercialisation and cost-reflective pricing.392 
Corporatisation —creating a separate legal business entity to provide the relevant goods and 
services. Such an entity is characterised by: 
• clear and non-conflicting objectives; 
• managerial responsibility, authority and autonomy; 
• independent and objective performance monitoring; and 
• performance-based rewards and sanctions.  
Commercialisation — organising an activity along commercial lines without creating a separate 
legal business entity. This is typically achieved by introducing and applying a set of commercial 
practices to the business functions of the government agency. Relevant commercial practices can 
include separate accounting for, and funding, non-commercial activities and separating regulatory 
functions from commercial activities.  
Full cost-reflective pricing — taking into account all the costs that can be attributed to the 
provision of the good or service, including cost advantages and disadvantages of government 
ownership.  
Competitive neutrality policy does not require governments to remove community service 
obligations (CSOs) from their businesses but does require that CSOs be transparent, appropriately 
costed and directly funded by governments. The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality 
Guidelines for Managers states:  
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A best practice approach would be for CSOs to be funded from the purchasing portfolio’s 
budget, with costs negotiated as if it were part of a commercially negotiated agreement. 
CSOs should include similar CN [competitive neutrality] requirements as other activities. 
For example, CSO activities should incorporate CN adjustments (for example tax 
adjustments) and earn a RoR [rate of return] (just as if they had been contracted out).393  
One of the benefits of competitive neutrality is improved transparency and accountability of 
government business activities, including greater transparency of CSOs. This in turn provides a 
safeguard against distorting cross-subsidisation.  
The need to comply with competitive neutrality policy can also improve government business 
performance. As Trembath has said: 
CN’s [competitive neutrality] requirement for government entities to face comparable 
costs and regulations to the private sector (that is, to face market incentives) means that 
the owner governments make better informed decisions about the future of those 
entities. Full attribution of costs often leads governments to assess afresh whether they 
wish to provide a good or service directly through a subsidiary entity, to introduce tenders 
to allow competitive bidding for the provision of the good or service, or to vacate the area 
of production.394 
The Australian Local Government Association provides examples of how competitive neutrality 
policy has changed the way councils operate:  
Application of competitive neutrality has required a substantial overhaul of how councils 
operate, including full-cost reflective pricing for competitive services. 
Full-cost pricing has ensured that local government does not provide subsidised services 
in competition with private providers. For example, Victorian local councils received 
complaints from private providers who accused local councils of cross-subsiding 
recreation services such as gyms and swimming pools. The Municipal Association of 
Victoria, by developing a model framework to determine the full-cost reflective pricing of 
these services, enabled councils to provide services in a competitive environment and 
fulfil its CPA obligations. (DR sub, page 3) 
The Local Government Association of Tasmania, commenting on the changes councils made to 
comply with competitive neutrality policy in that State, notes that the changes ‘have not been 
received well by all members of the community, particularly where consumers have to pay for a 
service that was previously free of charge’ (DR sub, page 7). 
13.2 CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY POLICY 
Stakeholders overwhelmingly support the principle of competitive neutrality, with calls for Australian 
governments to re-commit to competitive neutrality policy.395  
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The OECD recently commented: 
The most complete competitive neutrality framework implemented today is the one 
found in Australia. … this framework is backed by separate implementation and 
complaints handling mechanisms.396 
Capobianco and Christiansen also state: 
Australia’s competitive neutrality policy has apparently worked well for the following 
reasons: (1) it deepened the reform of public enterprises in Australia; (2) it has been 
implemented by large governmental businesses, which led to significant efficiency gains; 
and (3) it substantially eliminated the advantages of government ownership.397 
But submissions raise concerns about the implementation of competitive neutrality policy in a wide 
range of activities that compete with government. These include businesses in insurance, transport, 
energy, telecommunications, health, commercial land development, construction, accommodation, 
waste collection, printing, legal services, agriculture, tourism, childcare and education. 
For example:  
• The Australian Information Industry Association notes, ‘there are some instances, notably in 
the telecommunications sector, where competitive neutrality seems to not function 
effectively’ (sub, page 12). 
• The Australian Private Hospitals Association says, ‘distinctions between regulatory 
arrangements applicable to public and private sectors not only work against competitive 
neutrality but also limit private sector patient access to affordable and appropriate treatment 
options’ (sub, page 8).  
• Paramedical Services Pty Ltd claims a lack of competitive neutrality in the non-emergency 
patient transport sector, with government ambulance services enjoying an unfair advantage 
due to subsidisation (sub, pages 11-12). 
• The Australian Education Union says, ‘competitive neutrality policy has been disastrous where 
it has been introduced (primarily in VET [vocational education and training])’ (sub, page 2). 
A number of submissions express concerns about businesses competing with local government. For 
example, the Small Business Development Corporation says it:  
… is aware of a number of service-based activities operated by government entities 
(particularly at the local government level) that directly compete with the private sector. 
This type of competition is unfair as such entities have the significant competitive 
advantage of being backed by government. By way of examples, local governments often 
operate child care centres, aged care facilities, and gyms in sport and recreation centres in 
competition with private operators. (DR sub, page 10) 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland also raises the issue of councils charging for 
waste collection through rate payments, impeding private competitors that are able to offer lower 
prices, increased services and more choice for consumers. It raises concerns about local councils 
providing free access to showgrounds or parklands for motorhomes, which makes it difficult for local 
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caravan park owners (who are subject to fees, licences, taxes and insurances) to compete (sub, 
page 5). 
The Panel cannot adjudicate every competitive neutrality issue raised in submissions. However, it is 
possible that some of the complaints fall outside the parameters of current policy. For example, the 
government activity may not meet current definitions of ‘significant business activity’.  
However, as the Queensland Competition Authority states: 
The revenue thresholds may not be met on a council by council basis, but the impact 
could be significant if the same problems are recurring for the same types of businesses 
across the state. This is particularly problematic for small businesses that compete, or 
would like to compete, to provide services. (sub, page 14) 
Queensland Law Society also argues: 
Local government protection of businesses that are not significant business activities is 
defeating competition. (DR sub, page 1) 
Submissions raise concerns about a number of instances where governments exercise regulatory or 
planning approval functions while also operating businesses that compete with private sector 
enterprises. For example, Cement Concrete and Aggregates Australia raises concerns about local 
governments being both applicant and assessor within the planning and development application 
process (sub, page 2). The Construction Material Processors Association raises a similar concern 
about councils considering planning permits for an extractive operation that would be in direct 
competition with the Council’s quarry (sub, page 11).398  
IPART raises related concerns about State-owned Corporations having a mix of commercial and 
non-commercial principal objectives.  
... it is important that SOCs [State-owned Corporations] are not placed at a disadvantage 
because they are required to pursue unfunded non-commercial objectives. We have 
identified some aspects of the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) (SOC Act) that 
inhibit competitive neutrality. (sub, page 23) 
The structure and identity of government businesses can also affect competitive neutrality. As the 
OECD recently said: 
It is easier to pursue neutrality when competitive activities are carried out in an entity 
with an independent identity, operated at arm’s length from general government. To 
achieve this governments can incorporate government businesses according to best 
practices (i.e. the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises) 
or to structurally separate commercial from non-commercial activities. This could also be 
useful in countering ad-hoc political interventions that might impede competitive 
neutrality.399 
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Calls to improve transparency  
Some submissions suggest that there is a lack of community awareness about competitive neutrality 
and limited public disclosure of governments’ compliance with competitive neutrality. The Law 
Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee notes: 
… the current system has limited visibility in the legal and business community, and lacks 
the machinery to enforce a complaint and incentives for ongoing compliance.  
A more effective system for dealing with specific complaints would need to involve formal 
obligations and enforceable adjudication by an independent body such as the Australian 
Competition Tribunal. Because most complaints would be likely to involve competing 
public policy objectives, any claim based on non-adherence to a competitive neutrality 
principle would need to be subject to an overall assessment as to whether the conduct 
had a net public benefit. (sub, pages 5-6) 
Typical of these concerns are those expressed by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(ACCI): 
… few businesses know exactly what competitive neutrality is, few complaints are filed, 
and for those upheld, government’s response is usually slow. A fundamental issue 
remains regarding the inadequacy of the enforcement process. (sub, page 23) 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also notes that, since 2005, there has 
been no significant reporting on competitive neutrality compliance across the jurisdictions. Prior to 
2005, the NCC considered competitive neutrality implementation across jurisdictions as part of its 
annual progress assessment of NCP. (sub 1, page 26)  
The Productivity Commission (PC) recommends that governments review ‘whether processes for 
handling competitive neutrality complaints are identifiable, independent and accessible’ (sub, 
page 34).  
The Australian Newsagents’ Federation Ltd argues:  
A more transparent process is important to remove any suspicion that the government 
agency investigating the competitive neutrality complaint may have a conflict of interest. 
(DR sub, page 7) 
ACCI points to the small number of complaints as evidence that the system is not performing well 
(sub, page 24).400 
In 2013, the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission undertook a comparison of 
competitive neutrality policies across Australian jurisdictions. It found that 112 competitive neutrality 
complaints were investigated across all jurisdictions between 1996 and 2012. During 2011-12 five 
complaints were investigated across all jurisdictions.401  
The declining number of complaints could reflect government business activities becoming familiar 
with their competitive neutrality responsibilities and ensuring that breaches do not occur. The Panel 
heard from some jurisdictions that competitive neutrality was now part of the culture, with 
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government businesses seeking advice on complying with competitive neutrality before making 
changes to business activities.  
A recent article by competition law authors Alexandra Merrett and Rachel Trindade also noted: 
The very low level of complaints could be because government businesses across the 
country are so compliant that there’s not even a suspicion that they could be failing to 
fulfil their obligations. On the other hand, it just might be that private businesses have no 
clue that such obligations exist or they (or their advisors) have no faith in the competitive 
neutrality process and cannot be bothered wasting time and money in pursuit of a 
complaint.402 
The PC recommends that competitive neutrality policy require self-reporting in annual reports by 
government businesses of the steps taken to comply with the policy. The PC argues that this would: 
… both aid in the assessment of compliance and also provide some transparency to 
private sector competitors that the business is operating in line with government policy. 
(sub, page 34) 
In addition, the PC recommends that the Heads of Treasuries should produce their annual 
competitive neutrality matrix within six months of the end of each financial year (sub, page 34).  
The Northern Territory Government ‘supports all governments including a statement of compliance 
with the competitive neutrality principles in their annual reports, provided the compliance burden of 
doing so is minimal’ (DR sub, page 3). However, the South Australian Government suggests that such 
reporting duplicates current arrangements and would add to the administrative burden of States (DR 
sub, page 16).  
The Panel considers that self-reporting by government businesses is important, not only for 
compliance transparency but also for instilling a culture within government businesses of complying 
with competitive neutrality policy.  
A number of submitters raise the issue of the need for stronger obligations on governments to 
respond to documented breaches of competitive neutrality policy and associated recommendations 
for remedial action.403  
The PC notes that there are no formal requirements for governments to do so, and that recent 
investigations undertaken by the Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office 
have not received official responses (sub, page 34). The ACCC suggests that a review of the timeliness 
and transparency of complaints handling could promote more effective competitive neutrality 
regimes. (sub 1, page 26) 
Calls to review competitive neutrality policy 
Various submissions call for a review of competitive neutrality policy.404 Areas identified where 
competitive neutrality policy could be improved to ensure better policy outcomes include:  
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• clearer guidelines on the application of competitive neutrality policy during the start-up stages 
of new government business enterprises that are, or will be, engaged in significant business 
activities, including the extent to which competitive neutrality provisions should be included in 
business models and initial planning; 
• defining the ‘longer term’ to which the policy applies — a critical component of the application 
of competitive neutrality policy is that government businesses earn a commercial rate of 
return to justify the retention of assets over the longer term but, as the PC states, ‘this term is 
not defined, nor is there guidance on its application to a start-up business’ (sub, page 34); and 
• principles for identifying and specifying non-commercial objectives of government businesses 
and those activities that should be funded transparently.  
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland suggests that the small business community 
would be better served if the policy covered all government businesses that engage in commercial 
operations (sub, page 5).  
The New South Wales Government considers that all jurisdictions should review their competitive 
neutrality policies as they apply to local governments, with a view to strengthening their application 
to relevant business activities (DR sub, page 15).  
National Seniors Australia also argues for extending competitive neutrality policies: 
… to any area where government agencies may compete with private or not-for-profit 
bodies for the supply of services. (sub, page 6) 
As discussed earlier, assessing government activities to which the current competitive neutrality 
policy applies is based on determining whether an activity is a ‘significant business activity’ (taking 
into account factors such as annual expenditure and market share) and whether the benefits of 
implementing the policy outweigh the costs (see Box 13.1). An important question is whether the 
scope of competitive neutrality policy should be extended to cover a wider set of government 
activities.  
What competitive neutrality policies capture varies across the OECD. As the OECD recently said: 
Some national authorities apply competitive neutrality policies only to the activities of 
‘traditional’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Others apply competitive neutrality practices 
to all types of government activities that can be characterised as ‘commercial’ in nature 
(for example where they provide goods and services in a given market), regardless of their 
legal form or profit objectives. There is no universal definition for what constitutes 
government ‘business’ activities; neither is there a clear definition for the demarcation 
between what constitutes commercial and non-commercial activities.405 
That said, commercial activities are typically characterised as a combination of: where there is a 
charge for the good or service; there are no restrictions on profitability; and there is actual or 
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potential competition.406 These characteristics are in line with the current business test the 
Australian Government applies under its competitive neutrality policy (see Box 13.1). 
A further issue is the appropriateness of the threshold tests for identifying ‘significant business 
activity’. The Western Australia Local Government Association says: 
Local Governments engaged in significant review activity in 1997-98 under the direction of 
the WA Department of Local Government. Reviews were required by Local Governments 
with an operating expenditure greater than $2 million and activities with a user-pays 
income of over $200,000. These thresholds are outdated and would need to be increased 
if competitive neutrality policy was once again actively applied to Local Governments in 
WA. (DR sub, page 6) 
The New South Wales Government argues: 
A clear and common understanding between jurisdictions on how ‘significance’ should be 
evaluated will be important to strengthening the application of competitive neutrality 
principles. (DR sub, page 14)  
The Queensland Law Society also points to the need to define ‘significant business activity’ to clarify 
what is and what is not covered (DR sub, page 2). 
Some jurisdictions have not revised their competitive neutrality policy statements in more than a 
decade. The Australian Government has not revised its competitive neutrality policy since 1996. The 
ongoing applicability of competitive neutrality requires that governments maintain up-to-date 
policies. 407 Updating the policies can also reinvigorate governments’ commitment to competitive 
neutrality policy.  
In addition, since each jurisdiction is able to adopt its own approach to competitive neutrality, 
cross-jurisdiction comparisons can help to determine ‘best practice’ as a basis for updating policies 
and improving current arrangements. 
Trembath408 suggests that a best-practice model for determining the scope of competitive neutrality 
should involve all government activities that charge users and trade in goods or services being 
identified as ‘businesses’. Identification of significant government business activities should refer to 
the conditions: 
• that all government business enterprises be treated as significant businesses; 
• that significance of other business activities depends on their impact on the relevant 
market(s); and 
• that activities’ status of significance or non-significance be regularly reviewed.  
Also, allegations of non-compliance should be heard by a body separate from the government 
businesses, which could be the subject of complaint.  
                                                          
406 OECD 2012, Competitive Neutrality: A Compendium of OECD Recommendations, Guidelines and Best Practice, page 26. 
407 The Competitive Neutrality guidelines in SA were updated in 2010 and the thresholds for significant business activities 
have not been indexed so less significant entities are now captured that would have been excluded in 1995 (South 
Australian Government, DR sub, page 15).  
408 Trembath, A 2002, Competitive Neutrality: Scope for Enhancement, National Competition Council Staff Discussion 
Paper, AusInfo, Canberra, pages 1-3. 
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Scope of competitive neutrality principles  
Current competitive neutrality policies already apply to significant business activities, but the Panel 
seeks to extend consumer choice and diversity into human services.  
The ACCC notes the scope for greater competition in human services and suggests that mechanisms 
by which this could be achieved include: facilitating competitive neutrality between private and 
public providers; and promoting competition between ‘public’ providers (sub 1, page 8).  
Commenting on extending competition into human services, National Seniors Australia says it will be: 
… important to ensure that competitive neutrality policies extend to any area where 
government agencies may compete with non-government bodies. If incumbent providers 
enjoy competitive advantages simply by virtue of government ownership, this could 
prevent private firms and non-government organisations from winning contracts, even 
though they may be more efficient or offer services that are better tailored to consumer 
needs. (DR sub, page 11) 
Commenting on competitive neutrality in higher education the Bond University says:  
Properly implemented, competitive neutrality in the higher education sector would 
ensure that user choice and diversity could drive the quality of education that is essential 
to Australia’s future social and economic well-being. This is a reform worthy of 
prioritisation. (DR sub, page 2) 
The New South Wales Government also sees scope to increase the contestability of markets for 
public services:  
In some areas, impediments exist that make it challenging for the private sector to 
effectively compete with the public sector, despite competitive neutrality requirements. 
There may be scope to increase contestability in public service markets, including for 
individual components of the service delivery chain, if community service obligations 
(CSOs) were transparent, explicitly priced and directly funded by the government. (sub, 
page 23) 
The New South Wales Government notes that changes to increase contestability in the State’s 
vocational education and training market will require TAFE Institutes to compete on a more neutral 
basis: 
These reforms include introducing a demand-driven system through individual student 
entitlements to government subsidised training for identified skills (from 1 January 2015), 
allowing the funds to follow the student to their choice of approved training organisation 
and increasing the contestability of government subsidies for training. The reforms also 
change TAFE governance structures, increasing competitive neutrality by separating the 
purchaser and provider roles and ensuring TAFE Institutes compete on a more neutral 
basis. (sub, page 25) 
The main challenges in securing competitive neutrality in human services include: structural 
separation; determining the operational form for government business activities, particularly when 
the activities sit within a broader range of government functions; and transparent costing and 
funding of CSOs. 
Appropriate cost-allocation mechanisms for identifying joint costs, assets and liabilities are also 
important when these are shared across a broad range of government business and non-business 
activities. If costs are not correctly attributed to the business activity, a government business could 
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undercut its private competitors. Transparency around cost structures also ensures that CSOs are not 
used to cross-subsidise commercial activities.  
Getting the right competitive neutrality policy settings in place in human services will be crucial to 
securing the benefits of a diverse range of innovative providers, including expanding choice to users. 
As National Seniors Australia says:  
… we do not under-estimate the challenge of achieving competitive neutrality where 
government agencies, for-profit and not-for-profit providers are all competing to supply 
government funded services, since each sector is affected by somewhat different 
competitive advantages and disadvantages, and each has something unique but valuable 
to offer. (DR sub, page 11) 
To ensure a consistent and evidence-based approach in all jurisdictions, National Seniors Australia 
suggests that consideration be given to commissioning an independent body to undertake a public 
inquiry to develop guidelines on how best to achieve competitive neutrality in markets for human 
services while maintaining scope of services and ensuring quality. 
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The Panel’s view 
The principle of competitive neutrality is an important mechanism for strengthening competition 
in sectors where government is a major provider of services. 
Concerns about competitive neutrality policy were raised with the Panel, particularly where 
businesses, in many instances small businesses, compete with local government. Although the 
government activities may not be ‘significant’, as judged by relevant guidelines, the breadth of 
sectors where issues were raised points to this as a potential obstacle to small business competing 
in a range of markets. 
The Panel is also concerned by the number of instances where local governments act as regulator 
and provider in a contested market. The operational forms through which government businesses 
conduct their activities can have implications for competitive neutrality.  
The absence of any requirement to respond to documented breaches of competitive neutrality 
policy is clearly undermining its efficacy. 
Competitive neutrality policies need to remain relevant and up-to-date. Specific matters that 
should be considered include: guidelines on the application of competitive neutrality policy during 
the start-up stages of government businesses; the period of time over which start-up government 
businesses should earn a commercial rate of return; and threshold tests for identifying significant 
business activities.  
There is scope to increase the transparency and effectiveness of competitive neutrality complaints 
processes and compliance with competitive neutrality policy, including by: 
• assigning responsibility for investigation of complaints to a body independent of 
government; 
• requiring governments to respond publicly to the findings of complaint investigations; and 
• requiring government businesses to include a statement on compliance with competitive 
neutrality policy in their annual reports.  
Since each jurisdiction is able to adopt its own approach to competitive neutrality, 
cross-jurisdiction comparisons can help to determine ‘best practice’ as a basis for updating policies 
and improving current arrangements.  
There is scope to extend the principles of competitive neutrality to markets where governments 
and other providers are supplying services, including human services.  
The case for extending the principle of competitive neutrality is strongest when:  
• there are different arrangements for government providers operating in the same market as 
alternative providers; and  
• the differential treatment is not justified on net public benefit grounds.  
Getting competitive neutrality settings right in human services will be crucial to facilitating choice 
for users and securing the benefits of a diverse range of service providers. Feedback on lessons 
learnt and different ways of achieving competitive neutrality in markets for human services across 
the jurisdictions could be incorporated into guidelines and practices.  
Implementation 
Competitive neutrality reforms require action by each government. Reviews of competitive neutrality 
policies and complaints processes should commence within six months of jurisdictions accepting the 
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recommendation. Government businesses should include a statement on competitive neutrality 
compliance in their next annual reports.  
An independent body, such as the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy, should 
subsequently review progress in each jurisdiction in reviewing competitive neutrality policies, 
improving the transparency and effectiveness of complaints processes and reporting on compliance 
with competitive neutrality principles in annual reports. 
Recommendation 15 — Competitive neutrality policy 
All Australian governments should review their competitive neutrality policies. Specific matters to 
be considered should include: guidelines on the application of competitive neutrality policy during 
the start-up stages of government businesses; the period of time over which start-up government 
businesses should earn a commercial rate of return; and threshold tests for identifying significant 
business activities. 
The review of competitive neutrality policies should be overseen by an independent body, such as 
the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43). 
 
Recommendation 16 — Competitive neutrality complaints 
All Australian governments should increase the transparency and effectiveness of their 
competitive neutrality complaints processes. This should include at a minimum: 
• assigning responsibility for investigation of complaints to a body independent of government;  
• a requirement for government to respond publicly to the findings of complaint investigations; 
and 
• annual reporting by the independent complaints bodies to the proposed Australian Council for 
Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) on the number of complaints received and 
investigations undertaken. 
 
Recommendation 17 — Competitive neutrality reporting 
To strengthen accountability and transparency, all Australian governments should require 
government businesses to include a statement on compliance with competitive neutrality 
principles in their annual reports.  
The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should report 
on the experiences and lessons learned from the different jurisdictions when applying competitive 
neutrality policy to human services markets. 
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14 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND OTHER COMMERCIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The commercial arrangements of government businesses are subject to competitive neutrality policy, 
as discussed in Chapter 13. But governments engage in a range of other commercial arrangements 
with the private sector and non-government organisations (NGOs). These include: 
• purchasing goods and services from external sources for their direct use (covering a range of 
purchase contracts, such as cleaning and maintenance of government buildings and special 
one-off financial advice relating to the sale of a government asset); 
• public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are long-term arrangements involving private sector 
delivery of large infrastructure and related services projects on behalf of governments 
(covering, for example, toll roads, hospitals and water supply facilities); 
• commissioning for the direct provision of human services, such as out-of-home care, as part of 
the commissioning cycle (see Section 12.4); and 
• fully exiting some activities through asset privatisations.  
14.1 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Government procurement often involves significant spending and large-value projects. Procurement 
decisions can affect the range of goods and services offered to consumers and to government. 
Procurement can therefore shape the structure and functioning of competition in markets.  
Public procurement is about securing the best value for taxpayers’ money.409 This can only occur 
when businesses genuinely compete on price and quality, and there is scope for businesses to 
innovate. Both the design of the competitive bidding process and how the process is carried out can 
influence outcomes. For example, the number of potential bidders could be smaller than desirable 
where a tender is highly specific or where the time scheduled for responses is short.  
As the Productivity Commission (PC) states: 
Government funding arrangements and procurement processes for service delivery can 
[also] distort competition if they preclude more efficient providers from entering the 
market, or can reduce the frequency of entry (and exit) through the lack of regular market 
testing. In some instances, government failure to create efficient market structures for 
the delivery of publicly funded services can also distort competition. (sub, page 8) 
Procurement processes therefore need to be designed in such a way that they do not unintentionally 
limit the number of potential bidders or the quality of services they offer.  
Tyro Payments Limited argues, ‘the Government itself has the key to promote innovation and 
competition through its procurement’ (DR sub, page 7).  
                                                          
409 Achieving value for money is the core rule of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules. Department of Finance 2014, 
Commonwealth Procurement Rules, Canberra, page 13.  
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The PC report on Public Infrastructure also states:  
… procurement practices that engender competition can improve efficiency by pushing 
firms to find cost savings or quality improvements but, in addition, may cause firms to 
trim the return they would expect to get, and this can improve value for money even 
further.410 
A number of submissions raise issues about procurement, including complexity, risk, accessibility 
(particularly for small businesses trying to win government contracts) and competition. For example, 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland says: 
Queensland businesses have raised significant and ongoing issues with the pre-existing 
procurement framework in Queensland, namely that they are not able to easily assess, 
access or participate in procurement opportunities.  
The following aspects of the procurement process need improvement: support and 
assistance provided by the agency or project tender manager, fairness and equity of the 
tender selection process, delivery of project and procurement and reporting 
requirements; and the application process and documentation required. (sub, page 10) 
As discussed in Chapter 12 on human services, government procurement processes have often been 
risk-averse and prescriptive. A submission from Kevin Beck states that tender documents are 
‘prescriptively written to place the entire onus on the respondent with risk and accountability 
deflected away from the agency’ (sub, page 3). Catherine Collins notes ‘tender documents for 
government contracts are unnecessarily large and complex’ (sub, page 1), which can make it 
particularly difficult for smaller businesses to compete.  
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland also observes: 
… the tender process itself is highly onerous and often small businesses do not have the 
time and resources that large businesses do to effectively compete for local tenders. 
(sub, page 9) 
In cases where governments require specific goods or services, governments can play a role in 
helping a range of businesses understand and bid for tenders. For example, the Western Australian 
Government hosts seminars for businesses wanting information on the government quote and 
tender process.411 Governments can also take steps to ensure that contracts are written in a way that 
is easy for businesses to understand and which allows for a range of innovate solutions to be 
considered.  
The Panel favours a focus on outcomes rather than outputs in government procurement. A focus on 
outcomes allows bidders to suggest different approaches that achieve the government’s desired 
result rather than having to demonstrate specific activities, tasks or assets. It allows potential bidders 
to offer new and innovative ways to meet government demands and helps to encourage a diverse 
range of potential providers. 
An example of outcomes-based procurement can be as simple as a tender for building 
maintenance specifying that floors must be clean and have a uniformly glossy finish (outcome 
                                                          
410 Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Report No. 71, Canberra, page 70. 
411 See Small Business Development Corporation 2015, Tender Process, Government of Western Australia, Perth, viewed 
9 February 2015 www.smallbusiness.wa.gov.au/tender-process/.  
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focus) rather than specifying that a contractor must strip and re-wax the floors weekly (output 
focus).412 
In moving to PPP models that include service delivery, contract design takes on a new importance, 
with a need to ensure procurement is outcomes based. An outcomes focus allows providers to 
develop innovative ways of achieving the government’s desired result. Outcomes-based PPP 
examples in the hospital sector are reported in Section 12.1.  
Moving to outcomes-based procurement is not without challenges. Governments need to find ways 
to define desired outcomes and measure performance. The Panel notes the steps governments are 
already taking, including the New South Wales Government’s Procurement Roadmap for 2013 and 
2014, which includes a commitment to move away from ‘one-size-fits-all’ tenders and use more 
flexible and less complex procurement strategies.413 
The balance in ensuring that procurement processes meet community needs, while allowing new 
innovative firms to compete, is captured in the New South Wales Government comment:  
Where reform involves contracting with non-government service providers, contracts 
should be structured to ensure competitive tension is maintained. For example, contract 
durations should be short enough to maintain competitive pressures on incumbent 
service providers, but of sufficient length to ensure service providers obtain a satisfactory 
return. (sub, page 27)  
In considering ways to encourage innovation, choice and responsiveness in service provision, 
governments are using trials or pilots of different types of tenders. Feedback and lessons learned 
from pilot tenders can then be incorporated into future guidelines and practices.  
Submitters also highlight the importance of adequate competition in procurement decisions. This 
relates both to governments looking to offer more, rather than fewer, procurement opportunities in 
the same market and to competition among suppliers once government procurement processes are 
put in place. For example, Australian Industry Group says:  
It is vital that Government procurement policy is directed at enhancing private sector 
access to the Government business market to ensure that there is an adequate level of 
competition among suppliers when a procurement strategy is executed. (sub, page 49) 
Australian Industry Group also says that government agencies should implement an approach that 
shows their commitment to five procurement principles:  
• value for money (looking beyond ‘least cost’ to also consider quality, after sales servicing and 
maintenance and ongoing supplier relationships);  
• clarity, transparency and improvement of processes;  
• full and fair access;  
• full opportunities for local suppliers; and  
• supporting industry through effective planning and communication (sub, pages 49-50). 
                                                          
412 Example taken from North, J and Keane B, 2014, Australia: Outcome-based contracting is on the up: Who’s doing it, 
why, and what you need to know about it, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, 13 May.  
413 NSW Government 2012, Procurement Roadmap, Sydney. 
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The National Commission of Audit also considered that the Australian Government’s procurement 
policies could be improved in terms of value for money:  
While value for money is the core principle underpinning government procurement 
policy, significant opportunities exist to improve efficiency and effectiveness and to take a 
more strategic approach. …The interpretation of value for money should reflect a more 
rigorous and sophisticated approach that looks beyond simple cost per day or cost per 
unit. A better approach would take into account outcomes, benefit and importantly risk 
relative to price. 
Associated with this reform is a need to build the skills and capabilities of the public sector 
to enhance competencies around good contracting.414  
Tyro Payments Limited recommends a review of Australian public procurement policies and 
procedures with a view to promoting competition and innovation through open panel tendering of 
available government services (DR sub, page 7). 
The New South Wales Government points to recent reforms to the State’s procurement policies that 
include an objective of promoting competition: 
… reforms are designed to encourage better value for money and improve outcomes 
through changes to procurement practices, and reducing the cost and complexity of doing 
business with the NSW Government. NSW agencies are required to encourage new 
entrants to apply for government business and expand the number of prospective 
suppliers where possible. The NSW Procurement Board is also required to take into 
account competition impacts in forming procurement category management plans. 
Reforms to the NSW procurement model supports testing the benefits of strategic 
commissioning approaches, such as outcomes-based contracting, which are designed to 
increase competition and contestability in government service delivery. (DR sub, pages 
10-11) 
The New South Wales Government provides examples of different delivery models, including 
introducing contestability in road maintenance and non-emergency patient transport services, a 
franchise model for Sydney Ferries and a Northern Beaches hospital public-private partnership. It 
notes: 
As these examples demonstrate, there is considerable scope for governments to promote 
increased competition in the delivery and procurement of government services. 
(sub, page 7) 
Similarly, the South Australian Government states that it has a State Procurement Board415 that acts 
to encourage competition in state procurement for regular requirements of state government, 
including the health and education systems. Procurement for infrastructure projects in South 
Australia is undertaken by the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure, which oversees 
a competitive tender process for building and construction and maintenance services (DR sub, 
page 18).  
                                                          
414 Australian Government 2014, Towards Responsible Government - The Report of the National Commission of Audit 
Phase One, Canberra, page 228.  
415 Government of South Australia, State Procurement Board, Procurement Policy Framework, Adelaide. 
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In the context of public infrastructure, the PC commented, ‘State and Territory governments have 
shown a strong interest in further improving their procurement practices and in promoting a more 
competitive environment’, but also noted scope to improve public sector procurement practices.416 
The PC identified ‘smart procurement strategies’ that governments can adopt to enable competition, 
such as:  
• packaging major projects into smaller parts to increase the number of potential bidders, where 
the benefits outweigh the costs; 
• taking into account that project scheduling can make a large difference to the number of 
potential bidders for a big project and therefore the prospects for genuine competition; and 
• penalising market participants that engage in ‘sweetheart’ deals with unions, which raises 
costs and may limit competition.417  
The competition principles set out in Recommendation 1 are aimed at encouraging governments to 
promote competition, choice and a diversity of providers in markets. These principles should guide 
procurement policies and decisions.  
The Australian Government’s Procurement Rules currently state that procurement should ‘encourage 
competition and be non-discriminatory’.418 The New South Wales Government ProcurePoint 
Statement on the Promotion of Competition also states that, competition, in the context of 
government procurement: 
Encourages new entrants to apply for government work and expands the number of 
prospective suppliers where possible; 
Improves whole of government procurement outcomes while encouraging competitive 
markets for good or service; 
Ensures government can be flexible, agile and adaptive as service delivery priorities 
change; and 
Promotes innovative market solutions to government service delivery objectives. 
As such, all agencies must act in a manner which promotes these principles. Promotion of 
competition includes price, product quality and service.419 
The Panel also sees an opportunity to compare procurement policies across jurisdictions to 
determine ‘best practice’ as a basis for further updating procurement policies and improving 
procurement practices.  
Privatisation 
From the perspective of competition policy, privatisation can be thought of as a form of 
procurement: the transfer of assets from the public to the private sector rather than a transfer of 
activities — in effect, procurement that is not repeated.  
                                                          
416 Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry Report, Volume 2, Report No. 71, Canberra, page 435 and 
page 2. 
417 Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Inquiry Report, Volume 1, Report No. 71, Canberra, page 30.  
418 Department of Finance 2014, Commonwealth Procurement Rules: Achieving value for money, Canberra, page 13. 
419 NSW Government, Direction 2013-02: Statement on the Promotion of Competition, Sydney.  
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The PC states:  
Where the objective of reform is to achieve the most efficient management of assets, 
privatisation of utilities will often be the preferred policy option.  
Also, that: 
• for electricity network businesses, state-owned businesses, on average, have lower 
productivity than their private peers;420 
• in some sectors, such as airports, privatisation has been consistent with the objective of 
achieving more efficient investment;421 
• privatised entities will generally have a greater incentive for good project selection and 
efficient delivery of infrastructure than government-owned businesses as they are subject to 
capital market disciplines.422 (sub, page 33) 
However, submissions raise particular concerns about governments privatising assets without first 
putting in place appropriate regulatory settings, including for competition.423 The Business Council of 
Australia (BCA), for example, says:  
Some government businesses that have been identified for sale will have monopoly 
power, or perform regulatory functions that create an actual or perceive conflict. It is 
important that prior to the sale of any such business that the structural issues are 
addressed, and measures put in place to enhance competition where appropriate. 
…Section 4 of COAG’s Competition Principles Agreement (1995) addressed structural 
reform of public monopolies, including the need to review the scope for 
pro-competitive reforms prior to the sale of public monopolies. The agreement did 
not require that these reviews were public, and so it is not clear whether and how 
such analysis has been undertaken prior to recent sales/long-term lease of assets such 
as the NSW and Queensland ports. (sub, page 44) 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also expresses concern about 
governments privatising assets with a view to maximising proceeds of sale at the expense of 
competition. The ACCC provides the example of the Sydney airport — where the Australian 
Government-leased Sydney Airport with the right of first refusal to operate a second Sydney airport 
(recently announced to be located at Badgery’s Creek).  
The ACCC states, ‘the right of first refusal confers on Sydney Airport a monopoly over the supply of 
aeronautical services for international and most domestic flights in the Sydney Basin, and forecloses 
the potential for competition between Sydney Airport and an independent operator of a second 
airport’ (sub 1, page 36).  
The ACCC is also concerned about the nature of the regulatory settings that apply to monopoly 
assets when privatised by governments: 
… at times, governments are not establishing appropriate access mechanisms prior to the 
sale of such assets, instead relying on contractual arrangements with the new owner. 
(sub 1, page 36) 
                                                          
420 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report no. 62, Canberra.  
421 Productivity Commission 2012, Economic Regulation of Airport Services, Report no. 57, Canberra. 
422 Productivity Commission 2014, Public Infrastructure, Report no. 71, Canberra.  
423 See also PC, sub, page 33. 
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The ACCC states that where the sale would otherwise be likely to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition in breach of section 50 of the CCA, the ACCC may be able to deal with infrastructure 
issues via undertakings accepted from infrastructure buyers to address those competition concerns. 
However, the ACCC considers that relying on the merger process is generally an inadequate way of 
dealing with complex issues of access to significant monopoly infrastructure. 
Section 50 remedies can only address competition concerns arising from an acquisition 
and therefore cannot extend to addressing competition issues arising from the monopoly 
characteristics of the infrastructure. In other words, where privatisation represents a bare 
transfer of the monopoly asset from the government to the private sector, the sale is 
unlikely to lead to a substantial lessening of competition in a market, and therefore 
merger remedies would not be available. (sub 1, page 37) 
That said, in asset privatisation cases where the identity of a potential purchaser raises competition 
concerns because it holds an interest in competing assets (horizontal aggregation) and/or businesses 
at other levels in the supply chain (vertical integration), undertakings may be a mechanism to deal 
with merger concerns. But, as the ACCC notes, ‘even in such cases it is not clear that section 50 
remedies represent the most effective mechanism for ensuring appropriate terms and conditions of 
access to monopoly infrastructure’ (sub 1, page 37).  
There are calls for a framework and best practice guidelines for privatising assets. For example, the 
Queensland Competition Authority says: 
A framework is required to ensure that economic efficiency is the goal when privatising.  
Contestability and privatisation decisions should be made within a framework that 
requires both a preference for solutions that allow for more competition and a 
requirement to carefully consider the efficiency implications of the contracts that are 
signed with suppliers.  
Decisions with regard to privatisation and contestability need to be made transparently, 
with opportunity for informed debate. (sub, page 11) 
The BCA comments that an adequate regulatory framework is a prerequisite for government asset 
sales to generate the greatest community benefit. Also, that:  
The regulatory frameworks — the rules, and the institutions that will administer them — 
must provide sufficient certainty to attract investors prepared to pay the full value of the 
assets, while encouraging competition and innovation in upstream and downstream 
industries. (sub, page 41) 
The PC also notes that privatisation may need to be accompanied by complementary policies to 
ensure that outcomes are efficient and certain community goals are met, including: structural 
separation of potentially contestable elements from natural monopoly network infrastructure; the 
creation of a sound regulatory environment prior to privatisation, including third-party access 
arrangements; clearly specified hardship policies and community service obligations; and a 
well-planned process of privatisation (sub, page 33). 
Undertaking regulatory reforms prior to privatisation is particularly important. As the OECD notes:  
Good practice calls for exposing as much as possible of an SOE’s [state-owned enterprises] 
activities to competition no later than at the time of privatisation. If monopoly activities 
necessarily remain the government faces a choice:  
1. Break up the company, sell the competitive parts and make specific regulatory 
arrangements for the rest; 
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2. If the company is to remain vertically integrated during and after privatisation then the 
need for independent and well-resourced regulation is further exacerbated.424 
The ACCC points to the PC’s government ownership framework for ensuring that governments make 
coherent choices about ownership. The PC states:  
The strongest (sound) rationale for government ownership is where governments find it 
difficult to write good contracts with private businesses or to regulate them effectively 
and where those contractual problems can be effectively overcome through government 
ownership.425 
Drawing on best-practice guidance developed by the OECD426 and experiences with privatisation in 
Australia and the UK, the PC recommends that governments should:  
• be guided by the overarching objective of maximising the net benefit to the community, with 
clear identification and prioritisation of any subsidiary goals; 
• undertake key regulatory reforms prior to sale; 
• avoid the unjustified transfer to the new owner of liabilities, obligations or restrictions that 
may inhibit the future efficiency of the business; 
• establish an expert unit within the relevant treasury to oversee the process, develop clear 
milestones and a timetable; 
• undertake genuine consultation with the public and key affected groups, including likely 
beneficiaries, accompanied by effective communication of the benefits of privatisation; and 
• ensure adequate accountability through independent auditing of the privatisation process.427  
The first two guiding principles align with the competition principles set out in Recommendation 1. 
They are a critical feature of best practice guidelines and practices for privatisation. Public 
transparency of adherence to principles, as noted by the BCA,428 is also important.  
All Australian governments should have best-practice privatisation guidelines and processes. As the 
Panel recommends in the case of infrastructure markets (Chapter 11), where monopoly 
infrastructure is privatised, it should be done in a way that promotes competition. Maximising sale 
proceeds at the expense of competition effectively places a long-term tax on consumers. An 
independent body, such as the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43), 
should be tasked with ensuring an adequate focus on competition in privatisation guidelines and 
processes.  
                                                          
424 OECD 2010, Privatisation in the 21
st
 Century, Summary of Recent Experiences, Paris, page 15.  
425 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report no. 62, Canberra, page 265. 
426 OECD 2010, Privatisation in the 21
st
 Century, Summary of Recent Experiences, Paris, page 15. 
427 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report no. 62, Canberra, page 293.  
428 BCA sub, page 44. 
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The Panel’s view 
Government procurement guidelines and decisions can have a big impact on the range of goods 
and services ultimately available to consumers. Procurement can also affect the structure and 
functioning of competition in markets.  
Tender documents have traditionally been written in a prescriptive fashion and with an 
overarching focus on value for money. Although risk management and value for money are both 
important considerations, too narrow a focus on these factors can constrain diversity, choice and 
innovation in government-commissioned provision of goods and services. 
Governments can take steps to encourage diversity, choice and innovation in procurement 
arrangements. Tendering with a focus on outcomes, rather than outputs, and trials of 
less-prescriptive tender documents could encourage bidders to suggest new and innovative 
methods for achieving the governments’ desired result. Education and information sessions can 
help a broad range of businesses understand the procurement process. 
Competition principles, particularly those promoting choice and a diversity of providers, should be 
incorporated into procurement, commissioning, public-private partnerships and privatisation 
policies and practices. 
Procurement and privatisation policies and practices should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the policy can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
Implementation 
Reviews of procurement, commissioning, PPPs and privatisation policies and guidelines should be 
undertaken by all Australian governments, and commence within 12 months of accepting the 
recommendation. An independent body, such as the proposed Australian Council for Competition 
Policy, should report on progress in reviewing procurement and privatisation policies. 
Recommendation 18 — Government procurement and other commercial arrangements 
All Australian governments should review their policies governing commercial arrangements with 
the private sector and non-government organisations, including procurement policies, 
commissioning, public-private partnerships and privatisation guidelines and processes.  
Procurement and privatisation policies and practices should not restrict competition unless: 
• the benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and 
• the objectives of the policy can only be achieved by restricting competition.  
An independent body, such as the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 43), should be tasked with reporting on progress in reviewing government 
commercial policies and ensuring privatisation and other commercial processes incorporate 
competition principles. 
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14.2 THE CCA AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY  
Under the National Competition Policy (NCP), governments agreed to extend the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (CCA, section 2B) so that it applied to the Crown insofar as it carried on a 
business, either directly or through an authority. The CCA states that the definition of a ‘business’ 
includes a business not carried on for profit. 
While the CCA does not define what the term ‘carrying on a business’ means, section 2C sets out 
some activities that are excluded (or do not amount to carrying on a business): 
• imposing or collecting taxes, levies or licence fees; 
• granting or varying licences; and 
• a transaction involving only the Crown and/or non-commercial authorities. 
There is also considerable case law on the question of what constitutes ‘carrying on a business’.  
Further, section 51 in Part IV sets out a process by which governments (the Australian Government 
and state and territory governments) may, by legislation, authorise conduct (other than mergers) 
that would otherwise contravene Part IV.  
There are many circumstances in which the Crown (whether as a department or an authority) 
participates in markets, sometimes with a substantial presence, but may not necessarily carry on a 
business for the purposes of the CCA. This is particularly true in the area of procurement —whether 
for the delivery of large infrastructure projects, or the regular requirements of the health or 
education systems. 
The BCA says: 
… more than 20 years after the Hilmer Report, it remains the case that a great deal of 
economic and potentially competitive activity remains beyond the reach of competition 
law in the hands of local, state and territory, and Commonwealth governments. Extending 
the competition law to these areas could be partly achieved by expanding the definition 
of ‘carrying on a business’, but would also require positive reform of legislation and 
regulations by the various levels of government.  
There are real opportunities to expose government activities to greater market disciplines 
so as to generate better outcomes for consumers, users of subsidised services, and for 
taxpayers. (sub, Main Report, page 40) 
The ACCC argues that, although the NCP reforms extended the CCA to apply to the Crown insofar as 
the Crown ‘carries on a business’, the reform ‘was intended to ensure that the public sector, where it 
acts as an ordinary economic player in a market, is subject to the same competition law provisions as 
the private sector’(DR sub, page 31). Also, since the 1990s, Australian governments have increasingly 
participated in markets in ways that do not amount to ‘carrying on a business’ for the purpose of the 
competition law.  
Market-based mechanisms are used by governments to finance, manage and provide 
government goods and services (described as ‘contractualised governance’ for the 
delivery of public services). Such mechanisms have the potential to significantly improve 
efficiency but also have the potential to harm competition — for example, by 
incorporating, in the contract, provisions that are likely to have the purpose or effect of 
restricting competition. (DR sub, page 31) 
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The NCP reforms could be taken a step further, so the Crown is subject to competition law insofar as 
it undertakes activity in trade or commerce. Extending the application of the CCA would place 
government bodies engaging in commercial activities on the same footing as private parties.  
In both New Zealand and the UK, government commercial activities are subject to competition law 
(See Box 14.1). The New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 covers the Crown ‘insofar as it engages in 
trade’. In the UK, the Competition Act 1998 applies to government activities where the body is an 
‘undertaking’ for the purposes of the law and where its activities are commercial in nature. 
The ACCC argues that ensuring that a government body, when it enters into a commercial 
transaction, is subject to the competition law:  
… is a logical extension of the NCP reforms. It: 
 places the government body in the same position as the private party entering into 
the contract (as the private party is subject to Part IV of the CCA, whereas the 
government body is currently immune unless it is carrying on a business);  
 treats government acquisitions of goods or services in the same way as private 
sector acquisitions of goods or services — provisions in Part IV explicitly 
acknowledge that anti-competitive conduct can arise in both supply and acquisition 
situations; and  
 is consistent with the principles developed for UNCTAD [United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development] on the application of the CCA to government … 
(DR sub, page 32)  
A number of other submitters also support extending the competition provisions of the CCA to the 
Crown insofar as it undertakes activities in trade or commerce.429 For example, Law Council of 
Australia — SME Committee says: 
The current tests for determining jurisdiction in relation to government activities are too 
complex. This recommendation will reduce this complexity. (DR sub, page 12) 
Box 14.1 Applying competition law to government activities in other jurisdictions 
New Zealand 
The New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 has a broader application to the Crown than the Australian 
law. If the Crown is engaged in trade, it is subject to the Commerce Act in relation to those 
activities. The Crown is regarded as including all government and quasi-government bodies. 
The New Zealand Commerce Act defines ‘trade’ as any trade, business, industry, profession, 
occupation, activity of commerce, or undertaking relating to the supply or acquisition of goods or 
services, or to the disposition or acquisition of any interest in land. The courts have interpreted the 
phrase ‘engaged in trade’ to have the meaning ‘carrying on trade’. This means the Crown must be 
doing more than just carrying out activities that affect trade to invoke the application of the New 
Zealand Commerce Act.  
 
                                                          
429 See, for example: Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, DR sub, page 18; Australia Industry Group, DR 
sub, page 19; Business Council of Australia, DR sub, page 45; Business SA, DR sub, page 3; Independent Contractors 
Australia, DR sub, page 10; Master Builders Association, DR sub, page 14; and Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 8.  
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Box 14.1 Applying competition law to government activities in other jurisdictions (continued) 
The trading functions of the Crown are subject to the New Zealand Commerce Act, but its 
administrative and regulatory functions are not. Often Crown Corporations carry out the trading 
activities of the Crown. Unlike the Crown itself, when a Crown Corporation is engaged in trade, its 
whole sphere of activity becomes subject to the Commerce Act, not just its trading activities. 
The Crown is subject to almost all the same penalties as private sector organisations, including 
third-party damages actions and other court orders. The only penalty to which the Crown is not 
subject is a pecuniary penalty payable to itself.  
Interconnected bodies corporate are not subject to the prohibition against anti-competitive 
mergers or agreements, where arrangements are solely between subsidiaries and/or the parent 
company. Amendments in New Zealand have: 
• following the electricity reforms, ensured agreements between bodies corporate owned by 
the Crown are subject to the Commerce Act as if they were arrangements between 
independent companies; and 
• subsequently reversed this for Crown-owned health trading enterprises, with the result that 
a public hospital merger is treated as a re-organisation within an interconnected body 
corporate rather than as a merger between two independent entities. 
United Kingdom 
The Competition Act 1998 (UK) applies to government activities where the body is an ‘undertaking’ 
for the purposes of the law and where its activities are commercial in nature. 
In determining whether a public body is acting as an undertaking in relation to the purchase of 
goods or services in a market, the economic or non-economic nature of that purchasing activity 
depends on the end use to which the public body puts the goods or services bought. 
A public body is likely to be engaging in economic activity if it is supplying a good or service and 
that supply is of a commercial nature. Conduct will not amount to economic activity if it is of a 
wholly social nature. 
In 2012, the UK Parliament passed the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (UK), which specifically 
applies the competition law merger controls in the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) to NHS Foundation 
Trust hospital mergers.  
However, a number of concerns are raised by state and local governments. For example, the New 
South Wales Government says: 
• the broad application of competition laws to government commercial activities risks 
compromising the policy functions of government — potentially an independent 
regulator, such as the ACCC, or the courts could be adjudicating government policy 
decisions and weighing up competition and public benefit objectives (providing an 
example from the UK, where the Competition Commission ruled against a proposed 
merger of the Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals and the Poole Hospital 
Trust);  
• governments undertake commercial activities in markets where full competition may 
not be necessary, or in some cases appropriate, to achieve the greatest public benefit — 
while increased competition and contestability can bring service improvement, imposing 
the disciplines of the CCA may constrain a government’s ability to design reforms to 
achieve the greatest public benefit and create disproportionate regulatory costs for 
government; 
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• the broad application of the CCA to government activities is likely to create significant 
ambiguity around how competition laws apply to particular activities and this will 
inevitably impose significant costs, since: 
: the legal test of ‘in trade or commerce’ is not necessarily easy to apply in a 
government context; and 
: legal complexities arise from the Australian Federation, for example, there will be 
constitutional limitations on the Commonwealth’s ability to amend the CCA to 
purport to apply to state government activities, in the absence of referral laws by 
the States; and 
• introducing uncertainty into current procurement processes may have unintended 
consequences (noting current asset recycling and infrastructure reinvestment 
commitments in New South Wales). (DR sub, pages 11-12) 
Arguments put by local government associations are that:  
• Applying competition law to commercial government activities needs to be tempered by the 
reality that a range of local government trading/commerce activities are delivered on a 
‘provider of last resort’ basis, particularly in remote/rural areas. 
• The change could create additional procurement practice compliance requirements. 
• Many local governments do not have the skill sets in-house to adhere to more stringent 
competition policy requirements in procurement.430 
The ACCC also acknowledges that governments balance competing considerations and that acting in 
ways that limit competition can sometimes be in the public interest. However, ‘including 
anti-competitive provisions in confidential private contracts is not the preferable way to achieve this 
outcome’ (DR sub, page 32).  
As the ACCC notes, authorisation under Part VII of the CCA provides a specific mechanism for 
exempting conduct that restricts competition in order to address market failure. Exemptions have 
been part of national reforms; for example, derogations under the National Energy Law. 
In addition, as the ACCC puts it, section 51 combined with cost-benefit analysis, ‘would make public 
the cost to competition from the government’s policy decision, and invite scrutiny as to whether 
restrictions on competition are in fact the best way to achieve the desired policy goal’ (DR sub, 
page 32).  
A number of submitters seek greater clarity on what would be ‘in scope’ if the CCA were to be 
amended to apply to the Crown insofar as it undertakes activity in trade or commerce.431  
In the Panel’s view, ‘activity in trade or commerce’ is not intended to cover all government activity. 
Rather, the intention is that it would cover the supply of goods or services by a government business 
(currently covered by ‘carrying on a business’) and all other commercial transactions undertaken by 
government bodies (such as procurement and leasing of government-owned infrastructure). 
Section 2C of the CCA, which sets out activities that are excluded (taxes, levies or licence fees, 
                                                          
430 See, for example: Local Government Association of Queensland, DR sub, page 4; and Western Australian Local 
Government Association, DR sub, page 8.  
431 See, for example: ACCC, DR sub, page 33; Department of Communications, DR sub, page 9; and NSW Government, DR 
sub, page 13.  
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granting or varying licences and transactions involving only the Crown and/or non-commercial 
authorities), would remain, clarified to define a ‘licence’ as meaning a licence, permission, authority 
or right granted under an enactment that allows the licensee to supply goods or services.  
The way competition law is applied in other countries also provides some guidance. In New Zealand, 
as long as the Crown’s decision is an exercise of the administrative or regulatory function of 
government, as opposed to trading, the decision is outside the jurisdiction of New Zealand’s 
Commerce Act.  
The term ‘engages in trade’ was examined by the courts in Glaxo New Zealand Limited v Attorney 
General [1991] 3 NZLR 129. The question in that case was whether the Minister of Health was 
engaging in trade in deciding, under powers conferred by law, in what circumstances sale of a certain 
drug should be subsidised by the Department of Health . On delivering the judgement of the Court of 
Appeal, Justice Casey stated: 
It is clear that the Minister was not engaged in trade as such, or in any business, industry, 
profession, or occupation. Nor … could her decision-making process be described as ‘an 
activity of commerce’.432 
In the Panel’s discussion with the New Zealand Commerce Commission about the scope of New 
Zealand’s Commerce Act, the example was cited of a national parks agency that restricts the number 
of concessions given to passengers paying for transport to offshore Nature Reserves. If the decision 
to restrict concessions is an administrative decision made by the Department on environmental 
conservation grounds, the Commerce Act does not apply. However, if concessions are restricted on 
the basis of maximising revenue, the Commerce Act does apply.  
The Panel’s view 
Through its commercial transactions entered into with market participants, the Crown (whether in 
right of the Commonwealth or the States and Territories, including local government) has the 
potential to harm competition. The Panel considers that the NCP reforms should be carried a step 
further and that the Crown should be subject to the competition laws insofar as it undertakes 
activity in trade or commerce. 
Implementation 
Amendments to the CCA so that competition provisions apply to the Crown insofar as it undertakes 
activity in trade or commerce should be undertaken at the same time as the Panel’s other proposed 
changes to the CCA. 
Recommendation 24 — Application of the law to government activities 
Sections 2A, 2B and 2BA of the CCA should be amended so that the competition law provisions 
apply to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and the States and Territories (including local 
government) insofar as they undertake activity in trade or commerce. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
                                                          
432 Cited in Chapman, M. 1997, ‘How the Act applies to local and central government‘, Compliance, Commerce 
Commission, page 2. 
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15 KEY RETAIL MARKETS 
Competition in the grocery and fuel retailing markets in Australia has been an area of considerable 
public, media and political interest and concern over many years, particularly because these products 
are frequently purchased, largely non-discretionary for most consumers and account for a significant 
proportion of consumer spending. 
Some of these markets are also relatively concentrated, raising the possibility of competition 
concerns arising if certain other factors are also present, including most importantly barriers to entry. 
However, the mere fact that some markets in Australia are relatively concentrated is neither 
surprising nor necessarily a cause for concern. In markets with high fixed costs, economies of scale 
are important. Australia has a relatively small population and ‘significant economies of scale tend to 
increase the need for the leading firms to account for a large market share and simultaneously help 
them achieve such shares’.433 
Provided there is strong competition from rivals to ensure that a large part of these gains is passed 
through to consumers, consumers will also benefit, notwithstanding the fact that the market will be 
more concentrated than some others. 
Competition policy and law have a crucial role to play in concentrated markets in ensuring that: 
mergers to achieve scale do not unduly harm competition; and large firms continue to face 
competitive constraints and are prevented from misusing their market power or engaging in 
unconscionable conduct. These issues are discussed in detail in Part 4 of this Report. 
15.1 SUPERMARKETS 
A number of small businesses, supermarkets and their representatives, consumers and other 
stakeholders raise concerns in submissions about the major supermarket chains, Woolworths and 
Coles. For example, Master Grocers Australia states: 
... the market dominance of two major retailers is seriously affecting the ability of smaller 
independent retailers to compete effectively in Australia. (sub, page 6) 
Other stakeholders, including Woolworths (sub, page 7) and Coles (sub, page 4), submit to the 
contrary that the grocery industry is highly competitive and has become more so in recent years. 
Australia’s grocery market is concentrated, but not uniquely so (see Box 15.1). Although 
concentration is relevant, it is not determinative of the level of competition in a market. A 
concentrated market with significant barriers to entry may be conducive to weak competition, but 
competition between supermarkets in Australia appears to have intensified in recent years following 
Wesfarmers’ acquisition of Coles and the expansion of ALDI and Costco. Consequently, few concerns 
have been raised about prices charged to consumers by supermarkets. 
                                                          
433 OECD 1999, Committee on Competition Law and Policy, Roundtable on Oligopolies, Paris, page 22. 
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Box 15.1: Market concentration 
Choice of measure affects outcome 
Estimates of market share and international comparisons are fraught. There is no single ‘true’ 
measure. Each may be useful depending on the question being asked. 
The ACCC’s 2008 grocery inquiry report devoted more than 20 pages to measures of market share 
in Australia and overseas, concluding, ‘the sector is concentrated. However, the level of 
concentration in the sector, and in particular the positions of Coles and Woolworths, does not 
represent a level which, of itself, requires market reform’; other factors must be assessed before 
drawing any conclusions about the degree of competition in the market.434  
The ACCC reported a number of market share figures published by overseas supermarket 
investigations (generally by competition agencies). The Panel has supplemented these figures with 
other published estimates to produce the table below: 
Estimated grocery market shares (%) by country 
Largest 
4 firms Australia* NZ* UK* Canada* Ireland* Austria* USA^ Switzerland~ 
1 30+ 56 27.6 29 20-25 N/A  25 32 
2 25 44 14.1 22 15-20 N/A  17 24 
3 
IGA, 15-17
 
(a)
 N/A  13.8 14 15 N/A  
8 
N/A  
4 ALDI, 6
 (a)
 N/A  9.9 11 10 N/A  5 N/A  
Top 4 total 75-80 100 65.4 76 60-70 N/A 55 N/A 
Top 2 total 55-60 100 41.7 51 35-45 65-70 42 56 
Sources: *ACCC 2008, Report of the ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices for standard groceries, pages 45-67, 
^www.theconversation.com ‘2013 Fact check on Grocery Market Concentration’ (note this measure is ‘share of food retail sector’), 
~www.euromonitor.com ‘Grocery Retailers in Switzerland’. 
(a) These figures are not calculated on the same basis as those shown for the largest two firms. 
By way of comparison, the Statement of Agreed Facts in Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (22 December 2014) states 
at paragraph 9 of Appendix 1 that ‘[from about 1 April 2011 to about 31 December 2011] Coles 
supplied approximately 30% of the grocery products supplied for retail sale to customers in 
Australia. Together with Woolworths, Coles supplied approximately 60% to 70% of the grocery 
products supplied for retail sale to customers in Australia.’ 
Some submitters argue that the market share figures reported above understate the true level of 
concentration in Australia’s grocery market. For example, AURL FoodWorks submits, ‘with regards to 
Australia, the figures do not represent the supermarket industry. Rather it is a representation of the 
much wider food industry, and in our opinion incorrectly includes specialty retailers such as bakeries, 
butchers and convenience stores. This clearly diminishes and misrepresents the actual market share 
held by Coles and Woolworths in the supermarket industry’. (DR sub, page 5) 
Although the Panel accepts that there are different ways of calculating market shares in grocery 
markets and that some produce higher estimates of market concentration (and higher market shares 
for Woolworths and Coles in particular), these figures were drawn from the ACCC’s 2008 grocery 
                                                          
434 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008, Report of the ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail 
prices for standard groceries, Canberra, page 49. 
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inquiry and were the ACCC’s best estimate of market share for ‘retail grocery sales’ at that time. 
Notwithstanding differences over exactly which figures should be used, they show that grocery 
markets are relatively concentrated in Australia, as they are in a number of other developed 
countries. 
Yet the important issue for competition is not whether the market is concentrated but whether some 
businesses engage in anti-competitive conduct. Other important factors include barriers to entry and 
the ability to switch to other suppliers, products or customers. 
Stakeholders raise a number of concerns about what might broadly be categorised as competition 
issues (including issues concerning the competition law) in relation to supermarkets. These include: 
• concerns that the pricing and other behaviour of major supermarket chains, including that 
‘predatory capacity’, drives out independent retailers and the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (CCA) is powerless to prevent this; 
• the prices the majors pay to suppliers are too low, disadvantaging both suppliers and other 
retailers;  
• their treatment of suppliers is unfair; and 
• their fuel discount shopper dockets unfairly disadvantage independent supermarkets and fuel 
retailers. 
For example, Business SA submits: 
Smaller, independent retailers are not worried about competing with the larger retailers, 
but are concerned about being pushed out of the market with tactics which will 
eventually result in a duopoly or monopoly market. This is not only at a supermarket level, 
but also at an individual brand level. (sub, page 6) 
Another category of concern is that increasing use of private brands is reducing shelf-space for 
branded products. Lynden Griggs and Jane Nielsen comment on the rise of supermarket private 
labels, noting: 
In the short term they may well see reduced prices, but long term, potentially, a reduction 
in choice and a reduction in innovation as small suppliers to the supermarket giants are 
removed from the market. (sub, page 1) 
The CCA has a range of provisions designed to address anti-competitive conduct, in particular 
provisions that relate to the misuse of market power and unconscionable conduct. The Panel cannot 
adjudicate whether a breach of the CCA has occurred in particular cases.  
However, the Panel reaffirms that these provisions should only prohibit conduct that harms 
competition, not individual competitors. In particular, the CCA does not, and should not, seek to 
restrain a competitor because it is big or because its scale or scope of operations enables it to 
innovate and thus provide benefits for consumers. The Panel recommends strengthening the misuse 
of market power provisions (see Recommendation 30). 
The Panel notes that, in December 2014 the Federal Court, by consent, made declarations that Coles 
engaged in unconscionable conduct in 2011 in its dealings with certain suppliers in contravention of 
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the Australian Consumer Law.435 The Court ordered Coles to pay combined pecuniary penalties of 
$10 million and costs. Coles also gave a court enforceable undertaking to the ACCC to establish a 
formal process to provide options for redress for more than 200 suppliers referred to in the 
proceedings.436 
Introducing a properly designed and effective industry code should assist in ensuring that suppliers 
are able to contract fairly and efficiently. However, any such code should not lead to agreements that 
benefit retailers and suppliers at the expense of consumers. 
The Panel notes that consultation on a draft Food and Grocery Code of Conduct took place in 
2014.437 The Panel received a number of submissions from independent supermarkets and their 
representatives emphasising the importance of ensuring that any such code is enforceable. The 
Australian Government has announced that the Code was prescribed on 26 February 2015, covering 
grocery suppliers and binding those retailers and wholesalers that agree to sign on to the Code.438  
A number of submissions comment on the Draft Recommendation for further deregulation of trading 
hours. These are discussed in detail in Section 10.5. Other submissions argue for and against the 
proposition that supermarkets should be permitted to sell alcohol. This is currently permitted in 
some jurisdictions but not others. See Liquor and Gambling in Section 10.4 for further discussion on 
this issue. 
The Panel considers that, in general, consumers and small businesses operating in the retail sector 
can benefit from introducing more competition through eliminating barriers to entry. This can 
include lifting restrictions on trading hours and on the types of goods that can be sold in 
supermarkets and service stations. 
The Panel recommendation on planning and zoning regulation is in Recommendation 9. The ACCC’s 
2008 grocery inquiry noted that planning and zoning laws act as a barrier to establishing new 
supermarkets. It noted that independent supermarkets were particularly concerned with 
impediments to new developments given the difficulties they have in obtaining access to existing 
sites.439 ALDI also indicates that these laws are a barrier to expansion (sub, page 1). 
Submissions also raise concerns about the range of retail outlets now operated as part of the 
corporate structures of Woolworths and Wesfarmers. For example, Vito Alfio Palermo notes that one 
or both of Woolworths or Wesfarmers are involved in ‘… groceries, liquor, hotels, hardware, 
electronics, apparel and homeware, office supplies …’ (sub, page 1). Such expansion may generate 
some efficiencies for these firms, and competition is generally unlikely to be harmed by the 
expansion of a firm from one sector to another; indeed, in some instances it is likely to be increased. 
However, the Panel notes that concerns may arise if market power were to be leveraged from one 
sector into another. As noted above, the Panel’s recommendations to strengthen the misuse of 
market power provisions of the CCA are set out in Recommendation 30. 
                                                          
435 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 
(22 December 2014). 
436 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, Court finds Coles engaged in unconscionable conduct and 
orders Coles pay $10 million penalties, media release 22 December, Canberra. 
437 Treasury, August 2014, Improving Commercial Relationships in the Food and Grocery Sector, Consultation Paper, 
Canberra. 
438 Billson, B (Minister for Small Business) 2015, Grocery Code to improve relationships between retailers, wholesalers 
and suppliers, media release 2 March, Canberra. 
439 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission2008, Report of the ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail 
prices for standard groceries, Canberra, page xix. 
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The move of the large supermarket chains into regional areas has also raised concerns about a loss of 
amenity and changes to the community. For example, Drakes Supermarkets submits: 
It is my view that [Coles and Woolworths] are land banking in many parts of [SA] where … 
competition already exists. They are applying for re-zoning of industrial and or 
commercial land usually outside existing shopping zones with the intent to shift the 
market away from existing zones. They have created major problems in the Riverland, 
South East and Adelaide Hills by locating outside traditional main streets. (sub, page 2) 
Structural changes such as these raise reasonable concerns for individuals about how their amenity 
will be affected. Changes that affect the level of activity occurring on the main street or in other 
traditional retail modes, or that result in some small, long-term or family-run businesses closing, can 
have real impacts on the local community. 
These issues, raised in numerous submissions, are clearly of concern to consumers and small 
business. The Panel is grateful to the small businesses and individuals who have been prepared to 
share their views. However, the Panel has also heard of small businesses opening up in new retail 
centres to take advantage of the customers attracted by the introduction of Coles or Woolworths. 
The Panel has also heard members of local communities who intend to continue to patronise the 
small, family-run businesses they have traditionally supported. In this context, the Panel notes the 
2015 Westpac Australia Day report, which found that ‘9 in 10 Australians (92 per cent) feel loyal to at 
least one small business in their community’.440 
The Panel considers that these concerns are not matters to be addressed by the competition law. 
They reflect broader economic and social changes that are often the outcome of competition. 
Undoubtedly these changes have the potential to damage individual businesses. However, consumer 
preferences and choice should be the ultimate determinants of which businesses succeed and 
prosper in a market. 
                                                          
440 Westpac 2015, Aussies support Australian by shopping local, media release 23 January. 
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The Panel’s view 
Australia’s grocery market is concentrated, but not uniquely so. Competition appears to have 
intensified in recent years, with Wesfarmers’ acquisition of Coles and the expansion of ALDI and 
Costco; consequently, few concerns have been raised about prices. 
Small supermarkets allege that the major supermarkets misuse their market power, including 
through ‘predatory capacity’ and targeting particular retailers. Suppliers raise concerns about 
misuse of market power and unconscionable conduct by the major supermarket chains.  
The Panel cannot adjudicate whether a breach of the CCA has occurred in particular cases but 
reaffirms that the competition laws should only prohibit conduct that harms competition, not 
individual competitors. The Panel recommends strengthening the misuse of market power 
provisions at Recommendation 30 of this Report.  
The Panel notes the recent Federal Court ruling that Coles engaged in unconscionable conduct in 
its dealings with certain suppliers in 2011. The Panel also notes that a code was prescribed on 
26 February 2015 covering grocery suppliers and binding those retailers and wholesalers that 
agree to sign on to the Code. 
Removing regulatory barriers to entry would strengthen competition in the supermarket sector. 
Planning and zoning restrictions are limiting the growth of ALDI and, as the ACCC has identified, 
more broadly affect the ability of independent supermarkets to compete. 
Trading hours’ restrictions and restrictions preventing supermarkets from selling liquor also 
impede competition. 
Supermarket operation has undergone a number of structural changes, including: greater vertical 
integration and use of private labels; an increase in the range and categories of goods sold within 
supermarkets; and greater participation by supermarket operators in other sectors. Like all 
structural changes, these can result in dislocation and other costs that affect the wellbeing of 
others. 
The move of larger supermarket chains into regional areas can also raise concerns about a loss of 
amenity and changes to the community. While the Panel is sensitive to these concerns, they do 
not of themselves raise competition policy or law issues. 
15.2 FUEL RETAILING 
The fuel retailing sector has been the subject of numerous reviews. Most notably, in 2007 the ACCC 
conducted an inquiry into the price of unleaded petrol.441 It found that wholesaling was dominated 
by four large players (Shell, BP, Caltex and Mobil) and identified options to improve competition but 
did not identify serious market failures warranting government intervention. 
In particular, the ACCC identified a need to ensure that access to fuel terminals did not act as an 
impediment to independent wholesalers importing fuel. The ACCC’s 2013 fuel monitoring work 
shows that independent imports have increased in recent years.442 
                                                          
441 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2007, Report of the ACCC inquiry into the price of unleaded petrol, 
Canberra, Foreword. 
442 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2013, Report of the ACCC into the prices, costs and profits of 
unleaded petrol in Australia, Canberra, page xiii. 
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Fuel retailing was found to have far more competitors, and the petrol operations of the 
supermarkets were an important presence alongside the operations of independent retailers. 
NRMA raises concerns about concentration in Australia’s fuel market (sub, page 2). It commends the 
ACCC for having opposed some acquisitions in the fuel retail sector but considers that prices are still 
higher than they should be, particularly in regional areas where competition is more limited (sub, 
pages 2-3). More specifically, Colac Otway Shire (DR sub, page 1) is concerned that fuel prices in 
Colac are higher than in nearby Geelong. 
On the information before it, the Panel does not consider that differences in pricing between regions 
are explained by any clear shortcoming in the competition law or policy. The Panel notes the 
Direction from the Minister for Small Business to the ACCC issued under the prices surveillance 
provisions of the CCA to monitor ‘prices, costs and profits relating to the supply of unleaded 
petroleum products in the petroleum industry in Australia for three years’, with effect from 
17 December 2014.443 This will provide further information to assist in assessing the weight of any 
competition concerns in the sector. 
Three academics submit that there is a case to reconsider whether to introduce a national version of 
Western Australia’s Fuelwatch scheme, under which fuel retailers must set their prices for the next 
day in advance and cannot change them for a 24-hour period (Byrne, De Roos, Beaton Wells, DR sub, 
page 7). They report their findings that, before Fuelwatch, prices rose more quickly than they fell, but 
that Fuelwatch has reduced this asymmetry and consumers are better able (and more likely) to make 
purchases on days where market-wide prices tend to be lower. 
The Panel welcomes this research but also notes the concerns raised when a national Fuelwatch 
scheme was proposed in 2008, including that ‘the scheme will reduce competition and market 
flexibility, increase compliance costs, and has more potential to increase prices.’444 Accordingly, the 
Panel considers that further evidence, both of a problem needing to be addressed and of the benefits 
and cost of Fuelwatch in WA, would be needed before any decision on introducing a national 
scheme. 
Some submitters raise concerns that discount fuel shopper dockets constitute a misuse of market 
power.445 Following an investigation, the ACCC accepted court-enforceable undertakings from 
Woolworths and Coles limiting the extent of fuel discounts to four cents per litre.446 This appears to 
have addressed the concerns of these submitters for the time being. The Panel notes reports 
suggesting that funds supermarkets previously spent on fuel discounts have been redirected to 
discount items sold in supermarkets.447 
Woolworths submits that there is no clear evidence to support the limiting of these discounts 
(DR sub, page 6). The Panel notes that, although Woolworths did not accept that its conduct had 
                                                          
443  Direction under section 95ZE, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 — Monitoring of the Prices, Costs and Profits 
Relating to the Supply of Unleaded Petroleum Products in the Petroleum Industry in Australia, 9 December 2014. 
444  ABC television Lateline 2008, ‘Four departments advised Govt against Fuelwatch scheme’, broadcast 28 May. 
445  See, for example: Australian Automobile Association, sub, pages 5-6; and Drakes Supermarkets, sub, page 2. 
446  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2013, Coles and Woolworths undertake to cease supermarket 
subsidised fuel discounts, media release 6 December, Canberra. 
447  Jander, M 2014, ‘Supermarkets shift discount war from fuel to groceries’, 28 January, ABC News citing a report by 
Commonwealth Bank analyst Andrew McLennan. 
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adversely affected competition, it offered the undertaking voluntarily to address the ACCC’s concerns 
about funding certain fuel discounts.448 
Should larger discounts reappear once the undertakings expire, the ACCC could pursue court action 
under the CCA if it formed the view that such conduct constituted a breach of the CCA. In this 
context, the Panel notes its proposed changes to the misuse of market power provisions of the CCA 
in Recommendation 30. 
The Panel is not persuaded that consumers are made worse off by the availability of fuel discounts at 
their current levels. However, shopper dockets can constitute a form of third-line forcing and 
loss-leader pricing, which has the potential to damage competition if sustained at high levels. 
The Australian Automobile Association (sub, pages 4-5) raises the issue of petrol price boards and 
proposes a national standard be developed. Presently, in most of Australia, price boards are 
permitted to show the discounted ‘shopper docket’ price, but the Australian Automobile Association 
is concerned that this may mislead consumers and unfairly advantage firms offering such discounts. 
New South Wales, South Australia and parts of Western Australia have regulations in place 
preventing this practice. NRMA supports the New South Wales regulation (DR sub, page 4), but 
Woolworths submits that such regulation is unnecessary (DR sub, page 8). 
The ACCC has not taken court action in response to such conduct to date, but the Panel notes that 
the CCA contains provisions dealing with misleading and deceptive conduct. Ministers for consumer 
affairs have indicated their intention to revisit this issue in future.449 The Panel notes that the 
differences in regulations between jurisdictions creates a ‘natural experiment’ that will provide 
evidence to assist Ministers in determining whether these regulations have had any effect on 
competition and whether they are in the public interest. 
National Seniors Australia draws attention to the relevance of price signalling provisions, which 
presently apply only to banking, to the fuel retailing market: 
National Seniors questions whether competition law is working effectively to ensure 
genuine price competition in automotive fuel retailing, where weekly price movements 
posted by the major distribution companies appear to move in tandem. The Review 
should consider whether price signalling provisions … should be extended to fuel suppliers 
and other sectors. (sub, page 8) 
The Panel’s views on the CCA’s price signalling provisions are set out in Section 20.2. The Panel also 
notes the current litigation in which the ACCC alleges that the Informed Sources service, which 
shares pricing information between fuel retailers, and participating petrol retailers have breached 
section 45 of the CCA, which prohibits contracts, arrangements and understandings that have the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
The Australasian Convenience and Petroleum Marketers Association has made public comments 
emphasising the importance of terminal access to facilitate wholesaling competition.450  
The availability of a timely and effective scheme to allow access, where appropriate, to natural 
monopoly infrastructure provides a possible avenue should independent wholesalers be frustrated in 
                                                          
448  Undertaking to the ACCC given for the purposes of section 87B by Woolworths Limited, page 1. 
449  Legislative and Governance Forum on Consumer Affairs 2014, Joint Communique, Meeting of Ministers for Consumer 
Affairs, 13 June. 
450
  
Moulis, N (ACAPMA CEO) 2014, ‘Fuel industry: Not drowning, waving‘, media release 9 April. 
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their attempts to gain access through commercial negotiations. The Panel’s views on the access 
regime under the CCA are set out in Chapter 24. The Panel has not seen evidence that would justify 
industry-specific intervention to facilitate such access for fuel terminals.  
As noted in relation to other sectors, the Panel notes the importance of planning and zoning 
regulations being required to take competition issues into account. To the extent that they allow only 
one service station serving a given area and discourage multiple service stations from opening in 
close proximity, such restrictions may reduce the likelihood of close competition that allows and 
encourages price comparison by consumers. 
The ACCC submits that the New South Wales government mandate requiring that a certain 
proportion of petrol sold in the State should contain ethanol is an example of regulation that limits 
competition and imposes costs on society (sub 1, page 40). The ACCC submits that the mandate has 
not only failed to achieve its industry assistance goals, but also diminished consumer choice and 
leading to consumers paying higher prices as they switch to premium fuels to avoid ethanol. 
Woolworths also submits that the New South Wales ethanol mandate should be repealed. In 
addition to its general concern with the mandate, Woolworths is particularly concerned that 
exempting retailers operating 20 or fewer service stations in New South Wales from the mandate is 
highly anti-competitive and inappropriate (DR sub, pages 7-8). 
The Panel considers that this mandate should be reviewed as part of the proposed new round of 
regulation review (see Recommendation 8) and repealed, unless it can be demonstrated that the 
benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and the objectives of the 
policy can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
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The Panel’s view 
Shopper dockets were a source of considerable concern, particularly for small competitors. These 
were up to 45 cents per litre but are now limited to 4 cents per litre through undertakings to the 
ACCC.  
The Panel is not persuaded that consumers are made worse off by the availability of discounts at 
their current levels. The Panel notes the undertakings accepted by the ACCC and the availability of 
the CCA’s misuse of market power provisions should future competition concerns emerge in this 
context. 
Stakeholders express concerns that prices are higher in certain regional areas, but the Panel does 
not consider that this is explained by any clear shortcoming in the law or policy. The Panel notes 
the 17 December 2014 Direction from the Minister for Small Business to the ACCC issued under 
the prices surveillance provisions of the CCA to monitor ‘prices, costs and profits relating to the 
supply of unleaded petroleum products in the petroleum industry in Australia for three years’. This 
will provide further information to assist in assessing the weight of any competition concerns in 
the sector. 
The Panel expresses no view as to the effect the Informed Sources pricing information sharing 
service has on competition. The Panel’s views on the CCA’s price signalling provisions are set out in 
Section 20.2. 
The New South Wales ethanol mandate should be reviewed, as part of a new round of regulatory 
reviews against the public interest test set out in Recommendation 8, and repealed, unless it can 
be demonstrated that the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the 
costs, and the objectives of the policy can only be achieved by restricting competition. 
In relation to the regulation of petrol price display boards, the Panel considers that the case for 
wider regulation to require only the undiscounted price to be displayed has not been made out. 
The Panel notes that differences in regulations across jurisdictions create a ‘natural experiment’ 
that will provide evidence to assist Ministers in determining whether these regulations have any 
effect on competition and whether they are in the public interest. 
In relation to proposals to introduce a national scheme based on Fuelwatch in Western Australia, 
the Panel considers that further evidence, both of a problem needing to be addressed and of the 
benefits and cost of addressing it in this way, would be necessary before any decision to proceed. 
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16 INFORMED CHOICE 
Globalisation, competition and technological innovation have expanded the range of businesses from 
which Australian consumers can choose to purchase goods and services. Just over 20 years ago 
Australian consumers did not have a choice of electricity, gas or telecommunications provider; today, 
because of competition reforms, most can choose among several competing providers. The Panel 
also recommends that user choice be placed at the heart of human services delivery, and that 
governments further their efforts to encourage a diversity of providers (Chapter 12). 
Although these developments have improved, and will continue to improve, choice for consumers, 
greater choice can also mean greater complexity. Consumers’ ability to navigate growing complexity 
potentially compromises the improvement in their wellbeing that wider diversity and choice offer. 
16.1 THE ‘RIGHT’ INFORMATION IS VITAL 
Greater choice can act as a powerful force to drive innovation in markets for goods and services, but 
it also means that consumers need to know more about market offerings if they are to secure the 
best deals. 
In human services, such as publicly funded hospital, disability and aged care, because users do not 
always pay directly for the services they receive, choice is often based on other factors, such as 
reputation, quality difference and convenience —not price. As such, an important prerequisite for 
introducing choice in human services markets is ensuring that consumers have access to relevant 
information about alternative providers to enable them to make informed choices. 
The Panel believes that markets work best when consumers are informed and engaged, empowering 
them to make good purchasing decisions. Empowering consumers requires that they have access to 
accurate, easily understood information about products and services on offer. 
However, just providing information is not enough to guarantee good choices by consumers. It is also 
important that: 
• the ‘right’ type of information be provided and is accessible; 
• consumers can assess the available offers; and 
• consumers can (and want to) act on the available information and analysis to purchase the 
goods and services that offer the best value.451 
As noted by the UK Office of Fair Trading (now part of the Competition and Markets Authority), 
‘when any of these three elements of the consumer decision-making process breaks down, 
consumers’ ability to drive effective competition can be harmed’.452 
On providing the ‘right’ information, CHOICE provides the following examples: 
Many of us are familiar with the range of factors that we take into consideration when 
contemplating the purchase of a new car. Although we may give different weight to fuel 
efficiency, acceleration speed, passenger capacity and boot-space, they are all 
                                                          
451  Office of Fair Trading 2010, What does Behavioural Economics mean for Competition Policy?, pages 10-11. 
452  Ibid., page 11. 
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meaningful, comparable, and comprehensible. However, few of us are equally familiar 
with, or confident in our judgement of, the factors which we might take into 
consideration when choosing an educational institution, or a brain surgeon. Data on class 
sizes in the case of the former, or mortality rates in the case of the latter, certainly 
constitute information, but information which might lead to very different conclusions 
depending on other factors, such as the number of auxiliary and support staff, or the 
relative severity of the surgeon’s cases … 
The more complex, and less tangible, that the service provided is, the more difficult it is 
for consumers to evaluate the choices available to them. (sub, page 26) 
KPMG notes that information released by governments is not always useful: 
In an effort to demonstrate openness and accountability, governments can often deluge 
the public with information that is not always particularly useful. This can create 
information overload or lead to a focus on information that is not crucial. The release of 
hospital waiting list data is a good example. While data is now becoming increasingly 
available to the public, it is not presented in a user friendly way and there is no evidence 
to suggest that consumers are using the data to inform their choice of hospital or doctor. 
(DR sub, page 13) 
A UK report on Better Choices: Better Deals also comments:  
The challenge for consumers is often in knowing what is relevant information and what is 
not; knowing what is accurate and what is not; and what can be trusted and what 
cannot.453 
The internet has increased the amount of information available to consumers and created new ways 
to compare deals. As Google Australia says:  
The Internet empowers consumers by putting essential information at their fingertips, 
which encourages businesses of all types to be more consumer-centric. Ultimately, this 
helps consumers make more informed choices, between a greater variety of goods and 
services, at lower prices. (sub, page 1) 
However, too much information can also affect consumers’ decisions. For example, consumers can 
find it difficult to compare differently structured offers.  
Review websites can help consumers decide what products and services represent best value; for 
example, TripAdvisor, Urbanspoon (people provide comments on hotels and restaurants) and eBay’s 
Feedback System (registered buyers and sellers leave feedback about transactions).  
Standardised performance measures and comparator websites can also save consumers time and 
help them make more informed choices about competing deals.454 As Byrne, de Roos and 
Beaton-Wells say: 
                                                          
453  UK Department for Business Innovations & Skills and Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team 2011, Better Choices: 
Better Deals, Consumers Powering Growth, page 10. 
454  Nielsen Australia 2013 Research found that respondents that used online comparison services said the services had 
saved them time, money and effort and helped them find a product that better suited their needs compared with 
shopping around, either online or through traditional offline methods, such as ‘bricks and mortar’ branches or retail 
stores. Cited in iSelect Limited 2013, page 29. 
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Internet-based price comparison websites, which have become increasingly popular in 
recent years, represent a technological innovation that reduces search costs. Indeed, 
websites that present retail price distributions and identify lowest-cost retailers to 
consumers correspond closely to the clearinghouses in theoretical models of consumer 
search. (DR sub, page 8) 
A wide range of comparator websites are available in Australia, including:  
• the Australian Energy Regulator’s energymadeeasy.gov.au, which allows customers to 
compare electricity and gas offers in a common format;455  
• myschool.edu.au, which enables parents and carers to search profiles of Australian schools 
(see Box 12.6); and 
• iSelect.com.au, which compares price and product features of private health insurance and car 
insurance products, and household utilities and financial products.  
A recent Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) report found that use of 
comparator websites in Australia is growing (in most cases), with a range of benefits for consumers. 
Comparator websites can:  
• assist consumers by simplifying complex information and helping them to make informed 
choices in situations where they would otherwise experience information overload and make 
no decision (or poor decisions); 
• assist consumers to break down complex plans by attempting to standardise retail plans that 
make it difficult to compare like-for-like; 
• place downward pressure on prices and foster product innovation; and 
• reduce search costs, thereby potentially making the process of researching and choosing 
products easier.456 
The ACCC also found that comparator websites can benefit competition by effectively reducing 
barriers to entry and making it easier for new entrants to enter the market.  
However, it is important that comparator websites serve as accurate decision-making tools and that 
consumers trust their operation. A number of submissions raise concerns about comparator websites 
(see Box 16.1). 
                                                          
455 The National Energy Retail Law requires that the Australian Energy Regulator maintain a website price comparator, as 
well as legislating certain requirements for the provision of information in standard format by retailers to energy 
consumers. 
456  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, The comparator website industry in Australia, An Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission report, Canberra, page 2. 
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Box 16.1: Submitters report that comparing deal offerings can be ‘tricky’  
CHOICE 
CHOICE’s research has shown for the last two years running, rising electricity costs were 
the number one cost of living concern for Australian households. Despite this high level 
of anxiety, our 2012 nationally representative survey of electricity consumers found 
that:457 
 One third of respondents who recently joined their electricity retailer said they had 
tried to compare providers but had found it was too hard to work out the best choice; 
 Only about half of those who recently joined their electricity retailer were confident 
they had made the best choice; and 
 29 per cent said they didn’t bother comparing providers as they are all about the 
same in terms of what they offer. (sub, page 23) 
Australian Dental Association Inc 
PHIs [Private Health Insurers] deliberately pitch advertising and various levels of cover 
to make it difficult for policy holders to compare the levels of cover on offer. It is not 
possible to make direct comparison of levels of cover on offer by the 34 PHI funds in 
Australia. The larger PHI funds engage in massive advertising campaigns using minor 
aspects of their business such as gym memberships or ‘join now claim now’ campaigns 
to make them attractive but give sparse details about the fine print of eligible services 
or full cost of premiums. Rather the cheap option is used as ‘bait advertising’ with the 
aim of having the consumer make direct contact in order to ‘up sell’ the level of cover.  
In an ideal market for dental care, choice of provider would be simple and effective. It 
would enhance competition. (sub, page 13) 
Medibank Private 
Internet aggregators allow consumers to compare participating private health 
insurance policies across pre-determined criteria, such as price and excess levels. This 
gives consumers easy access to certain information on competing products, and has 
reduced barriers to entry by reducing the power of existing brands. 
Aggregators now account for almost 20 per cent of all sales, and over 60 per cent of 
consumers consult aggregators prior to making a purchasing decision. On the one hand 
this drives greater competition, but on the other hand this largely unregulated segment 
of the industry presents issues for consumers. 
When they convert searches into a sale, aggregators receive commissions of between 
30-50 per cent of the annual premium. Because commissions received by aggregators 
vary across insurers, there is an incentive to promote policies that will generate higher 
revenue rather than meet the needs of consumers. (sub, page 15) 
The ACCC notes that some industry participants can undermine the benefits of comparator websites 
and mislead consumers. The ACCC’s concerns centre on a lack of transparency in respect of the: 
• nature or extent of the comparison service, including market coverage; 
                                                          
457 CHOICE 2013, ‘Energy retailers’ marketing tactics, Sydney. 
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• savings achieved by using the comparison service; 
• comparison services being unbiased, impartial or independent; 
• value rankings; 
• undisclosed commercial relationships affecting recommendations to consumers; and 
• content and quality assurance of product information.458 
In early 2015, the ACCC plans to release best-practice guidelines to assist comparator website 
operators and businesses to comply with Australia’s competition and consumer protection laws.459 
Other technological innovations, such as advances in metering technologies, also offer consumers 
better information about their consumption patterns, which can assist them to compare deals on 
offer. The ACCC says: 
… advanced metering with communication capability (smart meters) are capable of 
recording consumption on a near real time basis, and differentiating consumption at 
different times of the day. This can provide consumers with better information about 
their consumption and more control over how they manage their use. In so doing, 
advanced metering can support greater consumer participation and choice in the market. 
Better consumption information can also help consumers weigh up competing retail price 
offers. (sub 1, page 21) 
16.2 ACTING ON INFORMATION 
Consumers often stay with current providers, despite better deals being available. The ACCC 
observes that this leads to sub-optimal outcomes for competition:  
The ACCC’s work in the energy, telecommunications and private health insurance sectors 
has shown the complexity of these products and the difficulties that consumers have in 
comparing them. As choice can appear too difficult, consumers remain with their current 
provider leading to sub-optimal results for competition and Australian economic welfare. 
(DR sub, page 27) 
Even when consumers can identify the best deal for them, there can be real or perceived costs of 
changing providers. Switching costs include contract termination fees and the need to adjust to a 
new product, such as a new mobile phone. In some markets, users can also find it difficult to move 
between providers. For example, an aged care resident (or his or her family) may need to be 
extremely dissatisfied with care provided by an aged care provider to consider moving to another 
care facility. 
Insights from psychology and behavioural economics suggest that consumers can have behavioural 
traits that prevent them from making good use of even well-presented information (see Box 16.2).460 
For example, the way a choice is presented (or ‘framed’) can affect consumers’ ability to make an 
                                                          
458 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, The comparator website industry in Australia, An Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission report, Canberra, page 2. 
459 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, Comparing apples with apples — ACCC report on the 
comparator website industry in Australia, Canberra, 28 November. 
460 See also: Lunn, P 2014, Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, OECD Publishing; and Productivity Commission 
2007, Behavioural Economics and Public Policy, Roundtable Proceedings, Canberra. 
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optimal choice.461 Consumers have also been shown to exhibit ‘present bias’ (preferring to maintain 
the status quo) and to have a tendency to focus excessively on short-term benefits and costs, with 
such traits often leading to poor choices and dulled competition.462 
Other reasons why consumers may not choose to act on a better deal include: 
• a lack of motivation — consumers are more likely to change providers where the consequence 
of not changing will have a significant impact on their lives; 
• a lack of capabilities; and 
• geographic or supply side constraints.463 
The community and policymakers can harness these behavioural traits to strengthen competition 
and improve outcomes for consumers. However, some businesses could also take advantage of these 
traits in ways that may not be in the best interests of consumers, including using consumer confusion 
or inertia to increase sales.464 
Where customers are prevented from choosing their preferred product because the right 
information is difficult to obtain or process, Fatas and Lyons argue that firms should be required to 
highlight such information up-front in a clear and transparent manner. Also: 
The aim is to help consumers act more closely in line with the rational ideal that makes a 
competitive market attractive — consumers get the product they want and at a price that 
reflects cost. Remedies that require clearer provision of information to final consumers 
may increase costs a little, but they are unlikely to have additional consequences that are 
harmful.465 
Education strategies can help to build consumer confidence about using products and providers that 
are new to a market and about switching arrangements. Insights about behavioural biases can be 
useful when designing and applying competition policy and law (see Box 16.2). The UK Office of Fair 
Trading noted: 
Behavioural economics … shows us the importance of making use of ‘smarter information’ 
— thinking carefully about its framing, the context in which information is read, and the 
ability of consumers to understand it.466 
                                                          
461 UK Financial Conduct Authority 2013, Applying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional 
Paper No 1, page 6. 
462 Office of Fair Trading 2010, What does Behavioural Economics mean for Competition Policy?  
463 Office of Fair Trading 2010, Choice and Competition in Public Services, A guide for policy makers, page 10. 
464 Gans, J 2005, Real Consumers and Telco Choice: The Road to Confusopoly, Australian Telecommunications Summit, 
Sydney. 
465 Fatas E and Lyons B 2013, ‘Consumer Behaviour and Market Competition’, Behavioural Economics in Competition and 
Consumer Policy, Economic & Social Research Council Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, 
page 35. Fatas and Lyon note that while policy that takes into account behavioural insights has a role to play in 
obtaining better market outcomes, it needs very careful design because some interventions can do more harm than 
good, page 29. 
466 Office of Fair Trading 2010, What does Behavioural Economics mean for Competition Policy?, page 37. 
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Box 16.2: Behavioural Economics 
Behavioural economics, a relatively new field of economics, draws on psychology and the 
behavioural sciences to gain insights into how individuals make economic decisions in practice. 
More specifically, behavioural economics assesses how preferences and choices are affected by 
cognitive, social and emotional factors.467 
Behavioural economists use observations of consumer behaviour, as well as repeated experiments 
in controlled environments, to assess how people behave in certain situations and induce 
principles of economic behaviour. As Lunn said: 
This inductive approach contrasts with the traditional deductive approach to 
economics, which deduces theories based on assumptions about what constitutes 
rational behaviour.468 
Insights from behavioural economics suggest that consumers’ choices can depend on context or 
situation (including the way information is displayed or ‘framed’). In addition, consumers can: 
exhibit present or status quo bias; focus excessively on short-term benefits and costs; be 
concerned about outcomes for others as well as themselves (i.e., they can be concerned about 
fairness, trust and reciprocation); and rely on ‘rules of thumb’ when making choices. 
For example, people tend to stick with the ‘default option’ even when it is not their best option. 
Evidence also suggests that people’s decision making is adversely affected when they face multiple 
or complex choices. They can fail to select the best option when more than a few options are 
available and can be unwilling to make a choice at all when faced with a more complex decision.469 
An important component of behaviourally informed policies centres on simplifying how 
information is presented to limit the number or complexity of options available within a 
choice-set.470 
Governments and regulators around the world are making increasing use of behavioural 
economics, most notably in the UK and the US.471 The UK Government, for example, has a 
Behavioural Insights Team that acts like an internal consultancy for UK policy makers.472 
The New South Wales Government has set up a Behavioural Insights Unit, following the success of 
the UK Behavioural Insights Team. The Unit is examining factors that influence patients’ decisions 
about whether to be admitted to hospital as a public or a private patient.473  
 
  
                                                          
467 Department of Finance and Deregulation, Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving Regulatory Design, page 15. 
468 Lunn, P, 2014, Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, OECD Publishing, page 9. 
469 Ibid., page 40. 
470 Ibid., page 39. 
471 OECD, Behavioural economics, OECD viewed 4 February 2015, 
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472 Behavioural Insights Ltd 2014, The Behavioural Insights Team, NSW Government viewed 4 February 2015, 
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473 NSW Government 2014, Understanding People, Better Outcomes, Behavioural Insights in NSW, Sydney, pages 6-7.  
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The World Bank, in a report titled World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behaviour, 
also recently said:  
Since every choice set is presented in one way or another, making the crucial aspects of 
the choice salient and making it cognitively less costly to arrive at the right decision (such 
as choosing the lowest-cost loan product, following a medical regimen, or investing for 
retirement) can help people make better decisions.474 
The Panel considers that governments, both in their own dealings with consumers and in any 
regulation of the information that businesses must provide to consumers, should draw on lessons 
from behavioural research to present information and choices in ways that allow consumers to 
access, assess and act on it. 
Less confident and vulnerable consumers 
Not everyone is a confident, engaged and capable consumer. Some Australians do not have access to 
the internet. Personal attributes and circumstances can affect consumer vulnerability, for example, 
intellectual disability or living in a remote location. As the Joint Councils of Social Service Network put 
it:  
… the work of the COSS [Councils of Social Service] network across Australia shows that 
people value choice if they have appropriate information about what services are 
available and power in deciding how a service is delivered and resources used. …However, 
some people experiencing poverty and inequality are placed at a significant disadvantage 
in exercising choice in market-based mechanisms. Factors influencing this disadvantage 
include mental or chronic illness, unemployment, insecure housing or homelessness, and 
income inadequacy or insecurity. (DR sub, page 9) 
The Productivity Commission (PC) suggests that greater product complexity and demographic 
changes may be increasing the pool of vulnerable consumers:  
As a result of better education and access to the Internet, many consumers are now more 
confident and informed. But greater product complexity, and demographic changes — 
such as population ageing — may have simultaneously increased the pool of vulnerable 
consumers. So too may have the increasing market participation of young people.475 
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, looking at the socio-economic aspects of 
consumer empowerment, found in general terms that:  
• males are more empowered than females; 
• younger people are more empowered than older people; 
• retired and unemployed people are less empowered; 
• people with lower levels of education are less empowered; and 
• internet use is associated with empowerment.476 
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But it is not only personal characteristics that can affect consumer vulnerability. An important factor 
influencing whether someone is able to make an informed choice is the characteristics of the market, 
product or transaction. Asymmetric information is an important feature of markets for human 
services, such as complex medical procedures and legal services. Decisions about human services 
may also need to be made quickly. As the PC notes: 
… choosing a health care service provider to treat an acute medical condition is often 
made quickly in a stressful situation, and consumers may be unable to make choices that 
are in their best interests. (sub, page 6) 
Intermediaries can play an important role in assisting to address information gaps by providing 
expert advice and helping users navigate complex systems, such as the health, aged care and civil 
justice systems. Intermediaries are particularly important when users are making one-off decisions 
(where they have not gained experience through repeated transactions) and where there are 
potentially significant consequences from making a wrong decision (for example, a decision about 
selecting a specialist to undertake a medical procedure).477 
However, the incentives of intermediaries must be aligned with those of the user (see Section 12.3). 
16.3 CALLS FOR ACCESS TO MORE INFORMATION  
Businesses are collecting more and more data, notably through transaction records and customer 
loyalty cards, to better understand their customers. A number of submitters argue that allowing 
consumers access to their usage data would empower consumers and facilitate competition. The 
ACCC says: 
… initiatives to allow consumers to effectively use their information, such as that 
underway in the UK and USA, have the potential to assist consumers to make better 
choices and drive competition. (DR sub, page 27) 
Similarly, CHOICE argues:  
Providing consumers with relevant, accessible information about the products they 
consume and the way in which they do so would improve both the individual consumer 
experience and the overall competitiveness of the marketplace. Coupling the release of 
this information with the development of user-friendly comparator tools would reduce 
consumer confusion and simplify the ways in which individuals engage with the market. 
(DR sub, page 42) 
The UK’s midata initiative aims to provide consumers with access to data that businesses collect 
about their transactions and consumption. Midata is a voluntary program between the UK 
Government, businesses, consumer groups, regulators and trade bodies. The UK Government points 
to two main benefits from midata: 
Helping consumers make better choices: with access to their transaction data in an easy 
to use format, consumers will be able to make better informed decisions, often with the 
help of a third party. Being able to base decisions on their previous behaviour will mean 
individuals can choose products and services which better reflect their needs and offer 
them the best value. This in turn will reward firms offering the best value products in 
                                                          
477 Office of Fair Trading 2010, Choice and Competition in Public Services, A guide for policy makers, page 39. 
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particular markets, allowing them to win more customers and profits and resources. This 
will drive competition in the economy. 
As a platform for innovation: midata will lead to the creation of new businesses which 
will help people to interact with their consumption data in many innovative ways.478 
The applications of midata are described as ‘potentially limitless’: 
They might enable you to identify which of the 12 million mobile phone contracts is the 
best for you (based on your past 12 months usage); to understand what the average fat 
content of the food you purchase from supermarkets is; or to find out whether there 
might be better ways of saving your money or using your credit and debit cards.479 
CHOICE argues that implementing a scheme in Australia based on midata would benefit competition 
by: 
(a) Supporting robust demand-side competition by enabling consumers to make better 
informed decisions based on their personal preferences, consumption habits and 
needs; and  
(b) Encouraging innovation and the development of a broader range of more useful 
products for consumers, as third parties analyse available open data and identify 
possibilities for new products and services. (DR sub, page 42) 
The US Government has also established a ‘Smart Disclosure’ agenda to drive the release of public 
and private sector data to help consumers make better choices about services in energy, healthcare 
and finance.480 Specific initiatives include: 
• Green Button — an energy-specific program that gives customers access to their electricity 
data in a portable and shareable format;481 
• Blue Button — that gives patients access to their health data, which consumers can use to 
compile their personal medical history, switch health insurance companies and set health 
goals;482 
• a MyStudentData Download Button — that gives students access to their financial aid data.483 
Australian consumers already have the right, under the Privacy Act 1988, to request access to their 
personal data held by businesses. But, as the ACCC notes: 
… the Privacy Act does not specify how the information is to be provided to consumers 
other than that it must be in a manner requested by the individual if it is reasonable and 
practicable to do. (DR sub, page 28) 
                                                          
478 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills 2012, Government Response to 2012 consultation, London, page 9. 
479 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills 2011, Better Choices: Better Deals, Consumers Powering Growth, 
London, page 6. 
480 US Government, Smart Disclosure Policy, Data.Gov, viewed 8 February, 
www.data.gov/consumer/smart-disclosure-policy.  
481 US Department of Energy, Green Button, Energy.Gov, viewed 8 February, http://energy.gov/data/green-button.  
482 US Government, Health and Human Service, 2013, About Blue Button, HealthIT.gov, viewed 8 February, 
www.healthit.gov/patients-families/blue-button/about-blue-button. 
483 Federal Student Aid, MyStudentData Download, Federal Student Aid, viewed 8 February 2015, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/resources/mystudentdata-download. 
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Also, based on the UK experience:  
… further developments would need to take place in Australia for consumers to have 
access to their information in an electronic, portable and secure format, which might in 
turn support the market conditions for the creation of innovative technologies to aid 
consumers to easily compare prices and analyse their purchasing behaviours. (ACCC DR 
sub, page 28)  
CHOICE recommends that governments should work with industry, consumer groups and privacy and 
security experts to develop a consumer data scheme similar to that in the UK. CHOICE also notes that 
the US ‘smart disclosure’ policy memorandum provides guidelines to ensure that data are released in 
a format that aids the ability of consumers to make informed decisions. 
The characteristics of smart disclosure include: 
• accessibility; 
• machine readability; 
• standardisation; 
• timeliness; 
• interoperability; and 
• privacy protection (DR sub, pages 7 and 43).  
Ensuring privacy and confidentiality and creating suitable and innovative platforms for sharing data 
will be key to making progress in this area.  
The ACCC argues that the UK’s approach to engaging with businesses on a voluntary basis is 
‘conducive to establishing the necessary market conditions for the creation of innovative 
technologies to help consumers analyse their data’ (DR sub, page 28).  
Following public consultation on the midata program, the UK Government announced that it would 
use the law, if necessary, to compel businesses to release consumers’ electronic personal data if they 
did not do it voluntarily.484 The power to do this was approved through the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013. 
However, following a review of the midata voluntary program, the UK Government concluded that, 
for now at least, there is not a strong case for using legislative power to compel companies to release 
personal data.485 
The Panel considers that not only businesses but also consumers should be able to benefit from 
information collected on individuals. Information that provides consumers with insights into their 
own consumption has the potential to lead to changes in behaviour with implications for competition 
and innovation. However, for information to be of value to consumers, it should be accessible in a 
useable format.  
                                                          
484 UK Government, Department for Business Innovation & Skills, midata: Government response to 2012 consultation, 
London, pages 14 and 16. 
485 UK Government 2015, Providing better information and protection for consumer, UK Government, viewed 30 January 
2015 www.gov.uk/government/policies/providing-better-information-and-protection-for-consumers/supporting- 
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Rather than developing websites themselves, another option is for governments to make available 
data for private businesses to develop into consumer information systems. For example, a number of 
apps were developed following Transport for NSW’s ‘Train App Hot House’ competition486 to 
encourage developers to produce the best real-time app products. 
The competition was launched in response to customer feedback showing that customers were 
looking for real-time information while travelling on public transport. Six app developers were 
selected to have access to real-time train and bus data. The new apps — Arrivo Sydney, 
TransitTimes+, TripGo, Triptastic and TripView — provide real-time information for trains and buses, 
and enable customers to view: 
• the location of the train and bus in real time; 
• train service updates such as cancellations and delays; 
• lift and elevator status for selected train stations; 
• bus stops and routes nearby using GPS; and 
• estimated bus arrival times.487 
The Panel’s view 
Markets work best when consumers are engaged, empowering them to make informed decisions. 
The Panel sees scope for Australian consumers to improve their access to data to better inform 
their decisions. 
Implementation 
The Panel considers that the Australian Government and state and territory governments, together 
with businesses, consumers groups and privacy experts, should establish an agenda for developing a 
partnership agreement that facilitates new markets for personal information services and allows 
individuals to access their own data for their own purposes.  
The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should set up a 
working group to develop a partnership agreement and innovative platforms for data sharing. The 
working group should draw on experiences and lessons learnt from initiatives currently being 
developed in the UK and the US to enable consumers to use their information.  
 
                                                          
486 Berejiklian, G (NSW Minister for Transport) 2013, All Aboard for Real Time Train Apps, media release, Sydney, 
1 February 2013.  
487 NSW Government 5 December 2013, Real time train apps now available, Transport for NSW, viewed 8 February 2015, 
www.transport.nsw.gov.au/news/real-time-train-apps-available. 
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Recommendation 21 — Informed choice 
Governments should work with industry, consumer groups and privacy experts to allow consumers 
to access information in an efficient format to improve informed consumer choice.  
The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 43) should establish 
a working group to develop a partnership agreement that both allows people to access and use 
their own data for their own purposes and enables new markets for personal information services. 
This partnership should draw on the lessons learned from similar initiatives in the US and UK.  
Further, governments, both in their own dealings with consumers and in any regulation of the 
information that businesses must provide to consumers, should draw on lessons from behavioural 
economics to present information and choices in ways that allow consumers to access, assess and 
act on them. 
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PART 4 — COMPETITION LAWS 
17 INTRODUCTION TO COMPETITION LAW ISSUES 
In this Part, we examine Australia’s competition laws, which are contained in Part IV of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), to assess whether they remain fit for purpose in light of 
consumer and business experience with the laws and developments in the Australian economy and 
abroad. 
Part 1 of this Report sets out a number of principles that guide the Panel’s review of Australia’s 
competition laws. An important principle is that competition policy should foster choice and 
increased responsiveness to consumers. This is reflected in the objective of the CCA, ‘to enhance the 
welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for 
consumer protection’.488 
The CCA (and competition policy more generally) is not designed to support a particular number of 
participants in a market or to protect individual competitors; instead, it is designed to prevent 
competitors’ behaviour from damaging the competitive process to the detriment of consumers. 
The robust competitive process supported by Part IV of the CCA may inevitably lead to some market 
participants being damaged or leaving the market completely. Those adversely affected by 
competition may feel aggrieved by this damage, but the CCA is neither intended nor designed to 
protect individual competitors or classes of competitors from such outcomes. 
Another guiding principle is that the law should be simple, predictable and reliable. Those objectives 
can be met if: 
• the law prohibits specific categories of anti-competitive conduct, with economy-wide 
application; 
• conduct is only prohibited per se489 if it is anti-competitive in most circumstances— other 
conduct is only prohibited where it can be shown that it has the purpose, effect or likely effect, 
of substantially lessening competition;  
• contraventions of the law are adjudicated by a court, with proceedings able to be initiated by a 
public regulatory authority or through private suit; and 
• there is facility for business to seek exemption from the law in individual cases on public 
benefit grounds. 
Furthermore, the law must balance two principles: 
• that its scope not over-reach (by prohibiting pro-competitive conduct) or under-reach (by 
failing to prohibit anti-competitive conduct); and 
• that the language of the law be clear to market participants and enforceable by regulators and 
the courts. 
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Competition laws that under-reach or over-reach will fail to secure the welfare of Australians, 
especially consumers. Laws that are unclear create business and regulatory uncertainty, which 
imposes costs on the economy. 
Our laws should also keep pace with international best practice. International best practice provides 
an important point of comparison to assess whether the scope of our laws is correct and whether the 
language and approach used are as simple as possible. Appendix B provides an overview comparison 
of the main areas of the law examined in this Report. 
Another guiding principle is that policies and systems be adaptable to changing economic 
circumstances. The more complex and specific the provisions of a law, the less it is able to adapt 
readily to change. 
17.1 SIMPLIFICATION 
Broadly speaking, submissions to the Review support Australia’s current legislative framework.490 
Some submissions identify improvements that could simplify drafting, improve clarity for users and 
better adhere to key economic underpinnings. However, submissions also note difficulties in 
simplifying the law, including where simpler drafting may lead to increased uncertainty (for example, 
ACCC, DR sub, page 29). 
Some of the complexity in the law has arisen from amendments and additions made in response to 
calls for more ‘effective’ regulation (for example, following judicial interpretation of the words of 
section 46 of the CCA) or where there has been a perceived shortfall or over-reach resulting from a 
court judgment. The certainty provided by specific drafting must be balanced against the complexity 
that arises from attempts to address all possible contingencies. 
The current law also duplicates provisions unnecessarily. For example, separate prohibitions have 
been enacted to address contracts that substantially lessen competition (section 45) and covenants 
that substantially lessen competition (sections 45B and 45C); exclusive dealing provisions contained 
in leases and licences of land are addressed separately from exclusive dealing provisions in 
agreements for the acquisition or supply of all other goods or services (section 47). Such unnecessary 
duplication could be reduced by inserting a definition to the effect that, for the purposes of the CCA, 
a contract includes a covenant and a lease or licence of land or buildings. 
The Panel considers that the current competition law provisions of the CCA, including the provisions 
regulating the granting of exemptions, are unnecessarily complex. Australia’s competition laws 
would benefit from simplification while retaining their underlying policy intent. 
17.2 SPECIFIC REFORMS 
Specific instances where the law could be improved are explored in the remainder of this Part. The 
Panel has been guided by the Review’s Terms of Reference and issues brought to our attention in 
submissions and consultations. 
The discussion is organised according to the separate topics indicated in the diagram below. 
                                                          
490 See, for example: Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 8; Australian National Retailers Association, 
DR sub, page 11; Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 8; Baker & McKenzie, DR sub, page 1; BHP Billiton, 
DR sub, page 4; Business Council of Australia, DR sub, page 11; Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 5; and South 
Australian Government, DR sub, page 18. 
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related matters
Competition laws
Exemption 
processes
Enforcement and 
remedies
National Access 
Regime
 
Under each topic, the Panel discusses and recommends legislative reform to improve the 
effectiveness of Australia’s competition laws. 
17.3 MODEL LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appendix A to this Report contains model legislative provisions reflecting many of the CCA reforms 
recommended by the Panel. 
The purpose of preparing the model legislative provisions is to communicate the Panel’s proposals 
with greater clarity and precision. The Panel hopes that the model provisions will assist governments 
in considering each proposal. The model provisions also reflect the Panel’s views on simplifying 
Part IV. 
It was not practical to prepare model provisions in respect of every recommendation made by the 
Panel. Where model provisions illustrate particular recommendations, this is indicated in the body of 
the Report. 
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The Panel’s view 
Competition laws that are fit for purpose support an adaptable economy by protecting the 
competitive process, so that a diversity of producers can respond to the changing needs and 
preferences of consumers. 
The concepts, prohibitions and structure of the CCA are sound. However, some provisions are 
unnecessarily complex, contributing to business and regulatory uncertainty and imposing costs on 
business and the economy. Such provisions can also inhibit the adaptability of the CCA to changing 
circumstances. 
The Panel considers that the competition laws could be simplified while maintaining their current 
policy intent. Business and consumers would benefit from simplification of the law. The Panel 
recommends that this task be undertaken in conjunction with the recommended reforms set out 
below. 
The Panel specifically recommends removing unnecessary or now redundant competition law 
provisions including: 
• subsection 45(1) concerning contracts made before 1977; and 
• sections 45B and 45C concerning covenants. 
17.4 IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing the Panel’s proposed legislative reform of the CCA will require amending legislation to 
be prepared by the Australian Government. The Panel considers that preparing this amending 
legislation would benefit from the assistance of an expert legal panel comprising representatives 
from the Treasury, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and private sector 
legal experts. Simplifying Part IV could be carried out concurrently with work done to progress 
agreed reforms in specific areas. 
Enactment of amending legislation is also subject to the requirements of the intergovernmental 
Conduct Code Agreement 1995, which obliges the Australian Government to consult with, and seek 
the approval of, the States and Territories on proposed changes to Part IV of the CCA.491 Importantly, 
this agreement provides for the seamless coverage of the competition law provisions across all 
jurisdictions and its application to bodies beyond the constitutional reach of the Australian 
Government. 
Section 29.3 sets out proposed timing for implementing the changes to the CCA. Exposure draft 
legislation should be prepared within 12 months of accepting the recommendations in consultation 
with States and Territories. Finalised amendments should be put to the States and Territories for 
their approval within two years. 
Recommendation 22 — Competition law concepts 
The central concepts, prohibitions and structure enshrined in the current competition law should 
be retained, since they are appropriate to serve the current and projected needs of the Australian 
economy. 
 
                                                          
491 Conduct Code Agreement 1995, clauses 6 and 7. 
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Recommendation 23 — Competition law simplification 
The competition law provisions of the CCA should be simplified, including by removing overly 
specified provisions and redundant provisions. 
The process of simplifying the CCA should involve public consultation. 
Provisions that should be removed include: 
• subsection 45(1) concerning contracts made before 1977; and 
• sections 45B and 45C concerning covenants. 
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18 MERGERS 
Section 50 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) prohibits mergers that would, or would 
be likely to, substantially lessen competition in any market. The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) is empowered to bring proceedings in court to prevent, or break 
apart, a merger that contravenes the law, or to seek a penalty. Third parties may also bring 
proceedings in court to break apart a merger that contravenes the law, or to seek damages. 
Anti-competitive mergers can cause harm to efficiency and consumers and can bring about adverse 
long-term changes to markets. However, most mergers do not unduly harm competition; indeed, 
mergers can deliver substantial economic benefits to business and consumers, including through 
creating economies of scale and transferring assets to more efficient managers. 
Australia’s merger laws make provision for a merger to be authorised (that is, exempted from the 
merger prohibition) if it is likely to result in public benefits that outweigh the likely harm to 
competition. 
Parties seeking approval before they merge to avoid the risk of court action492 have three separate 
processes available to them, as set out in the diagram below. Merger parties can choose any of the 
three processes, taking into account whatever factors they think relevant, such as the legal test, 
decision-maker, onus of proof, timing, level of transparency and certainty, and legal costs. 
Parties need only obtain one clearance or authorisation from one process to proceed with a 
transaction, and it is open to them to pursue more than one. For example, in early 2014, AGL sought 
informal clearance from the ACCC for its proposed acquisition of Macquarie Generation. When this 
was not granted, AGL applied successfully to the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) for 
merger authorisation. 
Currently, it is not compulsory to notify or seek approval before proceeding with a merger. Some 
submissions argue that mandatory pre-notification of mergers should be required for firms with a 
substantial degree of market power (for example, Retail Guild, DR sub, page 10). However, despite 
the lack of a legal obligation to do so, firms proposing to engage in mergers that may affect 
competition generally choose one or more of the available processes. 
Although this involves some time and expense, it can avoid the risk that the ACCC or a third party 
may ask a court to unwind a completed transaction (through a court-ordered divestiture) and/or 
impose penalties if it is found to breach the CCA.493 The Panel considers that these sanctions provide 
sufficient incentive for parties to notify the ACCC of mergers without the need for mandatory 
notification. 
  
                                                          
492 Informal clearance from the ACCC, unlike formal clearance or merger authorisation, does not provide legal protection 
against third-party legal action, only an indication from the ACCC that it will not take action. 
493 As noted above, informal clearance from the ACCC does not provide legal protection against third party legal action. 
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Past reviews of Australia’s competition laws have generated debate about the appropriate legal test 
for mergers. In 1992, the law was altered from a ‘dominance test’ to a ‘substantial lessening of 
competition’ test.494 Submissions offer near-universal support for the substantial lessening of 
competition test. 
Submissions to the Issues Paper raise the following matters with respect to the merger law: 
• the market definition applied in the assessment of mergers, particularly when merging firms 
compete in global markets; 
• creeping acquisitions; 
• whether merger review under the CCA should be aligned with other approval processes, such 
as those associated with the Foreign Investment Review Board; and 
• the timeliness and transparency of merger approval processes. 
Submissions to the Draft Report raise further concerns with the way the current test is applied 
(including whether too few mergers are being opposed by the ACCC) and the rights of third parties to 
be heard when they are affected by mergers. Submissions also respond to the Draft 
Recommendations regarding changes to the definition of ‘competition’, consultation by the ACCC on 
ways to improve its informal merger review process and changes to the formal merger clearance and 
authorisation processes. 
18.1 MARKET DEFINITION AND GLOBAL COMPETITION 
The Panel received submissions from a number of parties, including the Business Council of Australia 
(BCA) (sub, Summary Report, page 16), Australian Dairy Farmers (sub, page 4), Foxtel (sub, page 3), 
Woolworths (sub, page 14) and Wesfarmers (sub, page 9), on how a ‘market’ is defined in the CCA 
and/or by the ACCC, and whether market definition and merger review more broadly take full 
account of globalisation and competition (including the threat of competition) from overseas firms. 
For example, the BCA emphasises the need for a ‘commercially realistic’ market definition, 
expressing concern that ‘The administrative approach to market definition can be at times unduly 
narrow’ (sub, Summary Report, page 16). 
Some submissions argue that the Draft Report focuses on the concerns of parties who consider that 
too many mergers are blocked, either due to excessively narrow market definition or incorrect 
application of the law by the ACCC, when the greater problem is that the ACCC opposes too few 
mergers.495 
The concept of a market is central to the application of competition law, including the merger law. It 
is an economic concept that focuses attention on the relevant sources of competition that constrain 
the parties to a merger.  
The meaning of the term ‘market’ under Australian law has been very stable. It was explained in 
1976 by the former Trade Practices Tribunal (now the Australian Competition Tribunal) in the context 
of a merger authorisation in the following terms: 
                                                          
494 Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 1992. 
495 See, for example: Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 12; Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 31; 
and AURL FoodWorks, DR sub, page 14. 
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A market is the area of close competition between firms or, putting it a little differently, 
the field of rivalry between them … Within the bounds of a market there is substitution — 
substitution between one product and another, and between one source of supply and 
another, in response to changing prices. So a market is the field of actual and potential 
transactions between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, 
at least in the long run, if given a sufficient price incentive.496 
This explanation has stood the test of time and has been approved by the High Court. In Queensland 
Wire,497 Mason CJ, Wilson J498 and Toohey J499 agreed with the above passage. Deane J used the same 
language and said ‘“market” should, in the context of the Act, be understood in the sense of an area 
of potential close competition in particular goods and/or services and their substitutes’.500 To the 
same effect, Dawson J stated, ‘A market is an area in which the exchange of goods or services 
between buyer and seller is negotiated’.501 
Similarly, in Boral,502 McHugh J said: 
... a market describes the transactions between sellers and buyers in respect of particular 
products that buyers see as close or reasonable substitutes for each other given the 
respective prices and conditions of sale of those products.503 
Assessing the likely effect of a merger on competition, including identifying markets that are relevant 
to such an assessment, involves judgment. Differences of opinion can and do emerge. Very few 
mergers are opposed by the ACCC. For example, the ACCC publicly opposed six out of 277 mergers 
reviewed on a non-confidential basis in 2012-13, or around two per cent.504 This suggests that the 
concerns raised with the Panel emanate from a small number of high profile, contentious cases. 
It is not the Panel’s role to adjudicate whether the ACCC has been right or wrong in its interpretation 
of the law in individual cases. When the ACCC and merger parties differ about whether a merger 
breaches the CCA, it is the place of the Tribunal or the courts to decide the outcome. The Panel is 
directed to assess whether the legal framework within which mergers are assessed is appropriate. 
Submissions raise the specific question of whether Australia’s merger laws give proper consideration 
to global markets within which many Australian businesses compete. Concerns have been expressed 
that the term ‘market’ in the CCA is defined as a market ‘in Australia’ and that this causes the 
competition analysis to be focussed too narrowly. Similar concerns about market definition and 
                                                          
496 Re Queensland Co-Op Milling Association Limited and Defiance Holdings Limited (QCMA) (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 518. 
497 Queensland Wire v BHP (1989) 167 CLR 177. 
498 Ibid., at 188. 
499 Ibid., at 210. 
500 Ibid., at 195. 
501 Ibid., at 199. 
502 Boral Besser Masonry v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374. 
503 Ibid., at 248. 
504 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian Energy Regulator 2013, Annual Report 2012-13, 
Canberra, page 41. 
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global competition have arisen overseas505 and also arose in submissions to the Dawson Review, 
which did not recommend changing the way markets are defined.506 
The Panel considers that it is necessary and appropriate for the term ‘market’ to be defined as a 
market in Australia. This is because the CCA is concerned with the economic welfare of Australians, 
not citizens of other countries. The law is intended to protect competition in Australian markets for 
the benefit of Australian consumers. If this aspect of the CCA were to be changed, and competition 
were to be assessed by reference to global markets, Australian competition law would be at risk of 
failing in its central objective. 
However, this should not mean the CCA ignore forces of competition that arise outside Australia but 
which bear upon Australian markets. The objective of the CCA is to protect and promote competition 
in Australian markets, but frequently the sources of competition in Australian markets are global in 
origin, especially as increasing numbers of Australian consumers purchase goods and services online 
from overseas suppliers. 
The CCA has been framed to take account of all sources of competition that affect markets in 
Australia. The term ‘competition’ in section 4 of the CCA is defined to include competition from 
imported goods and services. 
The geographic boundaries of many markets extend beyond Australia. In those circumstances, a 
corporation that competes for the supply of goods or services in Australia does so in the broader 
geographic market. Any assessment of competition under the CCA must take account of those 
market realities. This has been recognised in decisions of the courts and the Tribunal. 
In Re Fortescue Metals Group, the Tribunal concluded that the relevant concept of a market for the 
purposes of the competition law: 
... consists of groups of buyers and groups of sellers in a geographic region who seek each 
other out as a source of supply of, or as customers for, products. The interaction of the 
buyers and sellers determines the price for the products.507 
The Tribunal described the process of defining the relevant market as ‘the identification of the 
participating firms, a description of the products exchanged and the borders within which the 
exchange occurs’.508 
Although the CCA is concerned with the wellbeing of Australian consumers, it takes account of all 
sellers that compete to supply products in Australia, wherever they may be located. 
This is also acknowledged by the ACCC, which states:  
The CCA … recognises that Australia operates in a global economy and provides a 
framework for such matters to be taken into account. For example when assessing the 
likely competitive effect of a proposed merger, the potential for competitive constraint to 
be provided by suppliers located outside Australia is taken into account by considering 
import competition. (sub 1, page 126) 
                                                          
505 See, for example: Jenny, F 2000, Competition Policy Analysis, edited by Hope, E, Routledge, London, page 31. 
506 Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the Dawson 
Review), Canprint Communications, Canberra, pages 50 and 59. 
507 In the matter of Fortescue Metals Group Limited [2010] ACompT 2 at [1011]. 
508 Ibid., at [1014]. 
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Nevertheless, given the importance of ensuring that global sources of competition are considered 
where relevant, the Panel recommends strengthening the current definition of ‘competition’ in the 
CCA so there can be no doubt that it includes competition from potential imports of goods and 
services and not just actual imports. 
The Panel does not intend that this change would expand market definitions in competition law to 
include every product and service that could conceivably be imported into Australia, only to clarify 
that the credible threat of import competition is a relevant component of a competition analysis. 
This proposal is supported by a number of submissions to the Draft Report,509 including both the SME 
Committee (DR sub, page 12) and the Competition and Consumer Committee (DR sub, page 8) of the 
Law Council of Australia. The Australian National Retailers Association also agrees that such a change 
would permit the CCA to consider all sources of competition that affect markets in Australia (DR sub, 
page 21). 
However, in the ACCC’s view, the current definition of ‘competition’ in the CCA already includes 
competition from actual and potential imports into Australia. The ACCC does not support changing 
the definition given the adverse impact this would have on the simplicity of the CCA and potential 
implications for enforcement (DR sub, pages 33-34). 
Although the BCA agrees with the Panel’s proposal concerning the definition of ‘competition’ in the 
CCA, it submits that ‘competitive analysis under the CCA can be characterised by the adoption of 
unduly narrow and static market definitions and an overreliance on existing market concentration’ 
(DR sub, page 11). The BCA notes that market definition is a tool in competitive analysis but should 
not determine the limits of competitive activity to be taken into account. The BCA also notes that, in 
some cases, market definition may not be required at all since competitive effects can be measured 
directly (DR sub, page 12). 
The Panel agrees that the importance of market definition and market concentration should not be 
overstated. However, the Panel does not consider that legislative guidance to this effect is necessary. 
The courts are able to use market definition as one of a number of analytical tools to assist them in 
determining the likely effects of a merger on competition. 
Some submissions also question whether the ACCC’s application of the CCA is constraining Australian 
businesses from achieving sufficient economies of scale to become globally competitive. For 
example: 
Competition Policy [is] frustrating mergers of companies in the global traded goods sector 
in the name of competition in the domestic market, but in the process denies a producer 
the extent of the market required for an operation to be internationally competitive … It 
is recommended priority be given to mergers which favour the formation of a strong 
group which can compete in international markets rather than having weak fragmented 
entities. (The Industry Group, sub, page 12) 
In order to compete effectively, businesses must continuously pursue economic efficiency. In many 
industries, efficiency requires scale. Businesses may pursue mergers in order to achieve efficient 
scale to compete more effectively in global markets.  
                                                          
509 See, for example: Australian Automobile Aftermarket Association, DR sub, page 3; Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, DR sub, page 18; Australian Industry Group, DR sub, pages 19-20; Coles Group, DR sub, pages 7-8; 
Foxtel, DR sub, page 1; SA Independent Retailers, DR sub, page 3; Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 8; and 
Woolworth Limited, DR sub, pages 31-32. 
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In many markets in Australia, mergers aimed at achieving efficient scale will not substantially lessen 
competition because of the constraining influence of imports. Such mergers are allowed under the 
CCA. 
However, in some markets, the opposite will be the case: the influence of imports may be weak and 
unable to constrain the resulting market power of the merged businesses. When that occurs, 
conflicting interests arise: the gain to the businesses that wish to merge through achieving greater 
efficiency against the potential detriment to Australian consumers on account of the reduction in 
competition. 
From time to time, there are calls for competition policy to be changed to allow the formation of 
‘national champions’ — national firms that are large enough to compete globally. Geoff Ball submits 
that the Draft Report leaves the impression ‘that somehow the formation of ‘National Champions’ 
must disadvantage suppliers and consumers in the Australian market’ (DR sub, page 1), while the 
National Farmers’ Federation submits that, to take advantage of the numerous export opportunities 
available to Australian farmers and agribusinesses, scale and capacity are important to improve 
efficiencies, lower costs and build lasting commercial relationships (DR sub, page 13). 
While the Panel agrees that the pursuit of scale efficiencies is a desirable economic objective, it is 
less clear whether, and in what circumstances, suspending competition laws to allow the creation of 
national champions is desirable from either an economic or consumer perspective. As the National 
Farmers’ Federation submits, while the legislative approach to mergers should take the benefits of 
scale into consideration, it should ‘equally ensure there is no negative impact on the supply chain 
from any imbalances in market power’ (DR sub, page 13). 
Porter510 and others note that the best preparation for overseas competition is not insulation from 
domestic competition but exposure to intense domestic competition. Further, the purpose of the 
competition law is to enhance consumer welfare, including through ensuring that Australian 
consumers can access competitively priced goods and services. Allowing mergers to create a national 
champion may benefit the shareholders of the merged businesses but could diminish the welfare of 
Australian consumers. 
Box 18.1 provides a discussion of recent calls to support the creation of national champions in 
Australian agriculture, with specific reference to New Zealand dairy co-operative, Fonterra. 
Box 18.1: Fonterra and calls for national champions in Australian agriculture 
The Fonterra co-operative is New Zealand’s dominant dairy company. It was formed from the 2001 
merger of the two largest co-operatives, New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Co-operative Dairies, 
together with the New Zealand Dairy Board. Some recent commentary suggests that Australia 
should seek to emulate the formation of Fonterra and our competition policy and laws should be 
amended to facilitate this outcome. 
The Panel considers that important differences between the circumstances surrounding Fonterra’s 
formation and those applying in Australia mean that this conclusion is not soundly based. 
 
                                                          
510 Porter, M E 1990, Competitive Advantage of Nations, Harvard Business Review, New York, page 86. 
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Box 18.1: Fonterra and calls for national champions in Australian agriculture (continued) 
Before Fonterra was formed, the New Zealand dairy market was highly regulated, with the New 
Zealand Dairy Board having a legislated export monopoly. The merger to create Fonterra was not 
permitted under New Zealand’s competition laws but was instead facilitated through special 
legislation. The legislation included provisions and obligations on Fonterra designed to provide for 
domestic competition and prevent harm to consumers and farmers as a result of the merger. 
Concerns were raised that the farm-gate price would be depressed due to Fonterra’s dominance 
as a buyer. These were addressed through a combination of regulation and incentives. Ongoing 
price monitoring, as well as Fonterra’s obligations to allow its farmer-shareholders open entry and 
exit at a ‘fair’ price, and to supply milk to competing processors, provide competitive pressure and 
an incentive for competitive pricing. To achieve domestic competition in the sale of milk products, 
Fonterra had to divest several brands to competitors and is obligated to supply them on 
competitive terms. 
‘Sometimes they think in Australia that we’ve got a monopoly and it works, but we don’t and 
having one doesn’t,’ New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Bill English, 
has observed.511 
The Panel considers that issues concerning the creation of national champions can be addressed 
under the existing CCA authorisation framework. It is appropriate that a competition regulator, 
whether the ACCC or the Tribunal, adjudicate such issues as they arise from time to time. 
The merger authorisation process (as set out in Box 18.2) applies a public benefit test that covers all 
potential benefits and detriments of a merger, including economies of scale. In this way, the current 
law recognises there may be occasions where it is in the public interest to allow a particular merger 
to achieve efficient scale to compete globally, notwithstanding that the merger adversely affects 
competition in Australia. 
                                                          
511 Binsted, T and Malpass, L 2014, ‘Tough cheese: Australia’s Dairy Conundrum’, Australian Financial Review, 2 August, 
Melbourne. 
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Box 18.2: Authorisation and the public benefit test 
Parties may seek authorisation for an acquisition. This process allows mergers even if they result in 
a substantial lessening of competition, but only if they meet a public benefit test. Applications 
have been rare (only two since the Tribunal became the first-instance decision-maker in 2007). 
The test applied by the Tribunal in assessing applications is that authorisation must not be granted 
unless it is satisfied that the acquisition is likely to result in such benefit to the public that it should 
be allowed. The Tribunal must consider as benefits: 
• a significant increase in the real value of exports; 
• a significant substitution of domestic products for imported goods; and 
• all other relevant matters that relate to the international competitiveness of any Australian 
industry. 
Other factors may also be considered.512 
The non-exhaustive list of factors that must be taken into account enables merger parties to argue 
that their proposed merger will result in public benefit through improving the business’s ability to 
expand exports or compete against imports. 
The factors that must be considered under the merger authorisation process have been criticised: 
Placing emphasis on these particular indicators is very likely to lead to sub-optimal 
outcomes. There is no a priori reason why growth in exports or the substitution of 
domestic production for imported products increases (or decreases) public welfare … 
Deeming benefit to lie with increased exports or import substitution has the potential to 
distort production, waste scarce resources, and ultimately reduce community incomes.513 
The Panel agrees that this list provides a narrow view of public benefit. However, it is a 
non-exhaustive list, and the Tribunal has interpreted public benefit to have a broad meaning.514 
Given that the Tribunal is already able to take into account whatever factors it deems appropriate, a 
change in the law may have limited utility. 
As noted elsewhere in this Report, the Panel recommends some procedural changes to the merger 
approval process (see Recommendation 35) and a change to the governance structure of the ACCC to 
ensure that broader business, consumer and economic perspectives can be brought to the work of 
the ACCC (see Recommendation 51). 
                                                          
512 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 95AZH. 
513 Productivity Commission 2014, Relative Costs of Doing Business in Australia: Dairy Product Manufacturing, Canberra, 
page 123. 
514 Victorian Newsagency (1994) ATPR 41–357 at 42, 677. 
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The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that it is necessary and appropriate for the term ‘market’ to be defined as a 
market in Australia. This is because the CCA is concerned with the economic welfare of Australians, 
not citizens of other countries. 
Although the objective of the CCA is to protect and promote competition in Australian markets, 
frequently the sources of competition in Australian markets originate globally. The CCA has been 
framed to take account of all sources of competition that affect markets in Australia. However, the 
current definition of ‘competition’ in the CCA could be strengthened so there can be no doubt that 
it includes competition from potential imports of goods and services and not just actual imports. 
In many markets in Australia, achieving efficient scale will not substantially lessen competition 
because of the constraining influence of imports. Such mergers are allowed under the CCA. 
If achieving efficient scale through a merger will also substantially lessen competition in Australia, 
conflicting interests arise: the gain to the businesses that wish to merge to achieve greater 
efficiency against the potential detriment to Australian consumers due to reduced competition. 
The Panel considers that such issues can be addressed under the existing CCA framework. It is 
appropriate that a competition regulator, whether the ACCC or the Tribunal, adjudicate such issues 
as they arise from time to time. 
As noted elsewhere in this Report, the Panel recommends some procedural changes to the merger 
approval process and a change to the governance structure of the ACCC to ensure that broader 
business, consumer and economic perspectives can be brought to the work of the ACCC.  
 
Recommendation 25 — Definition of market and competition 
The current definition of ‘market’ in section 4E of the CCA should be retained but the current 
definition of ‘competition’ in section 4 should be amended to ensure that competition in 
Australian markets includes competition from goods imported or capable of being imported, or 
from services rendered or capable of being rendered, by persons not resident or not carrying on 
business in Australia.  
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
18.2 CREEPING ACQUISITIONS 
Concerns about ‘creeping acquisitions’ typically arise where a business with a substantial degree of 
power in a market acquires many small competitors over time. 
The merger provisions of the CCA focus on the effect or likely effect on competition of a particular 
merger or acquisition. In 2008 and 2009 government discussion papers considered possible changes 
to deal with ‘creeping acquisitions’, which the 2008 paper described as: 
... conduct that comprises the accumulated effect of a number of small individual 
transactions which, when considered in isolation at the time that each transaction 
occurred, would not breach section 50. That is, while each transaction considered at the 
time it occurred may have a limited impact on competition, and would therefore not fall 
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within the scope of section 50, over a longer period a series of such transactions may have 
the cumulative effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.515 
Prior to the 2008 and 2009 discussion papers, creeping acquisitions had already been the 
subject of much consideration, including by the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on the 
Retailing Sector (Baird Committee) in its 1999 report Fair Market or Market Failure?, the 
Dawson Review, and the Senate Economics References Committee in its 2004 report on The 
Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Protecting Small Business. 
In 1999, the Baird Committee noted its concerns that section 50 was unlikely to be breached by 
small but repeated acquisitions of independent grocery retailers.516 It also noted that there was 
a ‘degree of equivocation’ among those giving evidence as to whether legislative amendments 
were required in relation to creeping acquisitions.517 However, concerns were raised that, in 
some instances, the ACCC is unaware that an acquisition has even taken place until after the fact 
due to the lack of notification requirements. 
In 2003, the Dawson Review considered and rejected a range of measures to deal with creeping 
acquisitions,518 including: 
• market share caps — rejected on the basis that they would inefficiently restrict competition, 
would be unworkable in the retail sector, and would adversely affect rural consumers in 
particular; 
• a declaration process, whereby industries declared by the government to be highly 
concentrated would have to notify the ACCC of any intended acquisitions — rejected because 
it would lead to large market participants establishing new facilities rather than buying existing 
stores from smaller rivals willing to sell; and 
• a proposal to amend subsection 50(3) to include a reference to creeping acquisitions as a 
relevant concern in assessments of mergers and acquisitions under section 50 — rejected 
because the ACCC could consider creeping acquisitions under the existing law. 
In 2004, the Senate Economics Reference Committee noted that ‘as a matter of logic’ creeping 
acquisitions in concentrated markets must over time substantially lessen competition. The 
Committee was of the view that section 50 was unable to deal with the issue of creeping 
acquisitions. It recommended that section 50 be revised to enable the ACCC to prevent creeping 
acquisitions that would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in an Australian market.519 
Following the 2008 and 2009 discussion papers, in 2011 the CCA was amended so that it now 
prohibits mergers likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition in ‘any’ market, instead of 
applying only to a ‘substantial’ market. Despite this change, many submitters consider that creeping 
acquisitions remain a problem. 
For example, NRMA (sub, page 3), Retail Guild of Australia (DR sub, page 70), COSBOA (sub, page 3), 
Friends of Hawker Village (sub, page 1), Metcash (sub, page 3) and AURL FoodWorks (sub, page 17) 
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all call for changes to address creeping acquisitions. These calls are mainly in the context of concerns 
about the size and expansion of Woolworths and Coles in the supermarket and fuel retailing sectors. 
Other submissions, including those from Woolworths (sub, page 80), Wesfarmers (sub, page 17) and 
the Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee (sub, page 10) argue that no 
such change is warranted. 
The ACCC’s position in its 2008 grocery inquiry was that, although amendments to deal with creeping 
acquisitions would be desirable, ‘such acquisitions do not appear to be a significant current concern 
in the supermarket retail sector’.520 Rather, the expansion of Woolworths and Coles had occurred up 
to that time mainly via organic growth, not acquisition. 
As a matter of concept, competition law should assess the overall effect of business conduct and not 
be narrowly focused on individual transactions. Various areas of competition law assess the 
anti-competitive effect of a commercial arrangement by reference to the aggregate effect of similar 
arrangements (specifically, section 45 that prohibits anti-competitive arrangements and section 47 
that prohibits anti-competitive exclusive dealing). 
A legitimate question therefore arises whether section 50, which addresses anti-competitive 
mergers, should be applied so that the anti-competitive effect of an individual merger is assessed by 
reference to the aggregate effect of other mergers undertaken by the same corporation (or group of 
corporations) within a stated period (for example, the prior three years). 
There would be complexities in introducing a concept of ‘merger aggregation’ into the CCA. Mergers 
rarely occur at the same time; they occur over time. Therefore, it is necessary to choose an 
appropriate period of time over which to aggregate the competitive effect of mergers undertaken by 
the corporation.  
The complicating factor is that market conditions may have altered materially over the period 
chosen, with competition having increased or decreased.  
In those circumstances, assessing the aggregate effect on competition of mergers that have occurred 
over a period becomes a difficult exercise. The longer the period chosen, the more difficult the task 
becomes. Any such change to the law would affect every corporation that undertook a merger. 
Assessing each merger would involve considering previous mergers undertaken by the corporation 
over the stated time period. This would impose additional costs and potentially increase the time 
required for merger review. 
On balance, in the absence of evidence of harmful acquisitions proceeding because of a gap in the 
law on creeping acquisitions, the Panel does not consider that a sufficiently strong case for change 
has been made. 
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18.3 SHOULD MERGER REVIEW UNDER THE CCA BE ALIGNED WITH OTHER 
APPROVAL PROCESSES? 
Some submissions, including one from Australian Dairy Farmers (sub, page 4), raise concerns about 
co-ordination of the timing of the various merger approval processes that exist under Australian law. 
Beyond the CCA, various other approval processes may apply to certain mergers and acquisitions, 
such as foreign investment, media diversity and financial regulator approvals. 
Australian Dairy Farmers’ particular concern arises from the bidding process for Warrnambool 
Cheese and Butter Factory Company Holdings Limited in 2013. One bidder, Murray Goulburn 
Co-operative Co Limited, was a competitor of Warrnambool Cheese and Butter for the acquisition of 
milk and made its bid conditional upon obtaining ACCC or Tribunal approval. Another bidder, the 
Canadian firm Saputo Inc., had no activities in Australia and decided not to seek ACCC or Tribunal 
approval, although it did seek and obtain approval from the Treasurer under the Foreign Acquisitions 
and Takeovers Act 1975, since it is a foreign investor.  
The Treasurer provided Saputo with approval on 12 November 2013, while Murray Goulburn did not 
lodge its application for merger authorisation until 29 November 2013. Saputo’s bid was accepted by 
the majority of Warrnambool Cheese and Butter shareholders before the Tribunal could rule on 
Murray Goulburn’s application, which was then withdrawn. 
Australian Dairy Farmers suggests that the Treasurer’s decision on Saputo’s bid should have been 
delayed until the merger authorisation process for Murray Goulburn’s bid had concluded (DR sub, 
page 16). Since any given merger may be subject to numerous approval processes, the logical 
extension of this proposal is that all approvals for all competing bids should be delivered 
simultaneously. 
The Panel does not support this proposal. The various approval processes are not related. Although it 
is desirable that decision-makers be cognisant of other processes, to require that each 
decision-maker delay its decision until all approval processes have been completed for all bidders 
would impose an unwarranted burden on bidders and sellers. Bidders and sellers are aware of the 
various approvals that may be required under various Australian laws and have some understanding 
of the time that could be taken. Sellers have incentives to maximise competition among potential 
bidders in any sales process. 
18.4 ENFORCEMENT OF THE MERGER LAW 
The merger law in section 50 is able to be enforced through court proceedings taken, by either the 
ACCC or by private parties opposed to the merger, in similar manner to all other competition 
provisions in Part IV.521 Only the ACCC is able to seek injunctive relief from the court to prevent the 
merger proceeding. However, private parties can seek an order requiring the acquiring party to 
divest the business that was acquired or an order for damages caused to the private party by the 
merger. 
The Retail Guild of Australia submits that it is not only merger parties who are affected by mergers; 
third parties can also be adversely affected. Although third parties can seek to persuade the ACCC to 
oppose a merger and/or to take their own private legal action, the Retail Guild submits that, in many 
situations, the costs and risks of private action are too great, making it impractical for private parties 
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to challenge mergers. The Retail Guild calls for changes to limit the costs to which third parties may 
be exposed when taking private action to challenge a merger (DR sub, page 49). The Consumer 
Action Law Centre also submits that it is important to have merger processes that allow consumer 
perspectives to be taken into account (DR sub, page 24). 
The Panel agrees that it is important to ensure that legal rights and remedies under the CCA are not 
undermined by being too costly, slow or uncertain to be of practical assistance. However, there is a 
balance to be struck; it is also important to ensure certainty and timeliness in merger decisions and 
that business is not burdened by unwarranted legal proceedings. The impediments to private 
enforcement of competition laws are discussed in more detail in Section 23.2. However, the Panel 
does not support any change to the law that would immunise private parties from the risk of an 
adverse costs order in connection with merger proceedings. 
The Panel also agrees that consumer perspectives are important to decisions about mergers and 
considers that the proposed new merger authorisation process (discussed below) will provide 
improved opportunities for third parties, including consumers and their representatives, to be heard. 
18.5 MERGER APPROVAL PROCESSES 
As noted earlier, parties wishing to seek approval before they merge to avoid the risk of court action 
have three separate processes available to them: informal clearance by the ACCC; formal clearance 
by the ACCC; and authorisation by the Tribunal. Many submissions are directed to these processes, 
with various proposals for change. The Panel has weighed these various proposals carefully. 
ACCC’s informal merger clearance process 
The informal clearance process is the most commonly used of the merger clearance options, with the 
ACCC considering 289 transactions on this basis in 2012-13.522 
Under the informal merger clearance process, the ACCC considers information provided by the 
merger parties and other parties, conducts its own analysis and forms a view as to the likely 
competition effects of the proposed transaction. Informal clearance by the ACCC does not provide 
statutory protection from legal action under section 50; it provides the ACCC’s view on whether an 
acquisition is likely to breach the CCA. Similarly, ACCC opposition to a merger does not legally 
prohibit the merger; only a court can do that. 
The vast majority of submissions support the informal clearance process because of its flexibility and 
relatively low cost. The fact that the process leads to the ACCC forming a view, rather than a decision 
of a court, means that it is not necessary for parties to provide legally admissible evidence. This 
reduces the complexity and expense associated with the process. 
Changes to the informal process following the Dawson Review have generally been welcomed: 
These reforms include Statements of Issues, Public Competition Assessments and letters 
to the merger parties often referred to as ‘transparency letters’. The ACCC should be 
commended for its efforts to improve the level of accountability and transparency in its 
informal merger review process. (Herbert Smith Freehills, sub, page 2) 
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However, for more complex matters, some submissions express the view that the informal process 
can be slow and/or unpredictable in timing. Foxtel suggests that there should be a strict timetable for 
completion of merger clearances (sub, page 7) rather than the current system where the ACCC can 
change its indicative timetable (for example, at the request of the merger parties or to allow it to 
gather more information in order to form a concluded view). 
The Law Council of Australia — SME Committee does not agree that timelines for merger review in 
Australia are too long: 
The SME Committee also believes that the Harper Review would benefit from giving more 
detailed consideration to the processes which apply overseas, which generally have much 
longer timelines than exist in Australia. (DR sub, page 19) 
Some submissions, such as that of the Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer 
Committee, consider that the informal process does not go far enough in providing transparency to 
merger parties (sub, page 67). In its view, merger parties should generally have access to third-party 
submissions about the merger, not just the ACCC’s summary of these concerns (sometimes referred 
to as a ‘transparency letter’). 
The BCA goes further, proposing that the ACCC’s decision on whether or not to oppose a merger 
should be subject to ‘an internal review’ by ‘a panel of Associate Commissioners with expertise in 
competition law and economics’, with the merger parties making submissions. The BCA’s suggestions 
include that the ACCC could allow this panel of Associate Commissioners to overturn the ACCC’s 
original decision and make a new decision (BCA, sub, Main Report page 99). 
Telstra submits that, given the risk that the Panel’s proposed changes to the formal clearance and 
authorisation provisions may not proceed, the Panel should make some recommendations ‘in the 
alternative’ relating to concerns that the informal clearance process lacks transparency, timeliness 
and appropriate review mechanisms (DR sub, page 9). 
The Panel agrees that, without an effective formal clearance mechanism, any problems with the 
informal process become more critical. However, as the Dawson Review noted, ‘The strengths of the 
current informal clearance process [including its speed and efficiency] stem from its informal nature, 
as do its weaknesses.’523 
Attempts to further formalise the informal merger clearance process would reduce its flexibility and 
inevitably have timing and resourcing implications. There do not appear to be any examples of 
merger regimes overseas that offer a high level of transparency without also imposing stricter 
information requirements and longer timelines than the Australian system. 
The Panel considers that it is not sensible to attempt to regulate an informal process which, by 
definition, operates outside any formal legal framework. The flexibility of the informal process is 
widely recognised as being beneficial. 
Nevertheless, the public interest is served by timely merger decisions and by transparency in the 
public administration of the merger law. The Panel sees scope for further consultation between the 
ACCC and business representatives with the objective of developing an informal review process that 
delivers more timely decisions. 
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The Panel considers that the identified concerns about merger clearance should also be addressed 
through streamlining the formal approval process. 
A number of submissions call for ex-post evaluation of ACCC merger decisions and/or monitoring of 
market outcomes.524 An evaluation process of this kind would assess the validity and effectiveness of 
past merger decisions; specifically, whether mergers that were allowed to proceed subsequently 
resulted in substantial damage to competition and whether the assessment of markets and entry 
barriers, on the basis of which mergers were prevented, subsequently proved to be erroneous. The 
object of such evaluations would be to improve future decision-making processes and decisions.  
The Panel considers that such evaluations would be beneficial and could be performed by the 
proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP). This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 25.7. 
Formal merger processes — clearance and authorisation 
Since 2007, following recommendations made by the Dawson Review, the ACCC has been 
empowered under the CCA to grant a formal clearance to merger parties if it is satisfied that the 
merger would not substantially lessen competition. ACCC decisions are subject to review by the 
Tribunal. Also since 2007, the Tribunal has been empowered to grant authorisation to merger parties 
if it is satisfied that the public benefits resulting from the merger outweigh the anti-competitive 
detriment. Prior to 2007, no formal clearance mechanism existed and the power to grant merger 
authorisations was vested in the ACCC, with decisions subject to review by the Tribunal. 
The formal clearance process has not been used since its introduction in 2007. Submissions have 
indicated that, although improvements to the ACCC’s informal process partly explain this, 
unattractive features of the formal process also deter merger parties from using it. 
The availability of this alternative to the informal process, particularly in potentially 
contentious cases, is desirable and should be retained. However, the formal merger 
clearance process has not been used, in part because it is unduly complicated by strict 
technical formal requirements for a compliant application, including for example, the 
detailed and prescriptive standard form application … which is onerous and inflexible. 
(BCA, sub, Main Report page 63) 
Herbert Smith Freehills submits that the onus on merger parties to establish that the merger does 
not breach the CCA and the requirement for Tribunal review of merger clearance decisions to be ‘on 
the record’ contributes to its lack of use (sub, page 9). The Law Council of Australia — Competition 
and Consumer Committee and Herbert Smith Freehills both call for the formal process to be 
amended or repealed. 
The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee advocates replacing it with a 
new formal process to be triggered at a point in the informal process (sub, page 69), while Herbert 
Smith Freehills prefers a new system of notification (sub, page 10). The BCA considers that the formal 
process should be retained and improved via a review to be conducted by the Treasury, in 
consultation with business, competition law practitioners and the ACCC (sub, Summary Report 
page 18). 
                                                          
524 See, for example: BCA, DR sub, Appendix 2 page 37; Retail Guild, DR sub, page 41; and Australian Automobile 
Association, DR sub, page 3. 
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The Panel considers that the existence of a formal merger clearance option serves a useful purpose, 
even if it is seldom used, since it provides a time-limited, accessible alternative to the ACCC’s 
informal clearance process. Feedback from submissions and the fact that the process has never been 
used support the view that the process needs reform to remove unnecessary restrictions and 
requirements that may have acted as a deterrent to its use. Reform should be considered in 
conjunction with the authorisation process, addressing the question whether two separate merger 
approval processes are needed in addition to the informal merger clearance process. 
The merger authorisation process was not commonly used when it was administered by the ACCC 
(with appeal to the Tribunal). Since 2007, when administration was transferred to the Tribunal, it has 
been used even more rarely. The process has now been used twice: by Murray Goulburn in 2013 
(whose application was withdrawn for commercial reasons) and by AGL in 2014. In AGL’s case, the 
authorisation was obtained in three months from application. However, the application followed a 
period of three months in which AGL sought informal clearance from the ACCC.  
The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee notes that its members have 
‘mixed views as to the efficacy of the current authorisation process contained within the Act, and the 
extent to which improvements could or should be made …’ (sub, page 72). In its submission to the 
Issues Paper, it suggests some immediate changes that could be made if the current process were 
retained, including the Tribunal appointing a Counsel Assisting to allow for smoother running of 
matters (sub, page 72). 
Further, the Competition and Consumer Committee offers suggestions about how the authorisation 
and formal merger review processes might be combined if the Panel were to recommend such a 
change, including information requirements and the option for some parties to continue to apply 
directly to the Tribunal, bypassing the ACCC (DR sub, page 22). 
The ACCC submits that, although the Tribunal is a highly regarded and experienced merits review 
body, it is not well suited to the role of first-instance decision-maker and nor is the ACCC’s dual role 
under the current merger authorisation process satisfactory. 
In particular, the ACCC is required both to act as an investigative body and to assist the Tribunal. The 
former role involves conducting market inquiries and gathering information from market 
participants. The latter involves: preparing a report on matters specified by the President of the 
Tribunal and any matter the ACCC considers relevant; calling witnesses; reporting on statements of 
fact; examining and cross-examining witnesses; and making submissions on issues relevant to the 
application. The ACCC also raises concerns about the lack of a merits review process under the 
present merger authorisation process, which is inconsistent with the process for all other 
(non-merger) authorisations (sub 1, pages 83-86). 
The Panel considers that an efficient and effective formal merger approval process is important for 
the economy. Although the informal approval process has been shown to work effectively for the 
majority of mergers, parties to complex and contested mergers should have an alternative merger 
review process available to them that delivers transparent and timely decision making, consistent 
with international best practice. 
The Panel considers that the current dual processes for formal merger clearance have features that 
are sub-optimal. It agrees with the BCA that a formal approval process should be retained and 
improved with the specific features settled in consultation with business, competition law 
practitioners and the ACCC. 
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Notwithstanding, the Panel considers that the general framework should contain the following 
elements: 
• It would be preferable for the ACCC to be the first-instance decision-maker, rather than the 
Tribunal. Having regard to its composition and powers, the ACCC is better suited to 
investigation and first-instance decision making in the administration of the competition law, 
including mergers; while the Tribunal is better suited to an appellate or review role. 
• The ACCC should be empowered to approve a merger if it is satisfied that the merger does not 
substantially lessen competition or that the merger results in public benefits that outweigh any 
detriments. Empowering the ACCC to apply both tests would enable merger parties to make a 
single application for approval that addresses both the anti-competitive effects of the merger 
and any public benefits that arise. 
• The formal process should not be subject to prescriptive information requirements. As the 
merger parties will have the onus to satisfy the ACCC of the competitive consequences, or 
public benefits, of the merger, they will have sufficient incentive to place relevant information 
before the ACCC (or face the risk that the ACCC will not be so satisfied). However, the ACCC 
should be empowered to require the production of business and market information to test 
the arguments advanced by the merger parties. 
• The formal process should be subject to strict timelines that cannot be extended, except with 
the consent of the merger parties. 
• Decisions of the ACCC should be subject to merits review by the Tribunal. 
The Panel notes that this change could be implemented without increasing the current maximum 
statutory time period of six months for the determination of a merger authorisation, by allowing the 
ACCC and the Tribunal each a maximum of three months to make their respective determinations.  
Submissions in response to the recommendations in the Draft Report almost universally agree that 
the current formal merger clearance process is unsatisfactory and should be reformed. However, 
views differ about aspects of the Panel’s proposals for reform: 
• some submissions express concern about losing the ability to apply directly to the Tribunal for 
merger authorisation, bypassing the ACCC; 
• views differ about the form of Tribunal review under the proposed merger authorisation 
process (full merits review or limited review based on the information that was before the 
ACCC); and 
• the ACCC expresses concern that, if merger parties were not required to provide specified 
information to the ACCC, this would delay assessments, and parties would have no incentive to 
provide unfavourable information (DR sub, page 60). 
These concerns and the Panel’s views are discussed in detail below. 
Loss of ability to apply directly to the Tribunal for authorisation 
A number of submissions raise concerns about the proposal that applications for merger 
authorisation be considered by the ACCC at first instance (with a right of merits review by the 
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Tribunal), rather than the present system whereby applications are made directly to the Tribunal.525 
For example, AGL Energy Limited submits: 
It is critical to maintain the avenue of direct merger authorisation by the Tribunal so that a 
party challenging the ACCC’s view can introduce new evidence to the Tribunal, as well as 
test the ACCC’s evidence through cross-examination under oath. If the Tribunal became a 
review-only body, such as is being proposed, the Tribunal would only be able to consider 
those documents already created and previously submitted to the ACCC. 
However, AGL’s experience in merger clearances is that the ACCC does not always provide 
the applicant with complete information regarding the evidence it is relying upon or the 
issues that it considers may result in a competitive detriment. The current process does 
not compel the ACCC to provide such transparency. (DR sub, page 4) 
Other submitters526 agree with the Draft Recommendation that applications for merger authorisation 
be heard by the ACCC in the first instance, with a right of review by the Tribunal. For example, the 
Consumer Action Law Centre submits: 
We support the proposal ... that the ACCC (rather than the Australian Competition 
Tribunal) be the decision maker at first instance regarding mergers ... [W]e consider the 
formality of the Tribunal process discourages consumers and consumer advocates from 
participating in merger decisions. (DR sub, page 16) 
… we were involved in the Tribunal’s consideration of the merger between AGL and 
Macquarie Generation. Our experience in this matter was, again, that the Tribunal is not 
open to consumer perspectives for two reasons: 
 the tribunal received several submissions from consumer advocacy organisations, 
but none appeared to attract any real attention from the Tribunal; and 
 despite not being bound by the rules of evidence, the Tribunal’s processes are very 
formal and court-like, which makes it difficult for individuals or even consumer 
organisations to participate. (DR sub, page 24) 
The Panel remains of the view that, having regard to its composition and powers, the ACCC is better 
suited to investigation and first-instance decision-making. The concern expressed by AGL Energy 
Limited, cited above, ought to be addressed through the design of the formal merger approval 
process. 
Under a formal process, appropriate requirements regarding information transparency can be 
mandated, giving merger parties the opportunity to bring forward all relevant evidence to assist the 
ACCC in making its decision. Further, as discussed below, the Panel believes the Tribunal review 
process can be designed to ensure that any unfairness to a merger party arising during the ACCC’s 
decision making can be remedied. 
                                                          
525 See, for example: AGL Energy Limited, DR sub, page 4; Baker & McKenzie, DR sub, page 3; Business Council of 
Australia, DR sub, page 4; Energy Supply Association of Australia, DR sub, page 1; Daryl Guppy, DR sub, page 9; Law 
Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, DR sub, page 20; and George Raitt, DR Sub, page 2. 
526 See, for example: Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 5; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 15; and ACCC, DR sub, 
page 59. 
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Merits review 
Submissions differ on whether the Tribunal’s review of an ACCC decision not to grant merger 
authorisation should be: a full rehearing with the right to adduce further evidence and information; a 
limited review, based only on the material before the ACCC; or a hybrid process that empowers the 
Tribunal to allow further evidence or information and to examine witnesses in certain circumstances. 
AGL Energy Limited (DR sub, page 4) and the BCA (DR sub, page 37) both emphasise the importance 
of being able to introduce new evidence to the Tribunal, as well as to test the ACCC’s evidence 
through cross-examination under oath. 
The ACCC submits that the Tribunal should be limited to the information that was before the ACCC, 
but to ensure that ‘truly new information’ is available to the Tribunal, provision could be made for 
the Tribunal to be allowed to consider new information that was previously not available. (DR sub, 
page 62). 
The Panel believes that a hybrid process is preferable. A full rehearing with an unfettered ability for 
parties to put new material before the Tribunal would likely dampen the incentive to put all relevant 
material to the ACCC in the first instance and may lead to delays if the Tribunal has to deal with large 
amounts of new evidence. 
On the other hand, circumstances may arise in which it is reasonable to allow new evidence to be 
provided to the Tribunal: the evidence may not have been available to the ACCC or the merging 
parties at the time of the ACCC decision; or the relevance of the information may not have been 
apparent at that time. The Tribunal may also consider that it would be assisted by hearing directly 
from witnesses relied on by the ACCC, through questioning by the parties and/or the Tribunal. 
Accordingly, the Panel considers that the Tribunal’s review of the ACCC’s decision should be based 
upon the material before the ACCC, but that the Tribunal should have the discretion to allow a party 
to adduce further evidence, or to call and question a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied there is 
sufficient reason. 
Information requirements 
In relation to the information requirements for formal merger approval, the ACCC submits that 
Australia should adopt a similar approach to that used in New Zealand, where a new, less 
prescriptive set of information requirements was recently introduced (DR sub, pages 60-61).  
The Panel agrees the clearance application form published by the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission in June 2014 is a useful illustration of its proposed approach.527 
The Panel maintains the view that it should not be necessary to burden merger approval processes 
with prescriptive information requirements. In a formal merger approval process, the burden will be 
upon the merging parties to satisfy the ACCC (and the Tribunal on review) that the merger would not 
substantially lessen competition in any market or would give rise to public benefits that outweigh 
any detriment. Provided the law contains penalties for providing false information to the ACCC, and 
the ACCC is empowered to seek additional information and documents from the merging parties, the 
process ought to ensure that relevant and accurate information is made available. 
                                                          
527 New Zealand Commerce Commission, Application — Notice seeking clearance, New Zealand Commerce Commission, 
Wellington, viewed 5 February 2015, <www.comcom.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11963>. 
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The Panel’s view 
The Panel’s assessment is that overall the merger provisions of the CCA are working effectively. 
The Panel does not recommend any changes to the substantive law. 
In relation to merger approval processes, the informal process works quickly and efficiently for a 
majority of mergers. Issues of transparency and timeliness arise with the informal process when 
dealing with more complex and contentious matters. Addressing those issues by changing the 
informal process could weaken it. Nevertheless, there should be further consultation between the 
ACCC and business representatives with the objective of delivering more timely decisions in the 
informal review process. 
Merger review processes and analysis would also be improved by implementing a program of 
post-merger reviews, looking back on a number of past merger decisions to determine whether 
the ACCC’s processes were effective and its assessments borne out by events. This function could 
be performed by the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 44). 
The formal merger approval mechanism, as an alternative to informal merger clearance, must be 
accessible and effective. Specifically, the Panel supports reforms to combine the two current 
formal merger exemption processes (that is, the formal merger clearance process and the merger 
authorisation process) and remove unnecessary restrictions and requirements that may have 
deterred their use. The Panel also considers that merger authorisation applications should not be 
taken directly to the Tribunal, bypassing the ACCC. 
The Panel considers that the specific features of the improved formal approval process should be 
settled in consultation with business, competition law practitioners and the ACCC, subject to 
including specific elements as set out in Recommendation 35. 
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Recommendation 35 — Mergers 
There should be further consultation between the ACCC and business representatives with the 
objective of delivering more timely decisions in the informal merger review process. 
The formal merger exemption processes (that is, the formal merger clearance process and the 
merger authorisation process) should be combined and reformed to remove unnecessary 
restrictions and requirements that may have deterred their use. The specific features of the review 
process should be settled in consultation with business, competition law practitioners and the 
ACCC. 
However, the general framework should contain the following elements: 
• The ACCC should be the decision-maker at first instance. 
• The ACCC should be empowered to authorise a merger if it is satisfied that the merger does not 
substantially lessen competition or that the merger would result, or would be likely to result, in 
a benefit to the public that would outweigh any detriment. 
• The formal process should not be subject to any prescriptive information requirements, but the 
ACCC should be empowered to require the production of business and market information. 
• The formal process should be subject to strict timelines that cannot be extended except with 
the consent of the merger parties. 
• Decisions of the ACCC should be subject to review by the Australian Competition Tribunal under 
a process that is also governed by strict timelines. 
• The review by the Australian Competition Tribunal should be based upon the material that was 
before the ACCC, but the Tribunal should have the discretion to allow a party to adduce further 
evidence, or to call and question a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient 
reason. 
Merger review processes and analysis would also be improved by implementing a program of 
post-merger evaluations, looking back on a number of past merger decisions to determine 
whether the ACCC’s processes were effective and its assessments borne out by events. This 
function could be performed by the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see 
Recommendation 44). 
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19 UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
Firms with a substantial degree of market power can engage in behaviour that damages the 
competitive process and thereby restricts the ability of other firms to compete effectively. Most 
industrialised countries have enacted competition laws with prohibitions against monopolisation or 
abuse of a dominant market position.528 
Common to those laws is the principle that firms are entitled, and indeed are encouraged, to succeed 
through competition — by developing better products and becoming more efficient — even if they 
achieve a position of market dominance through their success. Those laws only prevent firms with 
substantial market power from engaging in conduct that damages competition. 
Large firms may also enjoy strong bargaining power that can be abused in dealings with their 
suppliers and business customers. While imbalance in bargaining power is a normal feature of 
commercial transactions, policy concerns are raised when strong bargaining power is exploited 
through imposing unreasonable obligations on suppliers and business customers. Such exploitation 
can traverse beyond accepted norms of commercial behaviour and damage efficiency and 
investment in the affected market sectors, requiring the law to respond both as a matter of 
commercial morality and to protect efficient market outcomes. 
Many jurisdictions have enacted prohibitions against unconscionable or unfair trading conduct 
between businesses (see Box 19.1). Those laws must strike a balance. On the one hand, the law 
should not intrude excessively into the bargaining process between businesses, as the bargaining 
process underpins the competitive market process that serves consumers and the welfare of 
Australians. On the other hand, on occasions, the bargaining process can be exploited by large or 
powerful firms in a manner that is inconsistent with commercial morality, requiring a response. 
Box 19.1: Examples of overseas approaches to anti-competitive unilateral conduct 
US: Prohibits monopolisation and attempted monopolisation by any firm (dominant or not) and 
requires an intent to monopolise and engage in predatory or anti-competitive conduct to prove a 
contravention (Sherman Act, section 2). 
EU: Prohibits any abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position in a market. Abuse can include 
imposing unfair trading conditions, limiting production to the prejudice of consumers, or applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions (Article 102, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)). 
Canada: Prohibits firms substantially or completely in control of a market from engaging in 
anti-competitive practices, which have the effect or likely effect of preventing or lessening 
competition substantially in a market (Competition Act, section 79). 
New Zealand: Prohibits a person with a substantial degree of power in a market from taking 
advantage of that power, for the purpose of restricting entry into, preventing or deterring 
competitive conduct in, or eliminating a person from, that or any other market (Commerce Act, 
section 36). 
In this chapter, the Panel considers the laws that regulate conduct by firms with substantial market 
or bargaining power, in light of the principles set out in Chapter 1. 
                                                          
528 OECD 1996, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation, OCDE/GD(96)131, Paris, page 35. 
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19.1 MISUSE OF MARKET POWER 
Section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) prohibits corporations that have a 
substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that power for the purpose of 
eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of a person into a market, 
or deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct.529 
Many submissions comment on section 46. As reflected in those submissions, opinions are divided 
on whether section 46 is framed in a manner that is effective in deterring anti-competitive behaviour 
by firms with substantial market power. 
Those seeking reform of the law most commonly propose that the prohibition should be revised or 
expanded to include an ‘effects’ test — that is, a firm with substantial market power would be 
prohibited from taking advantage of that power if the effect is to cause anti-competitive harm. Two 
main arguments are advanced for the inclusion of an effects test: 
• As a matter of policy, competition law ought to be directed to the effect of commercial 
conduct on competition, not the purpose of the conduct, because it is the anti-competitive 
effect of conduct that harms consumer welfare. 
• As a matter of practicality, proving the purpose of commercial conduct is difficult because it 
involves a subjective enquiry; whereas, proving anti-competitive effect is less difficult because 
it involves an objective enquiry. 
Those opposing reform are concerned that introducing an effects test would ‘chill’ competitive 
behaviour by firms in the market, which would be harmful to consumer welfare. 
The debate around whether section 46 should be based solely on a ‘purpose’ test or should also (or 
alternatively) have an ‘effects’ test is one of the enduring controversies of competition policy in 
Australia. Section 46 has been the subject of a large number of independent reviews and 
parliamentary inquiries (see Box 19.2). 
Box 19.2: History of proposals for an effects test530 
Year Review 
Recommend 
effects test? Reasons 
1976 Trade Practices Act Review Committee 
(Swanson Committee) 
No The section should only prohibit abuses 
by a monopolist that involve a proscribed 
purpose. 
1979 Trade Practices Consultative 
Committee (Blunt Review) 
No Would give the section too wide an 
application, bringing within its ambit 
much legitimate business conduct. 
1984 Green Paper, The Trade Practices Act 
Proposals for Change 
Yes Difficulty in proving purpose.  
1989 House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs (Griffiths Committee) 
No Insufficient evidence to justify the 
introduction of an effects test into 
section 46. 
                                                          
529 Part IV is mirrored in the Competition Code in Schedule 1 of the CCA, which applies the anti-competitive conduct laws 
through application legislation in the States and Territories. 
530 Adapted from Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the 
Dawson Review), Canprint Communications, Canberra, Box 3.2 History of the effects test, page 83. 
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Box 19.2: History of proposals for an effects test (continued) 
1991 Senate Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs (Cooney 
Committee) 
No Might unduly broaden the scope of 
conduct captured by section 46 and 
challenge the competitive process itself. 
1993 Independent Committee of Inquiry 
into Competition Policy in Australia 
(Hilmer Committee) 
No It would not adequately distinguish 
between socially detrimental and socially 
beneficial conduct. 
1999 Joint Select Committee on the 
Retailing Sector (Baird Committee) 
No Such a far-reaching change to the law 
may create much uncertainty in issues 
dealing with misuse of market power. 
2001 House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and 
Public Administration (Hawker 
Committee) 
No Await the outcome of further cases on 
section 46 before considering any change 
to the law. 
2002 Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee Inquiry into 
section 46 and section 50 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. 
No Referred consideration of section 46 to 
the Dawson Review. 
2003 Trade Practices Act Review Committee 
(Dawson Review) 
No The addition of an effects test would 
increase the risk of regulatory error and 
render purpose ineffective as a means of 
distinguishing between pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive. 
2004 Senate Economics References 
Committee Inquiry into the 
Effectiveness of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 in protecting Small Business 
No While sympathetic to some of the 
arguments for an effects test, the 
difficulties with introducing it meant that 
the Committee did not recommend the 
inclusion of an effects test. 
The Panel considers that the long-running debate concerning ‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ in the context of 
section 46 has been somewhat unproductive. In one sense the concerns raised by both sides of the 
debate are correct. 
Internationally, competition laws have been framed so as to examine the effects on competition of 
commercial conduct as well as the purpose of the conduct (see Appendix B). In Australia, section 45 
(anti-competitive arrangements) and section 47 (exclusive dealing) apply if the purpose, effect or 
likely effect of the conduct is to substantially lessen competition; section 50 (mergers) applies if the 
effect or likely effect of the conduct is to substantially lessen competition. 
Equally, competition laws have been framed (and interpreted) in a manner that is designed to 
minimise the risk that the law might chill competitive behaviour. 
The challenge is to frame a law that captures anti-competitive unilateral behaviour but does not 
constrain vigorous competitive conduct. Such a law must be written in clear language and state a 
legal test that can be reliably applied by the courts to distinguish between competitive and 
anti-competitive conduct. 
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Difficulties with the current form of section 46 
Section 46 only applies to firms that have a substantial degree of power in a market. The threshold 
test of substantial market power enjoys broad support, and the Panel did not receive any 
submissions making a case for change. 
Section 46 defines conduct as a misuse of market power if it satisfies two legal tests: 
• First, the conduct must have involved taking advantage of the firm’s market power. 
• Second, the conduct must have been undertaken for the purpose of eliminating or 
substantially damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of a person into a market, or 
deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct. 
Take advantage 
Both the courts and the legislature have wrestled with the meaning of the expression ‘take 
advantage’ over many years. Its meaning is subtle and difficult to apply in practice. The ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘take advantage’ is to use to one’s advantage. But when the words are coupled 
with market power, it is necessary to understand how a firm might use market power to its 
advantage and what constitutes a use of market power. 
The difficulty with the expression lies in the fact that market power is not a physical asset (such as an 
airport) or a commercial instrument (such as a lease), the use of which can be observed. Market 
power is an economic concept, describing the state or condition of a market. A firm possesses 
market power when it has a degree of freedom from competitive constraint. Recognising that, the 
High Court concluded in Queensland Wire531 that taking advantage of market power means engaging 
in conduct that would not be undertaken in a competitive market (because the firm would be 
constrained by competition). 
In the years since the decision in Queensland Wire, the difficulties in interpreting and applying the 
‘take advantage’ test and determining whether specific business conduct does or does not involve 
taking advantage of market power have become apparent. The following cases illustrate some of the 
difficulties. 
• In Melway,532 trial and appellate courts differed on whether refusing to supply Melway street 
directories to a particular retailer involved taking advantage of market power — the High 
Court ultimately concluded that it did not. 
• In Boral,533 trial and appellate courts differed on the circumstances required to show that 
selling products at low prices involved taking advantage of market power (and constituted 
predatory pricing). Following Boral, the Parliament amended section 46 in an attempt to 
capture predatory pricing conduct.534 However, the amendments themselves are cast in 
language that is difficult to interpret and apply in practice (while the amendments seek to 
prohibit pricing below cost, the expression ‘cost’ is not defined and there are circumstances in 
which pricing below certain measures of cost might be an ordinary business strategy in a 
competitive market). 
                                                          
531 Queensland Wire Industries v BHP (1989) 167 CLR 177. 
532 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 13. 
533 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374. 
534 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsections 46(1AAA) and (1AA). 
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• In Rural Press,535 trial and appellate courts differed on whether a threat by one regional 
newspaper publisher to begin distributing its newspaper in a neighbouring region, in order to 
deter the neighbour from distributing its newspaper in the first publisher’s region, involved 
taking advantage of market power — the High Court ultimately concluded that it did not. 
Following Rural Press, Parliament amended section 46 in an attempt to explain the meaning of 
‘take advantage’.536 It is doubtful that the amendments assisted. 
• Recently, in Cement Australia,537 the meaning of the expression ‘take advantage’ was again a 
central matter of dispute in determining whether conduct, involving the acquisition of flyash (a 
by-product of coal-fired electricity generation, that can be used as a cementitious material in 
concrete), amounted to a misuse of market power. The Federal Court concluded that the 
conduct did not amount to a misuse of market power in contravention of section 46 but did 
have the likely effect of substantially lessening competition in contravention of section 45. 
The important point is not whether the outcomes of those cases, on the facts before the court, were 
correct or incorrect from a competition policy perspective. The issue is whether the ‘take advantage’ 
limb of section 46 is sufficiently clear and predictable in interpretation and application to distinguish 
between anti-competitive and pro-competitive conduct.  
A number of submissions also draw attention to an economic problem in using the ‘take advantage’ 
test to distinguish between lawful and unlawful business conduct. The economic premise of the test 
is that a firm with substantial market power should be permitted to engage in particular business 
conduct if firms without market power also engage in that conduct. However, as observed by 
Katharine Kemp, US jurisprudence recognises that particular conduct might be competitively benign 
when undertaken by a firm without market power but competitively harmful where a firm has 
market power.538 Similarly, Professor Stephen Corones submits: 
… conduct engaged in by a firm with substantial market power will have a much greater 
propensity to have market-distorting foreclosure effect, than the same conduct engaged 
in by a firm without substantial market power. The need to examine the conduct of major 
business[es] more closely than those without market power has been recognised in both 
the United States and the EU. (DR sub, page 11) 
RBB Economics submits: 
Since the same conduct can have different economic effects in different circumstances, it 
follows that conduct can be anti-competitive when it is pursued by a firm with market 
power even if it is unproblematic in situations where such power is absent. If one 
considers most of the categories of conduct that can give rise to anti-competitive 
outcomes — price discrimination, exclusive dealing, loyalty rebates, bundling, refusal to 
deal, etc. — it is evident that these are also commonly observed phenomena in many 
well-functioning competitive markets. (DR sub, page 4)  
In the Panel’s view, the ‘take advantage’ limb of section 46 is not a useful test by which to distinguish 
competitive from anti-competitive unilateral conduct. The test has given rise to substantial 
difficulties of interpretation, revealed in the decided cases, undermining confidence in the 
effectiveness of the law. 
                                                          
535 Rural Press Limited v ACCC [2003] HCA 75. 
536 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsection 46(6A). 
537 ACCC v Cement Australia [2013] FCA 909. 
538 See also Katherine Kemp, DR sub, pages 9-12. 
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Further, and perhaps more significantly, the test is not best adapted to identifying misuse of market 
power. Business conduct should not be immunised merely because it is often undertaken by firms 
without market power. Conduct such as exclusive dealing, loss-leader pricing and cross-subsidisation 
may all be undertaken by firms without market power without raising competition concerns, while 
the same conduct undertaken by a firm with market power might raise competition concerns. 
Purpose 
The second legal test in section 46 is the ‘purpose’ test. As noted earlier, the purpose test has been 
the primary focus of debate concerning section 46. Compared to the ‘take advantage’ test, the 
meaning of the ‘purpose’ test in section 46 is at least clear and capable of reliable application by the 
courts. 
The debate over whether section 46 should include a subjective purpose test or an objective effects 
test tends to obscure a more significant issue. Presently, the purpose test in section 46 focuses on 
harm to individual competitors — conduct will be prohibited if it has the purpose of eliminating or 
substantially damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of a person into a market, or deterring or 
preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct. 
Ordinarily, competition law is not concerned with harm to individual competitors. Indeed, harm to 
competitors is an expected outcome of vigorous competition. Competition law is concerned with 
harm to competition itself — that is, the competitive process. 
Given the existing focus of the purpose test in section 46, resistance to changing the word ‘purpose’ 
to ‘effect’ is understandable. It would not be sound policy to prohibit unilateral conduct that had the 
effect of damaging individual competitors. However, an important question arises whether 
section 46 ought to be directed at conduct that has the purpose of harming individual competitors 
(under the existing purpose test) or whether it ought to be directed at conduct that has the purpose 
or effect of harming the competitive process (consistent with the other main prohibitions in 
sections 45, 47 and 50 of the CCA). 
Many submissions to the Draft Report express both strong support for539 and strong opposition to540 
changes to the existing focus of section 46, viz, on ‘purpose’. Other submissions canvass other 
                                                          
539 See, for example: Alinta Energy, DR sub, page 2; George Altman , DR sub, page 2; Australian Automotive Aftermarket 
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options, including retaining the existing proscribed purposes in addition to introducing a reference to 
‘effect’,541 duplicating existing provisions regarding the misuse of market power in the 
telecommunications industry542 and re-framing the test in terms of the ‘rule of reason’ approach 
adopted in the US.543 
The current purpose test in section 46 is inconsistent with the focus of equivalent prohibitions in 
overseas jurisdictions: 
• In respect of section 2 of the US Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolisation or attempts to 
monopolise in trade or commerce, the American Bar Association states that ‘Modern U.S. 
decisions hold that it is not subjective intent but objective intent that is relevant, and that 
intent can be inferred from conduct and effect. The focus of the U.S. courts is on evidence of 
monopoly power and proof of exclusionary conduct’ (American Bar Association, sub, page 7). 
• In Canada, section 79 of the Competition Act prohibits anti-competitive conduct by a dominant 
firm that has the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
• In respect of Article 102 of the TFEU which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, the 
International Bar Association states ‘… in recent years the approach of both the EU 
Commission and the European courts (together with many Member State authorities) to 
Article 102 TFEU has moved towards an approach which focuses more on whether the conduct 
of dominant businesses has (or would have) adverse effects on competition (in particular 
focussing in principle, on exclusionary conduct which forecloses equally efficient competitors)’ 
(International Bar Association, sub, page 17). 
The Panel considers that the current form of section 46, prohibiting conduct if it has the purpose of 
harming competitors, is misdirected as a matter of policy and out of step with equivalent 
international approaches. The prohibition ought to be directed to conduct that has the purpose or 
effect of harming the competitive process. 
Re-framing section 46 
An effective provision to deal with unilateral anti-competitive conduct is a necessary part of 
competition law. This is particularly the case in Australia where the small size of the Australian 
economy frequently leads to concentrated markets. The Panel considers that section 46 can be 
re-framed in a manner that will improve its effectiveness in targeting anti-competitive unilateral 
conduct. 
Accordingly, the Panel proposes that the primary prohibition in section 46 be re-framed to prohibit a 
corporation with a substantial degree of market power from engaging in conduct if the conduct has 
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market. 
The prohibition would make two significant amendments to the current law. First, it would remove 
the ‘take advantage’ element from the prohibition. Second, it would alter the ‘purpose’ test to the 
standard test in Australia’s competition law: purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
MasterCard, DR sub, pages 2-4; National Seniors Australia, DR sub, page 14; Origin Energy, DR sub, page 2; QBE 
Insurance Australia, DR sub, pages 3-4; Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, pages 10-15; Ian Stewart, DR sub, pages 4-8; 
Telstra Corporation Limited, DR sub, pages 13-16; and Wesfarmers Limited, DR sub, page 3. 
541 See, for example: Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 13. 
542 Vodafone Hutchison Australia, DR sub, page 14. 
543 American Bar Association, DR sub, pages 3-6. 
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competition. The test of ‘substantially lessening competition’ would enable the courts to assess 
whether the conduct is harmful to the competitive process. 
The proposed test of ‘substantial lessening of competition’ is the same as that found in section 45 
(anti-competitive arrangements), section 47 (exclusive dealing) and section 50 (mergers) of the CCA, 
and the test is well accepted within those sections. As explained by the former Trade Practices 
Tribunal in QCMA, competition ‘expresses itself as rivalrous market behaviour’ and ‘is a process 
rather than a situation’.544 
Section 4G of the CCA defines ‘lessening of competition’ to include ‘preventing or hindering 
competition’. The proper application of the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test is to consider 
how the conduct in question affects the competitive process — in other words, whether the conduct 
prevents or hinders the process of rivalry between businesses seeking to satisfy consumer 
requirements. 
The Panel’s proposed changes to section 46 in the Draft Report drew both support and opposition in 
subsequent submissions. Much of the opposition focuses on the defence proposed in the Draft 
Report, which is discussed below. 
A number of submissions express concern about introducing the ‘substantial lessening of 
competition’ test into section 46. They suggest the change would increase business cost and 
uncertainty because a business has relatively more information about the purposes for which it 
engages in conduct compared to the effect of its conduct on competitors (see for example, Business 
Council of Australia, DR sub, page 16). 
The Panel’s proposed reform to section 46 is an important change, which will (like all regulatory 
change) involve some transitional costs, as firms become familiar with the prohibition and as the 
courts develop jurisprudence on its application. In the Panel’s view, the change is justified as 
transitional costs should not be excessive and will be outweighed by the benefits. 
The Panel agrees with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) that the 
uncertainty ‘should not be unduly significant as the change is to an existing test with which 
businesses are already familiar’ (DR sub, page 53) — that is, the substantial lessening of competition 
test used in other provisions of the CCA. This incorporates ‘standards and concepts … at least well 
enough known as to be susceptible to practically workable ex ante analysis’ (Minter Ellison, DR sub, 
page 5). 
Indeed, framing the offence by reference to the impact on competition in a market enables major 
businesses to advance pro-competitive justifications for their conduct (Professor Stephen Corones, 
DR sub, page 3), in the absence of an anti-competitive purpose. 
The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee supports retaining section 46 
in its existing form. However, it also submits that, if the law were to be amended to a ‘substantial 
lessening of competition’ test, the purpose element should be deleted; in other words, conduct by a 
firm with substantial market power would be unlawful if it would have or be likely to have the effect 
of substantially lessening competition. This is the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test used in 
section 50 of the CCA (mergers) and in the equivalent Canadian prohibition (referred to above). The 
Competition and Consumer Committee submits that a prohibition based on the competitive purpose 
of business conduct runs the risk of ‘prohibiting statements of hostile (but aggressively competitive) 
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intent rather than only anticompetitive conduct, by firms with substantial market power’ (DR sub, 
page 15). 
The Panel acknowledges the force of this submission but considers that the Committee’s concern is 
mitigated by altering the focus of the prohibition from a purpose of harming a competitor to a 
purpose of substantially lessening competition. 
In recommending reform of section 46, the Panel wishes to minimise the risk of inadvertently 
capturing pro-competitive conduct, thereby damaging the interests of consumers. To neutralise 
concerns about over-capture, the Panel proposed a defence in the Draft Report. The defence 
provided that the prohibition would not apply if the conduct in question would be both: 
• a rational business decision by a corporation that did not have a substantial degree of power in 
the market; and 
• likely to have the effect of advancing the long-term interests of consumers. 
The onus of proving that the defence applied would have fallen on the corporation engaging in the 
conduct. 
This proposed defence is generally not supported by submissions. Many feel that the first limb leaves 
a number of questions unanswered, and replicates the problems with the existing ‘take advantage’ 
test: 
... does it have to be a profit maximising strategy, or could a strategy aimed at increasing 
market share that was not profit maximising qualify? If the respondent gives reasons for 
the conduct and the court accepts those reasons as genuine, is the court then required to 
go behind the reasons, and decide whether the explanations were objectively valid in 
terms of economic theory or best business practice? (Professor Stephen Corones, DR sub, 
page 3) 
This is a reformulation of the ‘take advantage’ requirement that exists in the current 
section 46. It gives rise to the same problems that flow from the ‘take advantage’ test. It 
requires the application of a counterfactual test that inverts the traditional counterfactual 
test applied elsewhere in the Act … (Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 3) 
Other submissions comment that the first limb would shift the onus of proof to the respondent: 
Effectively moving a similar concept to the ‘take advantage’ element to a defence would 
also effectively shift the burden of proof from the ACCC to the respondent, imposing 
considerable costs on business. (Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, 
page 33) 
... it is inappropriate for the onus to be on the defendant to establish such a defence. 
Misuse of market power is a serious allegation and a person making such an allegation 
should, at minimum, have a proper factual and legal basis for that person’s case in 
relation to the types of matters referred to in any such defence. (Arnold Bloch Leibler, 
DR sub, page 6) 
This reverse onus of proof means that, to avoid inadvertently breaching the law in 
developing new products and competitive strategies, businesses will have to undertake 
assessments of their current and proposed practices to establish how a hypothetical 
rational business would behave and operate … To do this effectively would require an 
extensive and high level undertaking that would be both time consuming and costly. 
(Insurance Australia Group, DR sub, page 2) 
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Concerns are also raised about the second limb of the defence: 
If a corporation can prove that its conduct is in fact in the long-term interests of 
consumers, that ought to be a sufficient defence … one way of satisfying such a defence 
would be to prove that the relevant conduct is efficient, and the Society recommends 
rephrasing the second limb of the defence to clarify that position. (Queensland Law 
Society, DR sub, page 4) 
The added requirement of the second limb to prove conduct in the long-term interests of 
consumers is too vague to serve as a defence. (Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 9) 
... the ‘long-term interests of consumers’ … is a standard which isn’t properly capable of 
practically workable ex ante application. Businesses are often not well equipped to assess 
the long term interests of consumers. They are usually more interested in more 
immediate buying preferences and buyer behaviour rather than considering how 
consumers’ interests will be served over the long term. (Minter Ellison, DR sub, page 5) 
Others argue that the proposed defence is unnecessary. They posit that a prohibition of misuse of 
market power based on the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test is sufficiently certain given the 
jurisprudence developed under sections 45, 47 and 50 that use the same test. The ACCC submits: 
The risk of overreach, as raised in submissions to the Review Panel and in the media, 
reflects a misconception of the SLC [substantial lessening of competition] test and there 
appears to be a significant degree of misunderstanding regarding the conduct that is likely 
to be prohibited by an SLC test. 
Damage to competitors, even to the extent of competitors being forced out of business, is 
not necessarily evidence of a lessening of competition. … businesses ‘competing’ through 
offering better products or services or by undertaking a successful promotional campaign, 
undertaking research and development which results in better products or more efficient 
processes, or passing savings through to consumers will be enhancing competition, not 
lessening it. (DR sub, page 52) 
Similarly, Minter Ellison submits: 
… the concepts of ‘substantial degree of power’, ‘purpose’, ‘effect’, and ‘substantially 
lessening competition’ are all well understood from past cases and therefore tractable for 
the purposes of allowing ex ante guidance for business conduct. (DR sub, page 5) 
The New Zealand Commerce Commission notes: 
We recognise the Panel’s desire to avoid capturing pro-competitive conduct. However, we 
consider that a defence that the conduct was pro-competitive can, and should, be 
captured within the main test as to whether the conduct had the effect, or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. This can occur, for example, through the recognition 
of actual or potential efficiency gains. (DR sub, page 5) 
RBB Economics submits: 
Our query would be whether it is possible that the proposed prohibition itself, which 
confines itself to conduct that will or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition, requires any additional defences. Pro-competitive conduct that harms 
competitors through the superior efficiency of the firm with market power should not in 
our view be categorised as creating an SLC [substantial lessening of competition] in the 
first place. Provided that was made clear in the framing and context of the law, the need 
for defences against false positives should not arise. (DR sub, page 5) 
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In light of arguments presented in submissions, the Panel accepts that the defence proposed in the 
Draft Report is not the best means of addressing potential concerns that the revised prohibition may 
inadvertently catch pro-competitive conduct. 
As a number of submissions observe, conduct undertaken by a firm with substantial market power 
can have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. For example, a firm with substantial 
market power may compete vigorously in a market through lower prices. If that is sustained through 
cross-subsidisation from another aspect of the firm’s operation, it may limit the ability of other firms 
in that market to compete. The issue for the court, and for firms assessing their own conduct, is to 
weigh the pro-competitive and anti-competitive factors to decide if the cross-subsidisation involves a 
substantial lessening of competition. 
Further, the inclusion of a defence to section 46 would be inconsistent with the approach taken in 
sections 45, 47 and 50 (where there is no express defence) and runs the risk of casting doubt on the 
established meaning of the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test.  
The approach adopted in comparable overseas jurisdictions is to empower the court to take into 
account the pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects of business conduct. Professor Stephen 
Corones submits that ‘under both EU competition law and US antitrust law, firms with substantial 
market power are provided with the opportunity of demonstrating pro-competitive efficiency 
justifications for their conduct’ (DR sub, pages 4-5). 
In respect of section 2 of the Sherman Act, the American Bar Association observes: 
In the U.S., a monopolist may rebut evidence of anticompetitive conduct by establishing 
that it had a valid justification for the conduct—that is, one related directly or indirectly to 
enhancing consumer welfare. For example, conduct may be important to preserve 
investment incentives or to generate cost savings that will be passed on to consumers. Or, 
the restraint may be necessary to bring a new product to the market. Assuming the 
monopolist shows it had a valid business justification, a plaintiff must then address 
whether the conduct is reasonably necessary to achieve those efficiencies and whether 
substantially the same efficiencies can be achieved by significantly less restrictive 
available alternatives. No legal distinction is typically made between short-term versus 
long-term effects. (DR sub, page 4) 
The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee suggests that, instead of a 
defence, section 46 might require the court to have regard to whether the conduct is 
efficiency-enhancing or include a list of factors to be taken into account (such as those contained in 
subsection 50(3) in the context of mergers) (DR sub, pages 18 and 19). 
The Panel considers that the preferable approach is to include in section 46 legislative guidance with 
respect to the section’s intended operation. Specifically, the legislation should direct the court, when 
determining whether conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition in a market, to have regard to: 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of increasing 
competition in the market, including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, product quality or 
price competitiveness; and 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening 
competition in the market, including by preventing, restricting or deterring the potential for 
competitive conduct in the market or new entry into the market. 
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These considerations would be mandatory, but non-exhaustive. The existing interpretative provisions 
in section 46, insofar as they are relevant to the proposed new test, would be retained 
(subsections 46(2) to 46(4)). 
The legislative guidance would assist with the court’s analysis and businesses’ understanding of how 
the proposed prohibition should be applied. The proposed legislative factors would expressly direct 
the court to consider any pro-competitive aspects of the impugned conduct, in addition to the 
alleged anti-competitive aspects, in assessing whether the conduct has the overall purpose, effect or 
likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
The Panel considers that introducing this legislative guidance is preferable to the defence proposed 
in the Draft Report. It is consistent with the legislative approach adopted in other provisions of the 
CCA, notably subsection 50(3) (mergers) and Australian Consumer Law section 22 (unconscionable 
conduct). It also addresses concerns expressed about reversing the onus of proof in the proposed 
defence, while clarifying the object of the prohibition. 
The proposed reform would allow section 46 to be simplified. Amendments introduced since 2007 
would be unnecessary and could be repealed. These include specific provisions prohibiting predatory 
pricing and amendments that attempt to explain the meaning of ‘take advantage’. 
Any residual concerns about business uncertainty can be further mitigated in two ways: 
• first, as recommended below, authorisation should be available to exempt conduct from the 
prohibition in section 46; and 
• second, the ACCC should issue guidelines on its approach to enforcing section 46, prepared in 
consultation with business stakeholders, legal experts and consumer groups, and issued in 
advance of the commencement of the revised prohibition. 
The proposed amendment to section 46 and the availability of authorisation would also obviate the 
need for the telecommunications industry-specific anti-competitive conduct provisions (Division 2 of 
Part XIB) and exemption order regime (Subdivision B, Division 3 of Part XIB) of the CCA. Division 2 
currently provides for an effects-based test in relation to the conduct of carriers or carriage service 
providers (within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 1997) with a substantial degree of 
power in a telecommunications market. Division 3 allows applications to the ACCC for an order 
exempting specific conduct from the scope of that effects test, where the public benefit outweighs 
the anti-competitive detriment. In this context, the Panel notes the Australian Government has 
announced a review of Part XIB of the CCA during the second part of 2015,545 in response to 
Recommendation 2 of the Statutory Review under section 152EOA of the CCA546 that Part XIB should 
be reviewed to assess its continued utility and effectiveness. 
Divestiture remedy to address market power concerns 
A court may order a broad range of remedies following a finding that a firm has engaged in misuse of 
market power in contravention of section 46. These remedies include declarations, injunctions, 
                                                          
545 Australian Government 2014, Telecommunications Regulatory and Structural Reform, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, page 14. 
546 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Review of Regulation 2014, The Statutory Review under section 152EOA of the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010, Canberra, page 24. 
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damages and civil penalties.547 However, neither the ACCC nor a private party is able to seek a 
divestiture order from the court to break up the firm found to have misused its market power. 
The Panel notes that divestiture as a remedy is raised in submissions to the Agricultural 
Competitiveness Green Paper and in submissions to this Review. For example, Master Grocers 
Australia/Liquor Retailers Australia considers: 
Whilst the inclusion of divestiture in a mandatory code would be a useful and powerful 
deterrent to misuse of market power, the additional inclusion of divestiture as a sanction 
in Section 46 of the CCA would be an appropriate powerful measure, including a 
deterrent, in overcoming conduct of the kind that is currently destroying healthy 
competition in the Australian supermarket industry. (DR sub, pages 20-21) 
The Hilmer548 and Dawson549 reviews considered proposals for a specific divestiture remedy (to be 
used in circumstances other than mergers) to address competition concerns about businesses with 
significant market power. Those reviews did not recommend its adoption because of the potentially 
broad nature of such a remedy and difficulties in targeting the conduct of concern. The Dawson 
Review noted that divestiture as a remedy in the case of acquisitions leading to a substantial 
lessening of competition is different to divestiture as a remedy for misuse of market power. 
Divestiture in the context of mergers involves the court ‘unwinding’ a transaction rather than 
splitting a firm that has expanded through organic growth.550 
Providing a general divestiture provision within the CCA for Part IV offences could, if exercised, see 
matters of market conduct dealt with through a structural remedy. Although reducing the size of a 
firm may limit its ability to misuse its market power, divestiture is likely to have broader impacts on 
the firm’s general efficiency. Such changes could also have negative flow-on effects to consumer 
welfare. It is also possible that divested parts of a business might be unviable.551 Further, it would 
leave the redesign of a firm or industry in the hands of the court, which is generally not well 
positioned to make decisions about industry policy. 
In the US, divestiture is available as a remedy for violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act (the 
anti-monopolisation provision). However, divestiture is ordered only rarely: the last major use of the 
divestiture remedy was the 1982 consent decree that broke the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company into a number of smaller companies:552 
Structural remedies present a number of difficulties and normally are reserved for cases 
in which a conduct remedy is insufficient … The least common and most complex form of 
structural remedy is breaking the dominant firm into competing entities. This sort of 
                                                          
547 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Part VI. 
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remedy has not been used in the United States in recent decades but was applied in the 
landmark American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases nearly a century ago.553 
In light of the above, the Panel considers the existing range of remedies is sufficient to deter a firm 
from misusing its market power and to protect and compensate parties that have been harmed by 
such unlawful conduct. Where section 46 is breached, the court already has available to it a wide 
range of sanctions, including: pecuniary penalties that can greatly exceed the benefit the firm has 
obtained from the conduct; a range of remedial orders, such as compensation payments to parties 
who have suffered loss or damage; and injunctive relief.554  
Ultimately, if circumstances were to arise where the public interest would be served by breaking up a 
firm or redesigning an industry, for competition or other policy purposes, it is open to the Parliament 
to legislate to bring about such reform. Such action would be expected to be rare and exceptional. 
Nevertheless, the Panel considers it preferable for any such action to be implemented by the 
Parliament rather than by the court as a remedy for breaches of competition law. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that section 46 is deficient in its current form. The ‘take advantage’ limb of 
section 46 is not a useful test by which to distinguish competitive from anti-competitive unilateral 
conduct. The ‘purpose’ limb, that prohibits conduct if it has the purpose of harming competitors, is 
misdirected as a matter of policy and out of step with equivalent international approaches.  
The provision should be directed to conduct that has the purpose, or would have or be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition, in a similar manner to the prohibitions in 
sections 45, 47 and 50. The provision should also include legislative guidance directing courts and 
firms to weigh the pro-competitive and anti-competitive impact of conduct. 
As with any change to the law, amending section 46 will involve some uncertainty, but the 
proposal adopts the long-standing expressions ‘substantial degree of power in a market’ and 
‘substantial lessening of competition’. 
Although uncertainty may lead to some cost, the Panel considers this is outweighed by the benefit 
of a more effective prohibition on unilateral anti-competitive conduct. 
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Recommendation 30 — Misuse of market power 
The primary prohibition in section 46 of the CCA should be re-framed to prohibit a corporation 
that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct if the proposed 
conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in that or any other market. 
To mitigate concerns about inadvertently capturing pro-competitive conduct, the legislation 
should direct the court, when determining whether conduct has the purpose, effect or likely 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, to have regard to: 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of increasing 
competition in the market, including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, product quality or 
price competitiveness; and 
• the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening 
competition in the market, including by preventing, restricting or deterring the potential for 
competitive conduct in the market or new entry into the market. 
Such a re-framing would allow the provision to be simplified. Amendments introduced since 2007 
would be unnecessary and could be repealed. These include specific provisions prohibiting 
predatory pricing, and amendments clarifying the meaning of ‘take advantage’ and how the causal 
link between the substantial degree of market power and anti-competitive purpose may be 
determined. 
Authorisation should be available in relation to section 46, and the ACCC should issue guidelines 
regarding its approach to the provision. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
19.2 MISUSE OF MARKET POWER IN A TRANS-TASMAN CONTEXT 
In the context of simplifying the CCA, the Draft Report recommends removing the provision 
concerning misuse of market power in a trans-Tasman market, section 46A (and the accompanying 
section 46B). 
Section 46A was enacted in 1990 (with a reciprocal provision in New Zealand’s Commerce Act) 
following the 1988 Australia/New Zealand Closer Economic Relations — Trade Agreement on 
Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods.555 Importantly, that agreement abolished anti-dumping 
measures between Australia and New Zealand. The object of section 46A was to use competition law 
as a safeguard against dumping-type conduct (that is, predatory pricing across the Tasman). 
Section 46A is in substantially the same form as section 46, save that it prohibits a firm taking 
advantage of substantial market power in a trans-Tasman market (a market in Australia, New 
Zealand or both) with the purpose of harming a competitor in an Australian market (other than a 
market for services, reflecting the dumping origins of the section).  
Insofar as a corporation takes advantage of market power in an Australian market or a market that 
spans both Australia and New Zealand, section 46A overlaps with section 46 in the CCA and is 
redundant. The principal circumstance in which the section has potential additional operation is if a 
                                                          
555 Ray, R (Minister for Defence) 1990, Second reading speech: Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power) 
Bill 1990, Canberra, 22 May. 
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firm with substantial market power in a New Zealand market (but not an Australian market) takes 
advantage of that power to harm a competitor in an Australian market involving the supply of goods.  
The Panel questions the continued utility of the section because: 
• First, since its enactment in 1990, the Panel is aware of only one case in which it has been 
invoked — an application for an interlocutory injunction, which was unsuccessful: Berlaz Pty 
Ltd v Fine Leather Care Products Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-118. 
• Second, it is doubtful that the section is able to achieve its original aim — to prohibit predatory 
pricing in an Australian goods market by a firm with market power in New Zealand. This is 
because predatory pricing in those circumstances would typically require the predatory firm to 
possess market power in the Australian market, not a New Zealand market, since the 
predation could not be successful without market power in the Australian market. 
Nevertheless, since section 46A was enacted as part of a package of reforms agreed between 
Australia and New Zealand relating to the trade in goods between the countries, its reconsideration 
should occur through consultations between both jurisdictions. Factors that might be considered 
during such consultations include: 
• whether the reciprocal prohibitions in the CCA and New Zealand’s Commerce Act have any 
significant operative effect; 
• if section 46 of the CCA is reformed in line with the Panel’s recommendation, whether the 
reciprocal prohibitions in both Acts ought to be reformed in like manner; and 
• if the reciprocal provisions are retained, whether they should be extended to markets 
involving the supply of services. 
The Panel’s view 
Reconsideration of section 46A should formally engage both jurisdictions to determine appropriate 
simplifications, amendments or removal of the provisions in each jurisdiction. 
19.3 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices for the same or similar goods or 
services, where the price difference does not reflect differences in the cost of supply, for example, 
student, seniors and family discounts, ‘early bird specials’, and discounts for bulk purchases and 
group buying. 
The effects of price discrimination will depend on the particular circumstances of the market. Pricing 
according to consumer willingness to pay can result in more consumers being able to obtain the good 
or service than if a common price were charged. In these circumstances, price discrimination can 
make goods or services more accessible and can enhance consumer choice. 
Price discrimination was prohibited under the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) until 1995, 
when the prohibition was removed (see Box 19.3). Nonetheless, awareness of price discrimination 
can irritate consumers who find themselves unable to purchase goods at the same price that others 
can. 
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Box 19.3: The former prohibition on price discrimination 
Prior to 1995, the then TPA had a specific provision against certain types of price discrimination. 
The Hilmer Review found that this provision was contrary to the objective of economic efficiency 
and had not assisted small business. Further, instances where price discrimination may have an 
anti-competitive effect could be adequately dealt with by other parts of the law. The Hilmer 
Review concluded ‘that a provision such as [section] 49 should form no part of a national 
competition policy’556 and, in 1995, the former section 49 was repealed. 
The Hilmer recommendations followed those of the Swanson (1976) and Blunt (1979) Committees, 
which had also proposed repealing the prohibition on price discrimination.557 The issue was 
reconsidered in the Dawson Review in 2003. The Dawson Review found that empirical evidence 
did not indicate the need for further regulation of price discrimination.558 
Some submissions call for reinstating a specific anti-competitive price discrimination provision, 
particularly in relation to the supply of goods to supermarkets.559 For example, AURL FoodWorks 
states: 
The practice of suppliers selling to some customers at one price and to other comparable 
customers at a higher price is an on-going concern … Independent wholesalers are not 
able to obtain goods or services at prices comparable to those charged by suppliers to the 
major chain supermarkets. This is despite having central distribution warehouses of 
comparable size and capable of like performance to the major chains. (sub, pages 7-8) 
Supporters of a price discrimination provision often argue that it would improve the ability of small 
businesses to compete, allowing them to be more responsive to consumer needs because it would 
remove the capacity of larger firms to price their product below the level charged by local, smaller 
retailers.560 However, restricting pricing flexibility can be harmful to competition and thereby harm 
consumers, a view supported by many submissions to the Draft Report.561 
                                                          
556 Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, page 80. 
557 The Trade Practices Act Review Committee 1976, Report to the Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs noted that 
section 49 drew more criticism in submissions than any other and found that some suppliers took the law to mean 
that they were required to charge similar prices to all customers, which led to price rigidity and overall price 
increases. 
 The Trade Practices Consultative Committee 1979, Small business and the Trade Practices Act again called for the 
repeal of section 49. The Committee noted that the flexibility of pricing was impaired by the operation of section 49 
and certain rigidities were introduced both by the section and the uncertainties of its application.  
558 Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act, Canprint 
Communications, Canberra, page 97. 
559 See, for example: Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 10; Master Grocers Australia, DR sub, 
pages 21-22; Bi-Rite Roma, DR sub, pages 1-2; and WA Independent Grocers Association, DR sub, pages 1-2. 
560 See generally submissions to the Senate Economics Committee, Inquiry into the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Guaranteed Lowest Prices — Blacktown Amendment) Bill 2009. 
561 See, for example: Australian Information Industry Association, DR sub, pages 9-11; Alinta Energy, DR sub, page 3; 
Australasian Performing Right Association Limited & Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners’ Society, DR sub, 
page 5; Australian Automotive Aftermarket Association, DR sub, page 4; Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, DR sub, page 20; ACCC, DR sub, page 54; Australian Copyright Council, DR sub, pages 6-7; Communications  
Law Centre, UTS, DR sub, pages 3-4; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 16; Electronic Frontiers Australia, DR 
sub, page 3; Daryl Guppy, DR sub, page 9; Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, DR sub, 
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Price discrimination should only be unlawful where it substantially lessens competition. The Panel 
agrees with the conclusions of previous reviews that anti-competitive price discrimination is best 
addressed under section 46. Some submissions to the Draft Report advise caution in relation to the 
reliance placed on section 46, and call for a more in-depth examination of the issue of price 
discrimination,562 on the basis that some retailers are unable to buy products from their suppliers at 
a price that is lower than the retail prices being charged by their major competitors. 
In the Panel’s view, the proposal for reforming section 46 should assist in identifying and prohibiting 
such conduct (see Recommendation 30). That is, the reforms would catch conduct engaged in by the 
major competitor (a firm with a substantial degree of power in a market) with the purpose, effect or 
likely effect of substantially lessening competition. The court would consider whether the price 
differential is explained by efficiency, innovation or price competitiveness (such as that achieved 
through volume-based pricing from suppliers) and whether it prevents, restricts or deters 
competitive conduct or new entry in the market. 
International price discrimination 
International price discrimination occurs when a supplier charges different prices for goods or 
services according to the country in which the products are sold. It is a common practice for products 
that enjoy intellectual property (IP) protection, such as books, digital music and videos, and software. 
Both IP laws and technology provide the means to segment markets by country.  
The Communications Law Centre, UTS states: 
… with respect to international price discrimination in relation to intellectual property 
products … copyright owners are entitled to: 
 segment markets by territory, and to enter into territorial licensing and distribution 
agreements; 
 discriminate as to price in different territories; and 
 use geoblocking measures to protect market segmentation. (DR sub, page 3) 
The ACCC also notes: 
While such practices are not new, the rise of the digital economy has increased 
consumers access to global marketplaces and awareness of different (higher) prices that 
may be charged in their home country. (sub 1, page 117) 
The Panel heard concerns about international price discrimination. For example, CHOICE points to 
evidence of price differences for music and movies from Apple’s Australian and US iTunes stores. 
According to CHOICE, Australians can also pay up to 60 per cent more for clothing and up to 
200 per cent more for cosmetics (sub, pages 13–15). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
page 34; National Seniors Australia, DR sub, pages 14-15; Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 4; and Woolworths, 
DR sub, page 32. 
562 See, for example: Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 16; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, 
DR sub, page 16; and Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 15. 
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The Issues Paper notes that the Canadian Government has announced plans to introduce legislation 
to address country-specific price discrimination against Canadian consumers.563 The Panel received 
submissions calling for a similar policy in Australia. Consumers SA states that it: 
... encourages the review to explore the possibility of legislation to inhibit international 
price discrimination … (sub, page 3) 
There are significant implementation difficulties associated with any attempt to prohibit 
international price discrimination. The American Bar Association notes: 
Regulation of international price differences is a risky endeavor. Even if regulation is 
limited to … ‘unjustified’ price discrimination, identifying such cases is extremely difficult 
given the complexity of the factors influencing pricing decisions in a given country … It 
could also create incentives for foreign suppliers to abandon or choose not to enter the 
Australian market, resulting in less choice for consumers and less interbrand 
competition in Australia. Likewise, Australian companies might opt out of overseas 
markets, or be constrained in their ability to compete in certain countries. (sub, page 3) 
While technology, including geoblocking, can contribute to instances of international price 
discrimination, the growth of distribution channels, both physical and technological, can help 
consumers and businesses overcome price discrimination. For example: 
• In markets for physical goods, mail-forwarding companies allow Australian consumers to buy 
goods in overseas jurisdictions and then have them forwarded to Australia. 
• Product review websites and price monitoring and comparison sites can help consumers find 
the product or service that best meets their needs and at the best price (see further discussion 
in Chapter 16). 
Some Australian consumers reportedly use virtual private networks to access digital content in 
overseas jurisdictions at the prices available in those jurisdictions.564 These prices may be lower than 
those charged in Australia, or the content may not be available in Australia. The legality of these 
mechanisms is the subject of some debate and is likely to depend on the specific circumstances and 
the terms and conditions relating to the transaction. The Panel notes that the Australian Government 
has issued guidance pointing out that ‘The Copyright Act does not make it illegal to use a [virtual 
private network] to access overseas content’.565 
In its evidence to the House of Representatives Standing Committee Inquiry into IT pricing, the ACCC 
noted that mechanisms to circumvent international price discrimination can help to put competitive 
pressure on prices: 
If the methods start to become a big enough way in which consumers are circumventing 
the limitations … those methods can start to have … an impact in the market … An 
illustration of that is the response of some of the television networks to bring forward 
                                                          
563 On 9 December 2014 the Canadian Government tabled the Price Transparency Act, intended to give Canada’s 
Commissioner of Competition the power to ‘seek court orders to compel the production of evidence to expose 
discriminatory pricing practices that are not justified by higher costs in Canada and to publicly report to consumers on 
the findings’. See: <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=913079>. 
564 See, for example: Lobarto, R and Ewing, S 2014, Australians embrace VPNs, Swinburne University of Technology, 
3 October, Melbourne, which notes that of 1,000 people surveyed about various aspects of their internet use, twenty 
per cent of respondents indicated they used a virtual private network, or web proxy, or both, to access the internet 
and download files at home. 
565 Turnbull, M (Minister for Communications) 2014, New Measures to tackle online copyright infringement, media 
release, 10 December, Canberra. 
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their broadcast of some of the popular overseas programming that would otherwise be 
made available through some of the illegal downloading sites.566 
However, some submissions to the Draft Report strongly oppose actions that circumvent 
international price discrimination: 
Foxtel believes that the Panel’s apparent desire to assist consumers to circumvent 
geo-blocks is misguided and dangerous … Furthermore, what the Panel does not appear 
to have appreciated is that any attempt to assist Australians to circumvent geo-blocks will 
have a real impact on the Australian businesses that invest in Australian content, create 
Australian jobs and pay tax in Australia. (Foxtel, DR sub, pages 11-12) 
... geo-blocking exists as an important and internationally applied, if imperfect, tool for 
writers and publishers to trade and manage the supply of their electronic-format 
copyright works into other markets. (Australian Society of Authors, DR sub, page 7) 
The Panel favours encouraging the use of market-based mechanisms to address international price 
discrimination rather than attempting to introduce a legislative solution. 
The Panel notes the recommendations of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Infrastructure and Communications in its July 2013 report into IT pricing in Australia.567 The 
Committee recommends removing restrictions on parallel imports, consistent with 
Recommendation 13. 
In addition, the Committee makes a number of recommendations (set out in Box 19.4) that the Panel 
endorses in principle as a means of encouraging market-based, consumer-driven solutions to 
concerns about international price discrimination. The Committee also makes a number of 
recommendations that could form part of the overarching review of IP the Panel proposes in 
Recommendation 6. 
Box 19.4: Relevant recommendations of House of Representatives Standing Committee Report 
on IT pricing in Australia 
House of Representatives Committee Recommendations that the Panel supports in principle 
include: 
Recommendation 5  
The Australian Government amend the Copyright Act’s section 10(1) anti-circumvention provisions 
to clarify and secure consumers’ rights to circumvent technological protection measures that 
control geographic market segmentation.  
 
                                                          
566 Bezzi, M (Executive General Manager ACCC) 2012, Official Committee Hansard, House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, Information Technology Pricing, ACCC, 31 October, Canberra. 
567 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications 2013, At what cost? IT pricing 
and the Australia tax, Canberra. 
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Box 19.4: Relevant recommendations of House of Representatives Standing Committee Report 
on IT pricing in Australia (continued) 
Recommendation 6  
The Australian Government investigate options to educate Australian consumers and businesses as 
to:  
• the extent to which they may circumvent geoblocking mechanisms in order to access 
cheaper legitimate goods;  
• the tools and techniques which they may use to do so; and  
the way in which their rights under the Australian Consumer Law may be affected should they 
choose to do so. 
Recommendation 8  
The Committee recommends the repeal of section 51(3) of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010. 
House of Representatives Committee Recommendations that the Panel considers should form 
part of a review of IP laws: 
Recommendation 7  
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government, in conjunction with relevant 
agencies, consider the creation of a ‘right of resale’ in relation to digitally distributed content, and 
clarification of ‘fair use’ rights for consumers, businesses, and educational institutions, including 
restrictions on vendors’ ability to ‘lock’ digital content into a particular ecosystem.  
Recommendation 9  
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider enacting a ban on 
geoblocking as an option of last resort, should persistent market failure exist in spite of the 
changes to the Competition and Consumer Act and the Copyright Act recommended in this report.  
Recommendation 10  
That the Australian Government investigate the feasibility of amending the Competition and 
Consumer Act so that contracts or terms of service which seek to enforce geoblocking are 
considered void.  
 
The Panel’s view 
Price discrimination can be beneficial to consumers. Accordingly, re-introducing specific provisions 
to the CCA that prohibit anti-competitive price discrimination could ultimately reduce consumer 
choice by discouraging flexible and innovative pricing. 
Anti-competitive price discrimination can be adequately dealt with by the existing provisions of the 
law, particularly section 46 (and especially if amended as proposed in Recommendation 30). 
Attempting to legislate against international price discrimination could result in significant 
implementation and enforcement difficulties and risks negative unintended consequences. 
Instead, the Panel supports moves to address international price discrimination through market 
solutions that empower consumers. These include removing restrictions on parallel imports and 
ensuring that consumers are able to take legal steps to circumvent attempts to block their access 
to cheaper legitimate goods. 
 
Unilateral Conduct 
Part 4 — Competition Laws 355 
Recommendation 31 — Price discrimination 
A specific prohibition on price discrimination should not be reintroduced into the CCA. Where 
price discrimination has an anti-competitive impact on markets, it can be dealt with by the existing 
provisions of the law (including through the Panel’s recommended revisions to section 46 (see 
Recommendation 30)). 
Attempts to prohibit international price discrimination should not be introduced into the CCA on 
account of significant implementation and enforcement complexities and the risk of negative 
unintended consequences. Instead, the Panel supports moves to address international price 
discrimination through market solutions that empower consumers. These include removing 
restrictions on parallel imports (see Recommendation 13) and ensuring that consumers are able to 
take lawful steps to circumvent attempts to prevent their access to cheaper legitimate goods. 
19.4 UNFAIR AND UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
The Terms of Reference task the Review with examining provisions of the Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL) that deal with unfair and unconscionable conduct, but only insofar as they relate to small 
business.  
As noted earlier in this section, a firm that enjoys a strong bargaining position because of its size and 
importance in a market has the potential to abuse that strength in dealings with suppliers and 
business customers. Such conduct may not contravene section 46 — it may not materially harm a 
competitor. However, it may so offend accepted standards of business behaviour that it is 
unconscionable.  
Statutory protection against unconscionable conduct, which recognises the disparity in bargaining 
power between buyers and sellers,568 was first introduced into the law in 1986 as a consumer 
protection measure.569 Since then, the effectiveness of the CCA’s unconscionable conduct provisions 
has been reviewed a number of times, leading to an expansion of their scope to cover certain 
business transactions,570 the unification of consumer and business unconscionable conduct 
provisions,571 and the introduction of interpretive guidance for the provisions.572 The introduction of 
  
                                                          
568 Trade Practices Act Review Committee 1976, Report to the Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs, at 9.56-9.62. 
569 Trade Practices Revision Act 1986. 
570 For example, former section 51AA of the then Trade Practices Act 1974, inserted by the Trade Practices Legislation 
Amendment Act 1992; and section 51AC of the then Trade Practices Act 1974, inserted by the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Fair Trading) Act 1998. For background see Report to the Hon Dr Craig Emerson MP Minister for Small 
Business, Independent Contractors and the Service Economy, Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs 
2010, Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct.  
571 Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2011. 
572 Ibid. See section 22 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and Part 2-2 of the ACL more generally. 
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the business unconscionable conduct provision was intended to ‘improve business conduct in the 
Australian economy and provide a more efficient and equitable basis upon which the forces of 
competition can operate’.573 
As discussed in Part 1, the CCA is not directed at protecting competitors but rather competition. This 
requires competition law to balance preventing anti-competitive behaviour that undermines 
competition against not inhibiting behaviour that is part of normal vigorous competition. 
A separate but parallel principle is that the business and wider community expect business to be 
conducted according to a minimum standard of fair dealing. There are sound economic and social 
reasons for enshrining minimum standards within the law. Because it is difficult to prescribe such 
minimum standards, the law prohibits unconscionable conduct, leaving it to the courts to determine 
in a given case whether the conduct fails to conform to the dictates of good conscience. 
Unconscionable conduct is assessed by reference to the particular circumstances in which the 
conduct occurs and often (but not always) includes a pattern of behaviour which, when taken 
together, constitutes unconscionability. 
A number of submissions, particularly from agricultural producers, raise concerns that the 
unconscionable conduct provisions are deficient because of the lack of specific definition or the 
difficulty in proving that the conduct meets the standard of judicially-defined unconscionable 
conduct.574 
The Panel notes that, in December 2014, the Federal Court by consent made declarations that Coles 
Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd engaged in unconscionable conduct in 2011 in its dealings with 
certain suppliers. The Court also ordered Coles to pay combined pecuniary penalties of $10 million, 
and Coles agreed to enter a court enforceable undertaking with the ACCC to provide redress to more 
than 200 of its suppliers referred to in the proceedings.575 
This successful conclusion to a case of business-to-business unconscionable conduct indicates that 
the current unconscionable conduct provisions appear to be working as intended. However, active 
and ongoing review of these provisions should occur as other matters arise. 
Issues relating to whether small business, in particular, can access justice in a time-efficient and 
low-cost way are addressed in Chapter 23. 
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See Reith, P (Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business) 1997, Second reading speech: Trade Practices 
Amendment (Fair Trading) Bill 1997, Canberra, 30 September. Prohibitions against unfair contract terms are also 
aimed at addressing unequal bargaining power. These provisions were introduced as part of the ACL reforms in 2010 
to protect consumers from unfair terms in standard form contracts and reflect concerns that consumers have little or 
no opportunity to negotiate with businesses about such contracts — see Emerson, C (Minister for Competition and 
Consumer Affairs) 2009, Second reading speech: Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2010, 
Canberra, 24 June. The Australian Government announced prior to the 2013 election that it would seek to extend the 
ACL protections dealing with unfair contract terms to small business. — see 
<www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/Small-Business-and-Unfair-Contract-Terms>. 
574 See, for example: AgForce Queensland, sub, page 2; Australian Chicken Growers’ Council Limited, sub, pages 7-8; 
Australian Dairy Farmers Limited, sub, pages 9-10; Australian Newsagents’ Federation, sub, page 11; and National 
Farmers’ Federation, sub, page 7. 
575 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, Court finds Coles engaged in unconscionable conduct 
and orders Coles pay $10 million penalties, media release, 22 December, Canberra. 
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The Panel’s view 
The Panel has heard concerns expressed by small businesses and suppliers in respect of behaviours 
of larger businesses in their supply chains. The business unconscionable conduct provisions were 
introduced specifically to address such concerns. 
The Panel believes that the current unconscionable conduct provisions are working as intended to 
meet their policy goals.  
Enforcing business-to-business unconscionable conduct provisions is an important function of the 
ACCC. The Panel notes the ACCC’s recent actions in the supermarket sector against unconscionable 
conduct in dealings with suppliers. 
Active and ongoing review of these provisions should occur as matters progress through the courts 
to ensure the provisions meet their policy goals. If deficiencies become evident, they should be 
remedied promptly.  
19.5 CODES OF CONDUCT 
An industry code is ‘a code regulating the conduct of participants in an industry towards other 
participants in the industry or towards consumers in the industry’.576 Codes are intended to influence 
or control commercial behaviour within a particular industry. Codes may also contain a dispute 
resolution framework for those covered by the code. 
In the context of the CCA, there are two types of codes: mandatory prescribed codes and voluntary 
opt-in prescribed codes. Outside the CCA, industries can also develop their own voluntary codes.577 
Most submissions referring to codes of conduct support their use,578 with the Australian Automotive 
Aftermarket Association noting that industry codes are often seen as a substitute for government 
regulation (DR sub, page 5). The Central Markets of Australia Association states, that when 
developing industry codes, they: 
… should be to promote good commercial practice, and/or prohibit other specific 
practices unique to an industry sector. Codes should not, however, exist to restrict 
competition, reduce commercial feasibility and/or establish an unintended commercial 
bias against one part of an industry (when justified). (DR Sub, page 3) 
A number of the parties who have sought to rely on the protection of prescribed or voluntary codes 
express concerns about their coverage and/or the effectiveness of dispute resolution processes.579 
                                                          
576 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsection 51ACA(1). 
577 The language used in the CCA is confusing, as voluntary codes may be created by legislation or ministerial order. The 
paradox of this is noted by Freiberg who states ‘There are thousands of voluntary codes of conduct or practice that 
operate independently of government. However, and possibly oxymoronically ‘voluntary codes’ may be recognised or 
created by legislation or ministerial order.’ Freiberg, A 2010, The Tools of Regulation, The Federation Press, Sydney, 
page 192. 
578 See, for example: Australian Newsagent’s Federation, sub, pages 12-13; Coles Group Limited, sub, page 12; Insurance 
Australia Group, sub, pages 15-16; Office of the Australian Small Business Commissioner, sub, pages 5-6; Master 
Grocers Australia, sub, page 53; Metcash, sub, page 9; and Woolworths Limited, sub, pages 78-79. 
579 See, for example: AgForce Queensland, sub, page 2; Australian Automotive Dealer Association, sub, pages 7-8; 
Australian Dairy Farmers Limited, sub, page 12; Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub, pages 29-30; Australian 
Forest Products Association, sub, page 2; Australian National Retailers Association, sub, pages 48-49; CHOICE, sub, 
pages 36-43; Consumer Action Law Centre, sub, pages 21-24; Insurance Australia Group, sub, page 16; Master Grocers 
Australia, sub, pages 53-57; and National Farmers’ Federation, sub, pages 10-11. 
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Submissions also support improving the effectiveness of the Horticulture Code of Conduct580 and the 
Grocery Industry (Unit Pricing) Code of Conduct.581 
A number of submissions also call for a supermarket code. These are discussed further in Chapter 15. 
The Panel notes that, on 24 September 2014, the CCA was amended to give the ACCC additional 
powers to issue infringement notices for alleged breaches of industry codes.582 These new powers, 
which apply from 1 January 2015, also allow the court to impose penalties on businesses that breach 
prescribed industry codes incorporating these new penalties.  
The first code to incorporate the new civil penalties is the Franchising Code of Conduct, which took 
effect on 1 January 2015. A breach of the Franchising Code exposes a franchisor or franchisee to an 
infringement notice penalty of $8,500 issued by the ACCC or a pecuniary penalty of up to $51,000 
imposed by the court. 
The new remedies and powers are a significant development. However, experience with 
administering the new provisions is needed before determining whether they should apply more 
broadly.  
The Panel’s view 
Codes of conduct play an important role under the CCA by providing a flexible regulatory 
framework to set norms of behaviour that generally apply to relationships between businesses 
within a particular industry. 
The Panel has heard from parties who believe that particular codes lack meaningful enforcement 
sanctions and the capacity for public enforcement.  
Introducing civil penalties and infringement notices for breaches of codes strengthens the CCA 
enforcement options.  
Having these options available for CCA codes is a significant development. Proponents of new CCA 
codes could consider whether penalties should be included for non-compliance. 
  
                                                          
580 Central Markets of Australia Association, DR sub, page 3. 
581 Queensland Consumers Association, DR sub, page 1. 
582 By the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Industry Code Penalties) Act 2014. 
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20 ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS, ARRANGEMENTS AND 
UNDERSTANDINGS 
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) prohibits certain types of provisions within 
agreements, arrangements and understandings between competitors. These types of arrangements 
are commonly called horizontal arrangements because they occur between competitors trading at 
the same level of the supply chain. Cartel provisions and exclusionary provisions (where competitors 
agree not to supply or acquire from particular persons or classes of persons) are prohibited per se. 
Other provisions are prohibited if they have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition.  
The CCA also prohibits certain types of conditions that are imposed as part of trading arrangements 
between suppliers and their customers. These types of arrangements are commonly called vertical 
arrangements because they occur between firms that trade at different levels of the supply chain. 
Resale price maintenance (where a supplier requires a retailer to price its products at no less than a 
minimum retail price specified by the supplier) is prohibited per se. Third-line forcing (where a 
supplier requires its customer to acquire another product from another supplier) is also prohibited 
per se. Exclusive dealing (where suppliers restrict the freedom of their customers to deal with other 
suppliers or within particular geographic areas, and likewise for acquirers) and other conditions are 
prohibited if the condition has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
20.1 CARTEL CONDUCT 
Prior to 2009, price fixing provisions and exclusionary provisions were prohibited per se and were 
subject to civil penalty sanctions. 
The Dawson Review recommended introducing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct.583 That 
recommendation was implemented in 2009 by the enactment of Division 1 of Part IV of the CCA, 
which introduced criminal and civil prohibitions of cartel conduct. In line with overseas practice and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommendations,584 the CCA 
now prohibits arrangements between competitors that fix prices, restrict outputs in production and 
supply chains, divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers or territories, or rig bids. 
Despite the introduction of the cartel prohibitions, the prohibition of exclusionary provisions remains 
in the CCA. 
Submissions express broad support for serious cartel conduct being prohibited per se and for 
imposing criminal sanctions for that conduct.585 However, a range of submissions criticise the form 
and scope of the cartel prohibitions. Two principal concerns are raised:586 
                                                          
583 Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act, CanPrint 
Communications, Canberra. 
584 OECD 1998, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, Paris. 
585 See, for example: BHP Billiton, sub, page 41; and Ian Stewart, sub, page 13. 
586 See, for example: Arnold Bloch Leibler, sub, page 2; Baker & McKenzie, sub, page 1; Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent 
Fisse, sub, page 9; and Law Council of Australia  — Competition and Consumer Committee, sub, pages 50-52. 
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• The provisions are unnecessarily complex, making the law difficult to understand and comply 
with. 
• The provisions have been framed too broadly and criminalise commercial conduct that ought 
not be characterised as cartel conduct, including joint venture activity and vertical 
arrangements between suppliers and their customers. 
Complex drafting 
The Panel agrees that the cartel provisions are complex. One explanation for their complexity is that 
laws that impose criminal sanctions must take account of the requirements of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code Act 1995. The Criminal Code provides that criminal offences consist of physical 
elements and fault elements. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) notes: 
The process of prescribing the cartel offences with the necessary degree of specificity 
required of a criminal offence has resulted in drafting that is complex and which may not 
provide adequate certainty. (sub 1, page 93) 
Since serious cartel conduct can cause significant damage to the competitive process, the Panel 
supports using criminal sanctions to punish and deter cartel behaviour. While drafting criminal 
conduct provisions must necessarily involve a degree of specificity, the Panel considers that the 
cartel provisions in their current form are overly complex and do not provide businesses with 
sufficient clarity and certainty. 
The New Zealand Parliament is considering amendments to that country’s competition laws to 
introduce criminal sanctions for cartel conduct. The proposed amendments are contained in the 
Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendments Bill 2014. The proposed cartel provisions are 
similar in many respects to the Australian cartel law, but are in a shorter and simpler form. The Panel 
considers that the proposed approach in New Zealand provides a useful illustration of how the law 
might be simplified in Australia. Simplification of the cartel provisions is broadly supported in 
submissions.587 
However, both the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) raise 
concerns about moves to simplify the cartel offences. The ACCC considers that the suggested 
changes would go beyond mere simplification, reducing the scope of the cartel provisions (DR sub, 
pages 36-40). The CDPP notes ‘the almost inevitable tension between the laudable goals of clarity 
and flexibility in … legislative drafting’ and questions the justification for amending the legislation 
before it has been tested in court (DR sub, page 3). 
The Panel considers that the complex definitions used to describe cartel conduct can and should be 
simplified. The separate elements for ‘purpose condition’, ‘purpose/effect condition’ and 
‘competition condition’ can be written more directly and simply into the definitions for the cartel 
provisions to be covered by the law, without giving rise to the concerns raised by the ACCC or the 
CDPP. The Panel’s model legislative provisions in Appendix A preserve the essential elements of each 
                                                          
587 See, for example: AGL Energy Limited, DR sub, page 5; Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, page 1; ASTRA Subscription 
Media Australia, DR sub, page 7; Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, DR sub, page 3; Australian Newsagents’ 
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of the cartel prohibitions — price fixing, restricting output, market allocation and bid rigging — but 
express them in a simpler form. 
The Panel also considers that the prohibition of exclusionary provisions, separately from cartel 
conduct, is unnecessary and increases the complexity of the law. The definition of exclusionary 
provisions overlaps substantially with the definition of market sharing, a form of cartel conduct. 
Many submissions agree, supporting the removal of section 4D of the CCA.588 
The ACCC submits that, although overlap exists between the cartel provisions and the definition of 
exclusionary provisions, there are some gaps. The ACCC does not support removing section 4D unless 
its full scope is carried across to the cartel provisions (DR sub, page 42). The Panel recommends that 
the separate prohibition of exclusionary provisions be removed from the CCA, with adjustments 
made to the cartel provisions to cover any resulting gaps in the law. The Panel’s recommendation is 
reflected in the model legislative provisions at Appendix A. 
Modifying the scope of the cartel prohibitions 
As noted earlier, competition laws must achieve the correct balance between prohibiting 
anti-competitive conduct and not prohibiting pro-competitive conduct. This is particularly important 
in the context of the cartel law, which prohibits conduct per se and imposes criminal sanctions. 
Submissions raise concerns that the existing cartel law captures conduct that ought not to be 
prohibited, either because the prohibitions are too broad or the current exemptions are too narrow. 
Specific problems with the current law have been raised: 
• The cartel law is not limited to conduct that harms competition in markets in Australia. 
• The ‘competition condition’ for the application of the cartel law is set at a very low threshold. 
• The exceptions for joint ventures and for vertical supply arrangements are each too narrow. 
Market limitation 
Australia’s competition laws are generally directed at conduct that harms competition in markets in 
Australia (see Chapter 18). This is because the CCA is concerned with the economic welfare of 
Australians, not citizens of other countries. 
However, the cartel conduct prohibition is not expressly limited to arrangements affecting 
competition in Australian markets. In Norcast v Bradken,589 the first and only case to consider the 
cartel prohibitions to date, the cartel prohibitions were found to be applicable to an arrangement 
concerning a tender for the sale of a Canadian corporation, which had business operations in Canada, 
Malaysia and Singapore, where the seller was based outside Australia and the tender was conducted 
outside Australia. 
In the Draft Report, the Panel expresses the view that the cartel provisions should apply to conduct 
affecting goods or services supplied or acquired in Australian markets in a similar manner to the 
other competition law prohibitions. The ACCC submits that this change has the potential to create 
complexity in the context of criminal proceedings because, in a given case involving international 
                                                          
588 See, for example: ASTRA Subscription Media Australia, DR sub, page 7; Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 2; Coles Group 
Limited, DR sub, page 7; Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, DR sub, page 6; 
MasterCard, DR sub, page 2; Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 2; and Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 6. 
589 Norcast S.ár.L v Bradken Limited (No 2) [2013] FCA 235. 
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trade, it would require a jury to make a determination about market boundaries, which is a 
somewhat abstract economic concept (DR sub, page 37). 
The Panel agrees that it would be inappropriate to require a jury to make a determination that 
involves abstract economic concepts. However, the Panel remains of the view that, for cartel conduct 
to be an offence in Australia, it should have an effect on trade or commerce within, to or from 
Australia. This is consistent with the treatment of cartel conduct (and competition law more 
generally) in comparable overseas jurisdictions (see Box 20.1). 
Box 20.1: International comparisons of cartel conduct 
In the US, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 1982 amended the Sherman Act so that it 
would not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations unless, relevantly, 
such conduct ‘has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on US domestic trade or 
commerce or on export trade … of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the US’.590 
The effect of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act was considered by the US Supreme 
Court in F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA (2004). The Supreme Court concluded that the 
Sherman Act did not grant relief in respect of the foreign effects of foreign cartel conduct. Breyer J 
(delivering the opinion of the court) observed: ‘The [Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act] 
seeks to make clear to American exporters (and to firms doing business abroad) that the Sherman 
Act does not prevent them from entering into business arrangements (say, joint-selling 
arrangements), however, anti-competitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only 
foreign markets … It does so by removing from the Sherman Act’s reach (1) export activities and 
(2) other commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those activities adversely affect 
domestic commerce, imports to the United States, or exporting activities of one engaged in such 
activities within the United States.’ 
In Europe, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits 
‘agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market’ (being the 
European Economic Area). 
In New Zealand, the proposed cartel laws contained in the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) 
Amendments Bill 2014 restrict the cartel conduct prohibition to conduct affecting the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services in New Zealand. 
An international comparison of approaches to this issue is included at Appendix B. 
The Panel considers that an approach, similar to that proposed in the New Zealand Cartel Bill, should 
be included in Australia’s cartel law, confining the prohibition to cartel conduct involving persons 
who compete to supply goods or services to, or acquire goods or services from, persons resident in 
or carrying on business within Australia. The Panel’s recommendation is reflected in the model 
legislative provisions at Appendix A. 
Competing firms 
Cartel conduct involves two or more competitors agreeing with each other not to compete. Cartels 
harm consumers because they usually increase prices or reduce choice. 
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The cartel prohibition sets a very low threshold for its application. In Norcast v Bradken the Federal 
Court concluded that the prohibition applies to an arrangement between corporations if there is a 
possibility (other than a remote possibility) that they are or would be in competition with each 
other.591 
The Panel considers this threshold is too low. Corporations that are not in competition with each 
other in their immediate markets commonly undertake joint or collaborative activities that produce 
consumer benefits. Under the current law, those activities would constitute cartel conduct and be 
subject to criminal sanctions if there is a possibility that they might compete in the relevant field of 
activity. 
The Panel considers the cartel prohibition should only apply to corporations that are in competition 
with each other or are likely to be in competition with each other, where likelihood is assessed on 
the balance of probabilities (that is, more likely that not). 
Joint ventures 
Joint ventures are a means by which two or more persons collaborate to undertake a commercial 
activity. They can be pro-competitive when they are employed as a means of developing new 
products or services or producing existing products or services more efficiently. However, they may 
also have anti-competitive effects, particularly where the participants are strong competitors in the 
field of activity proposed to be the subject of the joint venture. 
The CCA provides exemptions from the criminal (section 44ZZRO) and civil (section 44ZZRP) cartel 
prohibitions for joint ventures, but the exemption is narrowly framed. It only applies where: 
• the cartel provision is in a contract; 
• it is for the purposes of a joint venture; 
• the joint venture is for the production and/or supply of goods or services; 
• in the case of an unincorporated joint venture, it is carried on jointly by the parties to the 
contract; and 
• in the case of an incorporated joint venture, the joint venture company has been formed to 
enable the parties to carry on the joint venture under their joint control or ownership. 
Submissions raise concerns that the narrow application of the current exemption is limiting 
legitimate commercial transactions. Some submissions note inconsistencies with other provisions of 
the CCA dealing with joint ventures.592 
Exempting joint ventures from the cartel conduct prohibition does not remove them from the scope 
of the CCA. A joint venture that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition will be prohibited by section 45 of the CCA. Accordingly, the relevant question is 
whether joint ventures should be assessed under the cartel prohibition, which imposes per se liability 
and criminal sanctions, or assessed under the usual test of substantially lessening competition. 
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592 See, for example: Arnold Bloch Leibler, sub, page 3; Baker & McKenzie, sub, page 3; Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent 
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The ACCC expresses a concern that, in its experience, cartelists have claimed their collaboration is a 
joint venture and sought to disguise their activities to evade the law (DR sub, page 39). 
The Panel considers that joint ventures should be assessed against a competition test and that the 
current joint venture defence to cartel conduct is too narrow. The various limitations in the defence 
are unnecessary and increase business compliance costs. In particular, the defence need not be 
confined to provisions within written contracts (joint ventures include less formal documentation, 
including operating procedures) nor confined to production and supply joint ventures. 
Again, as a comparison, the New Zealand Cartel Bill contains a broader exemption in respect of 
collaborative activity. Although the New Zealand exemption may be too broad, the limitations in the 
Australian law should be broadened. 
Specifically, the Panel recommends three changes to the current exemption. First, the exemption 
should apply to joint venture provisions whether the provisions are contained in a contract, or form 
part of less formal arrangements such as management or operating protocols. Second, the 
exemption should apply to any joint venture for the production, supply, acquisition or marketing of 
goods or services. Third, the exemption should apply to provisions that satisfy any of the following 
tests: 
• the provision relates to goods or services that are acquired, produced, supplied or marketed 
by or for the purposes of the joint venture; 
• the provision is reasonably necessary for undertaking the joint venture; or 
• the provision is for the purpose of the joint venture. 
The Panel’s recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions at Appendix A. 
Vertical supply arrangements 
Restrictions imposed in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services are common 
and may be pro-competitive or anti-competitive depending on the circumstances. For example, a 
franchisor may require its franchisees to confine their trading to a particular geographic region. 
Provided the products supplied by the franchise compete with a wide range of other products, the 
geographic restriction may increase competition by encouraging franchisees to invest in their 
designated business area. For that reason, vertical supply restrictions are usually only prohibited if 
they have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
On occasions, a business (such as a wholesaler) may supply goods or services to another business 
(such as a retailer) and also compete with the retailer in the retail market. The business may wish to 
supply its goods or services to the second business on the condition that the second business confine 
its retail activities to a particular geographic region. Again, such trading conditions may be 
pro-competitive or anti-competitive, depending upon the range of competing suppliers and products 
in the retail market. They should only be prohibited if they substantially lessen competition. 
However, without a suitable exemption, such conditions would be a per se offence under the cartel 
laws. 
The CCA currently provides an exemption from the cartel laws for vertical supply restrictions that 
constitute exclusive dealing within section 47 of the CCA. Although section 47 covers various forms of 
exclusive dealing, it does not cover all forms of vertical supply restrictions (this is discussed below in 
Section 20.3). Accordingly, vertical supply restrictions not covered by section 47 are also outside the 
exemption to the cartel conduct prohibitions. Submissions raise concerns that the exemption for 
vertical restrictions, based on section 47, is too narrow and should be broadened. 
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The ACCC cautions against a broader carve-out from the cartel laws for vertical restrictions (DR sub, 
page 40) and disagrees with the relevant amendments to section 47 proposed in the Draft Report: 
The ACCC does not support the proposed amendments to section 47 as proposed by Draft 
Recommendation 28. The ACCC considers that these amendments will inappropriately 
broaden the scope of the prohibition which, due to the anti-overlap provisions, will 
consequently narrow the application of the cartel and exclusionary dealing provisions. (DR 
sub, page 56) 
The Panel considers that a broader exemption should be included in the cartel laws to ensure that 
vertical supply restrictions are assessed under a substantial lessening of competition test rather than 
a per se prohibition. While the ACCC’s concerns are noted, the Panel does not believe that the 
current exemption, which is formulated by reference to section 47, is adequate to protect legitimate 
trading conduct from the cartel laws.  
It is possible to formulate a clearer exemption that defines vertical trading restrictions that should be 
exempt from the per se cartel prohibitions and assessed under a substantial lessening of competition 
test. Again, as a comparison, the New Zealand Cartel Bill contains a broader exemption in respect of 
vertical supply restrictions. The Panel’s recommendation is reflected in the model legislative 
provisions at Appendix A. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel supports a specific set of per se prohibitions in the CCA, with criminal sanctions aimed at 
serious cartel conduct. However, the current drafting of those provisions has given rise to concerns 
about their scope and whether they only target harmful anti-competitive conduct. 
The prohibitions against cartel conduct should be simplified and the following specific changes 
made: 
• The provisions should apply to cartel conduct involving persons who compete to supply 
goods or services to, or acquire goods or services from, persons resident in or carrying on 
business within Australia. 
• The provisions should be confined to conduct involving firms that are actual competitors 
and not firms for whom competition is a mere possibility. 
• A broader exemption should be included for joint ventures, whether for the production, 
supply, acquisition or marketing of goods or services, recognising that such conduct will be 
prohibited by section 45 of the CCA if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
• An exemption should be included for trading restrictions imposed by one firm on another in 
connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services, recognising that such conduct 
will be prohibited by section 45 of the CCA (or section 47 if retained) if it has the purpose, 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
The CCA should also be amended to remove the prohibition on exclusionary provisions, with an 
amendment to the definition of cartel conduct to address any resulting gap in the law. 
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Immunity policy 
The cartel conduct legislation was accompanied by administrative arrangements to support a joint 
CDPP/ACCC leniency program to be available for criminal cartel offences and the corresponding civil 
prohibitions. Owing to their secretive nature, detecting the existence, activities and impact of cartels 
can be difficult. An immunity policy can encourage businesses and individuals to disclose cartel 
behaviour and be a powerful disincentive to the formation of cartels.593 
Submissions support the existence of the ACCC’s immunity policy, which applies to cartel conduct 
and provides protection against civil proceedings instituted by the ACCC. Immunity from criminal 
prosecution is determined by the CDPP in accordance with the same principles that determine 
immunity under the ACCC’s immunity policy.594 
Where the ACCC is of the view that the applicant satisfies the conditions for immunity under the 
immunity policy, it will recommend that the CDPP grant the applicant immunity from prosecution. 
The CDPP will exercise an independent discretion when considering such a recommendation by the 
ACCC. Where the CDPP is satisfied that the applicant meets the ACCC’s conditions for immunity, the 
CDPP will grant immunity, pursuant to subsection 9(6D) of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1983. 
In its published guidance on its immunity policy, the ACCC has stated that it ‘regularly reviews the 
effectiveness of its immunity policy’.595 An attempt to legislate the immunity policy could limit its 
success by reducing its flexibility. 
An important consideration for immunity applicants, and those suffering loss or damage as a result 
of the activities of cartels, is whether the outcome of an immunity application has an impact on the 
liability of the immunity applicant to compensate cartel victims. Submissions note the availability of 
‘bar orders’ in some jurisdictions to deal with the interface between cartel prosecutions and 
compensation litigation.596 
Bar orders have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, they may increase the incentive for 
cartel participants to disclose cartel conduct, thereby bringing the cartel to an end. On the other 
hand, bar orders prevent those who have been harmed by cartel conduct from recovering 
compensation from the immunity applicant, although they may still be able to recover compensation 
from other cartel participants who have not received immunity. 
The Panel considers there is no evidence showing that current arrangements are failing to achieve 
their objective of bringing about the deterrence and disclosure of cartel conduct. Accordingly, the 
Panel does not recommend introducing bar orders. 
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page 1. 
594 Ibid., page 6. 
595 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2014, Updated Immunity Policy to uncover cartel conduct , media 
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The Panel’s view 
The immunity policy is an important component of the detection and successful prosecution of 
cartel conduct. The immunity arrangements provide an adequate level of certainty and fit within 
the broader regime of the scheme for immunity for accomplices administered by the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. 
 
Recommendation 27 — Cartel conduct prohibition 
The prohibitions against cartel conduct in Part IV, Division 1 of the CCA should be simplified and 
the following specific changes made: 
• The provisions should apply to cartel conduct involving persons who compete to supply goods 
or services to, or acquire goods or services from, persons resident in or carrying on business 
within Australia. 
• The provisions should be confined to conduct involving firms that are actual or likely 
competitors, where ‘likely’ means on the balance of probabilities. 
• A broad exemption should be included for joint ventures, whether for the production, supply, 
acquisition or marketing of goods or services, recognising that such conduct will be prohibited 
by section 45 of the CCA if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
• An exemption should be included for trading restrictions that are imposed by one firm on 
another in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services (including intellectual 
property licensing), recognising that such conduct will be prohibited by section 45 of the CCA 
(or section 47 if retained) if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
 
Recommendation 28 — Exclusionary provisions 
The CCA should be amended to remove the prohibition of exclusionary provisions in 
subparagraphs 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i), with an amendment to the definition of cartel conduct to 
address any resulting gap in the law.  
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
20.2 ANTI-COMPETITIVE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Since June 2012, the CCA has prohibited: the private disclosure of pricing information to a competitor 
on a per se basis; and the general disclosure of information where the purpose of the disclosure is to 
substantially lessen competition in a market (Part IV, Division 1A of the CCA). These prohibitions have 
become known as the ‘price signalling’ provisions.  
At present, by regulation, the provisions only apply to banking services and both have a number of 
exceptions.597 To date no cases have been brought under either provision. 
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The provisions stem from the 2007 ACCC report on unleaded petrol prices.598 That report identified 
conduct (the exchange of retail petrol prices among competitors) considered to be anti-competitive, 
but that did not amount to a ‘price-fixing understanding’ within the current judicial interpretation of 
section 45 of the CCA. 
The ACCC recommended amending the law to broaden and clarify the meaning of the term 
‘understanding’. In particular, it recommended the law provide that an understanding may be found 
to have been arrived at, notwithstanding that it was ascertainable only by inference from 
surrounding circumstances.599 
In October 2010, the then ACCC Chair, Graeme Samuel, expressed concerns about price signalling in 
the banking sector.600 Subsequently, in December 2010, the then Australian Government, as part of 
its Competitive and Sustainable Banking System reforms, legislated to prohibit anti-competitive price 
signalling, initially in the banking sector. 
Price signalling has the potential to harm the competitive process. Competitors may be able to use 
the disclosure of price information as a means of co-ordinating their pricing decisions. Depending on 
the form of price signalling and the market circumstances, price signalling may reduce the 
commercial risks for competing firms to engage in co-ordinated behaviour and thereby increase the 
likelihood of anti-competitive pricing outcomes. Box 20.2 outlines the laws in other jurisdictions that 
address anti-competitive disclosure of information. 
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Box 20.2: International comparisons of anti-competitive disclosure of information 
Anti-competitive price signalling and information exchanges (or ‘concerted practices’ as they are 
known in some jurisdictions) are subject to different laws in the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU.  
In the US, the general provisions in section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act have been used to bring actions involving price signalling conduct (for example, 
the Ethyl case601 and the Petroleum Products602 case). 
In Canada, the general provisions in subsection 45(1) of the Competition Act dealing with cartel 
conduct and section 90.1 dealing with agreements that prevent or lessen competition substantially 
in the market are relied upon. The Competition Bureau has noted that an agreement may be 
inferred in circumstances where there is unilateral information exchange together with parallel 
conduct. 
In the UK, the general Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act, which includes the concept of 
concerted practice, can be relied on to capture price signalling conduct. 
Similarly, the EU’s general Article 101 prohibition, which includes the concept of ‘concerted 
practice’, can be relied on to capture price signalling conduct. 
For further information on international approaches to this issue, see Appendix B. 
Submissions contain a range of views that generally reflect those previously expressed in the debates 
leading up to the introduction of the legislation. It is fair to say that no-one seems happy with the 
provisions in their current form — submissions either argue for modification,603 or repeal604 or 
extension of the provisions to all sectors of the economy.605 
Public disclosure of prices is a common business practice by which businesses communicate with a 
broad customer base and help consumers make informed choices. For this reason, the current public 
disclosure price signalling laws may over-capture pro-competitive or benign conduct. 
Private disclosure of price information between competitors will generally have greater potential to 
harm competition. Private disclosure enables competitors to communicate their pricing intentions 
with each other without consumers observing the communication, thereby reducing the risk of 
adverse consumer reaction before a new pricing level becomes settled. 
However, in some circumstances, competitors disclose pricing information in the ordinary course of 
business. As discussed in the context of cartel conduct, price disclosure may occur in connection with 
joint ventures and similar collaborative arrangements (for example, a bank lending syndicate or 
insurance layers offered by numerous insurers). Price disclosure may also occur in connection with a 
supply arrangement, but where the supplier also competes with its business customer in a 
downstream market. 
The difficulties of defining the circumstances in which disclosure of price information is 
pro-competitive or benign, and the circumstances in which it is likely to be harmful to competition, 
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have resulted in a complex set of provisions now contained in Division 1A of Part IV. The provisions 
endeavour to craft suitable exemptions from the prohibitions. However, the difficulty in catering for 
all circumstances has resulted in a general exemption for disclosure in the ordinary course of 
business. 
The fact that the provisions were, from their enactment, confined to the banking sector indicates an 
understandable concern about their application to all parts of the economy. The Panel considers that 
competition laws ought to be capable of general application to all parts of the economy. 
Unlike most parts of the competition law, the price signalling provisions do not enjoy wide support: 
they are complex and create an additional compliance burden for business. 
Other provisions of the competition law are capable of addressing anti-competitive price signalling. 
For example, if the price signalling causes competitors to agree the level of their prices, the conduct 
will be prohibited as price fixing by the cartel provisions. If, on the other hand, the price signalling 
falls short of price fixing but has the effect of substantially lessening competition (by enabling 
competitors to co-ordinate their pricing decisions), the conduct will generally be prohibited by 
section 45. 
The concern originally raised by the ACCC was that a practice of exchanging price information 
between competitors may not constitute an ‘understanding’ within the meaning of section 45 and 
thereby not be regulated by section 45. Whether that concern is realistic might be debated — it 
would be usual to infer that competitors had an understanding to exchange price information if they 
engaged in that conduct on a regular basis. 
Nevertheless, the concern can be readily addressed by expanding section 45 so it applies to 
contracts, arrangements, understandings and concerted practices, where a concerted practice is a 
regular and deliberate activity undertaken by two or more firms. It would include the regular 
disclosure or exchange of price information between two firms, whether or not it is possible to show 
that the firms had reached an understanding about the disclosure or exchange. 
Ensuring that section 45 of the CCA can apply to instances of concerted practice that substantially 
lessen competition will meet the policy intent of the price signalling provisions. This would remove 
the need for a separate division on price signalling within the CCA, and is consistent with simplifying 
the CCA and ensuring that its provisions apply generally throughout the economy. 
None of the submissions to the Draft Report support the existing price signalling provisions, even 
those that oppose an amendment to introduce concerted practices into the CCA.606 Among 
supporters of extending section 45 to cover concerted practices,607 concerns are raised about the 
description of activity to be covered. RBB Economics notes that, while agreeing there is no rationale 
for price signalling laws to apply only to the banking sector, expanding the scope of section 45 to 
                                                          
606 See, for example: AGL Energy Limited, DR sub, pages 5-6; Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, pages 3-4; ASTRA Subscription 
Media Australia, DR sub, page 7; Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 22; Business Council of 
Australia, DR sub, page 20; Cement Industry Federation, DR sub, page 5; Foxtel, DR sub, page 4; Minter Ellison, DR 
sub, page 4; Origin Energy Limited, DR sub, page 2; and Woolworths Limited, DR sub,  pages 40-42. 
607 See, for example: Australian Aftermarket Automotive Association, DR sub, page 3; Australian Motor Industries 
Federation, DR sub, page 9; AURL FoodWorks, DR sub, page 12; BHP Billiton, DR sub, pages 4-5; CHOICE, DR sub, 
page 25; Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 2; Professor Philip Clarke, DR sub, page 3; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, 
page 15; Customer Owned Banking Association, DR sub, page 3; Daryl Guppy, DR sub, page 7; National Seniors 
Australia, DR sub, pages 13-14; and Queensland Law Society, DR sub, pages 2-3. 
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cover concerted practices could provide ‘exceptionally wide’ discretion to the competition authority 
to intervene in markets (DR sub, page 5). 
The ACCC considers that the prohibition should be broader, that consideration should be given to 
prohibiting certain types of concerted practice on a per se basis, and that a concerted practices 
concept should be included in civil cartel prohibitions (DR sub, pages 43-48). Caron Beaton-Wells and 
Brent Fisse consider the definition presented in the Draft Report ‘both under-inclusive and 
over-inclusive: under-reach arising due to the definition mentioning regularity of conduct; over-reach 
because the definition fails to specify that the activity must be co-ordinated conduct geared to 
avoiding competition’ (DR sub, pages 2-3). 
Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse also submit that a concerted practices concept be included in 
civil cartel prohibitions (DR sub, pages 6-9). The Law Council of Australia — Competition and 
Consumer Committee seeks further consultation on the circumstances in which price signalling 
should be prohibited (DR sub, page 10). 
The Panel considers that the issue of anti-competitive disclosure of information (particularly price 
information) requires only a modest refinement to Australia’s competition laws. For the reasons 
expressed earlier, the Panel considers that the price signalling provisions contained in Division 1A of 
Part IV are not fit for purpose and should be repealed. Even without those specific provisions, many 
instances of anti-competitive disclosure of price information will contravene the existing competition 
laws: 
• The disclosure may constitute evidence of an understanding about the prices to be charged by 
one of the parties to the disclosure in competition with another party, in contravention of the 
cartel laws. 
• The regular disclosure of price information may constitute evidence of an understanding to 
disclose such information between the parties, and that understanding may have the purpose, 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in contravention of section 45. 
The gap in Australia’s competition laws, in comparison to comparable overseas jurisdictions 
(particularly Europe), is that anti-competitive disclosure of information between competitors will 
only contravene the law if the court is able to conclude that the parties to the disclosure had either 
reached an understanding about the prices to be charged (price fixing within the cartel laws), or 
reached an understanding about the disclosure of information with an anti-competitive purpose or 
effect. Australia’s competition laws do not apply where two or more competitors engage in a 
co-ordinated practice, such as disclosure of price information, which practice can be shown to be 
likely to cause a substantial lessening of competition, unless the parties had reached an 
understanding about the practice. 
The Panel considers that section 45 of the CCA should be expanded to include engaging in a 
concerted practice with one or more other persons that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. As noted above, some submissions express concern about the 
meaning to be given to the expression concerted practice, as it has not previously been used within 
Australia’s competition laws. 
The word ‘concerted’ means jointly arranged or carried out or co-ordinated. Hence, a concerted 
practice between market participants is a practice that is jointly arranged or carried out or 
co-ordinated between the participants. The expression ‘concerted practice with one or more other 
persons’ conveys that the impugned practice is neither unilateral conduct nor mere parallel conduct 
by market participants (for example, suppliers selling products at the same price). 
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The Panel’s proposal is that such conduct would only be prohibited if it can be shown that the 
concerted practice has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. The 
Panel considers that the word ‘concerted’ has a clear and practical meaning and no further definition 
is required for the purposes of a legal enactment. 
The Panel does not consider that the cartel conduct prohibitions should be expanded to include 
concerted practices. The Panel considers that imposing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct should 
require proof of a contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors. 
The Panel’s view 
Competition laws should apply generally across the economy, not to particular sectors. There is no 
policy rationale for price signalling laws to apply only to the banking sector. 
Public disclosure of pricing information is a common business practice by which suppliers 
communicate to their customers. It can help consumers to make informed choices and is therefore 
unlikely to raise significant competition concerns in most instances. 
Private disclosure of pricing information has the potential to harm consumer interests since it can 
facilitate collusion or co-ordination between competitors. However, in many business 
circumstances, such disclosure is necessary and usual. 
Section 45 of the CCA should be able to address instances of anti-competitive price disclosure. 
That can be achieved by expanding the section to prohibit a person engaging in a concerted 
practice with one or more other persons that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
 
Recommendation 29 — Price signalling 
The ‘price signalling’ provisions of Part IV, Division 1A of the CCA are not fit for purpose in their 
current form and should be repealed. 
Section 45 should be extended to prohibit a person engaging in a concerted practice with one or 
more other persons that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
20.3 VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS (OTHER THAN RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE) 
As products are supplied down through a supply chain, it is not uncommon for suppliers (whether 
manufacturers, importers or wholesalers) and acquirers (whether wholesale distributors or retailers) 
to impose and agree trading restrictions. For example: 
• A manufacturer of sporting equipment may supply its products to a retailer on condition that 
the retailer not purchase similar products from a competing manufacturer (full-line forcing). 
• A food franchisor may supply a franchise to a company on condition that the franchisee only 
operate within a specified geographic region. 
• A retail chain may acquire whitegoods from an importer on condition that the importer not 
supply its products to a competing retail chain (exclusive dealing). 
• A retailer may sell a particular mobile telephony plan on condition that the customer also 
acquire a particular mobile phone (second-line forcing or bundling). 
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• A franchisor may supply a franchise on condition that the franchisee purchase products for 
sale from third-party suppliers approved by the franchisor (third-line forcing). 
Usually, vertical trading restrictions are unlikely to cause any significant competitive harm. Most 
markets have many manufacturers and importers of competing goods and many competing 
wholesalers and retailers. A vertical restriction agreed between one manufacturer and one retailer 
would be unlikely to cause any significant harm to competition. Vertical restrictions can also be 
commercially advantageous both to the parties to the agreement and to consumers. The restrictions 
are a means by which independent traders can align their commercial interests and objectives to the 
benefit of each and can, as a result, offer consumers a better quality product. 
However, in some circumstances, vertical trading restrictions can damage competition and are 
prohibited by the exclusive dealing provisions in section 47 of the CCA. The effect of vertical 
restrictions can be to restrict or exclude other traders from reasonable access to the market, 
reducing consumer choice. This is likely to occur when a significant proportion of the market for a 
particular product becomes subject to such restrictions. 
For example, this might occur if a particular manufacturer enjoys a position of market dominance for 
its product and supplies the product to retailers on condition that they not acquire any competing 
products. It may then become difficult for a competing manufacturer to gain access to the retail 
market. 
For these reasons, section 47 prohibits most vertical restrictions only if they have the purpose, or 
have or are likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. The one exception is 
third-line forcing. Under the CCA, third-line forcing is prohibited per se. 
Submissions raise two main concerns in relation to section 47: 
• whether third-line forcing should be prohibited per se; and 
• whether the complexity in the language of section 47 can be reduced. 
Third-line forcing 
Broadly, third-line forcing involves the supply of goods or services on condition that the purchaser 
acquire goods or services from another person, or a refusal to supply because the purchaser will not 
agree to that condition.  
Third-line forcing is similar in character to second-line forcing. Second-line forcing occurs where a 
corporation supplies a product on condition that the purchaser acquire another product from that 
corporation (or a related company); that is, the corporation bundles products together as a package.  
Under the CCA, third-line forcing is prohibited per se; whereas, second-line forcing is only prohibited 
if it has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. 
Australia is the only comparable jurisdiction that prohibits third-line forcing per se. The US, Canada, 
the EU and New Zealand all leave the conduct to be dealt with by their general prohibitions against 
anti-competitive agreements or unilateral conduct — which are all assessed under a 
competition-based test. Further information on international approaches to this issue is included at 
Appendix B. 
There has been significant debate for many years about whether the per se nature of Australia’s 
prohibitions is appropriate. Both the Hilmer and Dawson Reviews recommended introducing a 
competition test to third-line forcing. The Hilmer Review noted, ‘There is a broad spectrum of tying 
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arrangements, with many having a positive implication for economic welfare’ and concluded that 
third-line forcing should only be prohibited if it substantially lessens competition.608  
Submissions support the view that third-line forcing should no longer be a per se prohibition.609 The 
vast majority of submissions to the Draft Report also support the Panel’s call for a change from a per 
se prohibition to a substantial lessening of competition test.610 Some submissions raise concerns 
about a lessening of freedom of contract through increased product bundling and tying;611 however, 
the Panel’s proposal is that the prohibition on conduct that substantially lessens competition would 
remain, and, in any case, the current per se prohibition could equally be seen to restrict suppliers’ 
freedom. 
Third-line forcing conduct can be exempted from the CCA by filing a notification with the ACCC. 
The ACCC is empowered to remove the exemption if it considers that the anti-competitive detriment 
outweighs any public benefit from the conduct. In practice, the vast majority of third-line forcing 
conduct notified to the ACCC is permitted, which strongly supports the view that the conduct is not 
overwhelmingly anti-competitive. The ACCC states that, in 2012-13, it received more than 750 
third-line forcing notifications and that, in the vast majority of cases, no further action was taken 
(sub 1, page 87). 
The Panel considers that third-line forcing can be beneficial for traders and consumers and that firms 
should be free to package products in a manner they believe consumers will want, provided the 
conduct does not substantially lessen competition. From an economic standpoint, there appears to 
be no justification for treating third-line forcing differently from other vertical restrictions or any 
basis for the view that such conduct will be overwhelmingly anti-competitive in the current 
Australian marketplace. Although exemption can be gained through the notification process, this 
imposes a regulatory cost on business. 
Accordingly, the Panel considers that third-line forcing conduct should be prohibited only where it 
has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. 
Complexity of the provisions 
Section 47 attempts to describe many of the common forms of vertical trading restrictions. Given 
that restrictions can take many forms, section 47 takes a detailed form. 
The Panel considers that the present form of section 47 suffers from two deficiencies. First, because 
it attempts to describe a considerable number of categories of (non-price) vertical restriction, it is 
difficult for a business person to read and understand. The complexity might be tolerated if it 
constituted a comprehensive code of prohibited trading conduct. But it does not: the types of 
                                                          
608 Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, pages 50 and 54. 
609 See, for example: Baker & McKenzie, sub, page 3; Business Council of Australia, Summary Report, sub, page 19; Arlen 
Duke and Rhonda Smith, sub, page 28; EnergyAustralia, sub, page 12; Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, sub, 
page 7; Foxtel, sub, page 2; Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, sub, page 9; Metcash 
Limited, sub, page 5; Queensland Law Society, sub, page 13; George Raitt, sub, page 2; and Woodward, L & 
Rubinstein, M, sub, page 4.  
610 See, for example: Australian Chamber of Commerce & Industry, DR sub, page 18; ACCC, DR sub, page 55; Australian 
National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 12; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 7; iiNet, DR sub, page 4; and 
Woolworths Limited, DR sub, page 33. 
611 See, for example: Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 17; and Law Council of Australia — SME 
Committee, DR sub, page 16. 
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vertical restrictions described in section 47 are not exhaustive. Vertical restrictions not addressed by 
section 47 are covered by section 45, which is expressed in more general terms. 
Hence, the second deficiency is that, despite its complexity, section 47 is not comprehensive, since it 
does not address every form of (non-price) vertical restriction. 
Submissions criticise the complexity of section 47 and the vast majority support revision along the 
lines proposed in the Draft Report.612 Some submissions suggest that section 47 could be deleted 
altogether, leaving vertical restrictions (including third-line forcing) to be addressed by section 45.613 
This is a reasonable proposal save for one matter. Section 47 prohibits both the contractual 
imposition of a trading restriction in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods and services, 
as well as a refusal to supply or acquire goods and services because the acquirer or supplier, 
respectively, will not agree to the trading restriction. However, section 45 only addresses the 
imposition of a trading restriction within a supply agreement — it does not address a refusal to 
supply or acquire.614 
The amendments to section 46 recommended in this Report (see Recommendation 30) would 
address such refusals to supply or acquire. The test for illegality under an amended section 46 and 
under section 47 would be the same: whether the conduct (the refusal to deal because another 
person would not agree to a vertical restriction) had the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
Section 46 has an additional limitation not expressed in section 47, namely, the prohibition only 
applies to a corporation that has substantial market power. However, this will not limit the 
effectiveness of the law. It is well accepted that vertical restrictions will not substantially lessen 
competition unless they are imposed by a corporation with substantial market power. 
The Panel considers that vertical trading restrictions, and associated refusals to supply, can be 
addressed by a combination of section 45 and an amended section 46. In effect, section 47 would 
become a redundant provision. The Panel favours simplifying the CCA by removing unnecessary 
provisions. 
Removing section 47 would be consistent with a number of comparable jurisdictions: 
• Despite the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 containing very similar competition law 
provisions to Australia’s provisions, the Commerce Act contains no equivalent of section 47. 
Vertical restrictions are addressed by the New Zealand equivalents of sections 45 and 46. 
• Likewise, there is no equivalent to section 47 in the EU’s competition laws. The two primary 
competition law provisions in Europe, Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, are equivalent to 
sections 45 and 46 of the CCA. 
  
                                                          
612 See, for example: ASTRA, DR sub, page 6; Australian Automobile Aftermarket Association, DR sub, page 4; Australian 
Corporate Lawyers Association, DR sub, page 3; Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 11; Baker & 
McKenzie, DR sub, page 1; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 7; Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 4; Professor Philip Clarke, 
DR sub, page 4; Law Council of Australia BLS Competition & Consumer Committee, DR sub, page 34; MasterCard, DR 
sub, page 2; Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 5; Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 6; Virgin Australia, DR 
sub, page 4; and Wesfarmers Limited, DR sub, page 3.  
613 See, for example: Arlen Duke and Rhonda Smith, sub, page 28; and Professor Alan Fels, sub, page 11. 
614 Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 4. 
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If section 46 were not amended as recommended, the Panel considers that section 47 should be 
simplified along the lines proposed in the Draft Report. The Panel has included a simplified form of 
section 47 in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. The model form takes account of 
submissions received in response to the Draft Report. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel has heard no economic or practical reason to retain the per se prohibition on third-line 
forcing. Retaining the per se prohibition imposes unnecessary costs on business because business 
must either refrain from preferred trading arrangements or file a notification with the ACCC.  
The provisions on third-line forcing (subsections 47(6) and (7) of the CCA) should be brought into 
line with the rest of section 47 and only prohibited where conduct has the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition. 
Section 47 is also unnecessarily complex. Given the Panel’s recommendations to amend section 46 
(see Recommendation 30), anti-competitive vertical restrictions (including third-line forcing) and 
associated refusals to supply or acquire can be addressed by sections 45 and 46, enabling 
section 47 to be repealed. 
 
Recommendation 32— Third-line forcing test 
Third-line forcing (subsections 47(6) and (7) of the CCA) should only be prohibited where it has the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
 
Recommendation 33 — Exclusive dealing coverage 
Section 47 of the CCA should be repealed and vertical restrictions (including third-line forcing) and 
associated refusals to supply addressed by sections 45 and 46 (as amended in accordance with 
Recommendation 30). 
20.4 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
Resale price maintenance (RPM) is a form of vertical restraint concerning resale prices. RPM involves 
a supplier (for example, a manufacturer or importer) supplying a product to a person (for example, a 
retailer) on condition that the product not be advertised for sale or sold below a price specified by 
the supplier. Section 48 of the CCA prohibits RPM and makes it a per se offence; however, RPM may 
be authorised if a manufacturer can demonstrate that the imposition of RPM results in a public 
benefit. 
The Dawson Review stated:  
The rationale behind a per se prohibition is that the conduct prohibited is so likely to be 
detrimental to economic welfare, and so unlikely to be beneficial, that it should be 
proscribed without further inquiry about its impact on competition.615 
                                                          
615 Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the Dawson 
Review), CanPrint Communications, Canberra, page 123. 
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The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee notes this position (sub, page 
61), arguing that RPM should not merit a strict prohibition since, in markets where there is sufficient 
inter-brand competition, RPM will have a limited effect on competition and, in some instances, RPM 
may even be beneficial. 
Is a per se prohibition appropriate? 
The appropriateness of a per se prohibition of RPM has been debated for many years, both in 
Australia and overseas. In 2007, the US Supreme Court ruled that the practice of RPM should no 
longer be subject to a per se prohibition under US Federal law and should instead be tested under a 
rule of reason (competition) analysis (Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v PSKS Inc.).616 
In Canada, RPM is also subject to a competition test, with conduct prohibited only when it has or is 
likely to have an adverse effect on competition in a market.617 Other jurisdictions, such as the UK, the 
EU and New Zealand, maintain a per se prohibition — generally with some provision to authorise 
conduct.618 See Appendix B for further information on international approaches to RPM. 
Like other forms of vertical trading restriction, RPM will not have an effect on competition in a 
market if the product is subject to strong rivalry from competing products. In those circumstances, a 
manufacturer or importer would be unable commercially to specify a minimum price that is above 
the level determined by competition. The ACCC recently authorised Tooltechnic Systems (Aust) Pty 
Ltd to engage in RPM, noting that Tooltechnic had only a very small share of the market.619 
Further, in a competitive market RPM may be beneficial to competition and consumers. For example, 
one purpose of imposing a minimum retail price within distribution arrangements is to create a 
financial incentive (through the retail margin) for a retailer to invest in retailing services (whether in 
the form of store fit-out or retailing staff). Otherwise, retailers that invest in their stores and staff 
training may be vulnerable to undercutting by ‘discounter’ retailers that do not make such 
investments.  
Manufacturers may also wish to engage in RPM as a marketing or branding strategy, where a fixed 
retail price is a signal to consumers that the product is a premium product. RPM enables a 
manufacturer to control its products’ branding and market positioning, which can be of value to 
consumers. 
Nevertheless, concerns remain about the likely anti-competitive effects of RPM. The primary 
rationale for a per se prohibition on RPM (as opposed to a competition-based test) is that RPM may 
facilitate manufacturer or retailer collusion. The ACCC notes that RPM can cause significant harm to 
the competitive process, including by: 
 facilitating collusion between suppliers: RPM conduct may be used by suppliers to 
reduce or eliminate price competition between its customers …  
 facilitating collusion between retailers: a bottom up RPM occurs when one or more 
retailers compel a supplier to adopt RPM conduct to reduce or eliminate price 
competition at the retail level …  
                                                          
616 As noted by Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, sub, page 61. 
617 Competition Act (Canada), section 76. 
618 For example, subsection 9(1) Competition Act 1998 (UK), article 101(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (EU). 
619 ACCC 2014, ACCC authorises minimum retail process on Festool power tools, media release 5 December, Canberra. 
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 supplier exclusion: an incumbent supplier may use RPM conduct to guarantee 
margins for retailers to make them unwilling to carry the products of a rival or new 
entrant;  
 retailer exclusion: RPM conduct can be used as a means to eliminate retail 
competition from discount or more efficient retailers. (sub 1, page 116) 
RPM and digital retailing 
Historically, RPM has been considered in the context of ‘bricks and mortar’ retailers. Now, RPM is 
emerging as an issue for new models of digital-based retailing. eBay states, based on annual surveys 
of its sellers, that around one-quarter of sellers are instructed by their suppliers to sell at 
recommended retail prices. As eBay notes: 
This clearly restricts the ability for eBay sellers to price their products at what they 
consider to be an appropriate price point and puts them at risk of adverse treatment by 
suppliers should they not comply with pricing instructions … eBay remains concerned, 
however, about the widespread abuse of the prohibition on resale price maintenance in 
the context of ecommerce and the ability of small businesses in particular to maximise the 
opportunities available on market platforms such as eBay. (sub, page 3) 
RPM in digital markets also received significant international legal attention recently when Apple was 
found to have breached EU and US competition laws by fixing the prices of e-books in collaboration 
with five publishers. Norton Rose Fulbright states that, prior to the conduct, the publishers switched 
their distribution arrangements from an independent distributor arrangement to an agency 
agreement, possibly to avoid breaching the relevant RPM provisions.620 
On balance, and having regard to the potential for RPM to become more commonplace in the online 
economy, the Panel considers it prudent to retain the per se prohibition for the time being. 
Policymakers should monitor this type of conduct since per se prohibition may become unnecessary 
in future.  
The Panel considers that allowing notification of RPM (discussed below) is an appropriate next step.  
Avoiding RPM or seeking exemption 
The prohibition against RPM does not apply when a manufacturer conducts business as a vertically 
integrated manufacturer/retailer. Under that business structure, where goods are not resold by an 
independent retailer, the manufacturer is also the retailer and is free to set its own retail price. A 
manufacturer may also choose to sell its products through an agency network. Under a genuine 
agency arrangement, the manufacturer sells its products directly to consumers and is therefore 
permitted to specify the retail price. 
A general tenet of competition law is that companies within a corporate group are treated as a single 
economic entity and are not considered to be competitors. For that reason, the prohibitions in 
sections 45 and 47 do not apply to trading arrangements entered into between related companies.621 
                                                          
620 Although moving to an agency agreement could circumvent the prohibition on RPM, in this case the agreement was 
not merely bilaterally between each publisher and Apple as agent, but also through a degree of horizontal collusion 
between the publishers. See: Coleman, M, Australia: Technology: Lessons from the ebooks case, Norton Rose 
Fullbright. 
621 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsections 45(8) and 47(12). 
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A similar principle ought to apply to RPM. Yet, currently, there is no exemption for RPM between a 
manufacturer and a retailer that is a subsidiary of the manufacturer. 
RPM can be authorised by the ACCC where it is found to result in a net public benefit. Although the 
option of authorisation exists, the Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee 
notes that the use of authorisation for RPM, which has been available since 1995, is ‘almost unheard 
of’ (sub, page 62). To the Panel’s knowledge, the authorisation granted recently to Tooltechnic, 
noted above, was the first ever application for authorisation in respect of RPM. 
The absence of RPM authorisation applications contrasts with the number of authorisation 
applications lodged with the ACCC for other CCA provisions. This may be evidence that 
manufacturers do not believe they can demonstrate sufficient public benefit to be granted 
authorisation. The Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee posits an 
alternative explanation, stating: 
There are few circumstances where a manufacturer that wished, for example, to specify 
minimum retail prices in launching a new product, would be prepared to place its launch 
on hold while the ACCC conducted a public inquiry into whether it would enhance 
economic efficiency. (sub, page 62) 
It is possible that the cost and delay of the authorisation process is a real deterrent to 
businesses seeking exemption for a retailing strategy involving RPM. 
The alternative exemption process under the CCA, notification, is not available for RPM. This reflects 
the traditional view that RPM is anti-competitive in the majority of circumstances. As discussed 
above, that view has been challenged in recent years.  
In contrast, notification is available for other forms of vertical restraint, including third-line forcing. 
Notification is a less expensive and quicker means of obtaining exemption. The ACCC may withdraw 
the exemption if it forms the view that the anti-competitive harm of the notified conduct outweighs 
any public benefit. 
The Panel considers that businesses should be permitted to seek exemption from the RPM 
prohibition more easily. This could be achieved through allowing RPM to receive exemption 
through the notification process, which is quicker and less expensive than authorisation. This 
change would also have the advantage of allowing the ACCC to assess RPM trading strategies 
more frequently, thereby gathering evidence on the competitive effects of RPM in Australia. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel does not see a sufficient case for changing the prohibition of RPM from a per se 
prohibition to a competition-based test.  
Nevertheless, the notification process should be extended to RPM to provide a quicker and less 
expensive exemption process for business. Notification offers a means of testing the evidence of 
the competitive effects of RPM in Australia. 
The prohibition should also be amended to include an exemption for RPM conduct between 
related bodies corporate, as is the case under sections 45 and 47. 
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Recommendation 34 — Resale price maintenance 
The prohibition on resale price maintenance (RPM) in section 48 of the CCA should be retained in 
its current form as a per se prohibition, but notification should be available for RPM conduct. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
The prohibition should also be amended to include an exemption for RPM conduct between 
related bodies corporate, as is the case under sections 45 and 47. 
20.5 LINER SHIPPING EXEMPTION UNDER PART X OF THE CCA 
The Terms of Reference (3.3.5) task the Review with considering whether existing exemptions from 
competition law and/or historic sector-specific arrangements are still warranted. Box 20.3 outlines 
previous reviews of Part X of the CCA and government responses. 
International liner shipping has historically enjoyed a degree of exemption from competition laws, 
both in Australia and overseas. This allows shipping companies to form conferences (effectively a 
form of cartel) to service particular trade routes. 
Part X of the CCA allows liner shipping operators to enter into agreements among themselves in 
relation to the freight rates to be charged, and the quantity and kinds of cargo to be carried, on 
particular trade routes. Operators register these agreements with the Registrar of Liner Shipping (an 
office created under Part X). Registration confers an exemption from the cartel conduct prohibitions 
and sections 45 and 47. 
To register an agreement, the Registrar must be satisfied that various conditions have been met. The 
most significant condition concerns any provision of the agreement that would otherwise contravene 
the cartel conduct prohibitions, or sections 45 or 47. The Registrar must be satisfied that such a 
provision is necessary for the agreement to operate effectively and is of overall benefit to Australian 
exporters (in the case of an outward conference agreement) or Australian importers (in the case of 
an inward conference agreement). 
Subject to receiving a report from the ACCC, the Minister is empowered under Part X to direct the 
Registrar to cancel the registration of a conference agreement, in whole or in part. The Minister may 
exercise the power if he or she is satisfied of certain matters, including that provisions of the 
agreement are not of overall benefit to Australian exporters or Australian importers. 
Part X also imposes obligations on liner shipping operators to negotiate (but not necessarily reach 
agreement) with peak shipper622 bodies around minimum service levels and to provide sufficient 
notification for changes to freight rates and surcharges. 
Much of the liner shipping to and from Australia is organised along conference lines, although this is 
becoming less common.623 Conference agreements allow for co-ordinated scheduling, revenue 
pooling, price fixing and capacity agreements. 
                                                          
622 The term shipper refers to the representative, owner or exporter of the goods being shipped. 
623 See, for example: ACCC, sub 1, page 49; and Global Shippers’ Forum, sub, page 3. 
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The historical argument for exempting liner shipping from competition law is that, without 
collaborative conduct among operators, the market would not deliver an efficient supply of liner 
cargo shipping services to Australia. The industry is characterised by lumpy investment, high fixed 
costs and low marginal costs. The premise underlying Part X is that, without co-operation among 
shipping companies, prices and service levels would be excessively volatile, owing to cycles of entry 
and exit creating periods of excess and under capacity.  
As Shipping Australia Limited states: 
The fundamental issue is that international liner shipping has a set of characteristics that 
require a specialised regulatory regime that, in turn, provides some limited exemption for 
price setting. (sub, page 10) 
Peak shipper bodies have also tended to support the Part X exemptions because they oblige shipping 
conferences to negotiate as a condition of registering agreements. 
Box 20.3: Reviews of Part X 
The most recent major review of Part X was conducted by the Productivity Commission (PC) in 
2005. The PC recommended that Part X be repealed and replaced with ACCC authorisation for liner 
shipping agreements.624 The recommendations of the 2005 inquiry report contrast with the PC’s 
previous review of Part X in 1999, which concluded that, on balance, the regime served Australia’s 
national interest at that time.625 The recommendation to repeal Part X was repeated in the 2012 
joint Australian-New Zealand PC study Strengthening Trans-Tasman Economic Relations.626 
In response to the 2005 review, the then Australian Government did not fully accept the PC’s 
recommendations but instead announced in mid-2006 its intention to introduce reforms to 
Part X.627 Among other things, the reforms were intended to clarify Part X’s objectives and remove 
discussion agreements from scope. 
The reforms were not implemented. Had they been, Part X’s operation would have been more 
closely aligned with the more pro-competitive regulatory regimes operating out of Europe and 
the US. 
Although the test for registering a conference agreement under Part X involves assessing the ‘overall 
benefit’ to Australia of the agreement, it does not expressly require assessing its competitive effects. 
Also, the test is not assessed by the primary competition regulator, the ACCC, but by the Registrar of 
Liner Shipping. 
                                                          
624 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974: International Liner Cargo Shipping, 
Canberra, page xxvi. 
625 Productivity Commission 1999, International Liner Cargo Shipping: A Review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Canberra, page xxviii. 
626 Australia and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012, Joint Study — Strengthening Trans-Tasman Economic 
Relations, recommendation 4.14, page 16. 
627 Joint Media Statement by Costello, P (Treasurer), and Truss, W (Minister for Transport and Regional Services) 2006, 
Government response to Productivity Commission Report ‘Review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(International Liner Cargo Shipping)’, Media Release 4 August, Canberra. 
Anti-competitive Agreements, Arrangements and Understandings 
382 Part 4 — Competition Laws 
No other industry enjoys legislative exemption from Australia’s competition laws. This is despite the 
fact that other industries have similar economic characteristics to the liner shipping industry, 
particularly the international airline industry. If participants in other industries wish to make 
agreements that would otherwise contravene the competition law, they are required to seek 
authorisation from the ACCC. 
The authorisation process is designed to test, in a public and transparent manner, whether 
agreements between competitors are in the public interest, weighing the potential anti-competitive 
detriment against any public benefits that the agreements may generate. An authorisation is usually 
granted for a specified period of time (typically five to 10 years) to enable the net effects of an 
agreement to be re-assessed at regular intervals. 
Box 20.4 outlines examples of liner shipping regulation in other jurisdictions. 
Box 20.4: Approaches to liner shipping regulation in other jurisdictions 
The Panel notes that, over the last two decades, other jurisdictions have moved to more 
competitive regimes and this has not led to excessive instability or ‘destructive competition’. 
The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development notes: 
The US and EU reforms, which have stripped shipping conferences of the ability to 
collude to set rates, have been shown to have had few negative effects. However, they 
have not been found to have any positive effects in reducing freight rates either. There 
is evidence that the reforms have been associated with increased market 
concentration. (DR sub, page 6) 
The EU approach628 
Prior to 2006, the EU provided a form of block exemption for conference agreements modelled on 
the ‘revised Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement’ decision. Conferences could not discriminate 
between ports or transport users and needed to apply a uniform or common rate for all goods 
carried. The block exemption only applied to agreements that did not allow individual service 
contracts. Agreements that did not qualify generally required individual authorisation. 
The European Commission also required that conferences not include: 
• a prohibition on individual service contracts; 
• restrictions, either binding or non-binding, on the contents of such contracts; 
• a prohibition of independent action on joint service contracts; and 
• also, that the terms of individual service contracts were to remain confidential, except 
where the shipper consented to such disclosure. 
In 2006 the EU removed the block exemption for liner shipping. The industry is now subject to the 
general provisions of EU law and conference agreements must seek authorisation.629 
 
                                                          
628 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974: International Liner Cargo Shipping, 
Inquiry Report, Canberra, page 118. 
629 Federal Maritime Commission 2012, Bureau of Trade Analysis, Study of the 2008 Repeal of the Liner Conference 
Exemption from European Union Competition Law, Washington DC, page 1. 
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Box 20.4: Approaches to liner shipping regulation in other jurisdictions (continued) 
The US approach630 
The US provides exemptions to anti-trust laws for liner shipping under the Shipping Act of 1984. 
This was significantly modified by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998. 
The US exemptions apply to agreements between carriers that discuss, fix or regulate freight rates, 
cargo space accommodation and other service conditions, pool revenues, earnings or losses, or 
restrict or regulate other aspects of service, such as cargoes to be carried and sailing schedules. 
Agreements must be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission. 
Importantly carrier agreements cannot: 
• prohibit member carriers from engaging in negotiations for individual service contracts with 
shippers; or 
• require members to disclose negotiations or make public terms and conditions of individual 
service contracts or adopt rules or requirements affecting the right of member carriers to 
enter into individual service contracts. 
The requirements that carrier agreements cannot prohibit or limit confidential individual service 
contracts mean that US shipping regulation still creates competition between shipping carriers. 
This is because agreements on pricing are effectively non-binding and terms of individual service 
contracts that deviate from the conference tariff are not observable. 
The 2005 PC report on liner shipping and Part X concluded that the evidence did not support 
continued special treatment of the liner shipping industry under Australia’s competition laws. The 
Panel has not received any information to cast doubt on that conclusion. 
Shipping Australia Limited strongly supports retention of Part X but notes: 
The norm now is the Discussion Agreement which does not pool revenues as stated in the 
draft report nor fix prices in the way the old Conference system did. (DR sub, page 3) 
Further, it argues that Part X is pro-competitive: 
It minimises barriers to entry to the Australian trade and ensures a high level of 
contestability from both direct new entrants and transhipment operators with individual 
shipping lines competing fiercely for market share. (DR sub, page 3) 
However, other submissions raise concerns that not all conduct is in shippers’ interests and may be 
anti-competitive. 
The Australian Peak Shippers Association Inc. considers: 
The setting of prices of freight surcharges by shipping lines, consortia and alliances should 
no longer be exempt from scrutiny under the current legislation. These surcharges, of 
which there are many … are randomly instituted or increased by shipping lines with little 
or no justification. They are essentially a clandestine method of increasing sea freight 
rates as all exporters will tell you the real sea freight rate is the total cost of moving a 
container through the stevedores’ wharf gates to finally land with the customer across the 
oceans of the world. (sub, page 7) 
                                                          
630 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act 1974: International Liner Cargo Shipping, 
Inquiry Report, Canberra, page 116. 
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and: 
… the exemption afforded the various Discussion Agreements that allows them to discuss 
sea freight rates and publish recommended general rate increases (GRIs), albeit that any 
published GRIs are not binding on their members, should be rescinded as they amount to 
‘price signalling’ to the market. (DR sub, page 2) 
The Panel considers that the ACCC should be the body to determine whether agreements entered 
into and practices undertaken by international liner shippers are pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive. If, as Shipping Australia Limited claims, the current Discussion Agreements can be 
shown to be pro-competitive, they are unlikely to contravene the competition laws and the 
agreements would likely be authorised by the ACCC. 
In comparison, in the international air freight industry, airlines reach agreements for the sale of 
freight capacity among themselves without contravening competition laws. To the extent that 
international airlines wish to discuss air freight rates or surcharges, or pool revenues or co-ordinate 
their operations, they must do so in accordance with the competition law and seek any necessary 
authorisations under it. 
Internationally, the trend is to remove special competition law exemptions for international liner 
shipping. If Part X were repealed, the authorisation procedure under the CCA would enable the ACCC 
to assess conference agreements as needed on a net public benefit basis. That would induce greater 
focus on the competitive effects of conference agreements, while allowing full input from shippers. 
Additionally, as discussed in Section 22.3 the Panel recommends that the ACCC be given power to 
issue block exemptions: these would exempt categories of conduct defined by the ACCC. If that 
power were to be introduced, the ACCC should develop a block exemption or exemptions for 
categories of liner shipping conduct that do not raise competition concerns, such as consortia or 
operational agreements (vessel sharing, co-ordination of routes and schedules). The block 
exemption(s) should be developed in consultation with liner shipping operators and shippers. 
The Australian Peak Shippers Association ‘strongly recommends that all sections of Part X, which 
support the negotiating position of Australian exporters/shippers, should be maintained’ (sub, 
page 7). If Part X were repealed, shippers would be able to formulate collective negotiation 
arrangements under the existing mechanisms in the CCA. 
If Part X were repealed, existing liner shipping agreements would face the full provisions of the CCA 
and some may be in breach of them. Therefore, a transition would be required. The Panel considers a 
period of two years should be sufficient to: create a block exemption; identify shipping agreements 
that qualify; and either authorise or modify other agreements to ensure compliance with the CCA. 
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The Panel’s view 
Part X should be repealed and the liner shipping industry should be subject to the normal 
operation of the CCA.  
The ACCC should be given power to grant block exemptions (see Recommendation 39). In 
consultation with the shipping industry and shippers, the ACCC should develop a block exemption 
for conference agreements that contain a minimum standard of pro-competitive features. 
For example, conference agreements that co-ordinate scheduling and the exchange of capacity, 
while allowing confidential individual service contracts and not involving a common conference 
tariff and pooling of revenues and losses, should be eligible for a block exemption. Other forms of 
agreement that do not qualify for the block exemption, and thereby risk contravening Part IV 
provisions, should be subject to individual authorisation.  
If a block exemption power is not introduced, it would be preferable to require conference 
agreements to seek authorisation by the ACCC as needed on the basis of the normal net public 
benefit test. Authorisation should be straightforward, involving a minimal compliance burden 
where shipping agreements have been negotiated with shippers. 
Implementation 
Repealing Part X would require transitional arrangements for existing agreements. The transition 
should be sufficiently long to allow for authorisations to be sought as needed and to identify 
agreements that qualify for the block exemption. The Panel considers a two-year transition should be 
sufficient. 
The block exemption for liner shipping agreements should be designed by the ACCC, in consultation 
with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Treasury, liner shipping 
operators and shipper bodies. Consultation on the block exemption should commence within six 
months of agreeing the recommendation and the details of the block exemption should be available 
within 12 months. This would be concurrent with the introduction of a Bill to repeal Part X to take 
effect 12 months later. 
Recommendation 4 — Liner shipping 
Part X of the CCA should be repealed. 
A block exemption granted by the ACCC should be available for liner shipping agreements that 
meet a minimum standard of pro-competitive features (see Recommendation 39). The minimum 
standard of pro-competitive features to qualify for the block exemption should be determined by 
the ACCC in consultation with shippers, their representative bodies and the liner shipping industry. 
Other agreements that risk contravening the competition provisions of the CCA should be subject 
to individual authorisation, as needed, by the ACCC. 
Repeal of Part X will mean that existing agreements are no longer exempt from the competition 
provisions of the CCA. Transitional arrangements are therefore warranted. 
A transitional period of two years should allow for the necessary authorisations to be sought and 
to identify agreements that qualify for the proposed block exemption. 
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21 SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AND EMPLOYMENT-RELATED 
MATTERS 
Negotiating employment terms and conditions has always been excluded from most of the 
competition law provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). This is achieved 
through paragraph 51(2)(a), which provides: 
In determining whether a contravention of a provision of [Part IV], other than 
section 45D, 45DA, 45DB, 45E, 45EA or 48, has been committed, regard shall not be had 
… to any act done in relation to, or to the making of a contract or arrangement or the 
entering into of an understanding, or to any provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, to the extent that the contract, arrangement or understanding, or the 
provision, relates to the remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or 
working conditions of employees. (emphasis added) 
The reason for this exclusion is that the negotiation and determination of employment terms and 
conditions is governed by a separate regulatory regime, currently contained in the Fair Work 
Act 2009. The policy rationale is that labour markets are not in all respects comparable to other 
product or service markets — a point recognised by the Productivity Commission (PC) in its Issues 
Papers for its inquiry into the Workplace Relations Framework: 
The Commission also recognises that the ‘price’ of labour differs from the price of most 
other inputs into an economy. This is not only because the price (wage) offered usually 
affects people’s workplace performance and because of the virtual exclusion of WR 
[workplace relations] from competition policy (Issues Paper 5), though these are 
distinctive features. It is also because many people’s incomes and indeed wellbeing 
depend to a considerable extent on that price.631 
In part, industrial law may be separated from competition law because it has ethical and 
social dimensions at its heart, to a greater extent potentially than the 
business-to-business aspects of competition law. In addition, labour markets have some 
characteristics different from goods markets ... 632 
As a general principle, the Panel concurs with the PC’s view in this regard. 
However, two categories of employment-related conduct do not fall within the general exclusion: 
• secondary boycotts, which are prohibited by sections 45D, 45DA and 45DB of the CCA; and 
• trading restrictions in industrial agreements, which are prohibited by sections 45E and 45EA of 
the CCA. 
The Panel received submissions to both the Issues Paper and the Draft Report that address each of 
these practices. 
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21.1 SECONDARY BOYCOTTS 
The CCA prohibits certain types of secondary boycott conduct. Generally, a secondary boycott 
involves two or more persons, acting in concert with each other, who engage in conduct: 
• that hinders or prevents a third person supplying goods or services to, or acquiring goods or 
services from, a fourth person (who is not an employer of the persons acting in concert), 
where the conduct is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the 
effect, of causing substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person 
(section 45D); 
• that hinders or prevents a third person supplying goods or services to, or acquiring goods and 
services from, a fourth person (who is not an employer of the persons acting in concert), 
where the conduct is engaged in for the purpose, and would have or be likely to have the 
effect, of causing a substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the fourth 
person trades (section 45DA); or 
• for the purpose, and having or likely to have the effect, of preventing or substantially hindering 
a third person (who is not an employer of the first person) from engaging in trade or 
commerce involving the movement of goods between Australia and places outside Australia 
(section 45DB). 
The secondary boycott prohibitions generally apply to employees who are members of the same 
employee organisation. Under section 45DC, an employee organisation may become liable for the 
secondary boycott activity of its members. 
Secondary boycotts are harmful to trading freedom and therefore harmful to competition. Where 
accompanied by effective enforcement, secondary boycott prohibitions have been shown to have a 
significant deterrent effect on behaviour that would otherwise compromise consumers’ ability to 
access goods and services in a competitive market.  
The Swanson Committee observed: 
... no section of the community should be entitled to be the judge in its own cause on 
matters directly aimed at interfering with the competitive process between firms. We 
make no exceptions to that position. If an organisation or group of persons for its own 
reasons deliberatively interferes with the competitive process, then the community is 
entitled to have those reasons scrutinised by a body independent of the persons engaged 
in the dispute.633 
The Panel considers this policy rationale, including its application to employee organisations, to be as 
relevant today as it was when first formulated. The Panel sees a strong case for effective secondary 
boycott provisions. The existence of such prohibitions and their enforcement by the ACCC or parties 
harmed by the conduct serve the public interest.  
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The Panel’s view is confirmed by the findings of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance 
and Corruption (the Royal Commission) concerning the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union (CFMEU) and Boral, published in Volume 2, Part 8.2 of the Royal Commission’s Interim 
Report.634 
The secondary boycott provisions of the CCA have been the subject of numerous amendments since 
their inception in 1977, particularly in relation to the types of conduct that should or should not be 
excluded from the operation of the laws. 
Presently, the secondary boycott prohibitions have two general exceptions (or defences): 
• The first defence applies if the dominant purpose for which a person engages in the conduct is 
substantially related to the remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or 
working conditions of that person or a fellow employee (subsection 45DD(1)). 
• The second defence applies if the dominant purpose for which a person engages in the 
conduct is substantially related to environmental protection or consumer protection, and 
engaging in the conduct does not constitute industrial action (subsection 45DD(3)). 
The Panel received submissions in relation to each of these defences. 
The Panel also received submissions in relation to the effectiveness of the current law in deterring 
secondary boycott behaviour. The submissions focus on the role of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) in enforcing the secondary boycott law and the deterrent effect of the 
sanctions for contraventions. These issues are also discussed in the Interim Report of the Royal 
Commission.635 
Employment exceptions 
A number of submissions argue for or against retaining the secondary boycott prohibition; some wish 
to broaden the scope of the employment exception. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (ACCI) supports retaining the secondary boycott provisions and separating commercial and 
workplace laws.636 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) seeks to either abolish the 
secondary boycott provisions (DR sub, page 10) or widen the employment exception applicable to 
secondary boycotts, arguing that it does not reflect Australia’s international obligations under the 
International Labour Organisation’s Convention 87 (sub, page 3). 
However, the Panel does not consider that the case has been made to either limit the scope of the 
prohibitions or broaden the applicable exceptions. Either of these options would weaken the 
effectiveness of the secondary boycott provisions. 
Environmental and consumer protection exception 
A number of submissions to the Issues Paper and the Draft Report argue for or against retaining the 
exception for secondary boycotts where the dominant purpose is environmental or consumer 
protection. Consumer and environmental organisations argue for retaining (or expanding) the 
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636 See sub, page 25 and DR sub, page 14. See also Master Builders Australia, sub 1, page 17. 
Secondary Boycotts and Employment-Related Matters 
Part 4 — Competition Laws 389 
exception, while industry groups argue for its removal.637 The Tasmanian Government proposes a 
separate inquiry into the public interest of retaining the environmental exception by an independent 
body (DR sub, page 1). 
The Panel did not receive compelling evidence of actual secondary boycott activity falling within the 
environmental and consumer protection exception in the CCA. In the absence of such evidence, the 
Panel does not see an immediate case for amending the exception. However, if such evidence arises 
from future boycott activity, the exception should be reassessed. 
During Panel consultations, industry representatives appeared to be primarily concerned that 
environmental groups may damage a supplier in a market through a public advocacy campaign based 
on false or misleading information. 
Submissions also tended to express concerns about public advocacy campaigns or false and 
misleading information, rather than secondary boycott activity as such. As consumer and 
environmental protection issues are often the subject of public advocacy, the Panel can understand 
that some may regard the secondary boycott exceptions as a form of protection of public advocacy in 
these areas. 
The Panel considers that, although a public advocacy campaign may damage a business, it does so by 
attempting to influence the behaviour of businesses and consumers. Businesses and consumers are 
free to make up their own minds about the merits of the campaign. 
A public advocacy campaign is therefore distinct from a secondary boycott—the latter aims not just 
to influence but also to hinder or prevent the supply or acquisition of goods or services. The 
Australian Food and Grocery Council acknowledges this: 
It is important to distinguish public advocacy (which should be permitted) from secondary 
boycott behaviour (which should be prohibited). (DR sub, page 11) 
However, a further question arises: if an environmental or consumer organisation advocates against 
customers purchasing products from a trading business, should the advocacy be subject to the laws 
prohibiting false, misleading and deceptive conduct?638 Presently, those laws only apply insofar as a 
person is engaged in trade or commerce. 
Expanding the laws concerning false, misleading or deceptive conduct to organisations involved in 
public advocacy campaigns directed at trading businesses raises complex issues. Many public 
advocacy campaigns directed at trading businesses concern health issues (for example, tobacco, 
alcohol and fast food) or social issues (for example, gambling). Consideration of expanding those laws 
in that context is beyond the Terms of Reference of this Review. We therefore make no 
recommendation in this regard. 
                                                          
637 See, for example: Australian Conservation Foundation, sub, pages 2-5; Australian Food and Grocery Council, sub, 
page 28; Australian Forest Products Association, sub, pages 3-5; Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, sub, pages 1-2; 
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Enforcement and deterrence 
A number of submissions raise concerns around whether or not the ACCC is taking sufficient steps to 
enforce the secondary boycott provisions.639 ACCI’s submission discusses the importance of publicly 
enforcing the provisions, including the availability of guidance about the laws for small business. ACCI 
argues that information about the ACCC’s enforcement decisions in relation to secondary boycotts 
lacks transparency.640 Submissions also support the Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction Industry (the Cole Royal Commission) recommendation: 
The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act contain secondary boycott 
provisions mirroring ss 45D–45E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), but limited in 
operation to the building and construction industry.641 
Submissions argue that the degree of concerns in the construction industry, and the complexity of 
the issues, warrant shared jurisdiction of these matters between the ACCC and any Australian 
Building and Construction Commission-type body, should one be re-established. 642 
In response to these concerns, the ACCC states that it carefully considers each and every complaint 
about secondary boycott conduct, noting that between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2014 it was 
contacted only nine times about secondary boycott issues. Four of these cases related to employee 
organisations and all were investigated. The ACCC also notes that a number of features make 
enforcement challenging: 
• difficulties in obtaining documentary evidence; 
• lack of co-operation of witnesses; and 
• potential overlaps between the ACCC and Fair Work Commission and Fair Work Building and 
Construction (sub 3, pages 6-7). 
In December 2014, the Interim Report of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and 
Corruption was tabled in Parliament. In that report, the Royal Commission states that its findings 
concerning the CFMEU and Boral suggest the following possible problems: 
• the ineffectiveness of the current secondary boycott provisions in sections 45D and 45E of the 
CCA to deter illegal secondary boycotts by trade unions; 
• the absence of specific provisions making it unlawful for the competitors or target of a 
secondary boycott knowingly to supply a product or service in substitute for a supply by the 
target; 
• an inability or unwillingness by the regulatory authorities to investigate and prosecute 
breaches of the secondary boycott provisions by trade unions speedily; 
• the absence of any speedy and effective method by which injunctions granted by a court 
restraining a trade union from engaging in an illegal secondary boycott can be enforced; 
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• the absence of a single statutory regulator dedicated to the regulation of trade unions with 
sufficient legal power to investigate and prosecute breaches of the secondary boycott 
provisions; and 
• the absence of appropriate legal duties owed by the officers of trade unions to their members, 
and the absence of appropriate mechanisms by which such officers can be held accountable to 
their members.643 
As with all competition laws, secondary boycotts need to be enforced consistently and effectively — 
and in a timely manner. The Panel reiterates its concerns expressed in the Draft Report regarding: 
the ability and willingness of the relevant regulatory bodies to investigate and bring legal 
proceedings to enforce the law; the speed with which legal proceedings can be commenced and 
completed; and the sanctions available for contraventions of the law.  
The Panel believes that the ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with increased vigour, 
comparable to that which it applies in pursuing other contraventions of the competition law. The 
Panel expects the ACCC will further develop its capability to enforce prohibitions on unlawful 
secondary boycotts in a timely way, especially in light of the Panel’s recommendation that its charter 
focus more clearly on competition issues (see Recommendation 49). As with all competition laws, the 
secondary boycott laws will only act as a deterrent to unlawful behaviour if the laws are enforced 
consistently and effectively. 
It would be useful for the ACCC to report generally about the number of complaints it receives about 
different parts of the CCA, including secondary boycotts and the manner in which the complaints are 
resolved. However, the ACCC should not be required to report publicly on investigations where it has 
decided that no contravention has occurred. Persons who are the subject of any ACCC investigation 
are entitled to a reasonable degree of privacy concerning allegations that are investigated and the 
outcomes of the investigation, unless proceedings are instituted.  
Currently, the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the prohibitions in sections 45D, 
45DA, 45DB, 45E and 45EA (subsection 86(4) of the CCA and subsection 4(4) of the Jurisdiction of 
Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987). Despite that, it is open to litigants to bring secondary boycott 
proceedings in the state Supreme Courts under the Competition Codes of the States and Territories. 
As the Competition Code is a law of the States (enacted through the various 1995 Competition Policy 
Reform Acts of the States), each state Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine such 
proceedings. This is convenient to litigants because a contravention of the secondary boycott 
sections may arise in connection with other common law disputes between employers and employee 
organisations that are commonly litigated in state courts. 
The Panel supports the current arrangements for access to secondary boycott remedies through both 
Federal and state jurisdictions. 
As discussed in Chapter 23 below, a corporation that contravenes the secondary boycott provisions is 
liable to a civil penalty not exceeding $750,000. This can be compared with much higher penalties for 
contravention of other competition law provisions ($10 million).644 The Panel sees no reason why this 
should be the case — a view shared by Boral Limited (DR sub, page 13). Penalties listed in the CCA 
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are maximum penalties. The courts will determine penalties based on a wide range of factors, 
including the harm resulting from the conduct.  
The Panel’s view 
A strong case remains for the prohibition of secondary boycotts, which should be retained in the 
CCA. A sufficient case has not been made to limit the scope of the secondary boycott prohibitions, 
nor to broaden the scope of the exception for employment-related matters. 
In the absence of compelling evidence that the exceptions for the purposes of environmental and 
consumer protection (as distinct from public advocacy campaigns) are harming business, the Panel 
does not see an immediate case for amending them. However, if such evidence arises from future 
boycott activity, the exceptions should be re-assessed. 
Employer groups in building, construction and mining perceive inadequacies in the public 
enforcement of the secondary boycott provisions of the CCA. Timely and effective enforcement 
serves as a deterrent to boycott activity and needs to exist both in regulatory culture and 
capability. The Panel believes that the ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with increased 
vigour, comparable to that which it applies in pursuing other contraventions of competition laws. 
The ACCC should record the number of complaints made to it in respect of different parts of the 
CCA in its annual report, including secondary boycott matters and the number of such matters 
investigated and resolved in each financial year. 
Further, the Panel sees no reason why the maximum pecuniary penalties for breaches of 
secondary boycott provisions should be lower than those for other breaches of the competition 
law. 
 
Recommendation 36 — Secondary boycotts 
The prohibitions on secondary boycotts in sections 45D-45DE of the CCA should be maintained and 
effectively enforced. 
The ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with increased vigour, comparable to that which 
it applies in pursuing other contraventions of the competition law. It should also publish in its 
annual report the number of complaints made to it in respect of different parts of the CCA, 
including secondary boycott conduct and the number of such matters investigated and resolved 
each year. 
The maximum penalty level for secondary boycotts should be the same as that applying to other 
breaches of the competition law. 
21.2 TRADING RESTRICTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS 
Section 45E of the CCA prohibits a person from making a contract, arrangement or understanding 
with an organisation of employees that contains a provision that has the purpose of: 
• preventing or hindering the person from supplying or continuing to supply goods or services to 
a second person that the first person has been accustomed, or is under an obligation, to 
supply, or doing so subject to conditions; or 
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• preventing or hindering the person from acquiring or continuing to acquire goods or services 
from a second person that the first person has been accustomed, or is under an obligation, to 
acquire, or doing so subject to conditions. 
Section 45EA also prohibits a person from giving effect to such a provision. 
Employer groups in the building, construction and resources industries raise concerns about 
industrial agreements that restrict employers in relation to acquiring services from contractors and 
labour hire businesses.645 They argue that restrictions on the use of contractors are particularly acute 
in their industries because the work tends to be project-based and the requirement for labour is not 
constant but dependent on the stage of a construction project. Submissions also refer to terms of 
industrial agreements that regulate the supply of certain goods, such as uniforms,646 or non-labour 
services, such as superannuation.647 
The concern expressed by employer groups arises from a possible conflict between the intended 
operation of sections 45E and 45EA and the regulation of awards and industrial agreements under 
the Fair Work Act. In this regard, the Panel notes that amendments to the Fair Work Act have 
expanded the scope of conduct it regulates beyond the remuneration, conditions of employment, 
hours of work or working conditions of employees, and that this has occurred since sections 45E and 
45EA were enacted. 
This issue was brought into focus by the 2012 decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, 
Australian Industry Group v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 108. The case considered the question 
of whether it was lawful for the Fair Work Commission to approve an enterprise agreement under 
the Fair Work Act that contained a provision requiring the employer to engage or deal only with 
those contractors who apply wages and conditions no less favourable than those provided for in the 
agreement. The Full Court concluded that it was lawful for the Fair Work Commission to approve the 
agreement. 
Relevantly, the Full Court concluded that the enterprise agreement did not involve any contravention 
of section 45E because: 
• it was not an agreement with an organisation of employees in the sense required by 
section 45E; and 
• as the agreement had statutory force, it was not a contract, arrangement or understanding 
within the meaning of section 45E. 
It appears that there may be a conflict between the purposes of the CCA, as reflected in sections 45E 
and 45EA, and the industrial conduct permitted under the Fair Work Act. The apparent purpose of 
subsection 51(2) and sections 45E and 45EA is to exempt from the CCA contracts governing the 
remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of employees, while 
prohibiting contracts between employers and employee organisations that otherwise hinder the 
trading freedom of the employer (in respect of the supply and acquisition of goods and services, 
which would include contractors). 
                                                          
645 See, for example: Australian Industry Group, sub, page 20; Australian Mines & Metals Association, sub, page 11; 
Master Builders Australia, sub, page 9; and Minerals Council of Australia, sub, page 14. 
646 ACTU, DR sub, pages 12-13.  
647 See, for example: Industry Super Australia, DR sub, pages 8-9; and Financial Services Council, DR sub, pages 1-2. 
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However, it appears to be lawful under the Fair Work Act to make awards and register industrial 
agreements that place restrictions on the freedom of employers to engage contractors or source 
certain goods or non-labour services. 
Although the evidence suggests that these issues are more significant in some industries than others, 
it is desirable that the apparent conflict between the objective of sections 45E and 45EA and the 
operation of the Fair Work Act be resolved. The Panel favours competition over restrictions and 
believes that businesses should generally be free to supply and acquire goods and services, including 
contract labour if they choose.  
The Draft Report notes a number of possible solutions to the apparent conflict, including: 
• a procedural right for the ACCC to be notified by the Fair Work Commission of proceedings for 
approval of workplace agreements that contain potential restrictions of the kind referred to in 
sections 45E and 45EA; 
• an amendment to sections 45E and 45EA so that they expressly include awards and industrial 
agreements (as proposed by employer representatives); and 
• an amendment to sections 45E, 45EA and possibly paragraph 51(2)(a) to exempt workplace 
agreements approved under the Fair Work Act (as proposed by trade unions).  
A number of submissions address these proposals. 
The ACTU states that section 172 of the Fair Work Act, which defines the permitted subject matter of 
an enterprise agreement, encompasses matters such as ‘ensuring that contractors are engaged on 
conditions no less favourable [than] those the instrument prescribes for employees, the provision of 
leave to workers to attend union training, salary packaging and superannuation’ and argues that 
‘negotiation and agreement making in relation to such matters is, and must remain, legitimate’. The 
ACTU submits that (absent the repeal of the trading restriction provisions) sections 45E and 45EA and 
paragraph 51(2)(a) should be amended to exempt the bargaining, making and approval of enterprise 
agreements or proposed enterprise agreements (DR sub, pages 12-13). 
Industry Super Australia states: 
... superannuation is not simply another financial service or product that is provided to 
employers. Superannuation is a key employment condition and takes the form of deferred 
wages’ and that it is ‘entirely appropriate that matters pertaining to superannuation be 
the subject of workplace collective bargaining between employers and employees (DR 
sub, page 9).648 
Conversely, a number of employer representative groups support an amendment to sections 45E and 
45EA so that they expressly apply to awards and industrial agreements to prevent interference in the 
freedom of companies to engage contractors.649 
                                                          
648 The Financial Services Council (DR sub, page 1) notes that ‘Competition in the default superannuation market is 
currently under consideration by the Government through the Treasury’s ‘Better regulation and governance, 
enhanced transparency and improved competition in superannuation Discussion Paper’. 
649 See, for example: Australian Mines & Metals Association, sub, page 12; Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, DR sub, page 15; Australian Industry Group, sub, page 20; Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association Limited, DR sub, page 11; Business Council of Australia, DR sub, page 51; and Master Builders Australia, 
sub 1, page 9 and DR sub, page 20. 
Secondary Boycotts and Employment-Related Matters 
Part 4 — Competition Laws 395 
The Panel considers that collective bargaining in respect of the remuneration, conditions of 
employment, hours of work or working conditions of employees should continue to be exempt from 
the application of the CCA, as reflected in paragraph 51(2)(a). 
However, the Panel does not support expanding these categories. Collective bargaining should not 
intrude on the freedom of companies to acquire goods or services, including labour services, from 
other contractors, or their freedom to supply goods or services to others. 
Accordingly, the Panel considers that sections 45E and 45EA should be amended so that they 
expressly apply to awards and industrial agreements, except to the extent that the awards and 
industrial agreements deal with the remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or 
working conditions of employees.650 Such an amendment would preserve the integrity of the current 
exception in paragraph 51(2)(a), while protecting the trading freedom of employers outside the 
scope of that exception. 
With that change to the CCA, it would become necessary for the Fair Work Commission to consider 
whether a proposed award or industrial agreement may potentially fall within the scope of sections 
45E and 45EA. The Panel considers that the ACCC should be given the right to intervene (that is, to be 
notified, appear and be heard) in proceedings before the Fair Work Commission concerning 
compliance with sections 45E and 45EA. From a practical standpoint, this would require a protocol to 
be established between the ACCC and the Fair Work Commission. This would allow the Fair Work 
Commission to identify potential non-employment restrictions in lodged applications and notify the 
ACCC accordingly. 
Also, the Panel observes that sections 45E and 45EA are presently framed in narrow terms. The 
prohibition only applies to restrictions affecting persons with whom the employer ‘has been 
accustomed, or is under an obligation’ to deal. As framed, the prohibition would not apply to a 
restriction in relation to any contractor with whom the employer had not previously dealt. 
The ACTU submits that the reason for that limitation is that sections 45E and 45EA were originally 
enacted as offshoots of the secondary boycott provisions — the ‘provisions were clearly aimed at 
preventing a union from entering into an arrangement with a trader to change that trader’s 
behaviour in support of the union’s boycott’ (DR sub, pages 9 and 11). 
Contraventions of sections 45E and 45EA can arise in the context of secondary boycott conduct, as 
illustrated by the findings of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption 
concerning the CFMEU and Boral published in its Interim Report.651 However, that does not support 
the limitations of sections 45E and 45EA to restrictions affecting persons with whom the employer 
‘has been accustomed, or is under an obligation’ to deal. The same harm can arise if the restriction 
relates to a contractor with whom the employer has not previously dealt, but with whom the 
employer wishes to deal. This restriction should be removed from the provisions. 
Further, consistent with the discussion above in relation to secondary boycotts, breaches of 
anti-competitive trading restrictions should not be subject to a lower maximum penalty than other 
breaches of competition laws. 
                                                          
650 To achieve this application, the exception in paragraph 51(2)(a) may need to be amended so that it applies to 
sections 45E and 45EA. 
651 Heydon AC QC, J D 2015, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption, Volume 2, Commonwealth 
of Australia, pages 1011 to 1115. 
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The Panel’s view 
There is an apparent conflict between the object of sections 45E and 45EA of the CCA and 
industrial conduct permitted under the Fair Work Act. The Panel considers it desirable that this 
apparent conflict be resolved. The Panel favours competition over restrictions and believes that 
businesses should generally be free to supply and acquire goods and services, including contract 
labour, if they choose. 
The Panel considers that sections 45E and 45EA should be amended so that they expressly apply to 
awards and industrial agreements, except to the extent they relate to the remuneration, 
conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of employees. 
The Panel also considers that the ACCC should be given the right to intervene in proceedings (that 
is, to be notified, appear and be heard ) before the Fair Work Commission and make submissions 
concerning compliance with sections 45E and 45EA.  
The present limitation in sections 45E and 45EA, such that the prohibition only applies to 
restrictions affecting persons with whom an employer ‘has been accustomed, or is under an 
obligation,’ to deal, should be removed. 
Breaches of anti-competitive trading restrictions should not be subject to a lower maximum 
penalty than other breaches of the competition law. 
 
Recommendation 37 — Trading restrictions in industrial agreements 
Sections 45E and 45EA of the CCA should be amended so that they apply to awards and industrial 
agreements, except to the extent they relate to the remuneration, conditions of employment, 
hours of work or working conditions of employees. 
Further, the present limitation in sections 45E and 45EA, such that the prohibitions only apply to 
restrictions affecting persons with whom an employer ‘has been accustomed, or is under an 
obligation,’ to deal, should be removed. 
These recommendations are reflected in the model provisions in Appendix A. 
The ACCC should be given the right to intervene in proceedings before the Fair Work Commission 
and make submissions concerning compliance with sections 45E and 45EA. A protocol should be 
established between the ACCC and the Fair Work Commission. 
The maximum penalty for breaches of sections 45E and 45EA should be the same as that applying 
to other breaches of the competition law. 
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22 EXEMPTION PROCESSES 
Competition is desirable not for its own sake but because, in most circumstances, it improves the 
welfare of Australians by increasing choice, diversity and efficiency in the supply of goods and 
services. In other words, competition is a means to an end. In some circumstances, arrangements 
that lessen competition may nonetheless produce public benefits that outweigh the detriment 
resulting from the lessening of competition. 
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) has various procedures by which businesses can apply 
to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for an exemption from the 
competition law for particular commercial arrangements on the basis that the arrangements 
generate a net public benefit. The CCA presently contains three separate exemption processes — 
authorisation, notification and clearance — that have different features. 
The authorisation process applies to most types of business conduct. The ACCC may grant 
authorisation if it is satisfied that the conduct generates a net public benefit. Exemption from the 
competition laws does not commence until the ACCC has made a determination in respect of the 
application, which often takes many months. 
At present, applications for merger authorisations are treated differently to other applications. 
Merger applications must be made to the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) and are 
subject to a time limit for determination. As discussed earlier in the context of mergers, the Panel’s 
view is that merger authorisation applications should be made instead to the ACCC in the first 
instance, with the Tribunal exercising a power of review (see Chapter 18). 
As an alternative to authorisation, a notification may be given to the ACCC in respect of exclusive 
dealing conduct (prohibited under section 47), collective bargaining conduct (prohibited under the 
cartel provisions and section 45) and price signalling (prohibited under Division 1A). Notification has 
an advantage over authorisation in that the relevant exemption is provided upon filing the 
notification.652 The ACCC may withdraw the exemption if it subsequently forms the view that the 
notified conduct does not give rise to a net public benefit. As discussed earlier in the context of 
resale price maintenance (RPM), the Panel considers that the notification procedure should be 
extended to RPM conduct (see Section 20.4).  
Businesses can also apply for a formal clearance of a merger transaction. Like authorisation, the 
clearance procedure only provides exemption from the merger law after the ACCC has made a 
determination on the application. The ACCC may grant clearance if it is satisfied that the merger is 
not likely to substantially lessen competition (see Chapter 18).  
A number of submissions comment on these exemption processes. In addition to issues concerning 
the merger approval processes (discussed in Section 18.5), submissions raise three matters for 
consideration: 
• whether the authorisation and notification processes can be simplified;653 
                                                          
652 In the case of third-line forcing, a type of exclusive dealing, and collective bargaining, the exemption commences 
14 days after filing the notification. 
653 Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, sub, pages 75-77. 
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• whether the notification process for collective bargaining is fulfilling its potential;654 and 
• whether the ACCC should be granted a general power to issue block exemptions.655 
22.1 SIMPLIFICATION OF THE AUTHORISATION AND NOTIFICATION PROCESSES 
Wherever possible, it is desirable to remove unnecessary complexity. Like much of the CCA, the 
authorisation and notification processes are unnecessarily complex, which imposes costs on 
business. Specifically: 
• The authorisation process focuses on the specific provisions of the CCA that might be 
contravened by the proposed business conduct. As a consequence, several different 
applications may be required in respect of a single commercial arrangement depending upon 
the number of provisions of the CCA that apply to the arrangement. 
• The authorisation and notification procedures do not empower the ACCC to grant exemption if 
the ACCC is satisfied that the proposed business conduct is unlikely to substantially lessen 
competition. In order to grant the exemption, the ACCC is required to assess the net public 
benefit of the proposed conduct. In contrast, the formal clearance process for mergers does 
enable the ACCC to exempt a merger if it is satisfied that the merger is unlikely to substantially 
lessen competition.  
Significant steps can be taken to simplify the authorisation and notification processes. First, in 
respect of authorisation, it should be permissible to apply for authorisation of a business 
arrangement or conduct through a single application and without regard to the specific provisions of 
the CCA that might be contravened by the proposed conduct. Second, for both authorisation and 
notification, the ACCC should be empowered to grant the exemption if it is satisfied that either the 
proposed conduct is unlikely to substantially lessen competition or is likely to result in a net public 
benefit. 
Each of these changes would assist in focusing the exemption process on the issues of substance and 
away from technicalities. Submissions to the Draft Report largely support this approach;656 although, 
two submissions indicate their concern that the new arrangements could create uncertainty.657  
The ACCC supports the objective of simplification. However, it expresses concern that empowering it 
to grant authorisation based on assessing the competitive effect of conduct may increase its 
workload materially. This is because a business may seek authorisation rather than rely on its own 
judgment about compliance with competition law. The ACCC also notes that, in the case of conduct 
that is subject to per se prohibition, allowing exemption on the basis that particular conduct does not 
substantially lessen competition represents a significant change to existing policy settings (DR sub, 
pages 65 and 66). 
                                                          
654 See, for example: Australian Dairy Farmers, sub, page 11; and Queensland Dairyfarmers’ Organisation, sub, page 8. 
655 Baker & McKenzie, sub, page 6. 
656 See, for example: Australian Chicken Growers’ Council Ltd, DR sub, page 3, Australian National Retailers Association, 
DR sub, page 13; Australian Taxi Industries Association, DR sub, page 12; BHP Billiton, DR sub, page 1; Business Council 
of Australia, DR sub, page 51; Julie Clarke, DR sub, page 5; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 7; Law Council of 
Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, DR sub, page 34; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, DR 
sub, page 20; Master Builders Australia, DR sub, pages 20-21; Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 6; Retail Guild of 
Australia, DR sub, page 7; and Telstra, DR sub, page 6. 
657 See, for example: Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 13; and Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR 
sub, page 18. 
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The Panel’s view 
Submissions broadly support the regime of exemptions under the CCA.  
The authorisation and notification processes can be simplified by ensuring that only a single 
authorisation application is required for a single business arrangement or conduct. 
It is also desirable for business to have a regulatory avenue available to demonstrate that specified 
conduct would not substantially lessen competition, thereby gaining exemption from the 
competition law.  
However, allowing exemption from the per se prohibitions (such as the cartel conduct 
prohibitions) on the basis that specified conduct does not substantially lessen competition would 
involve a significant change to current law and policy. Although not all cartel conduct substantially 
lessens competition (occasionally cartel conduct occurs between small firms that hold an 
insubstantial market share), it is almost always anti-competitive in nature and usually has no 
countervailing public benefit. 
In respect of such conduct, it is appropriate that exemption be based on demonstrating that the 
conduct has a net public benefit. Exemption on the basis that conduct does not substantially 
lessen competition should only be available in respect of sections 45, 46 (as proposed to be 
amended), 47 (if retained) and 50, being provisions that include the ‘substantial lessening of 
competition’ test. 
 
Recommendation 38 — Authorisation and notification 
The authorisation and notification provisions in Part VII of the CCA should be simplified to: 
• ensure that only a single authorisation application is required for a single business 
transaction or arrangement; and 
• empower the ACCC to grant an exemption from sections 45, 46 (as proposed to be 
amended), 47 (if retained) and 50 if it is satisfied that the conduct would not be likely to 
substantially lessen competition or that the conduct would result, or would be likely to 
result, in a benefit to the public that would outweigh any detriment. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
22.2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NOTIFICATION 
Collective bargaining is an arrangement by which two or more competing businesses come together 
to negotiate with a supplier or a business customer over terms, conditions and prices. Collective 
bargaining arrangements may take various forms and have different effects upon competition. For 
example, two or more competing suppliers might wish to appoint a bargaining agent to act on their 
behalf to negotiate standard terms and conditions of trade with one or more business customers; 
under a different arrangement, two or more competing suppliers might wish to jointly negotiate 
price with a large business customer with the understanding that, if price is not agreed during the 
negotiation, none of the suppliers will deal with the business customer. The latter form of 
arrangement is often referred to as a ‘collective boycott’.  
Collective bargaining will usually contravene the cartel prohibitions because the underlying 
arrangement will usually lead to the competing businesses agreeing to pay or receive the same price 
for goods or services (price fixing) or agreeing not to deal with a particular supplier or business 
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customer (collective boycott). Therefore, in the absence of an exemption, it will usually be unlawful 
for competing businesses to engage in collective bargaining. 
Although collective bargaining will often be harmful to competition, it can also have beneficial 
effects. Small businesses dealing with large businesses often face an imbalance in bargaining power. 
That imbalance can result in inefficient or unfair commercial outcomes. Permitting small business to 
bargain collectively in certain circumstances can redress the imbalance in power and result in more 
efficient market outcomes.  
For that reason, the CCA permits businesses, particularly small businesses, to seek an exemption for 
collective bargaining in certain circumstances by filing a notification with the ACCC. The collective 
bargaining notification process has the potential to address a number of the concerns raised by small 
businesses that supply goods and services to larger businesses. 
In consultations with small business, the Panel discovered a low level of awareness of how the 
collective bargaining provisions might benefit the sector. There appears to be a need to enhance 
small business awareness of the notification process.  
Submissions broadly support the collective bargaining notification process, with a number noting the 
need to increase the flexibility and effectiveness of collective bargaining for small business.658 
Suggestions include: 
• improving the timeliness and/or decreasing the costs of the notification process;659 and 
• increasing flexibility and simplification (for example, by broadening the range of parties 
covered by arrangement notification).660 
The Shopping Centre Council of Australia has an alternative view, stating that many small businesses 
believe they can achieve a better outcome through individual negotiations with suppliers (DR sub, 
page 7). 
Some submissions support an increased role for peak bodies in filing applications and negotiating 
collective bargaining arrangements on behalf of members.661 However, others express a contrary 
view, with Independent Contractors Australia stating that bargaining parties should always be named 
publicly and that authority to bargain collectively should only be granted to parties who have direct 
commercial arrangements with the bargaining target (DR sub, page 9). 
The ACCC also supports amending and simplifying the collective bargaining notification process to 
increase the use of collective bargaining by small business. It observes that it continues to receive 
more applications for authorisation of collective bargaining arrangements than notifications, even 
though the notification process is intended to be simpler and less expensive than the authorisation 
process. This indicates that the notification process is not working as intended. 
                                                          
658 See, for example: Australian Chicken Growers’ Council Limited, DR sub, pages 2-5; Australian Dairy Farmers, DR sub, 
page 14; Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, pages 28-30; Business Council of Cooperatives and Mutuals, 
DR sub, page 4; Grain Producers SA, DR sub, page 3; Growcom, DR sub, page 2; and Woolworths Limited, DR sub, 
pages 32-33. 
659 Australian Newsagents’ Federation, sub, pages 11-12. 
660 See, for example: Australian Chicken Growers’ Council Limited, sub, page 7; and Australian Dairy Farmers, sub, 
page 11. 
661 See, for example: Australian Dairy Farmers, sub, page 11. 
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The ACCC also notes that, currently, it receives very few collective bargaining proposals that include 
collective boycott activity, even when that activity could be efficiency-enhancing. The ACCC believes 
there may be a perception among small businesses and their advisors that a collective bargaining 
arrangement that includes the prospect of a collective boycott would not be approved. The ACCC 
submits to the contrary that such arrangements are capable of being approved in appropriate 
circumstances (DR sub, pages 112-113).  
Box 22.1 below identifies a number of changes the ACCC recommends making to the collective 
bargaining notification process to improve its utility.  
Box 22.1: ACCC-proposed collective bargaining reforms 
The ACCC identifies a package of amendments to address current deficiencies in the collective 
bargaining notification process (DR sub, pages 112-113). 
First, the ACCC considers safeguards are necessary to make notifications involving collective 
boycott proposals more likely to be approved. In particular, the ACCC recommends that:  
• The ACCC be able to impose conditions on notifications involving collective boycott activity 
where conditions could address any identified concerns and enable the ACCC to allow the 
notification to stand. Currently, the ACCC is not able to allow the notification to stand 
subject to conditions, and so must object to the notification in its totality in such 
circumstances.  
• The timeframe for the ACCC to assess collective boycott notifications be extended from 14 
to 60 days. A longer time period before a collective boycott notification would come into 
force would allow the ACCC adequate time to consult with the counterparty/ies and assess 
the proposed conduct.  
• In exceptional circumstances where a collective boycott is causing imminent serious 
detriment to the public, the ACCC should have a limited ‘stop power’ to require collective 
boycott conduct to cease, subject to Tribunal review.  
Second, the ACCC considers it important to address the current inflexibility with the notification 
process and recommends that greater flexibility be provided:  
• in the nomination of members of the bargaining group, such that a notification could be 
lodged to cover future (unnamed) members of the bargaining group;  
• in the nomination of the counterparties with whom the group seeks to negotiate, such that 
a notification could be lodged to cover multiple counterparties; and  
• for the ACCC to impose different timeframes for the expiration of collective bargaining 
notifications. Currently collective bargaining/collective boycott notifications expire 
automatically after three years. The ACCC should be able to set a timeframe to suit the 
circumstances, with the current three-year period remaining as a default.  
Third, the current maximum value thresholds for a party to notify a collective bargaining 
arrangement should be reviewed to ensure that they are not restricting participation by small 
businesses.  
In conjunction with the proposed legislative changes, the ACCC would amend its collective 
bargaining notification guidelines to provide information about the range of factors relevant to 
considering whether a collective boycott may be necessary to achieve the benefits of collective 
bargaining. This may help to address the perception that collective boycotts are unlikely to be 
approved.  
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Box 22.1: ACCC-proposed collective bargaining reforms (continued) 
The ACCC supports the Draft Report’s recommendation that the ACCC should enhance the 
awareness of the collective bargaining notification process and its benefits for small business. This 
will be particularly important if the ACCC’s proposed amendments are implemented and the 
collective bargaining notification process becomes more flexible and accessible for small business. 
 
The Panel’s view 
The collective bargaining notification process is potentially of significant benefit to small business 
and could be more widely used. The regime could be simplified in respect of the businesses 
covered by a notification. The regime could also better facilitate collective boycott activity where it 
enhances efficiency. 
The Panel considers that the ACCC’s proposals strike an appropriate balance between facilitating 
the exemption of collective bargaining, including the potential to engage in boycott activity, while 
maintaining safeguards. 
 
Recommendation 54 — Collective bargaining 
The CCA should be reformed to introduce greater flexibility into the notification process for 
collective bargaining by small business.  
Reform should include allowing: 
• the nomination of members of the bargaining group, such that a notification could be lodged to 
cover future (unnamed) members;  
• the nomination of the counterparties with whom the group seeks to negotiate, such that a 
notification could be lodged to cover multiple counterparties; and  
• different timeframes for different collective bargaining notifications, based on the 
circumstances of each application. 
Additionally, the ACCC should be empowered to impose conditions on notifications involving 
collective boycott activity, the timeframe for ACCC assessment of notifications for conduct that 
includes collective boycott activity should be extended from 14 to 60 days to provide more time 
for the ACCC to consult and assess the proposed conduct, and the ACCC should have a limited 
‘stop power’ to require collective boycott conduct to cease, for use in exceptional circumstances 
where a collective boycott is causing imminent serious detriment to the public.  
The current maximum value thresholds for a party to notify a collective bargaining arrangement 
should be reviewed in consultation with representatives of small business to ensure that they are 
high enough to include typical small business transactions. 
The ACCC should take steps to enhance awareness of the exemption process for collective 
bargaining and how it might be used to improve the bargaining position of small businesses in 
dealings with large businesses. The ACCC should also amend its collective bargaining notification 
guidelines. This should include providing information about the range of factors considered 
relevant to determining whether a collective boycott may be necessary to achieve the benefits of 
collective bargaining. 
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22.3 BLOCK EXEMPTIONS 
Competition law regimes in some other jurisdictions provide a mechanism by which defined 
categories of conduct are granted a ‘safe harbour’ exemption from competition law. Box 22.2 below 
summarises examples of block exemptions in other jurisdictions. 
The block exemption removes the need to make individual applications for exemption. The 
exemption is granted if the competition regulator considers that certain conditions are satisfied: 
either that the category of conduct is unlikely to damage competition; or that the conduct is likely to 
generate a net public benefit. 
Box 22.2: International examples of block exemptions 
UK 
The Secretary of State may make a block exemption order exempting agreements from the 
prohibition against certain horizontal conduct.662 These agreements must contribute to improving 
production or distribution, or promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers 
a fair share of the resulting benefit. The agreements must not impose on the parties concerned 
restrictions that are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives, or afford the 
undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition. 
EU 
The European Commission may grant exemptions for certain agreements and practices if those 
agreements and practices are assessed as having significant countervailing benefits. This may be 
done on an agreement-by-agreement basis or through applying block exemptions for categories of 
conduct.663 
Singapore 
Under section 36 of the Competition Act 2004 (Singapore), the Competition Commission of 
Singapore may recommend to the Minister that a particular category of agreement be exempted 
from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements. 
A block exemption power under the CCA may be an efficient way to deal with certain types of 
business conduct that are unlikely to raise competition concerns, either because of the parties 
engaged in the conduct or the nature of the conduct itself. This would be an efficient means to 
provide certainty for businesses in respect of conduct that is unlikely to raise significant competition 
problems. It may also play a role in educating and informing business about the types of conduct that 
do not raise competition concerns and those that do. 
Submissions to the Draft Report broadly support empowering the ACCC to grant block exemptions,664 
with a number seeking more details on how the recommendation would work in practice.665  
                                                          
662 Competition Act 1998 (UK), section 6. 
663 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 101(3). 
664 See, for example: Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, page 3; Australian Chicken Growers Council Ltd, DR sub, page 3; ACCC, 
DR sub, page 67; Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 14; Baker & McKenzie, DR sub, page 2; BHP 
Billiton, DR sub, page 1; Law Council of Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee, DR sub, pages 24-28; 
Queensland Law Society, DR sub, page 6; and Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 7. 
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The ACCC supports this proposal. It also notes that such a power would be an effective way to deal 
with shipping conference agreements if Part X of the CCA were repealed, and could be used in the 
context of intellectual property (IP) licences if subsection 51(3) of the CCA were repealed (DR sub, 
page 67). 
The ACCC submits that a block exemption regime should incorporate the following features (DR sub, 
page 68):  
• The basis for the ACCC issuing a particular block exemption should be either that the conduct 
is unlikely to substantially lessen competition or that it results in a net public benefit.  
• The ACCC should have the ability to set parameters that exclude or limit the benefit of the 
block exemption in certain circumstances and to revoke or amend the block exemption in 
particular circumstances, subject to an appropriate consultation and notice period.  
• It should be possible for the ACCC to impose a time limit on the operation of the block 
exemption, after which it may review and re-consider the terms of the block exemption and 
issue a new one if the public benefit/detriment test is met.  
• The ACCC should publicly consult and issue a draft document prior to issuing the block 
exemption.666  
The Panel considers that the ACCC’s suggestions have merit. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
665 See, for example: Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 18; Australian Taxi Industry Association, DR sub, 
page 12; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 18; Law Council of Australia — SME Business Law Committee, DR 
sub, page 20; and Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 19. 
666 See also discussion by Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 18. 
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The Panel’s view 
A block exemption power, exercisable by the ACCC, should be introduced to the CCA to 
supplement the authorisation and notification frameworks. 
Such a power would be helpful in establishing ‘safe harbours’ for business, reducing compliance 
costs and providing further certainty about the application of the CCA. It would also create a 
preferable process for exempting efficiency-enhancing arrangements entered into by international 
liner shipping firms and IP owners if Part X and subsection 51(3), respectively, were to be repealed 
in line with the Panel’s recommendations.  
The test to be applied for granting a block exemption should be consistent with the test the Panel 
proposes in respect of authorisations and notifications generally — that the ACCC be satisfied that 
the conduct described in the block exemption: 
• would not have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition; or  
• would result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to the public that outweighs any detriment to 
the public flowing from the conduct. 
The ACCC should be empowered to grant a block exemption that applies generally to specified 
conduct or is limited such that it applies: to specified persons or classes of persons; in specified 
circumstances; or on specified conditions. A block exemption should cease to have effect at the 
end of a period specified in the exemption. 
The details of the procedural aspects of the block exemption power should be refined as part of 
any implementation process. The Panel considers that the ACCC should publicly consult and issue a 
draft document prior to issuing the block exemption. The ACCC should also maintain a public 
register of all block exemptions, including those no longer in force. 
 
Recommendation 39 — Block exemption power 
A block exemption power, exercisable by the ACCC, should be introduced and operate alongside 
the authorisation and notification frameworks in Part VII of the CCA.  
This power would enable the ACCC to create safe harbours, where conduct or categories of 
conduct are unlikely to raise competition concerns, on the same basis as the test proposed by the 
Panel for authorisations and notifications (see Recommendation 38).  
The ACCC should also maintain a public register of all block exemptions, including those no longer 
in force. The decision to issue a block exemption would be reviewable by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal.  
The Panel’s recommended form of block exemption power is reflected in the model legislative 
provisions in Appendix A. 
 
  
Enforcement and Remedies 
406 Part 4 — Competition Laws 
23 ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES 
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) confers both public and private enforcement rights to 
take action under the competition law. 
Public enforcement is undertaken by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
The ACCC is empowered to investigate possible contraventions of the competition law and to 
institute proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia seeking penalties and other remedies 
depending on the contravention.667  
The ACCC is also empowered under section 155 of the CCA to compel individuals to appear before it 
to answer questions about a potential contravention, and to compel corporations and individuals to 
provide information and produce documents. 
Individuals may also bring proceedings in the Federal Court to seek redress for contraventions of the 
competition law. 
Submissions raise a number of concerns about the scope of public and private enforcement rights 
under the CCA and about the ACCC’s use of its powers under section 155 of the CCA. 
23.1 PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
In proceedings commenced by the ACCC, the Federal Court may impose various sanctions or grant 
various categories of relief in respect of a contravention of the competition laws, including:668 
• in the case of cartel conduct, a term of imprisonment for up to 10 years on an individual who 
has knowingly participated in the contravention (or a fine of up to 2,000 penalty units, 
currently $340,000, or both) and, in respect of a contravening corporation, a fine in an amount 
not exceeding the greater of $10 million, three times the gain from the contravention or, 
where gain cannot be readily ascertained, 10 per cent of the corporation’s annual turnover; 
• in the case of a contravention by a corporation of any other competition law provision (except 
sections 45D, 45DB, 45E, or 45EA), a civil penalty in an amount not exceeding the greater of 
$10 million, three times the gain from the contravention or, where gain cannot be readily 
ascertained, 10 per cent of the corporation’s annual turnover; 
• in the case of a contravention by a corporation of section 45D, 45DB, 45E, or 45EA, a civil 
penalty not exceeding $750,000; 
• an injunction to prevent the continuation of the contravening conduct; 
• a range of probationary and community service-type orders; 
• orders publicising the contravention;  
• orders for compensation on behalf of other identified persons; and 
• in the case of a merger that has been completed, an order that the acquiring corporation 
divest the business or assets that were acquired. 
                                                          
667 The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions may also commence prosecutions relating to criminal offences 
such as making and giving effect to cartel provisions in sections 44ZZRF and 44ZZRG of the CCA. 
668 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Part VI. 
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Only a few submissions address the adequacy of the sanctions and remedies that may be imposed 
for contraventions of the competition law. There appears to be general approval of the severity of 
the sanctions. 
The Panel received some comments, particularly from the Australian Mines and Metals Association 
(sub, page 7), in relation to the adequacy of pecuniary penalties for contravening the secondary 
boycott provisions. As discussed earlier, the Panel considers that the maximum penalty should be the 
same as that for other contraventions of Part IV (see Recommendation 36). 
A few submissions propose that a divestiture remedy be available for contraventions of section 46 
(in addition to applying to breaches of the merger provisions). This issue is discussed above in 
Section 19.1 in the context of section 46. The Panel does not support such a proposal.  
23.2 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Consumers or businesses harmed by a contravention of the competition law can seek relief from the 
Federal Court, most commonly damages (compensation) or injunctions to prevent and restrain the 
contravening conduct. 
A number of submissions comment on the difficulties confronting many consumers and small 
businesses that wish to bring private actions in the Federal Court in respect of competition law. For 
example, Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse note that private parties face a range of difficulties in 
pursuing private action, including: 
 uncertainty as to when the limitations period commences;  
 difficulties in obtaining access to information generally and information from the 
ACCC;  
 the apparent inability to rely on admissions made in ACCC proceedings, owing to 
the uncertain scope of section 83 of the CCA;  
 challenges in proving and quantifying loss; and 
 requirements imposed by section 5 of the CCA to seek ministerial consent in 
relation to proceedings involving extraterritorial conduct. (sub, pages 29-30) 
From submissions and consultations with small business, the Panel is convinced that there are 
significant barriers to small business taking private action to enforce the competition laws.669 A 
private action would be beyond the means of many small businesses. In some cases, a small business 
might not wish to bring a proceeding for fear of damaging a necessary trading relationship. 
These issues are considered below. 
Section 83 of the CCA 
The CCA provides one mechanism intended to reduce the costs associated with private enforcement 
proceedings. Section 83 is intended to facilitate private actions by enabling findings of fact made 
against a corporation in one proceeding (typically a proceeding brought by the ACCC) to be used as 
prima facie evidence against the corporation in another proceeding (typically a proceeding brought 
by a private litigant). 
                                                          
669 See, for example: Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 48; and Ritchies Stores, DR sub, page 3. 
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However, a significant potential deficiency has emerged in respect of the scope of section 83. Many 
ACCC proceedings are resolved by the corporate defendant making admissions of fact(s) that 
establish the contravention, but it is uncertain whether section 83 applies to such admissions. A 
number of decisions of the Federal Court suggest that section 83 is confined to findings of fact made 
by the court after a contested hearing.670 
The effectiveness of section 83 as a means of reducing the costs of private actions could be enhanced 
if the section were amended to apply, not just to findings of fact, but to admissions of fact made by a 
corporation in another proceeding.671  
However, submissions express concern about the impact that extending section 83 to admissions of 
fact might have on the willingness of parties to co-operate in cartel matters or settle matters with 
the ACCC, compromising the effectiveness of public enforcement of the CCA.672 The assumption 
underlying those concerns is that companies may choose to settle a proceeding brought by the ACCC 
on the basis of admissions of fact, believing that those admissions cannot be relied upon by a private 
litigant seeking compensation in a follow-on proceeding. If the admissions could be relied upon, it 
might change how respondent companies assess the advantages of settlement. 
Despite these concerns, the Panel continues to support extending section 83 to admissions of fact, 
for the following reasons: 
• First, the current distinction between findings of fact and admissions of fact for the purposes 
of section 83 is somewhat artificial. Most contested hearings involve a mixture of factual 
admissions (often made in pleadings) and factual findings to resolve the dispute. It is difficult 
to separate the factual admissions and findings. Further, there is a real possibility that 
admissions of fact made by a respondent company in a proceeding brought by the ACCC would 
be admissible against that company in a follow-on proceeding under section 81 of the Evidence 
Act 1995 in any event, thereby rendering the perceived distinction under section 83 
irrelevant.673  
• Second, it is doubtful that a change to section 83 would materially alter the assessment by a 
respondent whether or not to settle an ACCC proceeding. The decision to resolve an ACCC 
matter by admissions is a significant one that would usually subject the respondent company 
to a financial sanction and adverse publicity. Having taken that decision, it is unlikely that the 
respondent company would subsequently contest the admitted facts in a follow-on 
proceeding. 
Even if the respondent company wished to preserve that right, the proposed change to 
section 83 would not prevent it from doing so. Section 83 merely makes the admitted fact 
prima facie evidence of that fact in the follow-on proceeding. The respondent company 
remains free, should it so choose, to adduce evidence in the follow-on proceeding contrary to 
                                                          
670 ACCC v Apollo Optical (Aust) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1456 at [24]; ACCC v ABB Transmission and Distribution Limited (No. 2) 
[2002] FCA 588 at [51]; ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) [2005] FCA 265 at [118]; ACCC v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd 
[2006] FCA 1427 at [107]. 
671 See, for example: CHOICE, DR sub, pages 29-30; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 18; Law Council of 
Australia — SME Committee, DR sub, page 21; Master Grocers Association/Liquor Retailers Association, DR sub, 
page 25; National Seniors Australia, DR sub, page 15; Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 7; Spier Consulting Legal, 
DR sub, pages 20-21 and David Wright, DR sub, page 8. 
672 ACCC, DR sub, page 79. See also submissions opposing changes to section 83 from Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, 
page 8; Business Council of Australia, DR sub, page 22; Minter Ellison, DR sub, page 7; and Queensland Law Society, 
DR sub, pages 7-8. 
673 See the discussion by Ryan J in ACCC v Pratt (No 3) [2009] FCA 407. 
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the admitted fact. Furthermore, admissions of fact in an ACCC proceeding will rarely, if ever, 
address the question of loss and damage suffered by market participants as a result of the 
contravening conduct. Accordingly, a plaintiff in a follow-on proceeding would need to prove 
loss and damage against the respondent company in order to recover compensation. 
The proposed amendment to section 83 removes doubt about its operation in the context of factual 
admissions and reduces the costs and risks of proceedings brought by persons who may have 
suffered loss and damage by reason of admitted contravening conduct. 
Cost of litigation and access to justice 
Smaller businesses frequently seek assistance from the ACCC in respect of competition law concerns. 
The ACCC plays a very important role in enforcing the law on behalf of businesses that are unable to 
do so themselves. Nevertheless, the ACCC is unable to take proceedings in respect of all complaints 
brought to it. Understandably, it seeks to prioritise the cases that it will pursue within its budgetary 
constraints. This can lead to some dissatisfaction among small businesses when the ACCC does not 
pursue their complaints. In part, this dissatisfaction is due to the absence of an effective alternative 
option they can pursue themselves. 
In general, the dispute resolution processes currently available to smaller businesses for competition 
law-related disputes do not meet their expectations. The Panel sympathises with their frustrations 
and considers that developing alternative dispute resolution processes could go some way to 
addressing small business concerns. 
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) considers, ‘alternative dispute resolution 
services that provides quality information quickly, informally and at low cost is essential to improving 
both competition and productivity for small and medium businesses’ (sub, page 13).  
A number of possible alternative dispute resolution options are put forward by small business. The 
Office of the Australian Small Business Commissioner states: 
Access to justice is another key component of a competitive marketplace. A small 
business focuses on plying its trade or profession. Disputes will arise from time to time, 
but small businesses will often not have the skills and resources on hand to deal with 
these incidents that arise in the course of business but are not a part of the ordinary 
course of that business. These types of business disruption are not easily catered for by 
small business and, depending on the particular dispute, can impact small business 
disproportionately, particularly where there is unequal bargaining power. (sub, page 4) 
The Australian Small Business Commissioner is an Australian Government initiative designed to act as 
an advocate for small businesses. However, the Australian Small Business Commissioner does not 
directly provide mediation or arbitration services.674 
The Panel notes that some States and Territories have introduced their own small business 
commissioners, offices of small business and ombudsmen that provide dispute resolution services.  
Both the South Australian Small Business Commissioner and the New South Wales Small Business 
Commissioner have some capacity to consider complaints falling within the remit of the CCA. The 
South Australian Small Business Commissioner is able to assist with businesses that are treated 
                                                          
674 Australian Small Business Commissioner, Our Role, Australian Small Business Commissioner, Canberra, viewed 
10 February 2015, <http://asbc.gov.au/about/our-role>.  
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unfairly in their commercial dealings with other businesses in the marketplace and in franchising 
disputes.675 The New South Wales Small Business Commissioner lists a range of disputes that can be 
considered through its mediation service, including those involving suppliers, wholesalers and 
purchasers, service providers, franchises and unfair contracts.676 The Western Australian Small 
Business Development Corporation states that it provides Western Australian small businesses with 
access to a speedy, low-cost, non-litigious process to resolve disputes with other businesses (sub, 
page 28).  
These services are in addition to any court or tribunal-based dispute resolution services, which are 
often available for consumer law matters.  
The Panel supports the positive comments received in submissions about the offices of small 
business and ombudsmen services. The Law Council of Australia — SME Committee notes that these 
offices already provide a valuable mediation function to many small businesses and believes that 
these initiatives should be supported and if possible extended (DR sub, pages 2-3).  
A number of concerns small businesses raise with the Panel were also raised with the Productivity 
Commission (PC) in the context of the PC’s Access to Justice Arrangements inquiry: 
• access to effective and low cost small business advice and dispute resolution services that are 
responsive to their individual needs;  
• the variety of frameworks providing dispute resolution services, some of which overlap; and 
• the cost of accessing court-based dispute resolution and the frequently drawn-out nature of 
proceedings. 
The PC’s Access to Justice Arrangements report concludes: 
Adequately resourced advice and resolution services that cater to the needs of small 
business, such as small business commissioners, have the potential to quickly and fairly 
resolve many legal disputes and allow small businesses to avoid the uncertainty and 
hiatus associated with being involved in a protracted, formal dispute.677  
The PC recommends that the Australian, state and territory governments should ensure by no later 
than 31 December 2015 that their Small Business Commissioners or dedicated Small Business Offices, 
have the financial resources, personnel and statutory capacity to, at a minimum: 
• provide comprehensive advice to small businesses on their rights and obligations, including 
appropriate referrals to other government and non-government agencies; 
• identify emerging and persistent areas of legal concern to small business and advocate for 
appropriate policy reform; 
• work co-operatively with other state, territory and national small business agencies; 
• mediate or refer disputes between small businesses and other businesses and state or 
territory government agencies, including local governments; and 
                                                          
675 Small Business Commissioner of South Australia, Dispute Resolution, Small Business Commissioner of South Australia, 
Adelaide, viewed 9 February 2015, <www.sasbc.sa.gov.au/dispute_resolution/overview>. 
676 NSW Small Business Commissioner, What to expect from our service, NSW Small Business Commissioner, Sydney, 
viewed 9 February 2015, <www.smallbusiness.nsw.gov.au/solving-problems/commercial-dispute-resolution>. 
677 Productivity Commission 2014, Access to Justice Arrangements, Inquiry Report No. 72, Canberra. 
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• have the power to compel state or territory government agencies, including local 
governments, to provide information on, and participate in mediation related to, disputes with 
individual small businesses. 678 
In addition, dispute resolution processes are available under industry codes and through industry 
ombudsmen; for example, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman. 
The PC also makes a number of recommendations designed to ensure efficient and streamlined 
services and minimise court-related costs for businesses: 
• ensure that future reviews of industry codes consider whether dispute resolution services 
provided pursuant to an industry code, often by industry associations or third parties, are 
provided instead by the Australian Small Business Commissioner under the framework of that 
industry code;679 
• broaden the use of the Federal Court’s fast-track model to facilitate lower cost and more 
timely access to justice;680 and 
• better manage the costs of litigation, including through the use of costs budgets for parties 
engaged in litigation.681 
Although some submissions argue ‘no costs’ orders for small businesses would be of assistance,682 
such changes could have unintended consequences; for example, encouraging frivolous or vexatious 
actions. 
The Panel also notes that the proposal for a Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman is in 
the process of being implemented and is expected to be finalised by 1 July 2015.683 The proposal to 
extend unfair contract terms laws to small business contracts also remains in progress, with the 
Australian Government currently reviewing feedback from consultations and developing a response 
in co-operation with state and territory consumer affairs ministers.684 
The Law Council of Australia — SME Committee does not support creating a new body solely to 
handle CCA-related small business disputes (DR sub, pages 2-3). The submission from the Office of 
the Australian Small Business Commissioner indicates that dispute resolution services are already 
available at both Commonwealth and state level; rather, the issue is raising small business’ 
awareness of their existence (DR sub, pages 1-3). Any new functions should be given to current 
service providers. Noting these submissions, the Panel does not consider a specific body is needed to 
deal with competition law dispute resolution. 
                                                          
678 Productivity Commission 2014, Access to Justice Arrangements, Inquiry Report No. 72, Canberra, page 299 and 
Recommendation 8.3. 
679 Ibid., Recommendation 9.3. 
680 Ibid., Recommendation 11.1. 
681 Ibid., Recommendation 13.3. 
682 See, for example: Master Grocers Australia, DR sub, page 58; and Independent Supermarket Retailers Guild of South 
Australia, DR sub, page 6. 
683 The Australian Small Business Commissioner will continue to operate until the Small Business and Family Enterprise 
Ombudsman commences, which is expected to occur by 1 July 2015. See Department of the Treasury, Small Business 
and Family Enterprise Ombudsman, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, viewed 9 February 2015, 
<www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/Business/Small-Business/Family-Enterprise-Ombudsman>.  
684 Department of the Treasury, Extending Unfair Contract Term Protections to Small Businesses, Department of the 
Treasury, Canberra, viewed 9 February 2015, 
<www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/Small-Business-and-Unfair-Contract-Terms>.  
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During consultation, the Panel heard concerns from some small businesses about their experience of 
raising concerns about anti-competitive conduct with the ACCC. These include: 
• responses from the ACCC that fail to explain clearly why the ACCC has decided not to pursue 
particular matters; 
• responses from the ACCC that were not timely; and 
• where the ACCC decided to pursue concerns raised by a small business, it failed to provide 
regular updates on the investigation’s progress.  
The Panel considers that the ACCC should tighten up its response to small business complaints 
concerning competition laws. If the ACCC determines that it is unable to pursue a particular 
complaint on behalf of a small business, the ACCC should communicate clearly and promptly its 
reasons for not acting and direct the business to alternative dispute resolution procedures. Where 
the ACCC does pursue a complaint raised by small business, it should keep the small business 
informed of the progress and outcome of its investigation.  
While the Panel finds no evidence of systemic concerns, it is pleasing to note that the ACCC 
continues to look for ways to enhance its interaction with small business complainants and 
acknowledges room for improvement (ACCC, DR sub, page 109). 
Private actions involving overseas conduct 
Conduct that contravenes Australia’s competition laws may take place overseas. From time to time, 
multinational corporations have entered into cartel arrangements that apply to many parts of the 
world, including Australia. Recent examples that have been the subject of ACCC proceedings include 
international cartels concerning vitamins, international air freight and the supply of marine hoses.  
Currently, those seeking compensation under Australian competition law in respect of contravening 
conduct that occurs overseas face two regulatory impediments: the business residence test; and the 
need to obtain ministerial consent.  
Business residence test 
Overseas conduct will only be subject to Australian law if it is engaged in by a corporation 
incorporated in, or carrying on business within Australia (subsection 5(1) of the CCA). The effect of 
that provision is that, in respect of contravening conduct that occurs overseas, a foreign corporation 
will only be subject to Australian competition law if it otherwise carries on business in Australia. 
The Panel considers that the application of the law to a foreign corporation should not depend on 
whether the corporation otherwise carries on business in Australia.685 Australian competition law is 
generally limited in its scope (and should be so limited) to conduct that harms competition in an 
Australian market. If a foreign corporation engages in conduct that harms competition in an 
Australian market, it should be subject to Australian law. 
                                                          
685 The Commonwealth has power under subsection 51(xx) of the Constitution to make laws with respect to trading or 
financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth and foreign corporations. There is no additional 
requirement that foreign corporations have any particular connection with Australia. 
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Submissions on this topic support the Panel’s Draft Recommendation to remove the ‘business 
residence’ requirement in section 5 of the CCA.686 
A number of submissions question whether it is appropriate for Australia’s competition laws to be 
limited to conduct that harms competition in an Australian market. For example, the Law Council of 
Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee notes that the ‘market in Australia’ requirement 
provides a strong jurisdictional nexus with Australia, but it might be too high a threshold to establish 
in all cases. An alternative is for the conduct to have an effect on local prices or terms of supply (DR 
sub, page 7). Ian Stewart comments: 
The logical jurisdictional connection lies somewhere between extraterritorial conduct that 
affects prices or terms of supply of goods or services supplied in a market in Australia … 
and extraterritorial conduct that affects prices or terms of supply of goods or services 
supplied into Australia (regardless of whether or not a market in Australia for those goods 
or services can be said to exist). (DR sub, pages 2 and 3) 
This issue does not arise directly out of the Panel’s recommendation to reform section 5 to remove 
the ‘business residence’ requirement. Since its enactment, Australia’s competition law prohibitions 
have generally been limited to conduct that harms competition in a market in Australia. That 
limitation arises out of the substantive prohibitions, not section 5. 
Until recently, the limitation has not been controversial. However, it assumed importance in the 
ACCC’s recent proceedings against two international airlines, Air New Zealand and Garuda, in respect 
of alleged cartel conduct that occurred overseas. The case related to surcharges applied to air freight 
services on routes from overseas locations to Australia. On 31 October 2014, the Federal Court found 
that the air freight services affected by the cartel conduct were not supplied in a market in Australia 
and, accordingly, the cartel conduct was not prohibited by Australian law (as in force at the time of 
the conduct).687  
The air freight surcharge case concerned the law against price fixing prior to the enactment of the 
cartel conduct prohibitions in Division 1 of Part IV of the CCA. As discussed in Chapter 20, the new 
cartel conduct prohibitions do not expressly require the conduct to affect goods or services traded in 
an Australian market. Although the Panel considers that the cartel conduct prohibitions should be 
limited to conduct that has a relevant territorial nexus with Australia, the Panel agrees with 
submissions that the appropriate nexus should not be stated in terms of having an effect on a market 
in Australia. Such a test would be inappropriate for a criminal offence that requires determination 
before a jury. Instead, the Panel recommends that, for cartel conduct to be an offence in Australia, it 
should have an effect on trade or commerce within, to or from Australia (see Recommendation 27). 
However, the Panel is not persuaded that further change is required to the substantive competition 
law provisions to remove the requirement that the relevant conduct must harm competition in a 
market in Australia. While from time to time cases such as the air freight surcharge case may give rise 
to difficult questions about the application of the law, the Panel considers that the ‘market in 
Australia’ requirement is a sensible limitation to the scope of Australia’s competition laws. 
                                                          
686 See, for example: Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, page 2; Australian Automotive Aftermarket Association, DR sub, 
page 3; Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, DR sub, page 18; Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, DR sub, page 35; Australian Industry Group, DR sub, page 20; Australian National Retailers Association, 
DR sub, page 12; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, DR sub, pages 12-13; and Ian Stewart, DR sub, 
pages 1-2. 
687 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited [2014] FCA 1157 at [20]. 
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Although the Panel considers that the business residence test in section 5 is unnecessary, a question 
remains whether section 5 should stipulate any other connection between the conduct and Australia 
as a requirement when the competition law is applied to overseas conduct. As discussed above, such 
a connection will often be required in any event because many of the substantive competition law 
provisions depend upon the conduct harming competition in an Australian market. However, not all 
provisions have that requirement (for example, resale price maintenance). 
The Panel considers that it would be appropriate to re-frame section 5 so that the competition law 
applies to conduct undertaken overseas insofar as the conduct relates to ‘trade or commerce’ as 
defined in the CCA: that is, trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and places 
outside Australia. That requirement would state a minimum connection between the overseas 
conduct and Australia. This would ensure that Australian law could not be applied to overseas 
conduct that had no direct relationship to trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia 
and places outside Australia.  
Ministerial consent 
The second regulatory impediment to private proceedings in section 5 of the CCA is that, if a person 
wishes to seek damages or other compensatory orders in relation to contravening conduct that 
occurred overseas, he or she must obtain the consent of the Minister (subsections 5(3) and (4)). The 
Minister is required to grant consent unless the conduct was required or specifically authorised by a 
foreign law and the Minister is of the view that it is not in the national interest to grant consent 
(subsection 5(5)).688 This requirement was introduced in 1986, at a time when there was concern 
over the extra-territorial reach of some competition laws.689  
The concern originated out of litigation commenced years earlier in the US by Westinghouse in 
respect of an overseas uranium cartel. Australian uranium producers became defendants to the US 
litigation.690 This resulted in the Australian Government enacting legislation to prevent the 
enforcement of the US judgment in Australia.691 
Also, at that time, many other jurisdictions, particularly developing countries, did not have 
competition laws. As a result, there was potential for diplomatic issues to arise if proceedings were 
brought in Australia for contravention of Australia’s competition laws in respect of overseas conduct 
that was authorised or permitted by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the conduct occurred.  
Since that time, many countries have enacted competition laws. Further, a greater uniformity has 
emerged concerning the extra-territorial reach of competition laws in comparable jurisdictions. In 
general, competition laws of comparable jurisdictions apply to overseas conduct if the conduct has a 
direct effect on domestic markets or trade.692 
                                                          
688 Similar requirements exist for the consumer protection provisions of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001, section 12AC. 
689 Trade Practices Revision Act 1986, section 8. 
690 A summary of the litigation arising from the uranium cartel, and the political responses to the litigation, is contained 
in Senz, D and Charlesworth, H, 2001, ‘Building Blocks: Australia’s Response to Foreign Extraterritorial Legislation’, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, Vol 2, pages 69-121. 
691 Foreign Antitrust Judgment (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979, which was subsequently incorporated into the 
Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984. 
692 In the US, see F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA (2004) 542 US 174. In the EU, see A. Ahlstrom OY v 
EC Commission [1988] 4 CMLR 901 (known as the Wood Pulp case). 
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In comparable overseas jurisdictions, such as the US, Canada, UK, EU, and New Zealand, there is no 
requirement to seek governmental consent in order to take proceedings in respect of contravening 
conduct that occurs overseas (see Appendix B). 
The requirement for ministerial consent imposes a material hurdle for private plaintiffs seeking 
redress for breaches of competition law and can give rise to substantial additional costs in the 
litigation. The ministerial consideration of the issue also takes time. Further, a defendant to a 
proceeding can seek judicial review of the Minister’s decision, which may cause delay in the principal 
proceeding.693 
The ministerial consent requirements apply to the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) as well as the 
competition law. Although the Panel is not reviewing the ACL generally, the Terms of Reference ask 
the Review to consider the ACL to the extent that it extends to protections for small business. This 
requirement could be relevant to small businesses privately enforcing the laws concerning 
unconscionable conduct.  
While a number of submissions support the Draft Recommendations concerning section 5,694 few 
expressly address the requirement for ministerial consent. The Law Council of Australia — 
Competition and Consumer Committee supports removing the requirement for ministerial consent 
(DR sub, page 8), as does Spier Consulting Legal (DR sub, page 9). Professor Philip Clarke does not 
support that recommendation, arguing that the requirement for ministerial consent helps to prevent 
damage to international comity from the extra-territorial operation of domestic competition laws 
(DR sub, page 2). 
The Panel considers that, today, there is a very low likelihood that Australian competition law 
proceedings involving overseas conduct would create diplomatic concerns. Accordingly, it considers 
that there is no ongoing need for the requirement for ministerial consent. Removing that 
requirement would reduce the costs of such actions where consent would currently be required. 
Proving loss or damage 
A matter raised in some submissions is the inclusion of a power to seek orders, in the nature of 
‘cy-pres’ orders, for breach of the competition law. A cy-pres order is used in the administration of 
estates or trusts where the original bequest or trust object fails for some reason. The court may 
order a cy-pres scheme to direct the application of funds toward a similar objective as the original 
gift or trust. 
In the context of competition law, it has been proposed that orders of that kind might be used when 
it can be shown that contravening conduct has caused quantifiable detriment, but it is not possible to 
identify the persons damaged by the conduct.695 The suggestion is that the court would order an 
amount of compensation or damages be paid into a trust fund to be spent in a manner directed by 
the court.  
                                                          
693 In 2008, Cathay Pacific unsuccessfully challenged the Minister’s decision to grant consent: Cathay Pacific Airways 
Limited v Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs [2010] FCA 510. 
694 See, for example: Arnold Bloch Leibler, DR sub, page 2; Australian Aftermarket Automotive Association, DR sub, 
page 3; Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, DR sub, page 18; Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, DR sub, page 35; Australian Industry Group, DR sub, page 20; Australian National Retailers Association, 
DR sub, page 12; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, DR sub, pages 12-13; and Ian Stewart, DR sub, 
pages 1-2. 
695 See, for example: Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, pages 18-19. 
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This proposal was previously considered (and rejected) by the Dawson Review. The Panel agrees with 
the conclusion of the Dawson Review: 
Such orders would involve the payment of compensation or damages into a trust fund to 
be directed toward purposes that are identified by the Court. For example, money from 
the trust might be used for the promotion of consumer or other affected interests. 
Acceptance of such a proposal would be to invite the Court, which is concerned with the 
administration of the Act, to become inappropriately involved in matters of policy in an 
area where the Act offers no guidance.696 
The Panel’s view 
Private enforcement of competition laws is an important right. However, there are many 
regulatory and practical impediments to exercising this right. The Panel considers it important to 
find ways to reduce those impediments. 
The effectiveness of section 83 of the CCA, as a means of reducing the costs of private actions, 
would be enhanced if the section were amended to apply to admissions of fact made by a 
corporation in another proceeding, in addition to findings of fact. 
Small businesses face significant practical difficulties in exercising rights of private enforcement. 
Understandably, the ACCC is not able to take proceedings in respect of all complaints brought to it. 
However, the ACCC should place some priority on its response to small business complaints 
concerning competition laws. If the ACCC determines that it is unable to pursue a particular 
complaint on behalf of a small business, the ACCC should communicate clearly and promptly its 
reasons for not acting and direct the complainant to alternative dispute resolution processes. 
Small business commissioners, small business offices and ombudsmen provide important, effective 
and low cost services to small businesses. These services are capable of resolving commercial 
disputes involving competition law issues in an effective and low-cost manner. They should 
provide dispute resolution services over competition-related disputes rather than having a 
CCA-specific dispute resolution scheme. 
The Panel agrees with Recommendation 8.3 of the PC’s Access to Justice Arrangements report, 
which is directed to enhancing the capacity of the Small Business Commissioners and dedicated 
Small Business Offices in each jurisdiction to provide alternative dispute resolution processes. 
Contravening conduct that occurs overseas should be subject to Australian competition law if the 
conduct relates to trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and places outside 
Australia, regardless of whether the person engaging in the conduct carries on business in 
Australia.  
Given that competition laws and policies are now commonplace around the world, there is no 
reason why private parties should have to seek ministerial consent before launching a proceeding 
that involves overseas conduct. 
 
                                                          
696 Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act, CanPrint 
Communications, Canberra, page 163.  
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Recommendation 41 — Private actions 
Section 83 of the CCA should be amended so that it extends to admissions of fact made by the 
person against whom the proceedings are brought in addition to findings of fact made by the 
court. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
 
Recommendation 53 — Small business access to remedies 
The ACCC should take a more active approach in connecting small business to alternative dispute 
resolution schemes where it considers complaints have merit but are not a priority for public 
enforcement. 
Where the ACCC determines it is unable to pursue a particular complaint on behalf of a small 
business, the ACCC should communicate clearly and promptly its reasons for not acting and direct 
the business to alternative dispute resolution processes. Where the ACCC pursues a complaint 
raised by a small business, the ACCC should provide that business with regular updates on the 
progress of its investigation. 
Resourcing of the ACCC should allow it to test the law on a regular basis to ensure that the law is 
acting as a deterrent to unlawful behaviour. 
Small business commissioners, small business offices and ombudsmen should work with business 
stakeholder groups to raise awareness of their advice and dispute resolution services. 
The Panel endorses the following recommendations from the Productivity Commission’s Access to 
Justice Arrangements report: 
• Recommendations 8.2 and 8.4 to ensure that small businesses in each Australian jurisdiction 
have access to effective and low cost small business advice and dispute resolution services;  
• Recommendation 8.3 to ensure that small business commissioners, small business offices or 
ombudsmen provide a minimum set of services, which are delivered in an efficient and 
effective manner; 
• Recommendation 9.3 to ensure that future reviews of industry codes consider whether dispute 
resolution services provided pursuant to an industry code, often by industry associations or 
third parties, are provided instead by the Australian Small Business Commissioner under the 
framework of that industry code;  
• Recommendation 11.1 to broaden the use of the Federal Court’s fast track model to facilitate 
lower cost and more timely access to justice; and  
• Recommendation 13.3 to assist in managing the costs of litigation, including through the use of 
costs budgets for parties engaged in litigation.697 
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Recommendation 26 — Extra-territorial reach of the law 
Section 5 of the CCA, which applies the competition law to certain conduct engaged in outside 
Australia, should be amended to remove the requirement that the contravening firm has a 
connection with Australia in the nature of residence, incorporation or business presence and to 
remove the requirement for private parties to seek ministerial consent before relying on 
extra-territorial conduct in private competition law actions. Instead, the competition law should 
apply to overseas conduct insofar as the conduct relates to trade or commerce within Australia or 
between Australia and places outside Australia. 
The in-principle view of the Panel is that the foregoing changes should also be made in respect of 
actions brought under the Australian Consumer Law. 
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. 
23.3 ACCC’S INVESTIGATIVE POWERS 
The ACCC’s primary investigative power is contained in section 155 of the CCA. Section 155 gives the 
ACCC power: 
• to compel individuals to appear before it to answer questions about a potential contravention; 
and  
• to compel corporations and individuals to provide information and to produce documents to it, 
if the ACCC has reason to believe that the person or corporation is capable of giving evidence, 
furnishing information or producing documents relating to a possible contravention of the 
CCA. It is not necessary for the ACCC to have reasonable grounds to believe that a 
contravention has occurred before exercising those powers.  
The section 155 powers have been a longstanding feature of Australia’s competition law framework. 
Contraventions of competition laws, particularly cartel-type conduct, are often clandestine. Thus, it is 
thought necessary to give the competition regulator strong coercive powers to uncover such 
contraventions. 
The ACCC outlines ways to strengthen its investigative powers under section 155 (sub 1, 
pages 97-101). The ACCC proposes that the section 155 powers be able to be used in a wider range 
of circumstances. Such circumstances include: after seeking injunctive relief; during multi-party 
investigations; and in relation to specific matters, such as designated telecommunication matters and 
the investigation of compliance with court-enforceable undertakings, which are not currently open to 
section 155 notices. 
Conversely, a range of submissions criticise the ACCC’s use of its current section 155 powers, citing 
the scope of the notices and the costs of compliance.698 Submissions also comment on the use of 
section 155 powers in the context of applications for merger clearance.699 
An appropriate balance must be achieved with respect to coercive powers. The Panel considers that 
the ability to compel business to provide evidence, information and documents relating to a 
potential contravention of the competition law is crucial to the ACCC’s administration of the CCA. 
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However, the Panel does not support the ACCC’s proposal that the powers be available for use after 
the ACCC has commenced proceedings in respect of an alleged contravention. The use of the powers 
at that time is likely to cause conflict with the court’s overall supervision of the proceedings. The 
court’s discovery and subpoena powers can be exercised to require production of additional 
documents.  
The Panel considers that the ACCC should be able to use section 155 powers to investigate 
compliance with court-enforceable undertakings. The ability to gather information about a possible 
contravention of an undertaking accepted by the ACCC would assist in protecting the integrity of 
undertakings as part of the broader compliance and enforcement framework. 
The Panel understands the concerns expressed by business over the cost of compliance with 
section 155 notices that require the production of documents. In the digital age, businesses retain 
many more documents, such as emails, than was the case 20 years ago. As a consequence, 
compliance with a section 155 notice may require electronic searches of tens of thousands of 
documents, which can occasion very large expense.700  
The courts have recognised the cost of documentary searches and, over the last 10 years, have 
modified the rights of discovery. For example, the Federal Court Rules 2011 (20.14) now require a 
party to undertake a reasonable search for documents. In determining what is a reasonable search, 
the party may take into account factors such as the number of documents involved and the ease and 
cost of retrieving the documents.  
The ACCC’s published guideline on section 155 acknowledges the burden that section 155 notices 
may impose on a recipient and accepts that the ACCC should take the burden into account.701 The 
Panel considers that this is an important responsibility for the ACCC, which should be exercised on 
each occasion that a notice is issued. The ACCC should accept a responsibility to frame a section 155 
notice in the narrowest form possible, consistent with the scope of the matter being investigated.  
There may also be scope to recognise, in the CCA or in a guideline, a principle equivalent to that 
recognised in the Federal Court Rules: that, in a digital age, the obligation to search for documents 
should be subject to a requirement of reasonableness, having regard to factors such as the number 
of documents involved and the ease and cost of retrieving the document. A number of submissions 
support such a proposal.702 However, some fear this could ‘water down’ a powerful tool used to 
obtain evidence about serious contraventions of the CCA.703 For its part, the ACCC states that it will 
review its internal processes for issuing section 155 notices in view of the concerns raised in 
submissions to the Review (DR sub, page 72). 
As to whether the reasonable search criteria should be enacted in the CCA or implemented as an 
administrative guideline, a number of submissions consider that the requirement that recipients 
                                                          
700 See, for example: Coles Group Limited, DR sub, page 10; and Telstra, sub, page 13. 
701 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008, A guide to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s power to obtain information, documents and evidence under s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Canberra, page 8. 
702 See, for example: AGL Energy Limited, DR sub, page 6; Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, DR sub, page 3; 
Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 13; Coles Group Limited, DR sub, pages 10-11; Law Council of 
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703 See, for example: ACCC, DR sub, page 72; Law Council of Australia — SME Committee, DR sub, page 21; and Spier 
Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 20. 
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undertake a reasonable search for documents should be enshrined in legislation.704 The Panel agrees. 
The failure to comply with a section 155 notice is an offence; accordingly, it is important that the 
scope of the legal obligation imposed by section 155 be contained in the legislation. 
The Panel agrees with the ACCC’s suggestion that, should a reasonable search test be introduced into 
the CCA, the most effective approach would be to introduce a defence to a ‘refusal or failure to 
comply with a notice’ under paragraph 155(5)(a) of the CCA that would be available to a recipient of 
a notice issued under paragraph 155(1)(b) who can demonstrate that a reasonable search was 
undertaken in order to comply with the notice (DR sub, page 73). 
The Panel’s view 
Compulsory evidence-gathering powers are important to the ACCC’s ability to enforce the CCA. 
Those powers should extend to gathering information about a possible contravention of an 
undertaking accepted by the ACCC. This will assist in protecting the integrity of undertakings as 
part of the broader compliance and enforcement framework.  
The exercise of the ACCC’s powers under section 155 can impose a regulatory burden on recipients 
of compulsory notices. 
The ACCC should accept a responsibility to frame section 155 notices in the narrowest form 
possible, consistent with the scope of the matter being investigated.  
Further, in complying with a section 155 notice, the recipient should be required to undertake a 
reasonable search.  
 
Compliance with compulsory powers facilitates the ACCC’s ability to investigate competition 
concerns. The ACCC states that the current sanction for a corporation failing to comply with a 
section 155 notice is too low. The present sanction is up to 20 penalty units for an individual (or 
12 months imprisonment) which, when applied to a corporation, amounts to a fine of up to 
$17,000.705  
In contrast, a person failing to comply with a notice issued by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission faces a sanction of up to 100 penalty units or two years imprisonment, or 
both,706 which translates to a fine of $85,000 for a corporation. Given the importance of compliance 
with section 155 notices to the administration of competition laws, the Panel agrees that the current 
sanction for a corporation failing to comply is inadequate.  
The Panel’s view  
The current sanction for a corporation failing to comply with section 155 of the CCA is inadequate. 
 
                                                          
704 See, for example: Business Council of Australia, DR sub, pages 24-25; Foxtel, DR sub, page, 7; Telstra Corporation 
Limited, DR sub, page 4; and Woolworths Limited, DR sub, pages 26-27. 
705 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, subsection 155(6A). See sections 4AA (level of penalty units) and 4B (penalties 
for corporations five times that of individuals) of the Crimes Act 1914. 
706 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, section 63. 
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Recommendation 40 — Section 155 notices 
The section 155 power should be extended to cover the investigation of alleged contraventions of 
court-enforceable undertakings. 
The ACCC should review its guidelines on section 155 notices having regard to the increasing 
burden imposed by notices in the digital age. Section 155 should be amended so that it is a 
defence to a ‘refusal or failure to comply with a notice’ under paragraph 155(5)(a) of the CCA that 
a recipient of a notice under paragraph 155(1)(b) can demonstrate that a reasonable search was 
undertaken in order to comply with the notice. 
The fine for non-compliance with section 155 of the CCA should be increased in line with similar 
notice-based evidence-gathering powers in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001. 
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24 NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME 
In some markets, competition depends on access to infrastructure facilities that occupy strategic 
positions in an industry (the so-called ‘essential’ or ‘bottleneck’ facilities).  
The National Access Regime (the Regime) in Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(CCA) provides a legal framework by which third parties can seek and obtain access to such 
bottleneck facilities in order to compete, or compete more effectively, in upstream and downstream 
markets.  
The two objectives of the Regime, as stated in the objects clause of Part IIIA, are to: 
... promote the economically efficient operation of, use of, and investment in the 
infrastructure by which services are provided, thereby promoting effective competition in 
upstream and downstream markets; and 
provide a framework and guiding principles to encourage a consistent approach to access 
regulation in each industry.707 
Generally, to gain access to bottleneck infrastructure under the Regime, two steps must be taken.708 
First, an application must be made to the National Competition Council (NCC) to recommend 
declaration of the infrastructure service, and the relevant Minister must then accept the 
recommendation and declare the service. To recommend declaration of an infrastructure service and 
declare the service, the NCC and the Minister respectively must be satisfied of specified criteria 
concerning the service (see Box 24.1). Declaration activates the arbitration processes under the 
Regime. 
Second, the person seeking access must request access from the infrastructure owner. If negotiations 
fail, terms and conditions of access can be arbitrated by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC). 
The Panel recommends combining the roles of the NCC and the ACCC under the Regime in the 
proposed Access and Pricing Regulator. See Section 27.1 for further discussion of these issues. 
Box 24.1: Declaration criteria in the CCA (sections 44G and 44H)  
The NCC cannot recommend that a service be declared, and the Minister cannot declare a service, 
unless satisfied of all of the following matters: 
a) that access (or increased access) to the service would promote a material increase in 
competition in at least one market (whether or not in Australia), other than the market for 
the service; 
b) that it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service; 
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Box 24.1: Declaration criteria in the CCA (sections 44G and 44H) (continued) 
c) that the facility is of national significance, having regard to: 
(i) the size of the facility; or 
(ii) the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or 
the importance of the facility to the national economy; 
e)  that access to the service:709  
(i) is not already the subject of a regime in relation to which a decision under section 44N 
that the regime is an effective access regime is in force (including as a result of an 
extension under section 44NB); or 
(ii) is the subject of a regime in relation to which a decision under section 44N that the 
regime is an effective access regime is in force (including as a result of an extension 
under section 44NB), but the NCC/designated Minister believes that, since the 
Commonwealth Minister’s decision was published, there have been substantial 
modifications of the access regime or of the relevant principles set out in the 
Competition Principles Agreement; and 
f)  that access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public interest. 
An infrastructure service may be exempted from declaration under Part IIIA of the CCA by any of the 
following regulatory processes:  
• Prior to the construction of a new facility, the operator of the proposed facility may apply to 
the NCC for a recommendation to the relevant Minister that the facility be ineligible for 
declaration. The facility will become ineligible if the Minister makes that decision. The Minister 
may only make that decision if he or she is satisfied that one of the declaration criteria will not 
be fulfilled. 
• A State or Territory applies to the NCC for a recommendation to the relevant Australian 
Government Minister that an access regime for a particular infrastructure service in that State 
or Territory is ‘effective’. The infrastructure service will be exempted from declaration if the 
Australian Government Minister makes that decision. The criteria to be applied for that 
decision are set out in the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA).710 
• The Australian Government or a State or Territory may apply to the ACCC for approval of a 
competitive tender process for the construction and operation of an infrastructure facility that 
is to be publicly owned. The facility will be exempted from declaration if the ACCC makes that 
decision. The ACCC may only approve the tender process if it is satisfied that reasonable terms 
and conditions of access to the facility will be the result of the tender process. 
• Operators of monopoly infrastructure submit an undertaking to the ACCC setting out the terms 
and conditions on which the operator will offer services using the infrastructure. The ACCC is 
empowered to accept or reject the undertaking. If the undertaking is accepted, the service 
cannot be declared. 
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The Regime was recently reviewed by the Productivity Commission (PC),711 which recommended 
retaining the Regime but revising its declaration criteria. The Review’s Terms of Reference require 
the Panel to consider whether the Regime is adequate, taking into account the PC’s inquiry. 
A number of submissions comment on the Regime, raising the primary issues of: 
• whether it is in the public interest to retain the Regime; 
• whether the PC’s recommendations concerning the declaration criteria should be 
implemented; and 
• whether there should be broader rights of review of access declarations and arbitrations 
before the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal). 
24.1 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME 
Australia is unique among comparable jurisdictions in having a general access regime that may 
potentially apply to any privately owned infrastructure facility that exists within a supply chain.712 
The Regime facilitates intrusive economic regulation of infrastructure assets. It overrides private 
property rights, mandating that the operator of an infrastructure facility make that facility available 
for use by a third party on terms and conditions (including price) determined by a regulatory body 
(the ACCC). By that process, the economic return that the operator is able to earn on its investment 
in the facility will be subject to regulation. 
Economic regulation of privately owned assets can impose costs on the economy. In recommending 
the introduction of the Regime, the Hilmer Review was conscious of the economic costs that might 
be imposed: 
The Committee is conscious of the need to carefully limit the circumstances in which one 
business is required by law to make its facilities available to another. Failure to provide 
appropriate protection to the owners of such facilities has the potential to undermine 
incentives for investment. Nevertheless, there are some industries where there is a strong 
public interest in ensuring that effective competition can take place ...713 
The PC also noted the costs created by access regulation: 
Access regulation also imposes costs, in particular where it adversely affects incentives for 
investment in markets for infrastructure services. There are costs associated with errors in 
setting access prices. For example, when prices are set too low, this can lead to delayed 
investment in infrastructure, or the non-provision of some infrastructure services. 
Regulated third party access can also impose costs on infrastructure service providers 
from coordinating multiple users of their facilities.714 
Given the economic costs that can be caused by this form of regulation, it is important to examine 
the benefits of the Regime carefully and to ask whether those benefits can be achieved by a less 
intrusive form of regulation. 
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Original objective of the regime 
The Regime was introduced in 1995 based on the recommendation of the Hilmer Review. 
One of the Hilmer Review’s major recommendations was to introduce competition into various 
industries that, at that time, were largely in public ownership. Those industries included electricity, 
gas, rail, airports, ports and telecommunications. Each of those industries consisted of potentially 
contestable commercial activities that required the use of ‘bottleneck’ infrastructure facilities. 
The Hilmer Review recommended introducing competition into those industries by separating them 
into their contestable and natural monopoly elements. As the contestable elements required access 
to the natural monopoly elements, the Hilmer Review recommended introducing a single national 
access regime to regulate that access. 
Part IIIA of the CCA was originally enacted to provide a common framework for access to 
infrastructure within each of those industries. However, it soon became clear that each industry had 
distinct physical, technical and economic characteristics and that it was preferable to address access 
issues on an industry-by-industry basis. Distinct access regimes have subsequently emerged 
(see Box 24.2).  
Box 24.2: Existing access regimes 
In the electricity industry, generators and retailers require access to the transmission and 
distribution wires. Access is governed by an industry-specific regime established by the National 
Electricity Law. 
In the gas industry, producers and retailers require access to transmission and distribution 
pipelines. Access is governed by an industry-specific regime established by the National Gas Law. 
In the telecommunications industry, providers of residential fixed line telephony and data services 
require access to fixed line infrastructure (historically copper wire, but currently being replaced by 
optical fibre and wireless services). Access to fixed line infrastructure is governed by an industry 
specific access regime, established under Part XIC of the CCA. 
The interstate rail track network is the subject of an access undertaking given by the rail track’s 
operator, Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), to the ACCC under Part IIIA. Intrastate rail track 
networks are subject to access regimes established in the State or Territory in which the railway is 
located. 
Ports throughout Australia are subject to various regulatory frameworks established in the State or 
Territory in which the port is located. 
Airport facilities are not regulated by an industry-specific access regime and are potentially subject 
to declaration under Part IIIA. Currently, no airport services are the subject of declaration. 
What is the role of Part IIIA today? 
Currently, only two services are declared under Part IIIA: 
• the Tasmanian railway network was declared in 2007; and 
• the Goldsworthy iron ore railway in the Pilbara, owned by BHP Billiton, was declared in 2008.  
National Access Regime 
426 Part 4 — Competition Laws 
No-one has sought access to the Goldsworthy railway since it was declared.715 
Access to the ARTC interstate716 and Hunter Valley717 rail networks, as well as the Co-operative Bulk 
Holdings bulk wheat port terminals in Western Australia,718 are governed by access undertakings 
accepted by the ACCC under Part IIIA. 
Since Part IIIA was enacted in 1995, four other services have been declared but the declarations have 
since expired or been revoked: 
• airport services at Melbourne Airport — declared in 1997, expired in 1998; 
• airport services at Sydney International Airport — declared in 2000, expired in 2005; 
• airport services at Sydney Airport — declared in 2005, expired in 2010; and 
• sewage transmission services on Sydney Water’s sewage reticulation network — declared in 
2005. As the access seeker did not pursue access, the declaration was revoked in October 2009 
following the enactment of a separate New South Wales access regime under the Water 
Industry Competition Act 2006. 
Thus, few infrastructure assets are currently regulated under Part IIIA. For the most part, the 
bottleneck infrastructure assets cited by the Hilmer Review as requiring access regulation have been 
regulated by industry-specific access regimes. Those regimes are either established under a 
co-operative legislative scheme of the States and Territories (for example, the National Electricity 
Law and the National Gas Law) or under a legislative scheme of individual States and Territories (for 
example, port regulation). 
However, Part IIIA continues to provide a legislative framework upon which industry-specific access 
regimes are based, acting as both a model and a ‘back stop’. Its legislative provisions are a model 
upon which industry specific access regimes have been developed. It also operates as a back stop to 
access regimes implemented through access undertakings accepted under Part IIIA (such as the ARTC 
rail track) or access regimes implemented under state and territory laws and certified as effective 
under Part IIIA. The undertaking and certification processes exempt the relevant facility from 
declaration under Part IIIA.  
Accordingly, Part IIIA has an indirect role in supporting many industry-specific access regimes, even 
though its direct role is limited. 
What is the anticipated role of Part IIIA into the future? 
In considering the anticipated role of Part IIIA into the future, the Panel has asked: What are the 
infrastructure facilities for which access regulation under Part IIIA would be expected to improve 
competition and economic efficiency in the Australian economy in the future? The Panel is of the 
view that, unless those facilities or categories of facilities can be identified, it is difficult to conclude 
that economic benefits outweigh the regulatory burden and costs imposed by Part IIIA on Australian 
businesses fits. 
                                                          
715 BHP Billiton, sub, page 23. 
716 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008, ARTC Interstate Rail access undertaking 2008. 
717 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2011, ARTC Hunter Valley access undertaking 2011. 
718 ACCC, sub 1, page 133. 
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Thus, in the Draft Report, the Panel invited comment on: 
• the categories of infrastructure to which Part IIIA might be applied in the future, particularly in 
the mining sector, and the costs and benefits that would arise from access regulation of that 
infrastructure; and 
• whether Part IIIA should be confined in its scope to the categories of bottleneck infrastructure 
cited by the Hilmer Review. 
Submissions responding to this invitation reflect two different perspectives. 
Some argue that it is unnecessary to identify the types of infrastructure to which Part IIIA might be 
applied in the future. The Australian Pipeline Industry Association is of the view that ‘the categories 
should be as broad as possible’; it considers that ‘effective use of the declaration criteria should 
ensure declaration only occurs where it is in the public interest’ (DR sub, page 1).  
The New South Wales Government states, ‘it is appropriate to maintain the current scope of the 
application of the Part IIIA regime’ (DR sub, page 14). Similarly, the ACCC does not see a need to 
identify those facilities for which access regulation will be required in the future: 
… the competition principles relating to access regulation and the back-stop role of 
Part IIIA mean that Australia’s competition policy can flexibly adapt to apply (or cease to 
apply) to facilities in response to changes in technological or other market conditions. 
(DR sub, page 84) 
The NCC also supports the back stop role performed by Part IIIA. It submits: 
One of the important objectives of Part IIIA is to provide a framework and guiding 
principles to encourage a consistent approach to access regulation in various industries. 
The certification process is designed to allow effective state and territory regimes to 
supplant the National Access Regime where such regimes also incorporate the principles 
set out in the Competition Principles Agreement. A principles based approach to the 
scope and operation of access regulation is important. (DR sub, page 3) 
Other submissions express a contrary view. Professors Ergas and Fels observe: 
Regulatory and third party access regimes exist outside of the Part IIIA declaration 
framework for virtually all of the industries identified by the Hilmer Committee as 
requiring a framework for access. No industries where additional access regulation would 
be necessary were identified by the Productivity Commission in its review of the National 
Access Regime. (DR sub, page i) 
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) (DR sub, page 23), Virgin Australia (DR sub, page 7) and the 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (DR sub, page 5) raise the potential need 
for access regulation at airports in the future. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development also notes: 
… the likelihood of capacity constraints at some airports and intermodal terminals in the 
next decade does have the potential to lead to an increase in access disputes … The 
Department believes that in the event commercial negotiations fail to provide acceptable 
outcomes, the National Access Regime in its current form provides an important backstop 
to the regulatory system. (DR sub, page 5) 
The regulatory issue that arises in respect of airports is generally one of monopoly pricing rather than 
access. Although airports are bottleneck facilities, their operators are not vertically integrated into 
upstream and downstream markets. Hence, they have limited incentive to reduce competition in 
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dependent markets,719 but they have power to impose monopoly charges on users of their facilities. 
To some extent, Part IIIA can be used as a means of addressing monopoly pricing at airports. 
However, that is not its original objective and its processes are cumbersome and not well suited to 
that function. As noted above, particular airport services at Melbourne Airport, Sydney Airport and 
Sydney International Airport have, in the past, been declared under Part IIIA, but those declarations 
have lapsed. Virgin Australia describes Part IIIA as a second-best option for ensuring access at 
airports but submits that Part IIIA should remain available in respect of airports until a better airport 
regulatory model is put in place (DR sub, page 7). 
Asciano raises the potential need for access regulation of privatised ports in the future. It observes 
that two issues arise from the creation of private port operator monopolies: vertical integration and 
monopoly pricing. If the port operator integrates into downstream services, such as stevedoring, 
incentives may arise to restrict access to port services by competing stevedoring businesses. 
Currently, Part IIIA addresses such issues where they arise, although Asciano is critical of the time 
involved in invoking that regime. Asciano submits that Part IIIA is not suited to addressing monopoly 
pricing issues and that ports require economic regulation at the time of privatisation (DR sub, 
pages 15-19).  
Glencore Coal observes, ‘The historical development of coal mining infrastructure in Australia has 
resulted in multi-user infrastructure, developed by State and Federal governments and now in the 
process of passing into the hands of private owners’ (DR sub, page 1). With a focus on the east coast 
coal supply chains, Glencore Coal submits that Part IIIA should apply to the following kinds of mining 
infrastructure:  
• below rail infrastructure, particularly existing below rail infrastructure and extensions of and 
expansions to that infrastructure;  
• port terminal infrastructure; and  
• port authority activities including rights to approve the construction of new terminals, control 
of vessel movements and port channel access. (DR sub, page 3) 
However, Glencore Coal draws a distinction between privately developed single-user infrastructure 
and publicly developed multi-user infrastructure that has been privatised: 
… we would regard it as being highly significant to the decision to impose regulation whether 
the infrastructure has been developed by a private party who has borne the cost and risk of 
that development without government support, or whether the infrastructure has been 
developed by government before being sold to a private owner as an existing multi-user 
monopoly, or with some other form of government support. (DR sub, page 11)  
A number of other submissions note this distinction. Rio Tinto submits that single-user infrastructure 
used primarily for the export of goods that is closely integrated with the production of those goods 
should be excluded from declaration under Part IIIA. It observes: 
Where infrastructure is integrated with the production of goods and has a single owner or 
operator, the production process and the operation of infrastructure are likely to be highly 
co-ordinated. Introducing a third party user onto such infrastructure will necessarily interrupt 
that coordination and create inefficiencies. 
                                                          
719 Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy (the Hilmer Review), Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, pages 240-241; and Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry 
Report No.66, Canberra, pages 276 and 278. 
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… Where such infrastructure is used to produce and export goods, third party access is unlikely 
to generate any benefits for Australian consumers. Where goods are being exported it is highly 
likely they are being exported into a competitive global market and that access to 
infrastructure is not necessary to allow competition in such markets. (DR sub, pages 7-8)  
BHP Billiton makes a similar submission (DR sub, page 7). It notes that, in 2005, the Exports and 
Infrastructure Taskforce720 considered the impact of applying the Part IIIA declaration regime to 
export infrastructure, and concluded that excluding from the application of that regime: 
... vertically integrated, tightly managed, logistics chains, especially those related to our 
export industries ... would minimise the risk that access regimes would disrupt and 
undermine the very areas of the economy that have performed best in the management 
of export related infrastructure. (DR sub, page 6) 
Professors Ergas and Fels also consider that Part IIIA should not apply to vertically integrated 
commercial facilities, including facilities used to export commodities. They observe: 
… any potential benefit from the Part IIIA declaration provisions would be limited, and any 
benefits could only be achieved at a considerable cost:  
 The declaration of vertically integrated facilities used to export commodities whose 
prices are determined in competitive global markets would not affect the prices of 
these commodities. Declaration would therefore not lead to competition benefits.  
 The declaration of vertically integrated commercial facilities operating in a 
competitive market context would give rise to a range of economic costs that may 
be very large. These include the ongoing costs of disputes, the consequences of 
pricing inefficiencies, inefficiencies arising from the disruption of vertically 
integrated processes, and dynamic (investment) inefficiencies’. (DR sub, page i) 
Three important themes emerge from the foregoing.  
First, Part IIIA has played an important role in developing industry-specific access regimes for the 
bottleneck infrastructure identified by the Hilmer Review and introducing competition in those 
industries. 
Second, in the future, Part IIIA will continue to provide a back stop to those industry-specific access 
regimes. While it would be possible to devise other legislative arrangements to maintain the current 
access regimes, it seems unnecessary to disrupt the role performed by Part IIIA in that context. That 
back stop role also applies to airports and ports. Although the primary economic issue at ports and 
airports is monopoly pricing, access problems might arise in the future that could be addressed by 
Part IIIA. 
Third, beyond the circumstances envisaged by the Hilmer Review, imposing an access regime upon 
privately developed single-user infrastructure is more likely to produce inefficiency than efficiency, 
impeding the competitiveness of Australian industry. This is particularly so for vertically integrated 
export industries that are subject to the constraints of international competition in the final goods 
market. 
                                                          
720 The Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce was established to identify and report to the then Prime Minister on ‘any 
bottlenecks, of a physical or regulatory kind, in the operation of Australia’s infrastructure that may impede the full 
realisation of Australia’s export opportunities’. 
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In the Panel’s view, it is important to preserve the beneficial aspects of the Regime while modifying 
its economically detrimental aspects.  
Conclusions of the Productivity Commission 
The PC considered that the Regime results in a range of potential benefits: 
• improvements to economic efficiency where the Regime reduces monopoly pricing, increases 
competition in dependent markets, or results in more efficient investment; 
• benefits from greater consistency in access regulation across the economy; and 
• administrative and compliance cost savings and more effective and efficient infrastructure 
regulation if the Regime supplants other less effective policy responses, or if its role as an 
overarching access regime improves other access regimes.721 
However, the PC also recognised that the Regime imposes costs: 
• access regulation may result in economic distortions including adverse effects on investment in 
markets for infrastructure services; 
• administrative and compliance costs can be substantial; and 
• where access regulation is applied, there might be production costs incurred by the 
infrastructure service provider from co-ordinating multiple users of its facility.722 
The PC concluded that the Regime had net benefits and should be retained: 
Based on a qualitative assessment of the available data, the Commission has determined 
that the Regime is likely to generate net benefits to the community. The Commission 
considers that the Regime should be retained, and its scope confined to ensure its use is 
limited to the exceptional cases where the benefits arising from increased competition in 
dependent markets are likely to outweigh the costs of regulated third party access. 
Renewed emphasis should be given to ensuring that the Regime better targets the 
economic problem to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary costs on the community 
and deterring investment in markets for infrastructure services for little gain.723 
                                                          
721 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No.66, Canberra, page 215. 
722 Ibid., pages 215-216, 237-240. 
723 Ibid., page 10. 
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The Panel’s view 
The National Access Regime in Part IIIA of the CCA was originally established to enable third-party 
access to identified bottleneck infrastructure where it was apparent that economic efficiency 
would be enhanced by promoting competition in markets that were dependent upon access to 
that infrastructure. 
The bottleneck infrastructure identified by the Hilmer Review included electricity wires, gas 
pipelines, telecommunication lines, freight rail networks, airports and ports. Distinct access 
regimes have emerged for these different types of infrastructure, reflecting their distinct physical, 
technical and economic characteristics. Those regimes appear to be achieving the original policy 
goals identified by the Hilmer Review. Part IIIA has played an important role in developing these 
access regimes. 
Part IIIA should continue to provide a back stop to the current industry-specific access regimes. It 
may also be needed for future access regulation of airport and port infrastructure.  
However, imposing an access regime upon privately developed single-user infrastructure is more 
likely to be produce inefficiency than efficiency, impeding the competitiveness of Australian 
industry. 
The Panel agrees with the conclusion of the recent PC inquiry that the National Access Regime is 
likely to generate net benefits to the community, but its scope should be confined to ensure its use 
is limited to the exceptional cases where the benefits arising from increased competition in 
dependent markets are likely to outweigh the costs of regulated third-party access. 
24.2 THE DECLARATION CRITERIA 
The scope of the Regime is largely governed by the criteria for declaration (set out in Box 24.1). An 
infrastructure facility cannot be declared (activating the Regime) unless the relevant Minister is 
satisfied that all of the criteria for declaration are satisfied.  
The PC recommended the following changes to the declaration criteria in Part IIIA: 
• that criterion (a) will be satisfied if access to an infrastructure service on reasonable terms and 
conditions through declaration (rather than access per se) would promote a material increase 
in competition in a dependent market; 
• that criterion (b) will be satisfied where total foreseeable market demand for the 
infrastructure service over the declaration period could be met at least cost by the facility; 
• as an alternative recommendation, that criterion (b) will be satisfied where it would be 
uneconomical for anyone (other than the service provider) to develop another facility to 
provide the service; and 
• that criterion (f) will be satisfied if access on reasonable terms and conditions through 
declaration would promote the public interest.724 
A number of submissions address the proposed changes to criteria (a), (b) and (f). 
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Criterion (a) 
As outlined in Box 24.1, criterion (a) is ‘that access (or increased access) to the service would 
promote a material increase in competition in at least one market (whether or not in Australia), 
other than the market for the service’. 
The PC concluded that criterion (a) should be expressly focused on the specific effect of declaration 
(rather than access) on promoting competition in dependent markets. It reasoned that the relevant 
comparison should be between the future state of competition in a dependent market without 
declaration (the status quo) and a situation in which the service is declared. The test should not be 
satisfied where there is already effective competition in dependent markets because declaration 
would be unlikely to promote a material increase in competition.725 
No submissions oppose the proposed change to criterion (a) and the change does not appear to be 
controversial. However, a number of submissions argue that the PC’s recommendation does not go 
far enough. Professors Ergas and Fels observe that the word ‘material’ is intended to be read as ‘not 
trivial’,726 thus creating a low threshold, and that the criterion can be met in circumstances where 
claimed increases in competition in a dependent market are hypothesised or speculative, and where 
the dependent market is of no or very limited national significance (DR sub, pages v and 31).  
They recommend that criterion (a) be amended such that access must result in a ‘substantial 
improvement in competition’ (DR sub, page 60). They also submit that criterion (a) should require 
that the dependent market, in which competition is to be improved by access, should be ‘substantial 
or nationally significant’ (DR sub, pages 60-61). 
Similarly, BHP Billiton draws attention to the conclusions of the Tribunal when reviewing the 
declaration of the Goldsworthy rail line in the Pilbara. The Tribunal concluded that access to the 
Goldsworthy rail line would not increase competition in the downstream global market for iron ore 
as that market was already subject to effective competition.727 It also concluded that access would 
not increase competition in the upstream market for iron ore tenements in the Pilbara observing, ‘In 
the case of the Goldsworthy line, it has the fewest tenements surrounding it, many of which are 
within trucking distance to the port. Access to that line will have only a minor effect on the tenement 
market’.728 Nevertheless, it concluded that criterion (a) was satisfied because access would increase 
competition in a market for rail haulage for iron ore in the vicinity of the Goldsworthy railway, and 
that that increase was more than trivial.729  
In respect of that conclusion, BHP Billiton observes: 
BHP Billiton is the only supplier and the only customer in that ‘market’. In the almost six 
years since the Goldsworthy railway was declared, no party has sought access to the 
Goldsworthy railway or otherwise sought to enter that ‘market’, and declaration has had no 
impact on competition in that “market”. The promotion of competition in that ‘market’, even 
had it occurred, could have no expected impact on national competitiveness. (DR sub, 
page 18) 
                                                          
725 Ibid., pages 172-173. 
726 See also Re Fortescue Metals Group (2011) 271 ALR 256 at [583]. 
727 Ibid, at [1083] and [1084]. 
728 Ibid, at [1131]. 
729 Ibid, at [1144] - [1147]. 
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The Panel agrees with the PC’s recommendation to re-focus criterion (a) on the specific effect of 
declaration. However, the Panel is also concerned that criterion (a) sets a low threshold for 
declaration. The burdens of access regulation should not be imposed on the operations of a facility 
unless access is expected to produce significant efficiency gains from competition. This requires that 
competition be increased in a market that is significant and that the increase in competition is 
substantial. 
Criterion (b) 
As outlined in Box 24.1, declaration criterion (b) is ‘that it would be uneconomical for anyone to 
develop another facility to provide the service’.  
Until the High Court decision in the Pilbara rail access case,730 the NCC and the Tribunal had 
interpreted criterion (b) as a ‘natural monopoly’ test. Under that test, it would be uneconomical to 
develop another facility if the facility in question could provide society’s reasonably foreseeable 
demand for the service at a lower total cost than if it were to be met by two or more facilities. 
In the Pilbara rail access case, the High Court rejected that interpretation of criterion (b) in favour of 
a ‘private profitability’ or ‘economic feasibility’ test:  
... requiring the decision maker to be satisfied that there is not anyone for whom it would 
be profitable to develop another facility.731 
The High Court’s interpretation of criterion (b) gave effect to clause 6 of the CPA, which was entered 
into by all Australian jurisdictions following the Hilmer Review. By clause 6, all jurisdictions agreed 
that the Regime should be a regime for access to services provided by means of significant facilities 
where, among other things:  
• it would not be economically feasible to duplicate the facility; and 
• access to the service is necessary in order to permit effective competition in a downstream or 
upstream market. 
Those tests require an evaluation of whether duplication is feasible or practical for a participant in 
the market.732 
Understood in that way, criterion (b) directs attention to the competition objective that lies at the 
heart of Part IIIA: whether the facility is a bottleneck, in the sense that access to the facility is 
necessary or essential to participate in an upstream or downstream market. Applying criterion (b) in 
that way promotes both competition and economic efficiency. If it is commercially feasible to 
develop another facility, the facility owner and access seeker have commercial incentives to reach an 
access agreement where it is efficient to do so. Where the facility can be bypassed, the facility owner 
has no incentive to refuse access and has an incentive to allow access if its overall costs will thereby 
be reduced.  
If the facility owner and access seeker are unable to reach agreement, it is a strong indication that 
substantial inefficiencies will result from access. Even if developing another facility causes average 
industry costs to increase, that occurs in many industries in which the presence of bottlenecks is not 
an issue.  
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731 Ibid., at [77]. 
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Further, the development of an alternative facility is likely to lead to more intense competition 
between the facility owner and the access seeker than would arise under access. There are 
substantial economic benefits from facilities-based competition including the expansion of overall 
capacity in the market, technological innovation, experimentation with different operational 
methodologies and the avoidance of co-ordination costs and other diseconomies. 
As discussed above, criterion (a) also has a competition focus, but it is a different focus to 
criterion (b). Criterion (b) asks whether the facility is a bottleneck in the sense that it is commercially 
infeasible to bypass the facility. If the facility is a bottleneck, criterion (a) asks whether declaration 
will increase competition in a dependent market. Such a range of competitors may already be 
participating in the dependent markets through other means that access to the facility will not have a 
material effect on competition. This is particularly so in a dependent market that is export-oriented.  
In its recent inquiry, the PC concluded that neither the ‘private profitability’ test approved by the 
High Court nor the ‘natural monopoly’ test previously applied by the NCC was apt. The PC was 
concerned that the private profitability test might be difficult to assess in practice and give rise to 
disputes (as argued by the ACCC and the NCC in their submissions to the PC inquiry). On the other 
hand, the natural monopoly test as traditionally applied was narrowly focused on demand for the 
service supplied by the relevant infrastructure, rather than total market demand. 
The PC concluded that a new test was preferable: 
The Commission’s preferred approach to criterion (b) accounts for both the total demand 
in the market in which the infrastructure service is supplied, and the production costs 
incurred by infrastructure service providers from coordinating multiple users of 
infrastructure.  
Criterion (b) should be satisfied where total foreseeable market demand for the 
infrastructure service over the declaration period could be met at least cost by the 
facility.733 
The PC also concluded that, if the test were to remain as a ‘private profitability’ test, criterion (b) 
should be amended to exclude any consideration of whether the operator of the infrastructure 
service was able to duplicate the facility: 
If criterion (b) continues to be applied as a private profitability test, the Commission 
considers that the term ‘anyone’ should not include the incumbent infrastructure service 
provider. This is because an incumbent service provider would avoid access regulation if it 
successfully argued that it could profitably duplicate its own facilities (although it would 
not be required to do so). All else equal, having the incumbent duplicate, or say it will 
duplicate, its facility would do little to nothing to promote competition.734 
The NCC (sub, page10 and DR sub, page 5), Fortescue (sub, page 1), AngloAmerican Metallurgical 
Coal (sub, page 5), Glencore Coal (sub, page 8 and DR sub, page 10), Baker and McKenzie (DR sub, 
page 7), Infrashare (DR sub, page 5) and the ACCC (DR sub, page 85) support the PC’s proposed 
change to criterion (b).735  
                                                          
733 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No.66, Canberra, page 19. 
734 Ibid., page 20. 
735 The Queensland Competition Authority ‘has not formed a conclusive position on the PC’s market-based approach … 
[but] considers both the natural monopoly test and the PC’s market based approach are superior to the exiting 
private profitability test’ (DR sub, page 2). 
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BHP Billiton (sub, page 34 and DR sub, page 17), Rio Tinto Iron Ore (sub, page 2 and DR sub, page 9) 
and Professors Ergas and Fels (DR sub, page 61) do not support the PC’s proposal and support 
instead the ‘private profitability’ test. Professors Ergas and Fels argue that a natural monopoly test 
divorces criterion (b): 
... from its original purpose: to ensure that access is available where an efficient access 
seeker requires it to compete (and that a facility was hence essential for competition), 
and that a facility could not, practically and reasonably, be duplicated. (DR sub, page 20) 
In weighing up the ‘private profitability’ test against the PC’s recommendation, Professor Hilmer 
remarked in 2013: 
The PC approach may do better on public benefit, while the High Court approach may do 
better on certainty and speed of resolution. Either could work, with the proviso that there 
be a further review after say 5 years …736 
The Panel considers that maintaining the ‘private profitability/economically feasible’ test for 
criterion (b) will best promote the competition policy objectives underpinning Part IIIA. Under that 
test, access regulation will only be considered where there is a bottleneck that needs to be 
addressed. Absent a bottleneck problem, competition and economic efficiency will be advanced if 
market participants are free to negotiate private arrangements concerning access. 
The alternative approach, evaluating whether a facility is a natural monopoly, suffers from a number 
of shortcomings. 
First, as observed by Professors Ergas and Fels, there are many instances in which such a test: 
... will almost trivially be met; for example, in respect of any facility that is dimensioned to 
operate with spare capacity, so that it would be cheaper for a third party to share an 
existing facility than to construct their own or use a substitute facility. (DR sub, page 20) 
Second, the test requires the decision-maker to evaluate least-cost solutions in complex industries, 
burdened by information asymmetries where the risk of error is high. In contrast, and as observed by 
the High Court, the ‘economically feasible’ test: 
… is a question that bankers and investors must ask and answer in relation to any 
investment in infrastructure. Indeed, it may properly be described as the question that 
lies at the heart of every decision to invest in infrastructure, whether that decision is to be 
made by the entrepreneur or a financier of the venture.737 
It is important to recognise that the test for criterion (b) posited by the PC, viz., whether total 
foreseeable market demand for the infrastructure service could be met at least cost by the facility, is 
a relevant factor in assessing whether developing an alternative facility is economically feasible. That 
was recognised by the High Court: 
… if the new facility is not more efficient than the existing facility, it is to be doubted that 
development of the new facility in competition with a natural monopoly would be 
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Melbourne, page 22. 
737 Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2012) 246 CLR 379 at [106]. 
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profitable. Especially would that be so where, as here, the capital costs of establishing the 
new facility would necessarily be very large.738 
Nevertheless, the Panel considers that criterion (b) should not be amended to make that test the 
focus of the enquiry. Rather, criterion (b) should continue to ask a competition question: whether it 
is economically feasible to bypass the facility. However, the Panel considers that it is desirable to 
revise criterion (b), as suggested by the PC, so as to exclude the service provider from the assessment 
of feasible duplication by anyone. 
The practical operation of the criterion should be re-assessed after a suitable interval of five to 
10 years. 
Criterion (f) 
As outlined in Box 24.1, declaration criterion (f) is that ‘access (or increased access) to the service 
would not be contrary to the public interest’. 
The PC recommended criterion (f) be amended to strengthen the public interest test. It observed: 
Given the costs associated with access regulation, it is appropriate that a service can only 
be declared where the decision maker is satisfied that declaration is likely to generate 
overall gains to the community. To support this, criterion (f) would be better drafted as an 
affirmative test that requires the public interest to be promoted (as opposed to access 
being ‘not contrary to’ the public interest). This approach is consistent with the focus of 
the National Competition Policy reforms and the guiding principle that competition will 
promote community welfare by increasing national income through encouraging 
improvements in efficiency. 
… 
Assessments under criterion (f) should specifically include any effects on investment 
(positive and negative) in markets for infrastructure services and dependent markets, and 
the administrative and compliance costs that would arise due to declaration. This change 
would also require criterion (f) to be framed as a test that assesses factors that affect the 
public interest with and without declaration.739 
Rio Tinto Iron Ore (sub, page 9 and DR sub, page 9), BHP Billiton (DR sub, page 19), the Law Council of 
Australia — Competition and Consumer Committee (sub, page 47), the BCA (sub, Main Report, 
page 78) and Professors Fels and Ergas (DR sub, page 62) support the PC’s proposed changes to 
criterion (f).  
The NCC (sub, pages 10-11) and AngloAmerican Metallurgical Coal (sub, pages 5-6) do not support 
the PC’s proposal.740 The NCC argues: 
There is a genuine risk that raising the hurdle higher will render declaration impossible 
and as a result nullify any effective threat from declaration as a means of encouraging 
private settlements of access disputes. (sub, page 11) 
                                                          
738 Ibid., at [102]. 
739 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No.66, Canberra, pages 20-21. 
740 Infrashare do not comment directly on criterion (f) but argue with respect to the public interest test that ‘the Panel 
should be seeking to make it easier, not more difficult, for access seekers to have critical infrastructure declared’ (DR 
sub, page 6). 
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A foundational principle of competition policy is that regulatory intervention into markets should 
only occur where the public interest is promoted. Although criteria (a) and (b) are important 
considerations in assessing whether an infrastructure facility should be declared, they do not exhaust 
the considerations that may bear upon the public interest in a given case. 
In particular, as the PC observed,741 third-party access may cause inefficiencies in dependent 
markets; in particular, access may negatively affect the ability of the infrastructure owner to 
co-ordinate its supply chain in the most efficient manner and may lead to the need to undertake 
additional capital investment in dependent markets (for example, larger stockpiles or other facilities). 
All factors that bear upon the overall public interest, including the history of the ownership of the 
asset, should be taken into account in the declaration decision. 
The Panel’s view 
The declaration criteria in Part IIIA should be targeted to ensure that third-party access is only 
mandated where it is in the public interest. To that end: 
• Criterion (a) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through 
declaration promote a substantial increase in competition in a dependent market that is 
nationally significant. 
• Criterion (b) should require that it be uneconomical for anyone (other than the service 
provider) to develop another facility to provide the service. 
• Criterion (f) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through 
declaration promote the public interest. 
Other access regimes 
As outlined earlier, a majority of access is regulated through state government or industry-specific 
access regimes. These regimes are closely linked to the national regime. As the ACCC notes: 
Along with the competition principles, Part IIIA provides an umbrella or template from 
which the industry-specific access regimes are drawn. Part IIIA has been influential in 
underpinning key principles in industries such as energy, telecommunication, ports, water 
and rail. (DR sub, page 82) 
The Panel considers that the CPA should be updated to reflect the revised declaration criteria. As the 
PC observed in relation to their recommendations: 
There is a strong rationale for aligning the principles in clause 6(3) of the CPA with the 
relevant declaration criteria in the CCA. Clause 6 of the CPA provides a framework for 
state and territory access regimes. Therefore, if ... amendments to the declaration criteria 
are not reflected in clause 6(3), state and territory access regimes may not be 
appropriately targeted at the economic problem that access regulation should address. 
The differences in wording between clause 6(3) and the declaration criteria are also likely 
to increase uncertainty over the interpretation of both.742 
                                                          
741 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No.66, Canberra, pages 100-105. 
742 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No.66, Canberra, page 255. 
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In making amendments to the declaration criteria, and the associated changes to the CPA, the Panel 
is aware that the criteria will flow on to state and industry-specific access regimes. The Panel believes 
that national conformity in access regimes is important for regulatory certainty across Australia.  
The Panel’s view 
The Competition Principles Agreement should be updated to reflect the revised declaration 
criteria. This should bring about national conformity in the various state and industry-specific 
access regimes.  
24.3 REVIEW OF ACCESS DECISIONS BY THE AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION 
TRIBUNAL  
The NCC must decide whether or not to recommend declaration of an infrastructure service within 
180 days of receiving the application. The Minister must decide whether or not to declare the service 
within 60 days of receiving the recommendation from the NCC. 
The Minister’s decision to declare or not to declare a service is subject to review by the Tribunal. 
ACCC arbitration decisions in respect of a declared service are also subject to review by the Tribunal. 
Since Australia enacted the former Trade Practices Act in 1974, the Tribunal (formerly the Trade 
Practices Tribunal) has fulfilled an important role in both the development and the administration of 
the law. While the Tribunal is given a number of functions under the CCA, its primary function is as a 
body of review. It is empowered to undertake merits reviews of various decisions of the ACCC, 
including authorisations and access arbitrations. Its particular strength lies in its composition. For the 
purposes of hearing and determining a matter that comes before it, the Tribunal is constituted by a 
presidential member (who is a Federal Court judge) and two other members (who have qualifications 
in industry, commerce, economics, law or public administration). 
In the past few years, the role of the Tribunal in reviewing declaration decisions of the Minister and 
arbitration decisions of the ACCC has been narrowed. By amendments to the CCA made in 2010, the 
Tribunal’s review is largely confined to examining the information taken into account by the NCC (in 
making a recommendation) or the ACCC (in making an arbitration decision), subject to the ability to 
request additional information the Tribunal considers reasonable and appropriate.743 
Additionally, in the Pilbara rail access case, the High Court ruled that a ‘reconsideration’ of the 
Minister’s decision to declare or not declare a service was different to the Tribunal’s usual functions 
in a re-hearing and involved ‘reviewing what the original decision maker decided and doing that by 
reference to the material that was placed before the original decision maker’.744 
Rio Tinto Iron Ore submits: 
The great strength of the Tribunal process prior to the amendments was that primary 
evidence … was tested through cross-examination … This allowed a much more rigorous 
examination than is possible before the NCC or Minister and is therefore much more likely 
to arrive at the correct result. (sub, page 10) 
                                                          
743 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, sections 44ZZOAAA and 44ZZOAA. 
744 Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2012) 246 CLR 379 at [60]. 
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Access decisions should be made in a timely manner. The amendments made to the CCA in 2010 
were intended to speed up declaration and arbitration decisions, including review by the Tribunal. At 
that time, the determination of the Pilbara rail access applications had taken many years — an 
undesirable outcome.  
That said, decisions to declare a service under Part IIIA or determine terms and conditions of access 
are very significant. The Hilmer Review expected that such decisions would be infrequent. As noted 
above, that is also the view of the PC which re-stated that the scope of Part IIIA should be ‘confined 
to ensure its use is limited to the exceptional cases where the benefits arising from increased 
competition in dependent markets are likely to outweigh the costs of regulated third-party access’.745  
In circumstances where access declarations and arbitrations are expected to be rare, and the costs 
of making a wrong decision are likely to be high, the Panel supports enabling a thorough examination 
of the costs and benefits of the decision while avoiding unnecessary delays. An appropriate balance 
can be achieved between empowering the Tribunal to undertake merits reviews of access decisions, 
including hearing directly from employees of the business concerned and relevant experts where 
that would assist, and maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review process. 
The Panel’s view 
The Australian Competition Tribunal fulfils an important role in both the development and the 
administration of Australia’s competition laws. 
Decisions to declare a service under Part IIIA, or determine terms and conditions of access, are 
very significant economic decisions where the costs of making a wrong decision are likely to be 
high. 
The Panel favours empowering the Tribunal to undertake a merits review of access decisions, 
including hearing directly from employees of the business concerned and relevant experts where 
that would assist, while maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review process. 
Implementation 
Updating the CPA to reflect the revised declaration criteria will require agreement of the States and 
Territories. Since amendments to the declaration criteria could affect existing access declarations, 
the Australian Government should work closely with the States and Territories to ensure there are no 
unintended consequences. However, given Part IIIA was recently reviewed by the PC, there should be 
no need for further public consultation on the proposed amendments. 
                                                          
745 Productivity Commission 2013, National Access Regime, Inquiry Report no.66, Canberra, page 2. 
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Recommendation 42 — National Access Regime 
The declaration criteria in Part IIIA of the CCA should be targeted to ensure that third-party access 
only be mandated where it is in the public interest. To that end: 
• Criterion (a) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through declaration 
promote a substantial increase in competition in a dependent market that is nationally 
significant. 
• Criterion (b) should require that it be uneconomical for anyone (other than the service 
provider) to develop another facility to provide the service. 
• Criterion (f) should require that access on reasonable terms and conditions through declaration 
promote the public interest. 
The Competition Principles Agreement should be updated to reflect the revised declaration 
criteria. 
The Australian Competition Tribunal should be empowered to undertake a merits review of access 
decisions, while maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review process. 
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PART 5 — COMPETITION INSTITUTIONS 
This Part asks whether our current competition institutions are fit for purpose to operate in the 
long-term interests of consumers. We also identify the best institutional structure to take forward 
future reforms to competition policy.  
The institutions that currently oversee the competition framework undertake four broad functions. 
 
At the Commonwealth level, competition policy is implemented through the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the National Competition Council (NCC), the Australian 
Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the Federal Court of Australia. In addition, state and territory 
regulators such as the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) 
implement aspects of competition policy. 
Under National Competition Policy (NCP), a range of new regulatory institutions were created. For 
example, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) were created to perform functions under a legislative framework focused on the long-term 
interests of consumers. 
The Panel has considered the institutional arrangements that will be needed to implement the 
reform agenda flowing out of this Review. We identify important factors for the success of a future 
competition institution, including the need for a national approach, with ‘buy in’ from all Australian 
governments, and the ability of the institution to provide independent advice on competition policy.  
Enforcement of 
competition law
Access and pricing 
functions
Review of 
competition and 
regulatory 
decisions
National oversight 
of competition 
policy
Competition institutions
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25 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR FUTURE COMPETITION 
POLICY 
25.1 STRONG INSTITUTIONS TO SUSTAIN REFORM 
The Panel believes that effective reform is unlikely to occur without an appropriate institutional 
regime to support it. The need for leadership in competition policy reform was recognised in the 
intergovernmental agreements giving effect to National Competition Policy (NCP), but momentum 
has since flagged. In particular, the National Competition Council’s (NCC) role has diminished as 
reforms agreed two decades ago are finalised or put aside unfinished.  
The Panel believes that strong leadership will be required to progress a new round of competition 
reform and that the multi-jurisdictional nature of reform calls for a body able to represent all 
jurisdictions. The Panel identifies a number of dimensions to the required leadership, including 
advocacy, holding governments to account and regularly analysing the state of competition, and 
assesses whether an existing institution could perform all of these various functions. 
25.2 LESSONS FROM NCP 
The NCP reforms adopted by the Australian Government and state and territory governments in 
1995 went beyond amendments to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) (then the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (TPA)). They included: 
• reforms to public monopolies and other government businesses, including structural reforms 
and competitive neutrality requirements; 
• a national access regime to provide third-party access to essential infrastructure; and  
• a legislation review program to assess whether regulatory restrictions on competition are in 
the public interest. 
This was an economy-wide reform agenda with a national focus. It required action from the 
Australian Government and state and territory governments, at times in concert (for example, the 
creation of a national energy market) but more frequently requiring individual governments to make 
or amend their own laws (for example, the legislation review program and structural reforms to 
public monopolies).  
To reflect this national, economy-wide focus, the intergovernmental agreements between the 
Australian Government and the state and territory governments that underpinned NCP contained a 
number of governance arrangements, including: 
• agreeing to a set of competition principles, with each jurisdiction determining its own priorities 
and undertaking its own legislation review program; 
• establishing the NCC to prepare public assessments of the performance of all governments in 
meeting their NCP commitments and advise the Australian Government Treasurer on 
competition payments to the States and Territories — the NCC also provides 
recommendations to Australian Government and state and territory Ministers in relation to 
third-party access to infrastructure; and 
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• the Australian Government making competition payments to the States and Territories in 
recognition that the Australian Government would gain more revenue than the States and 
Territories from the reforms.746 
As the Productivity Commission (PC) noted in its 2005 Review of National Competition Policy 
Reforms: 
Distinguishing features of NCP were its national focus, extensive agenda, agreed 
framework of reform principles, commitments to timeframes, with contingent financial 
payments from the Australian Government to the States and Territories.747 
A number of submissions state that an explicit institutional framework will again be necessary to 
progress the competition policy agenda (see for example, the Business Council of Australia (BCA), 
sub, Summary Report, page 26 and New South Wales Government, sub, page 10).  
The Panel agrees that establishing institutional arrangements to implement the reform agenda 
coming out of this Review will be crucial to reinvigorating competition policy. The views put to the 
Panel are in general agreement that the lessons from NCP demonstrate the importance of an 
institutional framework to deliver competition policy reform.  
25.3 A NATIONAL APPROACH TO COMPETITION POLICY 
Submissions from businesses, consumers and governments argue that the national, 
intergovernmental approach adopted under NCP must be reinvigorated and that this requires an 
institutional competition policy advisor. 
But, importantly, the national approach under NCP provided each jurisdiction with flexibility to 
determine its priorities consistent with the agreed competition policy principles. 
The issues highlighted in this Report fall under the responsibility of all three levels of government: 
Commonwealth, state and territory and local government. There are also a number of areas that will 
require a cross-jurisdictional approach.  
But the starting point for reform will be different across jurisdictions. Progress under NCP varied 
depending on the different structural features of the state and territory economies and different 
cultural and social priorities. This was reflected both in the issues that the jurisdictions sought to 
prioritise and their level of progress in achieving outcomes. These differences will also affect the 
priorities that the jurisdictions seek to pursue in future.  
Successful competition policy reform will require commitment and effort from all three levels of 
government. Although the Australian Government may have a leadership role in addition to taking 
action in its own sphere, leadership will also be required from the States and Territories and local 
governments. As the Reform of the Federation White Paper: Issues Paper 3 points out, ‘National 
interest does not mean Commonwealth interest’.748 
                                                          
746 The last competition payments to the States and Territories were made in 2005-06. Since then, the role of the NCC 
has been limited to making recommendations on third-party access to infrastructure. 
747 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Canberra, page 127. 
748 Australian Government 2014, Reform of the Federation White Paper: Issues Paper 3: Roles and Responsibilities in 
Health, Canberra, page 30. 
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25.4 INDEPENDENT COMPETITION POLICY ADVICE 
The NCC’s independence is seen as an important contributor to the success of NCP and identified as 
an equally important component of any institutional arrangements put in place to support future 
competition policy.  
Submissions argue for a broad role to be performed by such a body. The New South Wales 
Government sets out a number of roles for an independent body: 
• independent monitoring of progress in implementing reforms; 
• periodically identifying areas for competition reform across all levels of government; 
• making recommendations to governments on areas of reform; and 
• playing an advocacy role (sub, pages 10-11). 
All submissions made on this issue stress the need for independence: that the functions, irrespective 
of whether they are performed by existing bodies or by a specially created one, be separate from the 
policy and/or regulatory bodies that would carry out or regulate the specific reforms. 
The Panel also considers that transparency is as important as independence. Transparency ensures 
that decisions and processes are open to public scrutiny. The PC discusses some of the benefits of a 
transparent process, including that it can aid public understanding of the benefits of reform: 
A properly constructed, transparent review process can generate stakeholder 
engagement and promote public awareness and acceptance of the need for reform, the 
issues and trade-offs associated with different policy approaches, and the resultant 
community wide benefits. (sub, page 10) 
Drawing on its past experience in implementing NCP, the NCC notes that assessment and 
accountability processes, including transparency, were one of three main elements behind the NCP’s 
success (sub, page 7). 
Given the wide-ranging potential impacts of competition policy on both consumers and businesses, 
advocacy, education, and independent and transparent oversight of implementation will be 
important in helping governments meet targets, encouraging public understanding and engagement, 
and guarding against bias.  
The NCC, as a national body, played a vital role as part of NCP. However, as noted in Chapter 10, the 
review and reform of legislation that may impede competition stalled following the conclusion of the 
NCC’s role in reviewing legislation. The NCC now retains only a limited role in relation to advising 
ministers on infrastructure and gas access matters. It has not maintained the capacity to readily step 
into a broader role again. 
25.5 COMPETITION PAYMENTS 
Under the NCP, the Australian Government made competition payments to state and territory 
governments to recognise that the Australian Government received a disproportionate share of 
increased revenue from the larger national income resulting from NCP. This was highlighted in an 
analysis of NCP undertaken by the PC (then the Industry Commission) that estimated the potential 
gains from NCP and how it would be reflected in increased revenue at both the Australian 
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Government and state and territory government levels.749 The payments were made, or withheld, by 
the Australian Government Treasurer following advice from the NCC.  
The New South Wales Government comments that vertical fiscal imbalance: 
… means that the Commonwealth would receive the largest revenue benefit from the 
economic growth arising from competition-enhancing reforms (via the increase in tax 
revenue), though for many types of reform, the expense associated with undertaking 
reform is largely borne by State governments. (sub, page 12) 
Over the course of the NCP from 1997-98 to 2005-06, $5.3 billion was paid to the States and 
Territories and $200 million was withheld.  
A common theme in the Panel’s meetings with representatives of the States and Territories was that 
competition payments contributed positively to their ability to implement reform. Although the 
quantum of the payments was not large compared to total state and territory revenues, 
representatives consistently argued that the payments provided an additional argument that could 
be used to support reform. In particular, it was put to the Panel that the possibility of payments 
being withheld was important to maintain support in the face of opposition to reform. 
The NCC’s assessment of competition payments is that they: 
... in several cases stiffened governments’ resolve to undertake reform. Fiscal penalties, in 
particular, focused attention on failed or excessively delayed reforms. (sub, page 8) 
The message from all those making submissions to the Panel on the issue of competition payments is 
that they assisted governments in delivering their reform agendas. However, their effectiveness 
across the NCP agenda was limited by not applying to the Australian Government and not 
consistently being applied to local government.  
At times, they also distorted the public message around the need for reform, creating a focus on 
withholding payments rather than the benefits that would flow from reform. This appears to underlie 
the position of many stakeholders that progress with competition policy reform waned when the 
competition payments ceased. Discerning whether this is the case is complicated by the introduction 
of the Seamless National Economy reform agreement that followed NCP. Although this also included 
incentive payments, it was overshadowed by the much larger changes in funding for human services.  
A number of submissions call for competition payments to be a feature of any future institutional 
framework to recognise the potentially uneven distribution of reform effort and reward. In the Draft 
Report, the Panel recommended that competition payments form part of the reform process. Most 
submissions to the Draft Report that discussed competition payments supported the idea of 
payments.750  
                                                          
749 Industry Commission 1995, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms: A report by the 
Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments, Canberra. 
750 See, for example: ACCC, DR sub, page 88; ACCI, DR sub, page 11; Australian Industry Group, DR sub, page 28; 
Australian Local Government Association, DR sub, page 3; Australian Motor Industry Federation, DR sub, page 14; 
Australian National Retailers Association, DR sub, page 14; Australian Newsagents’ Federation, DR sub, page 23; Law 
Council of Australia  — SME Committee, DR sub, page 24; National Competition Council, DR sub, page 11; National 
Farmers’ Federation, DR sub, page 16; New South Wales Government, DR sub, page 8; South Australian Government, 
DR sub, page 22; Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 24; Western Australia Local Government Association, DR sub, 
page 10; and Woolworths Limited, DR sub, page 24. 
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The NCC notes: 
Based on its experience under the NCP, the Council considers that the inclusion of a type 
of ‘reform payment’ for achievement of reform objectives is desirable and the application 
of these payments to the Commonwealth is a worthwhile extension. (DR sub, page 11) 
The New South Wales Government notes: 
As the Panel has acknowledged [in its Draft Report], competition payments play a critical 
enabling role in this institutional framework by encouraging jurisdictions to undertake 
important reforms where they may otherwise face disincentives from unilateral action. 
Competition payments are critical as they: 
 Redress the misalignment between reform costs and benefits… 
 Contribute to the implementation costs of reform that are borne by the States, 
which are typically upfront while the benefits accrue over time… 
 Assist in securing national reform where the benefits of reform are not shared 
evenly between the States. (DR sub, page 8)  
The South Australian Government agrees:  
... there is merit in the Commonwealth Government making competition payments to the 
States and Territories for genuine productivity enhancing reforms...[but there] is the 
possibility that slow reforming states would benefit from competition payments at the 
expense of states that have been early adopters of reforms. (DR sub, page 22) 
The BCA also argues: 
A proposed new incentive model is for a new intergovernmental agreement to be 
structured essentially as a joint venture where all jurisdictions contribute to the cost of 
reforms but all share more evenly in the fiscal benefits through productivity payments. 
(sub, Main Report, page 106) 
The focus on sharing benefits was a crucial feature of the NCP payments, which should be reinstated 
in any future arrangements. The payments should not be misrepresented as an ‘incentive’ or a ‘bribe’ 
for the States and Territories (and local government) to undertake reform. Such an approach has the 
potential to direct the focus away from the benefits of reform.  
However, as with the NCP reforms, the benefits of reform will not necessarily flow in proportion to 
the effort expended in pursuing and implementing reform. It is therefore reasonable to facilitate a 
process to rebalance any such revenue effects. 
The PC’s argument (sub, page 24) that any effects of vertical fiscal imbalance are better addressed 
directly than remediated through a competition policy payments process is laudable. However, the 
Panel wants to avoid vertical fiscal imbalance acting as a barrier to a set of reforms that have the 
potential to significantly enhance the long-term interests of consumers. 
The PC should be tasked to undertake a study of reforms agreed to by the Australian Government 
and state and territory governments to estimate their effect on economic activity and on revenue in 
each jurisdiction. Payment of any compensation would be contingent on an independent assessment 
of whether reforms had been undertaken to a sufficient standard. That assessment would be based 
on actual implementation of reforms, not on the basis of undertaking reviews or other processes. 
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25.6 MARKET STUDIES 
The competition laws serve an important purpose in discouraging anti-competitive behaviour. 
However, there are occasions where competition concerns arise within a market that do not fall 
within the bounds of the law. In these cases, a comprehensive review of the market can help 
policymakers better understand the competitive landscape and determine whether policy changes 
are needed. 
A market study is one means though which policymakers can delve deeper into the workings of a 
market in an effort to identify changes that would lead to more competitive outcomes. In its 
guidance on market studies, the former UK Office of Fair Trading noted that market studies are: 
... examinations into the causes of why particular markets are not working well for 
consumers, leading to proposals as to how they might be made to work better. They take 
an overview of regulatory and other economic drivers in a market and patterns of 
consumer and business behaviour... 
As well as taking a look at particular markets, market studies can relate to practices across 
a range of goods and services, for example, doorstep selling.751 
In addition to observing businesses operating in a market, market studies can play an important role 
in examining the role of government. The former UK Office of Fair Trading also noted: 
As well as investigating adverse effects on competition caused by business and consumer 
behaviour, market studies can also examine restrictions on competition that can arise 
through Government regulation or public policy. 
... 
As government regulation and policy are not typically susceptible to enforcement action, 
market studies can be the best response to concerns regarding markets where public 
restrictions may be distorting a market or chilling competition.752 
The absence of a formal market studies power in Australia is generally in contrast with other 
comparable economies. When looking at overseas comparisons, it is possible to make some 
generalisations: 
• Market studies are most often undertaken by the competition regulator, as a complement to 
its broader competition enforcement and education priorities. 
• Most market studies bodies possess mandatory information-gathering powers — there will 
usually be policies about how the information collected as part of a market study will be used. 
• Most market studies are published, allowing for a broader public discussion of the policy and 
recommendations relating to the market in question. 
• A common outcome of market studies is recommendations for changes to legislation or 
government policies — as is the case with PC inquiry recommendations and state and territory 
regulator recommendations.  
Submissions generally support introducing a market studies power;753 however, the Panel heard 
differing views as to whether the ACCC or a different body is best placed to undertake market 
                                                          
751 Office of Fair Trading 2010, Market Studies: Guidance on the OFT Approach, London, page 2. 
752 Ibid., pages 2-4. 
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studies. Some submitters, including the ACCC (DR sub, page 88), CHOICE (DR sub, page 34), the 
Consumer Action Law Centre (DR sub, page 21) and the Australian Communications Consumer Action 
Network (DR sub, page 6) favour vesting market studies powers with the ACCC. 
Reflecting overseas experience, the ACCC notes that it would like the ability to initiate market studies 
for various reasons: 
• as a lead-in to competition or consumer protection enforcement action when anti-competitive 
behaviour is suspected in a sector but the exact nature and source of the problem is unknown;  
• to identify a systemic market failure (instead of ad hoc compliance action against individual 
firms) and to better target a response (whether, for example, [through] enforcement action or 
compliance education);  
• to identify market problems where affected parties are disadvantaged and either have 
difficulty making a complaint to the ACCC or accessing the legal system to take private action;  
• to address public interest or concern about markets not functioning in a competitive way; the 
market study could either confirm such concerns, and propose some solutions, or reveal them 
to be unfounded; or  
• to fact-find to enhance the ACCC’s knowledge of a specific market or sector, particularly where 
a market is rapidly changing, and raises issues across the ACCC’s functions. ( sub 1, page 138) 
CHOICE’s submission points out ‘The international experience overwhelmingly supports aligning 
market studies with the ACCC’ (DR sub, page 34), while the ACCC adds: 
A 2003 OECD report found that close to all of the respondent competition authorities 
conducted general sector investigations or economic studies; a 2012 ICN [International 
Competition Network] report found that 40 ICN member authorities were using market 
studies. The performance by the ACCC of a market study function should therefore not be 
regarded as an unusual suggestion; rather it is a mainstream one. (DR sub, page 91) 
Although the market studies function resides with the competition regulator in some countries, the 
Panel believes that this approach may lead to conflicts between policy and regulation/enforcement 
functions. As the Monash Business Policy Forum states, ‘separation of policy design and 
implementation is key to effective regulatory agencies … regulators should be explicitly excluded 
from policy development’ (sub, pages 13 and 17). 
Submissions to the Draft Report also recognise potential conflicts of interest. For example, Spier 
Consulting Legal notes, ‘There are potential issues of conflict of roles of the ACCC and [a market 
study function] diverts the ACCC from its core roles’ (DR sub, page 23), while Australian Industry 
Group submits that it ‘understands and supports the separation of Government policy formulation 
from Government policy implementation, as a general principle of good policy governance’ (DR sub, 
page 26).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
753 See, for example: Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, DR sub, page 17; Australian Newsagents’ 
Federation, DR sub, page 22; Consumer Action Law Centre, DR sub, page 21; Australian Communications Consumer 
Action Network, DR sub, page 6; Peter Mair, DR sub, page 1; Australian Automotive Aftermarket Association, DR sub, 
page 18; Spier Consulting Legal, DR sub, page 23; National Farmers’ Federation, DR sub, page 16; Law Council of 
Australia — SME Committee, DR sub, page 23; Law Council of Australia– Competition and Consumer Committee, DR 
sub, page 29; and Retail Guild of Australia, DR sub, page 7. 
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The Panel favours an approach to market studies that is clearly separate from the enforcement 
function. The market studies function would therefore be separate from the necessarily adversarial 
nature of enforcement under the CCA. It would seek instead to focus on understanding the range of 
factors — government or otherwise — that shape the level of competition in a market. 
A market study should consider the framework, structure and rules that govern a market. This is 
broader than issues relating to the CCA and could include advice to governments on issues relating to 
market stewardship and procurement policies. Recommendations could be made to implement 
changes in any of these areas, either through changes to regulation that directly determine the shape 
of the market or to regulation that has the unintended consequence of reducing competition in the 
market; for example, by affecting entry into or exit from the market.  
A market study is not necessarily a precursor to enforcement action. Rather, where there are 
conduct concerns, the market studies body could refer its concerns to the ACCC for appropriate 
investigation. 
Australia has no dedicated market studies body to examine the competitive dynamics of particular 
markets in a systematic way. Currently, inquiries into these issues are conducted on an ad hoc basis 
by, for example, the ACCC, the PC or state and territory regulators, but none of these bodies is 
specifically designed to conduct market studies.  
The ACCC’s submission notes its role in market studies: 
The ACCC currently has some scope to conduct market studies. Under section 28 of the 
CCA, the ACCC has functions in relation to dissemination of information, law reform and 
research although the information gathering powers set out in the CCA do not apply to 
this section. Under Part VIIA of the CCA, the Minister may require the ACCC or another 
body to hold a price inquiry. The ACCC may also hold such inquiries with the Minister’s 
approval. (sub 1, page 139) 
The Panel notes that the ACCC will continue to investigate particular markets as part of its routine 
assessments. However, allowing the ACCC to conduct formal market studies as described here could 
encourage the perception that such studies are a precursor to enforcement action. The Panel is keen 
to avoid creating such a perception. 
The usefulness of a market study will depend on the information acquired. Most market studies 
bodies in other jurisdictions have mandatory information-gathering powers. The rationale for 
mandatory powers is that they help to ensure that a market study builds an accurate picture of the 
market. 
However, mandatory information-gathering powers are a significant legal imposition and there is a 
presumption that they should be used sparingly. 
The PC has information-gathering powers in relation to its inquiries under section 48 of the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 but generally chooses not to use them, relying instead on 
information voluntarily submitted by interested parties. That said, the ability of the PC to draw upon 
these powers if required may act as an incentive for parties to provide information voluntarily. 
Submissions are generally in favour of a market studies body having access to information-gathering 
powers, but note that these powers should be used judiciously. For example, the BCA submits, 
‘Information gathering should be voluntary in the first instance, with any subsequent use of 
mandatory powers subject to a test of reasonableness’ (DR sub, page 4), while the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) states, ‘ACCI also supports the [proposed Australian 
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Council for Competition Policy] being granted similar data collection powers to those granted to the 
Productivity Commission’ (DR sub, page 17) and the Consumer Action Law Centre notes that 
information-gathering powers have proved useful in competition investigations (DR sub, page 21). 
The approach adopted by the PC — inviting interested parties to comment on issues and undertaking 
independent research, while having the power to compel production of information — appears to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
Outcomes of studies 
The former UK Office of Fair Trading guidance material notes that options available at the conclusion 
of its market studies include: 
 improving the quality and accessibility of information for consumers; 
 encouraging businesses in the market to self-regulate; 
 making recommendations to the Government to change regulations or public 
policy; 
 taking competition or consumer enforcement action; or 
 making a market investigation reference to the relevant authority.754 
Importantly, findings and recommendations presented to government allow the market studies body 
to dispel myths about the market and determine the effects on consumers without limiting the 
reform options for government. Ultimately, this provides government with valuable information 
about the nature and extent of any problems but leaves maximum flexibility for policy responses.  
The Panel notes an important distinction between market studies and market investigations as 
undertaken in the UK. Although market studies generally result in recommendations and/or findings, 
market investigations go a step further by allowing the market investigation body to impose a wide 
range of legally enforceable remedies. 
The former UK Competition Commission guidelines provide an overview of the possible outcomes 
from a market investigation:755 
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CHOICE’s submission supports an additional market investigations function (sub, page 56). However, 
the ACCC disagrees, noting that it does not support the ability of a market investigations body to 
impose legally enforceable remedies (sub 1, page 139). The Panel believes the ACCC’s view is 
preferable, as it is consistent with Australia’s Constitution, which gives the Australian Parliament the 
power to make laws and the judiciary the power to impose remedies.  
A wide range of parties may be interested in commissioning a particular market study, including 
governments (jointly or individually), market participants (including businesses and consumers) and 
regulators. Business SA notes that it is: 
... pleased that the Panel’s proposed [institutional arrangements] will allow small business 
to raise issues they wish to be the focus of market studies. It is imperative that this 
mechanism be formally embedded into the governing legislation ... and that genuine 
requests from small business, including its representative bodies, are given proper 
consideration. (DR sub, page 11) 
The Panel favours an open process where all market participants have the capacity to request market 
studies. The body vested with a market studies power will have to prioritise requests for studies 
based on its assessment of where the potential public benefit is greatest.  
25.7 EX-POST EVALUATION OF SOME MERGER DECISIONS 
A number of submissions call for ex-post evaluation of ACCC merger decisions and/or monitoring of 
market outcomes.756 An evaluation process of this kind would assess the validity and effectiveness of 
past merger decisions; specifically, whether mergers that were allowed to proceed subsequently 
resulted in substantial damage to competition, and whether the assessment of markets and entry 
barriers, on the basis of which mergers were prevented, subsequently proved to be erroneous.  
Such evaluations use quantitative and sometimes qualitative techniques to look back on selected 
past merger decisions to assess whether the conclusions were correct in light of the available 
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evidence at the time of the decision.757 This may also assist in determining whether the ACCC’s 
processes were effective and improve the quality of future decisions. The Panel supports review of 
previous merger decisions but considers it important that there be no ability to overturn past ACCC, 
Tribunal or court decisions based on such evaluations. 
25.8 A NEW COMPETITION POLICY INSTITUTION 
The Panel believes that reinvigorating competition policy requires leadership from an institution 
specifically constituted for the purpose. Leadership encompasses advocacy for competition policy, 
driving implementation of the decisions made and conducting independent, transparent reviews of 
progress. The Panel believes that no existing institution is able to undertake the functions detailed 
above. Their importance necessitates creating a new body. 
The NCC, which oversaw the NCP, now has a considerably diminished role. It has been put to the 
Panel that the NCC no longer has the capacity to provide leadership in this domain. 
Recommendation 50 proposes that the remaining functions of the NCC, associated with the National 
Access Regime, be transferred to a national Access and Pricing Regulator. The NCC could then be 
dissolved. 
The PC is the only existing body with the necessary credibility and expertise to undertake this 
function, given its role as an independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social 
and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. But the PC’s work is driven by the 
Australian Government and, if it were to have a national competition policy function as well, its 
legislation and governance would need significant change. 
The Panel considers that a new national competition body, the Australian Council for Competition 
Policy (ACCP), should be established with a mandate to provide leadership and drive implementation 
of the evolving competition policy agenda.  
The ACCP cannot be accountable to just one jurisdiction, but must be accountable to them all. This 
suggests an agreement between governments and oversight by a Ministerial Council. Given the 
economy-wide nature of competition issues, this responsibility should be assigned to Treasurers. 
Governments should agree the functions of the ACCP and the process of appointing its members and 
funding. Although there should be scope for members to be nominated and appointed by all 
governments, their role would not be to represent a jurisdictional interest but rather to view 
competition policy from a national perspective. 
25.9 FUNCTIONS OF THE ACCP 
The ACCP should have a broad role. In particular, the ACCP should advise governments on how to 
adapt competition policy to changing circumstances facing consumers and business. The ACCP should 
therefore develop an understanding of the state of competition across the Australian economy and 
report on it regularly.  
The competition policy environment is not static. New technologies can raise new issues and resolve 
older ones. The Panel considers that governments would benefit from an annual analysis of 
developments in the competition policy environment. 
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This would include more detail on the specific priority issues or markets that should receive greater 
attention. It could also include recommending review mechanisms, particularly for more heavily 
regulated markets, to ensure more burdensome or intrusive regulatory frameworks remain fit for 
purpose. 
Commenting on best practice and international developments would provide opportunities for 
governments to consider whether the outcomes of different approaches to reform in other 
jurisdictions apply within their own.  
A clear advocate for competition policy is needed in Australia’s institutional structure. Too often this 
has fallen by default to the ACCC, which can be an uneasy role for a regulator to fulfil. Advocacy on 
particular issues may be seen to prejudice the outcome of investigations. Competition policy 
advocacy and advice will cover market design and stewardship advice in areas such as human 
services, which are beyond the scope of the CCA. The ACCP’s independence and accountability to all 
governments, as well as its broader policy mandate and lack of enforcement powers, would make it 
the ideal body to undertake those advocacy functions. The Panel sees advocacy for competition as a 
central function of the ACCP. 
The ACCP should also act as an independent assessor of progress on reform, holding governments at 
all levels to account. The ACCP would be well placed to assess whether reforms have been 
undertaken to a sufficient standard to warrant competition payments. 
Australian Industry Group notes some concerns in creating the new body, particularly in relation to 
confusion related to state and territory government and Australian Government responsibilities, as 
well as potentially complex governance arrangements. Australian Industry Group notes:  
Complex governance structures run the risk of ensuring government engagement, at the 
expense of business engagement. That is, a COAG-based structure might help to attract 
and engage state government stakeholders in long-term national competition policy, but 
its complexity might also risk the engagement and support of business and community 
stakeholders. (DR sub, page 25-26) 
It also queries whether responsibility would be better allocated to the Treasury, the PC or the ACCC. 
Similarly, a number of submissions to the Draft Report propose that the functions in question be 
assigned to existing institutions. The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network notes,  
‘Given the advisory nature of the functions of the proposed national body we do not see a problem 
with these tasks residing with an existing Commonwealth institution’ and goes on to recommend 
that the market studies power be conferred on the ACCC, for example (DR sub, page 6).  
The national, non-regulatory nature of the ACCP provides a unique position to guide competition 
policy reform for all three levels of government in Australia compared with an Australian 
Government body or one that also has regulatory functions. Rather than confusing the policy 
landscape, the ACCP would provide a single focal point for competition reform in Australia. 
However, the BCA notes that it is:  
… always conscious of the need to avoid establishing new public bodies without a clear 
justification. On this occasion the case for the ACCP is strong. We believe the most 
important outcome of the draft report is recognition of the need for a substantial 
microeconomic reform agenda. The evidence of past reforms is that a powerful 
independent body drove the success of those reforms.  
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The panel’s proposal for a new ACCP deals directly with the lack of a strong institution 
today charged with providing incentives and sanctions to all Australian governments to 
encourage ongoing reform. There is no obvious alternative institution in Australia to 
perform this function. (DR sub, page 26) 
The ACCP’s effectiveness would be enhanced by assigning it a market studies function, which would 
create a convenient, consistent, effective and independent way for governments to seek advice and 
recommendations on recurrent and emerging competition policy issues. 
Given the potential for conflicts between the ACCC’s investigation and enforcement responsibilities 
and the scope of a market studies function, the Panel believes it is appropriate to vest such a power 
with the ACCP rather than the ACCC. As previously discussed, the ACCC already undertakes some 
market research functions under section 28 of the CCA. The Panel recognises the importance of the 
ACCC continuing to undertake this research to inform its day-to-day operations but considers the 
proposed market studies function fulfils a very different role and should be vested in the ACCP. 
Market studies should not be undertaken for the purposes of informing the compliance and 
enforcement work of the ACCC; instead, they should inform the broader debate on competition 
policy.  
The market studies function would have a competition policy focus and complement but not 
duplicate the work of other bodies such as the PC. For example, States and Territories could call upon 
the ACCP to undertake market studies of the provision of human services in their jurisdiction as part 
of implementing the choice and competition principles set out in Recommendation 2. 
Mandatory information-gathering powers can help to ensure that a market study builds an accurate 
picture of the market, as suggested by the New South Wales Government (DR sub, page 7), and will 
provide flexibility for the ACCP to conduct its inquiries in the manner best suiting the particular 
circumstances. 
The NCP recognised the principle that the different circumstances in different jurisdictions could lead 
to different approaches to either the scope or timing of reform. In agreeing with this principle, the 
Panel considers that the ACCP should be able to receive referrals from jurisdictions collectively as 
well as individually. 
This would ensure that each jurisdiction has the freedom to identify its own concerns, while allowing 
the ACCP the flexibility to consider whether those concerns have broader or cross-jurisdictional 
impacts.  
In addition, the Panel considers that all market participants, including small business, consumers and 
regulators, should have the opportunity to raise issues they would like to see become the subject of 
market studies. Funding could be set aside in the ACCP budget to undertake studies in addition to 
those referred by the Ministerial Council. The decision would rest with the ACCP as to which of these 
outside requests it might take up, and it would not be obliged to agree to all requests.  
The Ministerial Council would need to oversee priorities and resourcing so that the ACCP has the 
capacity to focus on the priorities of governments and market participants.  
Ex-post evaluations of merger processes are relatively common in overseas jurisdictions and are 
often performed by competition bodies themselves or consultants engaged by those firms. Although 
internal or consultant evaluations might be expected to assist the ACCC, the Panel envisages that 
such a function should be performed by the ACCP. This would have the additional benefit of being 
clearly independent of the ACCC, improving public confidence in the findings. 
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25.10 GOVERNANCE OF THE ACCP 
The governance arrangements of an institution should reflect the functions that institution 
undertakes. The functions of the ACCP include advocacy, education, oversight of reform progress and 
undertaking independent market studies. As the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association notes: 
... structure, accountability and resourcing will be critical in ensuring the ACCP can 
appropriately discharge its duties and achieve the stated objectives of providing 
competition advocacy and leadership and driving implementation of the evolving 
competition and policy agenda. (DR sub, page 4) 
Another feature of the ACCP is that it will be ‘national’ and so accountable to the Australian 
Government and state and territory governments.  
Into the future, each level of government will continue to have responsibility for implementing 
economic reforms. The establishment of governance arrangements to implement reforms must be 
undertaken in the context of Australia’s federal structure. Many of the competition policy reforms 
outlined in this Report are overseen by state and territory governments. All Australian governments 
must have confidence in the governance arrangements for a reinvigorated round of competition 
policy reform to succeed. For example, both the Australian Government and the States and 
Territories fund, regulate and provide human services. While the allocation of responsibilities across 
the Federation may change as a result of the Reform of the Federation White Paper, it is reasonable 
to assume that all levels of government will continue to have some role in the provision of human 
services. 
A national body 
The ACCP will be a ‘national’ body — this means that it is not ‘owned’ by any level of government, 
Commonwealth, State or Territory — but is created through legislation passed in one State and by 
application in all other jurisdictions. A national body can oversee implementation of the reform 
agenda by all governments (individually and collectively) as it would not potentially be seen as one 
government telling another what to do. However, it does require the authority to consider issues in 
all jurisdictions. 
The NCC, which was created by Australian Government legislation, was seen as an Australian 
Government body, despite the Australian Government needing the agreement of the majority of 
States and Territories to appoint Commissioners. The Australian Government effectively managed 
the appointments process and the NCC reported to the Australian Government on state progress in 
implementing NCP reforms for the purpose of the Australian Government making competition 
payments.  
Similarly, the ACCC is seen as owned by the Australian Government, notwithstanding the States’ role 
in appointing Commissioners. 
In the Draft Report, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is cited as an example of a 
‘national’ body — it is created by state legislation, the South Australian Australian Energy Market 
Commission Establishment Act 2004. 
The AEMC was created to be the rule maker for the national energy market. Like the participating 
States and the Australian Capital Territory, the Commonwealth is a jurisdiction in the National 
Electricity Market. Governance of the AEMC is shared by jurisdictions. 
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The AEMC is also required to comply with a number of South Australian, New South Wales and 
Commonwealth laws relating to such matters as record-keeping, information disclosure, financial 
reporting and employment-related matters. For example, the AEMC complies with the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth), New South Wales work health and safety laws and South Australian laws such as the 
Freedom of Information Act 1991, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 and the State Records 
Act 1997. 
These requirements can impose some limitations on the governance structure; for example whether 
an individual officeholder is accountable for the expenditure of monies, rather than a board. 
However, establishing the ACCP under its own legislation does remove some potential limitations on 
the role of a governing board. 
Members of the ACCP 
As noted above, consultation between the Australian and state and territory governments on 
appointments would not be sufficient for an agency to be seen as national rather than 
Commonwealth. 
Given the ACCP involves all nine jurisdictions, requiring each jurisdiction to appoint members would 
create a governing body that was too large. It could also result in the board members regarding 
themselves (and being regarded by others) as representing the interests of their jurisdictions rather 
than the national interest. A potentially more desirable structure would be a limited number of 
members with all States and Territories having the opportunity to nominate members. 
In the ‘national’ AEMC, the Chair is nominated for appointment by state and territory energy 
Ministers. There are two other Commissioners, one of whom is appointed by state and territory 
energy Ministers and the other appointed by the Australian Government energy Minister. The 
Commissioners are supported by a Chief Executive.  
Once nominated by the States and Territories, Commissioners are required to be part of a selection 
panel process. This can reduce the risk of members being seen as state representatives first rather 
than members of a national body.  
A similar process could be used to appoint Commissioners to the ACCP. Each state and territory 
government could nominate members for state and territory positions on the ACCP Board, and all 
nominees would then be required to undergo a selection process under an approved appointment 
protocol. Ministers would then sign off on the recommended appointments. 
The Panel’s view is that the ACCP should be governed by a five-member board that would include 
two state and territory nominees, chosen through a merit selection process, two members selected 
by the Australian Government and a Chair. The Panel recommends that nomination of the Chair be 
rotated between the Australian Government and the States and Territories combined. 
The nature of its functions also means that the ACCP Board should not require full-time members. As 
a result, the governance requirements should be met with part-time members. The advocacy role, 
though, would require a full-time Chair. Funding of the ACCP should be shared among all 
jurisdictions. The Australian Government should provide half of the funding and States and 
Territories the remainder proportional to their population size. 
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The Panel’s view 
The Panel believes that reinvigorating competition policy reform requires leadership from an 
institution specifically constituted for the purpose. The Panel therefore proposes establishing the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) with a mandate to provide leadership and drive 
implementation of the evolving competition policy agenda. Establishing governance arrangements 
to implement reforms must be undertaken in the context of Australia’s federal structure. 
The Panel sees advocacy for competition as a central function of the ACCP. It should also act as an 
independent assessor of progress on reform and be a place for collaboration. 
The effectiveness of the ACCP would be enhanced by assigning it a market studies function, which 
would create a convenient, consistent, effective and independent way for governments at all 
levels to seek advice and recommendations on recurrent and emerging competition policy issues. 
The competition policy environment is not static. New technologies can raise new issues and 
resolve older ones. The Panel considers that governments would benefit from an annual analysis 
of developments in the competition policy environment, which could be undertaken by the ACCP. 
The benefits of reform, including any fiscal dividend, should be commensurate with the reform 
effort made. The differing revenue bases of the Australian Government and the States and 
Territories mean that revenue may not flow in proportion to reform effort. The PC should be 
tasked to undertake a study of reforms agreed to by the Australian Government and state and 
territory governments to estimate their effect on the economy and revenue in each jurisdiction. 
The ACCP could assess whether reforms had been undertaken to a sufficient standard to warrant 
compensation payments. That assessment would be based on actual implementation of reforms, 
not merely undertaking reviews or other processes. 
The ACCP must have appropriate governance arrangements in place from its inception. The Panel’s 
view is that the ACCP should be governed by a five-member board, with the Chair serving on a 
full-time basis and other members on a part-time basis.  
As a national body, the ACCP Board should be composed of two state and territory members, 
drawn from nominations made by state and territory governments, and then formalised by 
Ministers following a selection process. The two Australian Government members would be 
directly appointed by the Australian Government.  
Funding would be shared by all jurisdictions, with half of the funding to be provided by the 
Australian Government and the remainder by the States and Territories, calculated according to 
their population size. 
Implementation 
Implementation of the ACCP will require an agreement between the Australian Government and all 
States and Territories. As the Reform of the Federation White Paper will discuss mechanisms under 
which the Australian Government and the States and Territories will take forward joint initiatives, the 
Panel does not offer detailed recommendations on the mechanisms or processes to achieve 
agreement on establishing the ACCP.  
However, the ACCP will be crucial to implementing a number of this Review’s recommendations. The 
Panel therefore recommends that the Australian Government and the States and Territories agree 
implementation arrangements for the ACCP within six months. 
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Recommendation 43 — Australian Council for Competition Policy — Establishment 
The National Competition Council should be dissolved and the Australian Council for Competition 
Policy (ACCP) established. Its mandate should be to provide leadership and drive implementation 
of the evolving competition policy agenda. 
The ACCP should be established under legislation by one State and then by application in all other 
States and Territories and at the Commonwealth level. It should be funded jointly by the Australian 
Government and the States and Territories. 
The ACCP should have a five-member board, consisting of two members nominated by state and 
territory Treasurers and two members selected by the Australian Government Treasurer, plus a 
Chair. Nomination of the Chair should rotate between the Australian Government and the States 
and Territories combined. The Chair should be appointed on a full-time basis and other members 
on a part-time basis. 
Funding should be shared by all jurisdictions, with half of the funding provided by the Australian 
Government and half by the States and Territories in proportion to their population size. 
 
Recommendation 44 — Australian Council for Competition Policy — Role 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy should have a broad role encompassing: 
• advocacy, education and promotion of collaboration in competition policy; 
• independently monitoring progress in implementing agreed reforms and publicly reporting on 
progress annually; 
• identifying potential areas of competition reform across all levels of government; 
• making recommendations to governments on specific market design issues, regulatory reforms, 
procurement policies and proposed privatisations;  
• undertaking research into competition policy developments in Australia and overseas; and 
• ex-post evaluation of some merger decisions. 
 
Recommendation 45 — Market studies power 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) should have the power to undertake 
competition studies of markets in Australia and make recommendations to relevant governments 
on changes to regulation, or to the ACCC for investigation of potential breaches of the CCA. 
The ACCP should have mandatory information-gathering powers to assist in its market studies 
function; however, these powers should be used sparingly. 
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Recommendation 46 — Market studies requests 
All governments, jointly or individually, should have the capacity to issue a reference to the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) to undertake a competition study of a particular 
market or competition issue. 
All market participants, including small business and regulators (such as the ACCC), should have 
the capacity to request market studies be undertaken by the ACCP.  
The work program of the ACCP should be overseen by the Ministerial Council on Federal Financial 
Relations to ensure that resourcing addresses priority issues. 
 
Recommendation 47 — Annual competition analysis 
The Australian Council for Competition Policy should be required to undertake an annual analysis 
of developments in the competition policy environment, both in Australia and internationally, and 
identify specific issues or markets that should receive greater attention. 
 
Recommendation 48 — Competition payments 
The Productivity Commission should be tasked to undertake a study of reforms agreed to by the 
Australian Government and state and territory governments to estimate their effect on revenue in 
each jurisdiction.  
If disproportionate effects across jurisdictions are estimated, competition policy payments should 
ensure that revenue gains flowing from reform accrue to the jurisdictions undertaking the reform.  
Reform effort should be assessed by the Australian Council for Competition Policy based on actual 
implementation of reform measures, not on undertaking reviews. 
25.11 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE CREATION OF NEW BODIES 
The Panel notes the Australian Government’s preference that the creation of new government 
bodies be limited.758 The policy states that, among other considerations: 
• Before establishing a new body, it must be asked whether the activity can be pursued, in 
whole or in part, from within an existing Australian Government entity or Australian 
Government company. Regulatory functions can be performed from within an existing entity, 
with legislation providing such independence as is necessary for the regulatory activity.  
• It is a strong preference of the Government that new activities should, where appropriate, be 
undertaken by public service departments. It is also the preference of the Government that 
functions that are related should be consolidated into the minimum necessary number of 
bodies, to speed up timeframes and improve the experience of clients who have to interact 
with any administrative processes. 
• Where the activity requires the creation of a new body, an analysis of costs and benefits, risks 
and potential alternatives to the proposed governance structure will need to be undertaken, 
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and brought forward to Cabinet for approval. The analysis should compare a minimum of three 
alternative governance structures for the proposed body. 
• As a general principle, where a new body is warranted, an appropriate sunset or reassessment 
date must be agreed (must be 10 years or less). 
The Panel believes that the ACCP meets the above criteria — rather than an Australian Government 
body, it is intended to be truly national in character, with shared governance and funding. There are 
no bodies that currently exist that are capable of taking on the ACCP’s functions. The need for this 
body to have strong ties to state and territory governments means that it would not be acceptable 
for its functions to be undertaken within an Australian Government Department. The ACCP’s 
strength derives from its independence, particularly insofar as it relates to the need to provide 
independent assessment of jurisdictions’ progress against agreed reforms.  
The Panel has also considered whether there is an existing body that could perform the functions 
envisaged for the ACCP. The ACCC is not an appropriate agency to undertake the proposed functions. 
As an enforcement agency, the ACCC is not best placed to advocate for reform, nor to undertake 
market studies. While the PC could undertake the functions of advocacy and market studies, it is an 
Australian Government body and to be effective, a body covering competition across the jurisdictions 
needs to be accountable to all jurisdictions. 
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26 ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 
Enforcement of competition law is crucially important to consumers and therefore to the 
performance of the economy.  
The primary enforcement body is the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 
which was created in 1995 by merging the Prices Surveillance Authority and the Trade Practices 
Commission, and adding some functions from the telecommunications regulator, Austel. The ACCC 
retained the Trade Practices Commission’s Commonwealth consumer protection enforcement 
functions and subsequently acquired the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) as a constituent 
component. 
Many submissions comment on the role, structure and effectiveness of the ACCC as the central 
regulatory body for competition law. Issues raised in submissions include: 
• whether the ACCC should be responsible for enforcing both competition law and consumer 
protection law or whether those responsibilities should be separated; 
• whether ACCC decision making would be improved by changes to its governance structure;  
• whether access and pricing regulatory functions should be undertaken by a body separate 
from the ACCC; and 
• whether the ACCC uses the media responsibly. 
26.1 COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION FUNCTIONS 
The ACCC argues that one of the core strengths of Australian competition policy is that competition 
enforcement, consumer protection and economic regulation are combined within a single, 
economy-wide agency with the objective of making markets work to enhance the welfare of 
Australians (sub 1, page 130). Having a single body fosters a pro-market culture, facilitates 
co-ordination and depth across the functions, ensures small businesses do not fall between the 
cracks, provides a source of consistent information to business and consumers about their rights, and 
provides administrative savings and skills enhancement through the pooling of information, skills and 
expertise (ACCC sub 1, page 131). 
Linking competition and consumer functions has been described as competition law keeping the 
options open, while consumer protection laws protect the ability of consumers to make informed 
choices among those options.759 
However, the Monash Business Policy Forum argues that the competition and consumer functions 
should be separate: 
... combining competition and consumer protection in a single regulatory agency is 
inconsistent with best practice design of regulatory institutions. (sub, page 33) 
Competition regulation is argued to be ‘neutral’, with the regulator an umpire in day-to-day market 
activities, while consumer protection re-balances the market towards consumers. In particular, the 
Monash Business Policy Forum notes that consumer protection matters can be used to raise the 
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agency’s public profile to the detriment of competition enforcement and that there are likely to be 
internal divisions of culture. It quotes Bill Kovacic, a former Chairman and Commissioner of the 
US Federal Trade Commission: 
During the [Federal Trade Commission’s] deliberations over Google’s merger, some 
Commission officials and staff advocated that the agency use the merger review process 
to exact concessions from the merging parties concerning their privacy policies and data 
protection practices. (sub, page 33) 
The Panel acknowledges that there are synergies in having competition and consumer functions in 
the one institution. Within the current structure of the ACCC, the market investigation skills of staff 
are relevant to a range of the organisation’s roles and functions, from the general competition and 
consumer protection, compliance and enforcement roles to specific competition functions such as 
mergers, authorisations and notifications. This facilitates staff movement across the agency, the 
building up of expertise and a common approach to issues.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identifies three major 
advantages of retaining the competition and consumer functions in one institution:  
• gains from treating competition and consumer policy as instruments that can be flexibly 
combined and more generally managed within a single portfolio of policy instruments; 
• gains from developing and sharing expertise across these two areas; and 
• gains in terms of the wider visibility to the community, and understanding in the community, 
of competition and consumer issues.760 
Various consumer groups support retaining a combined competition and consumer body, focusing on 
the ACCC’s record of being an active competition and consumer regulator. 
Submissions to the Draft Report generally agree that the ACCC’s competition and consumer functions 
should be retained within the one agency. The Consumer Action Law Centre notes, ‘competition and 
consumer policy should be considered by the one body because they are so intertwined as to be 
essentially two elements of the same area of policy’ (DR sub, page 22). 
The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network submits that it sees the competition and 
consumer protection roles of the ACCC as complementary and those roles ‘as inextricably linked and 
important to maintain within the same organisation’ (sub, page 9).  
CHOICE notes one of the benefits of having a combined competition and consumer regulator is 
avoiding regulatory over-capture (sub, page 55). 
The question for the Panel is whether the claimed cultural benefits of separate regulators outweigh 
the synergy benefits from combining competition and consumer functions. The Panel is not satisfied, 
on balance, that separating the competition and consumer functions would deliver an overall 
benefit. Small businesses, in particular, which sometimes display the characteristics of businesses 
and at other times of consumers, could ‘fall through the cracks’. 
For example, currently the ACCC can assess a complaint of anti-competitive behaviour against the 
misuse of market power provisions, the business unconscionable conduct provisions or the operation 
of a relevant code. Having these considerations split across different agencies could lead to 
                                                          
760 OECD 2008, The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies, Policy Roundtables, Paris. 
Enforcement of Competition Law 
Part 5 — Competition Institutions  463 
additional administrative complexity or, far worse, to duplicate prosecutions of the same conduct 
under separate parts of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) by separate agencies. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that the ACCC should continue to combine competition and consumer 
regulation.  
There are synergies from having the competition and consumer functions within the one regulator. 
For example, fair trading issues may raise concerns about misuse of market power, unconscionable 
conduct or unfair contract terms. Having one regulator overseeing all of these functions allows the 
different courses of action to be considered simultaneously. It also encourages the building of 
expertise. 
Recognising that these synergies come with tensions, the Panel notes that the ACCC should 
maintain an appropriate balance between its competition-related functions and its consumer 
protection role. 
 
Recommendation 49 — ACCC functions 
Competition and consumer functions should be retained within the single agency of the ACCC. 
26.2 ACCC ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 
The ACCC is established under the CCA as a statutory authority. It is governed by a Chairperson and 
other persons appointed as members of the Commission (usually called Commissioners). Decisions 
are made by the Chairperson and Commissioners meeting together (or as a division of the 
Commission), save where a power has been delegated to a Commissioner. The Commission is 
assisted by its staff. The Chairperson and Commissioners are appointed on a full-time basis and 
effectively perform an executive role. 
The ACCC is subject to external parliamentary scrutiny through the Senate Economics References 
Committee, which examines the operations and performance of all Treasury portfolio agencies as 
part of the Senate Estimates process that occurs up to three times each year. The ACCC’s annual 
report is also tabled in the Australian Parliament. 
Other bodies reviewing the ACCC’s activities include tribunals and courts and the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman. The ACCC and its staff must also comply with a range of other general rules and 
guidance, such as the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, Legal Services 
Directions,761 Commonwealth freedom of information framework762 and general obligations on 
public service employees.763 
The ACCC, like other executive institutions, is issued with a Statement of Expectations by the 
Australian Government, most recently in 2014.764 This sets out the Government’s expectations about 
the role and responsibilities of the ACCC, its relationship with the Government, issues of 
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transparency and accountability and operational matters. The ACCC has responded with its 
Statement of Intent.765 
The ACCC was constituted in 1995 following the implementation of the Hilmer Review. Since that 
time the ACCC has had three Chairs and a number of Commissioners. Over that period the economy 
has become increasingly complex and the ACCC’s role has expanded significantly. While the ACCC has 
been a successful agency, the question for the Panel is whether its governance structure can be 
enhanced to ensure that it continues to perform well into the future. 
The Review’s remit includes considering the governance structure of the ACCC and whether 
improvements may be made to strengthen decision making. Given the fundamental role that ‘checks 
and balances’ play in good governance structures, it is appropriate to consider whether checks and 
balances currently in place are sufficient. 
The Panel notes comments by the Chair of the ACCC since the release of the Draft Report that: 
... [the ACCC] will closely consider the Draft Report’s analysis of institutional issues and 
look forward to the community discussion it will generate. In this area, we will be 
particularly interested in better understanding the problems the recommendations are 
directed towards addressing.766 
The Panel sees a number of problems with the Commission’s current governance. Commissioners 
appear to be too enmeshed in the ACCC’s day-to-day decision making and so act like senior 
managers of the ACCC rather than independent directors. The Panel notes the ACCC’s comments that 
Commissioners cannot direct staff recommendations (DR sub, page 100); however, this is not the nub 
of the Panel’s concern. The Panel is concerned that enforcement decisions under the CCA are 
currently susceptible to ‘group think’ given the strong internal focus induced by the full-time nature 
of appointments to the Commission. The Panel is also concerned about the emergence of ‘silos’ in 
the ACCC’s structure, which further narrows the focus of individual Commissioners. 
In the Draft Report, the Panel proposed two options to widen the diversity of views available to the 
ACCC in its decision making:  
• replace the current Commission with a Board, comprising a number of members akin to the 
current Commissioners, who would work full-time in the operations of the ACCC, and a 
number of independent non-executive members with business, consumer and academic 
expertise, who would not be involved in the day-to-day functions of the ACCC; and 
• impose an Advisory Board without decision-making powers. 
The Panel notes general support for improving the ACCC’s governance arrangements. For example, in 
his submission,767 John Dahlsen states: 
Governance arrangements could clearly be improved to establish a chain of accountability 
superior to what currently exists. It is possible that the strong, independent and 
non-conflicting influence of directors with clearly mandated powers could improve the 
situation. (sub, page 131) 
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The BCA: 
... strongly supports the option to introduce a board, but recommends that the board be 
constituted on similar lines to a commercial board set up under the Corporations Act 
rather than replicating the current commission structure as proposed in the Draft Report. 
(DR sub, page 29) 
However, the board option receives limited support. Submissions mostly reject one or both of the 
Panel’s proposed options for change. CHOICE is quite direct, stating ‘in the absence of evidence of 
problems with the existing arrangements it is not clear that either of the options presented by the 
Panel is warranted’ (DR sub, page 39). 
The Panel accepts concerns raised in submissions. Again, CHOICE notes that the ‘proposal to add an 
advisory board appears to duplicate consultative structures that already exist within the ACCC’ 
(DR sub, page 39). However, the Panel remains concerned that, as currently structured, the ACCC is 
too internally focused and that a wider range of outside views should be incorporated into its 
decision making. It is therefore proposed that half of the ACCC Commissioners be appointed on a 
part-time basis. These part-time positions should be occupied by people who hold other roles in 
business, consumer advocacy and academia that allow them to bring a contemporary and broader 
view to the ACCC’s decision making. The Chair could be appointed on either a full-time or a part-time 
basis. 
The Panel accepts that this arrangement may give rise to concerns of conflicts of interest arising 
between the day-to-day roles of the part-time Commissioners and their responsibilities as 
Commissioners. The ACCC currently manages conflicts of interest through members being required 
to declare any actual or apparent conflicts of interest. ACCC members are required to provide the 
Chair with an annual statement of personal interests. The Panel is satisfied that this approach 
remains sufficient to ensure that conflicts of interest are either avoided or sufficiently declared, even 
with the addition of part-time Commissioners. 
The Panel considers that there should be no Deputy Chairs to avoid the perception that 
Commissioners are actively engaged in managing the agency. The Chair can nominate a 
Commissioner to preside as Chair in his or her absence. 
Sectoral Commissioners 
The Panel notes that the ACCC currently has sectoral Commissioners (both of whom also happen to 
be Deputy Chairs): a small business Commissioner and a consumer Commissioner. However, these 
Commissioners are not confined to deciding on matters related to those areas of expertise but are 
responsible for decision making across the full range of ACCC activities. The Panel notes that these 
Commissioners are not required by the CCA to represent sectoral interests. Subsection 7(4) of the 
CCA requires that at least one of the members of the Commission should have knowledge of, or 
experience in, consumer protection and subsection 10(1B) requires that one of the Deputy Chairs 
should have knowledge of, or experience in, small business matters. 
However, they may in practice be expected to represent sectoral interests. The then Assistant 
Treasurer’s press release announcing a re-appointment to the Commission stated that it ‘guarantees 
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that the Government will continue to deliver on its commitment to ensuring that there is a 
permanent voice for small business at the ACCC’.768 
The Panel acknowledges that consumer protection and small business knowledge and experience are 
important to the ACCC. However, the expectation that these Commissioners represent a particular 
sector is not congruent with the actual role Commissioners perform. Instead, all Commissioners are 
involved in all decisions of the Commission. At the same time, the presence of sectoral 
Commissioners could let other Commissioners ‘off the hook’ from having to consider the interests of 
small business and consumers in their decision making. 
The Panel is of the view that small business and consumer issues are too important to be ‘siloed’ and 
should be the joint responsibility of all Commissioners. 
The CCA already requires, at subsection 7(3), the Minister to be satisfied that a person qualifies for 
appointment because of his or her ‘knowledge of, or experience in, industry, commerce economics, 
law, public administration or consumer protection’ and must also ‘consider whether the person has 
knowledge of, or experience in, small business matters’. Accordingly, the Commission is well 
positioned to consider small business and consumer issues without the need for sectoral 
Commissioners. 
Accountability 
The ACCC should also report regularly to a broad-based committee of the Parliament, such as the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, to build profile and credibility for the 
agency as well as to subject it to additional accountability to the Parliament. In its submissions, the 
ACCC indicates its support for this proposal (DR sub, page 9). 
The Panel’s view 
ACCC decision making is sound, but the Panel considers there are benefits from further 
strengthening the ACCC’s governance and accountability. 
The Panel believes that incorporating a wider range of viewpoints through adopting part-time 
Commissioners would improve the ACCC’s governance. Part-time Commissioners would enrich the 
ACCC’s decision making by adding the perspectives of members whose responsibilities extend 
beyond the ACCC, including but not limited to roles in business, consumer advocacy and academia. 
The Panel proposes abolishing sectoral Commissioners. The Panel believes that, in making 
appointments to the Commission, the current requirements considered by the Minister — for 
experience and knowledge of small business and consumer protection — are sufficient to 
represent these interests in ACCC decision making. The Panel also notes that, in any event, all 
Commissioners are required to make decisions across the full range of the ACCC’s operations. 
The ACCC should also make regular appearances to a committee of Parliament, such as the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics. 
Implementation  
Changes to the ACCC’s governance to create part-time Commissioners and to abolish the positions of 
Deputy Chair will require the CCA to be amended. 
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This should be done in a staged manner to ensure minimum disruption to current arrangements. For 
example, every second appointment, from adoption of this proposal, could be converted into a 
part-time appointment until such time as half of the Commissioners, and if the Government chooses 
the Chair, are part-time appointees. 
Recommendation 51 — ACCC governance 
Half of the ACCC Commissioners should be appointed on a part-time basis. This could occur as the 
terms of the current Commissioners expire, with every second vacancy filled with a part-time 
appointee. The Chair could be appointed on either a full-time or a part-time basis, and the 
positions of Deputy Chair should be abolished. 
The Panel believes that current requirements in the CCA (paragraphs 7(3)(a) and 7(3)(b)) for 
experience and knowledge of small business and consumer protection, among other matters, to 
be considered by the Minister in making appointments to the Commission are sufficient to 
represent sectoral interests in ACCC decision-making.  
Therefore, the Panel recommends that the further requirements in the CCA that the Minister, in 
making all appointments, be satisfied that the Commission has one Commissioner with knowledge 
or experience of small business matters (subsection 10(1B)) and one Commissioner with 
knowledge or experience of consumer protection matters (subsection 7(4)) be abolished.  
The ACCC should report regularly to a broad-based committee of the Parliament, such as the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics. 
26.3 ACCC AND THE MEDIA 
The ACCC has a long history of using the media to raise awareness of competition issues. However, 
this important educative role can cross over into advocacy of particular policy positions. An advocacy 
role can compromise stakeholders’ perceptions of the ACCC’s impartiality in its enforcement of the 
law. This is reflected in the BCA’s comment: 
... business remains concerned about the potential of investigations being prejudiced by 
the media conduct of interested parties, including the ACCC. (BCA sub, Summary Report, 
page 24) 
As discussed previously, there is a role for competition policy advocacy. The Panel considers it 
desirable that this function not be undertaken by the ACCC. The ACCC undertaking such an advocacy 
role can compromise stakeholders’ perceptions of the impartiality of the agency in administering and 
enforcing the competition law.  
However, the ACCC should continue to have a role in communicating to the public through the 
media, including explaining enforcement priorities, educating business about compliance with the 
legislation and publishing enforcement outcomes. 
The Dawson Review recommended that the ACCC develop a media code of conduct and the Panel 
notes a reference in the Dawson Review that ‘The ACCC was conscious of the concerns expressed 
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and supported the introduction of such a code in order to address them’.769 The Panel understands 
that this recommendation has not been adopted.  
The Panel believes that the ACCC should establish, publish and report against a media code of 
conduct. This should counter the perception of partiality on the part of the ACCC or individual 
Commissioners or the Chair, especially in enforcement actions. 
In supporting the development of a media code of conduct, the BCA suggests that the Dawson 
Review principles guide its development (DR sub, page 33).  
Those principles are: 
12.1.1 the public interest is served by the ACCC disseminating information about the aims of 
the Act and the ACCC’s activities in encouraging and enforcing compliance with it. This 
extends to information about proceedings instituted by it, but an objective and balanced 
approach is necessary to ensure fairness to individual parties; 
12.1.2 the code should cover all formal and informal comment by ACCC representatives; 
12.1.3 whilst it may be necessary for the ACCC to confirm or deny the existence of an 
investigation in exceptional circumstances, the ACCC should decline to comment on 
investigations; 
12.1.4 with the object of preserving procedural fairness, commentary on the commencement 
of court proceedings by the ACCC should only be by way of a formal media release 
confined to stating the facts; and 
12.1.5 reporting the outcome of court proceedings should be accurate, balanced and 
consistent with the sole objective of ensuring public understanding of the court’s 
decision.770 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel is of the view that the ACCC should not undertake competition policy advocacy as this 
may compromise stakeholder perceptions of its impartiality. These functions should be 
undertaken by the ACCP. 
The Dawson Review’s recommendation that the ACCC develop a media code of conduct remains 
appropriate to strengthen the perception of the ACCC’s impartiality in enforcing the law. 
Implementation 
The ACCC should develop and publish a media code of conduct within 12 months. 
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Recommendation 52 — Media Code of Conduct 
The ACCC should establish, publish and report against a Code of Conduct for its dealings with the 
media with the aim of strengthening the perception of its impartiality in enforcing the law. The 
Code of Conduct should be developed with reference to the principles outlined in the 2003 Review 
of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act. 
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27 ACCESS AND PRICING REGULATION 
Economic regulation of monopoly or other infrastructure where there is limited, or no, competition 
among providers seeks to protect, strengthen and supplement competitive market processes to 
improve the efficiency of the economy and increase the welfare of Australians.  
Economic regulatory functions are currently undertaken by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and by state and territory regulators. The ACCC regulates access to 
and pricing of national infrastructure services, such as telecommunications, energy (through the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) which is a separate but constituent part of the ACCC) and bulk 
water, and monitors pricing in other infrastructure markets where there is limited competition. 
27.1 A SEPARATE ACCESS AND PRICING REGULATOR 
The Panel sees benefit in focusing the ACCC on its competition and consumer functions and 
separating out its current access and pricing functions into a separate, dedicated regulator. 
Amalgamating all Australian Government price regulatory functions into a single body will sharpen 
focus and strengthen analytical capacity in this important area of regulation. 
The ACCC points to the benefits of having access and pricing regulation undertaken by the 
competition and consumer regulator. However, the Panel considers that, although synergies 
between the competition and consumer functions are strong, synergies between competition 
enforcement and access and pricing regulation are weaker. 
The culture and analytical approach required to regulate an industry differ from those typically 
characteristic of a competition law enforcement agency. For example, the former is required to have 
an ongoing and collaborative relationship with the industry it regulates, while the latter is more likely 
to involve adversarial interactions. 
There is also a risk that an industry regulator’s views about the structure of a particular market could 
influence a merger decision. The latter is required to be based on the likelihood of a particular 
transaction resulting in a substantial lessening of competition, not on a view of what a particular 
market structure should be. 
The Monash Business Policy Forum proposes the creation of an ‘Australian Essential Services 
Commission’ to bring all pricing and access regulation into one agency. The body would: 
... bring together the current regulatory functions of the ACCC, ACMA [Australian 
Communications and Media Authority], the regulatory functions of the Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority, and groups such as the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). (sub, page 36) 
The Monash Business Policy Forum stresses the importance of co-locating functions by similarity of 
analytical approach rather than by industry: 
Colocation by industry increases the likelihood of capture. It creates regulatory inflexibility 
as ‘industry specialists’ rather than ‘analytical generalists’ dominate regulators. It risks the 
creation of a regulatory culture that views the particular industry that is the focus of 
regulation as ‘special’ and ‘separate’ from broader economic and social considerations. 
(sub, page 17) 
States and Territories have called for the AER to be separated out of the ACCC. The 1 May 2014 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Energy Council meeting communique notes ‘state and 
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territory Ministers reiterated their support for separation of the AER from the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission. The Chair agreed to communicate these views to the Australian 
Government’.771 
The Energy Networks Association argues: 
... the separation of the AER into a stand-alone independent industry-specific regulatory 
body would assist it in having the flexibility to further develop its specialist expertise in 
the energy sector, provide greater autonomy and give better scope for development of an 
organisation culture focused on providing appropriate, predictable and credible long-term 
signals for efficient investment … (sub, page 6) 
On the other hand, the ACCC advocates that the AER should be retained within the ACCC’s current 
structure, arguing that locating the AER within the ACCC creates efficiencies, particularly in relation 
to sharing corporate functions such as legal resources. 
The Consumer Action Law Centre supports this view, submitting: 
… there are significant benefits from keeping the ACCC and AER together. Not only are 
there operational efficiencies in the AER and the ACCC sharing resources (the two 
regulators share many functions and it means that the AER is able to be represented in a 
number of state capital cities), it is also our view that regulators that focus narrowly on 
one industry are at significant risk of becoming ‘captured’ by industry interests. (sub, 
page 27) 
Other submissions, without speaking directly to the issue of separating the AER, note the need for 
greater clarity in respect of the AER’s role within the ACCC. The Australian Energy Market Operator 
states that it is important to maintain the AER’s market functions (DR sub, page 3). 
In  its Draft Report, the Panel suggests that only the AER’s roles in the National Electricity Law and 
the National Gas Law would transfer to the proposed national Access and Pricing Regulator (APR). 
The AER points out that most of the National Energy Retail Law’s functions are regulatory, rather 
than consumer or competition functions (DR sub, page 6), so also transferring them to the APR would 
be consistent with the Draft Report’s preference for the APR to have a regulatory focus. 
Nevertheless, under this approach, some residual consumer functions (for example, in relation to 
energy customer hardship programs) would also transfer to the APR. It would be overly complex to 
separate out these residual consumer functions from the APR and, accordingly, the Panel proposes 
moving the AER into the APR as an integrated unit. 
The Department of Communications notes, ‘the Vertigan Panel expresses the view, shared by the 
Department, that “the need for industry-specific regulation will not diminish, at least in the near to 
medium term”‘ (DR sub, page 6). The Panel does not disagree with this view (though addresses 
whether there is an ongoing need for Part XIB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) in 
Section 19.1) but notes the Vertigan Report’s view: 
These factors do not suggest reverting to an industry‐specific regulator. Even though 
many aspects of telecommunications regulation will remain ‘bespoke’, there are now 
sufficient commonalities between regulated industries — for instance, the reliance on 
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what amounts to a ‘building blocks’ model of price-setting — as to create opportunities 
for economies of scale and scope in network access regulation.’772 
The Panel agrees with the Vertigan Panel that the case has not been made for an industry-specific 
regulator for telecommunications. Industry-specific regulators are at risk of capture, or perceptions 
of capture, by the regulated industry, which undermines their independence. An industry-specific 
regulator may become resistant to change or may be perceived as unduly favouring incumbents (or 
new entrants) to the detriment of competition. 
The Panel considers that access and pricing regulation would be best performed by a single 
independent agency. The benefits of such an arrangement include that a single agency: 
• will have the scale of activities that enables it to acquire broad expertise and experience across 
a range of industries, and acquire and retain staff who have that expertise; 
• regulating a range of infrastructure industries reduces the risk of capture; and 
• will reduce the costs associated with multiple regulators and regulatory frameworks and 
promote consistency in regulatory approaches.  
The Panel’s proposal would see the following regulatory functions transfer to the APR: 
• those currently undertaken by the ACCC in energy (through the AER), water and 
telecommunications; and 
• those currently undertaken by the NCC in relation to the National Access Regime and the 
National Gas Law.  
Most consumer protection and competition functions associated with regulatory functions would 
remain with the ACCC — the exception being residual consumer functions undertaken by the AER 
under the National Energy Retail Law, which would transfer to the APR. 
Including the NCC’s functions under the National Access Regime and the National Gas Law within the 
APR would allow the NCC to be dissolved. This would result in the APR undertaking both the 
declaration functions under the National Access Regime and the National Gas Law and the current 
ACCC role in arbitrating the terms and conditions where a facility is declared, but where terms and 
conditions are not able to be commercially negotiated. 
The Panel notes the APA Group’s concerns (DR sub, page 2) about potential conflicts of interest 
where a single body undertakes the declaration and arbitration functions. The PC has also noted that 
there is ‘a need for particular caution in guarding against any potential for unwarranted extension of 
the scope of the [National Access] Regime’ and that separating the advisory and regulatory functions 
provides ‘an important safeguard’.773 The Panel does not foresee any conflict in a single regulator 
performing both functions and anticipates there may be benefits. The Panel also notes that, under 
the telecommunications access regime (in Part XIC of the CCA), the ACCC currently performs both the 
declaration and arbitration functions. 
The Panel also notes the Department of Communications’ concerns (DR sub, page 8) regarding the 
number of regulators with which the telecommunications sector may need to engage as a result of 
this change. However, the Panel considers that it is not so much the number of regulators but the 
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presence of significant gaps or overlaps among regulators that imposes the greater burden on 
business. The Panel also notes that it is not unusual for businesses to face a number of regulators. 
Further functions which could, over time, be conferred upon the national access and pricing 
regulator include rail regulation. Asciano notes that it: 
... operates its above rail operations under six different access regimes with multiple 
access providers and multiple access regulators. This multiplicity of regimes adds costs 
and complexity to rail access for no benefit, particularly as many of the access regulation 
functions are duplicated across states. (DR sub, page 7) 
27.2 GOVERNANCE 
As outlined previously in relation to the ACCC and the proposed ACCP, the governance arrangements 
instituted for the APR will need to be appropriate to its functions. The APR will be undertaking 
functions of a legislative and analytical nature and require an ongoing engagement between it and 
the industries it is intended to regulate. 
The governance arrangements would further need to reflect that the APR would administer 
Commonwealth functions, such as telecommunications, and functions contained in state and 
territory legislation, such as energy. 
The Department of Communications submits that: 
… the Constitution prescribes communications services as a Commonwealth responsibility 
(section 51(v)). An industry-specific communications sector regulator would avoid 
potential governance issues arising from combining telecommunications with other 
network industries where responsibility is shared or resides with the states or territories. 
(DR sub, pages 7–8) 
The Panel acknowledges this concern but notes that the ACCC has managed such issues since the 
establishment of the AER — a constituent component of the ACCC with functions conferred upon it 
by state and territory legislation. The composition of the members should be able to address these 
issues and effectively ensure national decision making is retained along the division of Constitutional 
responsibilities. 
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) notes that it: 
… considers that the quality of substantive decision making by the new regulator would 
be most improved by:  
 the establishment of a board, for the same reasons outlined for the ACCC 
 the re-introduction of full merits review for final decisions 
 the establishment of a new requirement that the access and pricing regulator 
consult upon, and periodically publish, a strategy document. This document 
would set out its regulatory objectives, including how it plans to reduce regulatory 
burdens. (DR sub, page 36) 
The Panel recommends that the APR be constituted as a five-member board. The board should 
comprise two Australian Government-appointed members, two state and territory-nominated 
members and an Australian Government-appointed Chair. Two members (one Australian 
Government appointee and one state and territory nominee) would be appointed on a part-time 
basis. 
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The Chair and the Australian Government-appointed members would have responsibility for 
telecommunications and other Commonwealth-only functions. The Chair and the state and 
territory-nominated members would have responsibility for energy functions, largely reflecting 
current arrangements of the AER as it currently operates within the ACCC. The creation of the APR 
will allow staff more easily to share experience in regulating networks and ways to engage with 
industry. 
The APR will be an Australian Government body within the portfolio of the Treasurer, with functions 
currently performed in the ACCC and NCC being transferred to it. The role of the Treasurer would 
largely relate to the administrative functions of the body, with sector-specific legislation and 
functions (such as energy) still being conferred on the regulator through the relevant 
Commonwealth, state and territory legislation. 
27.3 STATE AND TERRITORY ACCESS AND PRICING REGULATION 
Each State and Territory has a regulator that undertakes access and pricing regulation analogous to 
that proposed to be undertaken by the APR. These regulators perform various functions, such as 
determining regulated prices for retail energy, water and transport services and access to essential 
services or infrastructure. Some of these regulators also provide economic policy advice to 
governments. For example, the Western Australian Economic Regulation Authority recently 
completed an inquiry into microeconomic reform.774 
State or Territory Regulator 
New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
Victoria Essential Services Commission 
Queensland Queensland Competition Authority 
Western Australia Economic Regulation Authority 
South Australia Essential Services Commission  
Tasmania Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 
Australian Capital Territory Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission 
Northern Territory The Utilities Commission of the Northern Territory 
Submissions note that, when state access and pricing regulators are added in, Australia has 11 
separate competition-related regulators (BCA sub, Main Report, page 20). Australia’s seven water 
regulators serve a population of 23 million while, by comparison, the UK’s single water regulator 
(Ofwat) serves more than 60 million people. 
The multiplicity of regulators results in fragmented regulatory oversight. For example, IPART 
identifies that: 
 IPART regulates 3 valleys for State Water. The Murray-Darling basin is regulated 
by the ACCC. 
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 IPART regulates around 21km of the Hunter Valley Coal rail network. The ACCC 
regulates the remaining 650km of track. (sub, page 30) 
A multiplicity of regulators can also be administratively costly, and lead to gaps and overlaps in 
regulatory responsibility. Business may have to engage with more than one regulator. 
The Panel believes that state and territory agencies should continue to have responsibility for those 
sectors with which they are, by geography and institutional arrangements, better placed to deal. But, 
as with the Murray-Darling agreement and the energy legislative regime, States can refer regulation 
to a national body to ensure consistent regulation across Australia. 
The subsidiarity principle that no higher-level agency should assume responsibility for functions 
which a lower-level agency may be better placed to undertake means that a national body should 
not necessarily assume responsibility for all access and pricing functions undertaken in Australia. For 
example, regulation of public transport fares may be better dealt with by state and territory agencies 
but the regulation of rail networks may be better undertaken by a national regulator. 
This need not mean that all access and pricing regulation will be done nationally.  
If national markets are established in the future, they should move to a national regulator under the 
same conditions as energy functions have transferred previously to the AER — the functions would 
remain in state and territory applied legislation, which recognises necessary jurisdictional 
differences, but be administered by an Australian Government agency. 
The Panel received a number of submissions naming particular sectors which could be transferred to 
a national framework, including rail regulation (see Asciano, DR sub, page 7) and water (see BCA, DR 
sub, page 35). The Panel supports States and Territories transferring those functions as and when 
national frameworks are developed. The Panel notes other submissions arguing that transfer to a 
national regulator may be premature, including the Water Services Association of Australia (DR sub, 
page 7) and IPART (DR sub, page 2). The Panel agrees that immediate transfer is premature but notes 
that it may still be a desirable objective over the longer term.  
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The Panel’s view 
The Panel proposes the creation of an Access and Pricing Regulator (APR) to oversee all industries 
currently regulated for the Australian Government by the ACCC, noting the energy functions in 
question are conferred by state and territory legislation. 
The following regulatory functions would be transferred from the ACCC and the NCC and be 
undertaken within the APR: 
• the telecommunications access and pricing functions of the ACCC; 
• price regulation and related advisory roles of the ACCC under the Water Act 2007 (Cth); 
• the powers given to the ACCC under the National Access Regime; 
• the functions undertaken by the AER under the National Electricity Law, the National Gas 
Law and the National Energy Retail Law; 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Access Regime; and 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Gas Law. 
While consumer protection and competition functions would largely remain with the ACCC, the 
Panel accepts that some of those functions, particularly those performed by the AER, should move 
to the APR for pragmatic governance reasons. 
Price surveillance and price monitoring functions should remain with the ACCC as these are often 
conducted on an economy-wide basis. 
The Panel recommends that the APR be constituted as a five-member board. The board should 
comprise two Australian Government-appointed members, two state and territory-nominated 
members and an Australian Government-appointed Chair. Two members (one Australian 
Government appointee and one state and territory appointee) would be appointed on a part-time 
basis. 
The APR should be established with a view to it gaining further functions as other sectors are 
transferred to national regimes. The Panel supports a continuing role for state and territory 
economic regulators. However, a move to national regulation as national markets are established 
should be encouraged, including, for example, in the case of water. 
Implementation 
The Australian Government should create the APR within 12 months of accepting the Panel’s 
recommendation. This should be achieved through amending the CCA to create the APR (in similar 
fashion to the provisions establishing the AER within the CCA), noting that the energy functions 
would continue to be contained within state and territory applied legislation. 
The Panel notes the COAG Energy Council’s announcement775 of a Review of Governance 
Arrangements for Energy Markets to commence in 2015. The review should be undertaken with 
regard to the recommendations of this Report and consider how best the new APR could interact 
with the other energy market institutions. 
A separate process could be undertaken in parallel to the creation of the regulator to determine 
which functions States and Territories may agree to confer. 
                                                          
775 Council of Australian Governments Energy Council 2014, Meeting Communique #2, 11 December, Adelaide. 
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Recommendation 50 — Access and Pricing Regulator 
The following regulatory functions should be transferred from the ACCC and the NCC and be 
undertaken within a single national Access and Pricing Regulator: 
• the telecommunications access and pricing functions of the ACCC; 
• price regulation and related advisory roles of the ACCC under the Water Act 2007 (Cth); 
• the powers given to the ACCC under the National Access Regime; 
• the functions undertaken by the Australian Energy Regulator under the National Electricity Law, 
the National Gas Law and the National Energy Retail Law; 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Access Regime; and 
• the powers given to the NCC under the National Gas Law. 
Other consumer protection and competition functions should remain with the ACCC. Price 
monitoring and surveillance functions should also be retained by the ACCC. 
The Access and Pricing Regulator should be constituted as a five-member board. The board should 
comprise two Australian Government-appointed members, two state and territory-nominated 
members and an Australian Government-appointed Chair. Two members (one Australian 
Government appointee and one state and territory appointee) should be appointed on a part-time 
basis. 
Decisions of the Access and Pricing Regulator should be subject to review by the Australian 
Competition Tribunal. 
The Access and Pricing Regulator should be established with a view to it gaining further functions if 
other sectors are transferred to national regimes. 
27.4 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE CREATION OF NEW BODIES 
As discussed in Section 25.11, the Australian Government has set out a policy for creating new 
bodies. The Panel is strongly of the view that the APR be created as a new body. To strengthen both 
the ACCC and the APR, it is essential that they be independent bodies to focus on their particular 
remits. The Panel notes that continuing regulation of the energy functions within the ACCC would not 
satisfy energy Ministers’ expressed preference for the AER to be a stand-alone body.776 Furthermore, 
the Panel considers it is not appropriate for regulatory functions to be undertaken within a policy 
Department. 
  
                                                          
776 Council of Australian Governments Energy Council 2014, Meeting Communique, 1 May, Brisbane.  
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28 REVIEW OF COMPETITION AND REGULATORY DECISIONS 
28.1 FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
Australia’s competition law is enforced through proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. 
Proceedings may be brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) or by 
a person harmed by contraventions of the law. 
The Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a contravention of the competition law has 
occurred. The Federal Circuit Court also has jurisdiction to determine matters arising under 
section 46. 
Competition law proceedings frequently involve disputes about the dimensions and attributes of 
markets within which particular businesses trade and the nature and extent of the sources of 
competition within those markets. It is often relevant for the court to hear from expert economic 
witnesses about those issues. For that reason, it is appropriate that competition law proceedings be 
determined in courts that, over time, can develop expertise in the types of issues that must be 
resolved.  
The Panel received limited feedback on potential procedural practices that would be beneficial in 
resolving competition law proceedings in a just and cost-effective manner. The ACCC submits that, 
although complex competition law proceedings present significant procedural challenges to the court 
and to parties, Federal Court judges have the tools at their disposal to direct procedures competently 
(DR sub, pages 104-105). 
In other jurisdictions, notably New Zealand, the court is able to draw on the assistance of an 
economist who presides over the proceeding alongside the trial judge.  
Although innovative and well regarded, the New Zealand approach may not be possible in Australia. 
In a workshop presentation The Judicial Disposition of Competition Cases,777 the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court778 notes the constitutional constraints preventing Australia from appointing lay court 
members in the same manner as New Zealand — namely, that judicial power must be exercised by a 
judge, and federal judges under section 72 of the Constitution cannot be part-time or acting.779 
Chief Justice Allsop notes that, instead, Australian courts can use ‘referees’ (including expert 
economists) to inquire into and report on one or more questions arising in court proceedings.780 The 
relatively recent Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Act (No. 1) 2009 provides 
for rules in relation to the use of referees in the Federal Court. The Chief Justice notes that the 
referee system has been used very successfully in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
The Panel supports the use of referees to assist the court in resolving questions, including complex 
economic issues, in competition cases. 
                                                          
777 Allsop, J 2009, The judicial disposition of competition cases, paper presented at the 7th Annual University of South 
Australian Trade Practices Workshop, Adelaide, 17 October. 
778 Then President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. 
779 WWF v TW Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434. 
780 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), section 51A. 
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28.2 THE AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
The Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) is created by Part III of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). Various powers have been conferred on it to review competition and 
economic decisions, including: 
• decisions of the ACCC under the CCA to grant authorisations or withdraw notifications; 
• decisions of the Minister to declare or not to declare an infrastructure service under Part IIIA 
of the CCA; 
• decisions of the ACCC to arbitrate terms and conditions of services declared under Part IIIA; 
and 
• pricing regulatory decisions of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) made under the National 
Energy Law and the National Gas Law. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal performs a very significant role in Australia’s competition and regulatory 
framework. 
The particular strength of the Tribunal lies in its composition. For the purposes of hearing and 
determining a matter before it, the Tribunal must be constituted by a presidential member (who is a 
Federal Court judge) and two members who are not presidential members. A person appointed as a 
member of the Tribunal must be qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge of, or experience in, 
industry, commerce, economics, law or public administration. In practice, the Tribunal is usually 
constituted with at least one member who is an economist. 
In its first submission, the ACCC recognises the important role of the Tribunal: 
The ACCC supports the OECD assessment that: ‘The Australian Competition Tribunal plays 
an important role as a merits review body, and the economic content in its 
determinations has made a significant contribution to both the legislative and judicial 
development of the law.’ (sub 1, page 139)  
The Tribunal currently has a role as a first-instance decision maker in authorising mergers, in addition 
to its review functions. First-instance decision making requires an investigative role that the Tribunal, 
with its predominant review function, is not well placed to deliver. The Panel considers that the 
Tribunal would be more effective if it were constituted solely as a review body. This is discussed 
further in Chapter 18. 
The nature and scope of the review function performed by the Tribunal varies and is dependent upon 
the powers granted to it in respect of different review tasks. In reviewing the ACCC’s authorisation 
decisions, the Tribunal is able to hear directly from business people concerned in the application and 
expert economists. 
However, in respect of the review of access pricing decisions, the Tribunal’s powers are often 
confined to considering the materials before the original decision maker; the Tribunal is unable to 
hear from the business people and expert economists who authored those materials. Although these 
restrictions enable reviews to be conducted more quickly, they also reduce the depth of the review 
the Tribunal is able to undertake. 
In a merger review context, BHP Billiton supports the Tribunal being able to hear directly from 
relevant witnesses rather than only being able to rely on the material before the ACCC (DR sub, 
page 2). This approach is generally supported by the ACCC, which also notes that the ability to call 
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further evidence should be balanced against the risk that parties may fail to provide relevant 
information up-front (DR sub, page 62-63).  
The Panel notes trade-offs in deciding how limited the merits review process ought to be in 
competition contexts. A more limited review provides faster, less costly decisions and better 
incentives to provide all information at first instance; whereas, a full review provides greater scope 
for considering all available evidence and may increase the likelihood of a correct decision. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that the Tribunal performs an important role in administering the competition 
law. Although it is important that review processes be conducted within restricted timeframes, the 
value of the review process would be greatly enhanced if the Tribunal were empowered to hear 
from relevant business representatives and economists responsible for reports relied upon by 
original decision makers. 
The Panel considers that a merits review process should maintain incentives to ensure all relevant 
material is provided to the first-instance decision maker, with the ability for the Tribunal to receive 
further information that materially bears on the Tribunal’s review. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Section 18.5. 
 
 
 Part 6 — Implementation 481 
PART 6 — IMPLEMENTATION 
29 IMPLEMENTING THE REVIEW 
The Panel’s recommended agenda of competition reform is ambitious, encompassing Australia’s 
competition policy, laws and institutions. As noted in Part 1, a need for a new round of 
microeconomic reform persists, much like the extended reform horizon associated with the earlier 
National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms. It is vital for not only our standard of living but also our 
quality of life.  
However, to succeed, as the Business Council of Australia (BCA) notes, a clear plan for implementing 
the reform agenda is required: 
The panel has put forward a very large reform program. Implementation of each reform 
will be complex and take time so prioritisation will be important. A clear plan on how to 
implement the agenda will be required for the community to accept it. (DR sub, page 5) 
During consultation, many people pointed to the successful implementation of the NCP reforms as 
an example to emulate. This chapter begins by considering important features of the NCP, especially 
the time interval between completion of the Hilmer Review and governments agreeing to the NCP 
reform agenda.  
A distinguishing feature of the current environment is that the roles and responsibilities of the 
Australian Government and state and territory governments are currently being reconsidered 
through the White Paper on the Reform of the Federation and the White Paper on Reform of 
Australia’s Tax System (the White Papers). 
Although a number of the Panel’s recommendations can be implemented by jurisdictions acting 
independently, in many cases reform outcomes will be enhanced through co-operation or 
collaboration across jurisdictions. Which level of government leads implementation of reforms across 
jurisdictions will reflect outcomes of the White Papers.  
Against this background, this Report sketches a ‘road map’ for implementation that identifies 
pathways forward, without pre-empting decisions that sit appropriately with governments and that 
will be subject to further consideration through the White Papers. 
29.1 IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY FOLLOWING THE HILMER 
REVIEW 
In considering how a review with recommendations ranging from high-level statements of principle 
to more specific policy and legislative change evolves into a program of reform, many stakeholders 
pointed to the Hilmer Review and the subsequent NCP reform agenda. The Hilmer Review’s 
recommendations were generally couched as statements of principle, from which emerged a 
successful and long-standing program of reform. Like this Review, the Hilmer Review made 
recommendations on competition policy, laws, and institutions and, also like this Review, 
recommendations on the laws and institutions were spelt out in greater detail than many of the 
policy recommendations, which were often expressions of principle. 
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Again like this Review, the recommendations on competition policy in the Hilmer Review drew on 
and extended reforms that were already being developed, often independently, by the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories. For instance, electricity reform commenced in Victoria and 
New South Wales essentially without the Commonwealth’s involvement.781 
The Hilmer Review also noted the importance of nationally consistent approaches to competition 
reform. Hilmer pointed to a ‘series of significant cooperative ventures by Australian Governments’,782 
including the National Rail Corporation, road transport regulation, regulation of non-bank financial 
institutions and the Corporations Law. 
Hilmer supported policy developments in individual jurisdictions but made recommendations for 
co-ordinated action to be taken by governments collectively. Nevertheless, NCP allowed jurisdictions 
to tailor reforms to reflect local conditions.  
This Review is similar to the Hilmer Review, but it has two important differences. First, the policy 
context for the Hilmer Review was very different from that applying today. Second, unlike this 
Review, which is addressed to a single Australian Government Minister, the Hilmer Review was 
addressed to the heads of all Australian governments.  
As set out in Box 29.1, the mechanics of implementing NCP were agreed by governments over an 
18-month period subsequent to the Hilmer Review. During that time, the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) added further detail that guided subsequent implementation of NCP by 
individual jurisdictions. 
                                                          
781 The Hilmer Review noted a number of other examples of competition reform in various jurisdictions, including reform 
of statutory agricultural marketing arrangements in New South Wales and Queensland; and reform of professional 
services and occupations in several jurisdictions, including relaxation of advertising restrictions in the legal profession 
and the removal of the monopoly over conveyancing services (Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National 
Competition Policy, Canberra, pages 12-13). 
782 Commonwealth of Australia 1993, National Competition Policy, Canberra, page 14. 
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Box 29.1: Implementation timetable for NCP 
The Hilmer Review was presented to governments in August 1993.  
On 25 February 1994, COAG agreed on the need for a more extensive microeconomic reform 
agenda and established a standing committee of officials (the COAG Working Group on 
Microeconomic Reform) to manage this process and develop detailed proposals for reform.783 
COAG agreed to the principles of competition policy as set out in the Hilmer Review and to (among 
other things) governments reporting to the next COAG meeting on the practicalities of applying 
the Hilmer recommendations and the Australian Government providing assistance to the States 
and Territories. 
In August 1994, COAG agreed ‘in general’ to a package of reform, which was then released for 
public comment. COAG also requested the former Industry Commission to assess the benefits to 
economic growth and revenue from implementing Hilmer and related reforms. This assessment 
was completed in March 1995.  
The Competition Policy Reform Bill was introduced into the Australian Parliament on 
29 March 1995.  
In April 1995 COAG agreed to a national competition policy legislative package with the Prime 
Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers signing three Intergovernmental Agreements to implement 
the package. (More information on these agreements is in Box 8.1).  
29.2 IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY TODAY 
NCP established a forward agenda for competition policy reform that guided governments for 
around a decade. In this chapter, the Panel proposes an updated competition policy agenda that can, 
if supported by all Australian governments, guide reform of Australia’s competition policy, laws and 
institutions into the future.  
Drawing on reform underway across the Australian Federation 
This Report identifies examples of competition policy reforms that are already in progress within 
individual jurisdictions. 
• Human services — Chapter 12 summarises the range of developments in contracting out, 
contestability and commissioning of human services across the Federation.  
• Planning and zoning — Section 10.1 notes that a number of jurisdictions are reviewing 
planning and zoning rules. 
• Heavy vehicles — Section 11.3 cites the considerable work undertaken by the Heavy Vehicle 
and Investment Reform project in progressing both user-charging and institutional reform 
options. 
These developments in competition policy have informed the Panel’s recommendations in this 
Report. Importantly, they also demonstrate the potential for jurisdictions to share reform ideas as 
well as information about the outcomes of reform. 
                                                          
783 Council of Australian Governments 1994, Communique 25 February 1994, Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
— Archive, viewed on 5 February 2015, http://archive.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/1994-02-25/. 
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The Panel’s view 
In the wake of this Review, governments should decide whether the next step includes an 
agreement on the reform agenda by all governments or whether jurisdictions independently 
consider and act on the Review’s recommendations. The NCP set a forward agenda for 
competition policy reform that guided governments for around a decade. The Panel endorses 
co-operation and collaboration across jurisdictions as generally more likely to produce better 
outcomes for Australians.  
A future national competition reform agenda 
The Panel recognises that the architecture of Australia’s Federation is being reviewed in the White 
Paper on the Reform of the Federation. Among other important issues, the Federation White Paper is 
considering appropriate principles to determine when national action — that is, action involving all 
governments, rather than just the Australian Government — is justified, and how best to achieve it 
when it is justified.784 
The Panel agrees with the view expressed in the Federation White Paper (Issues Paper 1) that: 
Sometimes a national approach is more appropriate than pursuing different approaches 
across the States and Territories. For example, economic considerations might require 
national regulation to make it easier for businesses to operate in more than one State or 
Territory. However, uniformity and consistency may come at the expense of diversity and 
competition between the States and Territories.785 
A number of recommendations in this Report can be implemented by jurisdictions acting 
independently of each other and may even benefit from a diversity of approaches. But the Panel 
considers that competition reforms are a prime candidate for a national approach. The Productivity 
Commission (PC) notes: 
A broadly-based reform program can make it easier for governments to progress a set of 
individual reforms that might be difficult to implement on a stand-alone basis. A 
broadly-based and integrated reform agenda — as was the case for NCP — improves the 
prospect that those who might lose from one specific reform can benefit from others and 
gain overall. As such, a broadly-based program can moderate adverse distributional 
effects. (sub, page 24) 
The Panel’s reform priorities have economy-wide impacts, and taken together are of national 
significance. This is discussed further in Chapter 30. 
Recommendations in this Report fall into three categories:  
• those that can be fully or largely implemented by the Australian Government or individual 
States and Territories acting alone;  
• those that benefit from being implemented jointly by the Australian Government and the 
States and Territories; and 
• those that create mechanisms to support reform at any jurisdictional level. 
                                                          
784 Australian Government 2014, Reform of the Federation White Paper: Issues Paper 1: A Federation for Our Future, 
Canberra, page 22. 
785 Ibid., page 22. 
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Recommendations for implementing the Panel’s Recommendations are set out in a road map in 
Section 29.3. 
Australian Government law and policy 
The Panel recommends both simplification of, and specific changes to, the competition provisions of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) (see Recommendations 22–42). The CCA is 
Commonwealth legislation and can be amended by the Australian Parliament. However, under the 
Conduct Code Agreement 1995,786 the Australian Government must consult with, and seek 
agreement from, the States and Territories before amending Part IV of the CCA. 
The Panel has prepared an updated ‘model law’ (see Appendix A) incorporating its recommended 
changes to Part IV of the CCA. This should assist in clarifying the changes the Panel is recommending. 
It should also assist the Australian Government to move directly to consultation with the States and 
Territories and other stakeholders on proposed changes to the law.  
Repeal of Part X of the CCA (see Recommendation 4) can also be initiated by the Australian 
Government, as can repeal of coastal shipping cabotage restrictions (part of Recommendation 5), 
which reside in Commonwealth legislation (that is, the Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian 
Shipping) Act 2012). 
As outlined in Section 10.7, pharmacy location rules arise from the Australian Community Pharmacy 
Agreement between the Australian Government and the Pharmacy Guild of Australia. Accordingly, 
negotiations towards the next Australian Community Pharmacy Agreement, due to commence in July 
2015, provide the opportunity to introduce transitional arrangements for removing pharmacy 
location rules (see Recommendation 14). Such transitional arrangements could include incorporation 
of a community service obligation covering retail pharmacy services.  
The Panel’s recommendation that the PC undertake a review of intellectual property (see 
Recommendation 6) can be implemented by the Australian Government without delay. 
Australian Government and state and territory policy and regulations 
A number of recommendations can be implemented at both Commonwealth and state and territory 
levels, either by jurisdictions acting independently or in co-operation or collaboration with other 
jurisdictions. 
For example, introducing choice and diversity in the provision of human services (see 
Recommendation 2) and incorporating competition considerations in planning and zoning rules (see 
Recommendation 9) can be implemented by jurisdictions individually and do not require national 
co-ordination. Similarly, the Australian Government and all States and Territories can undertake their 
own reviews of regulatory restrictions on competition (see Recommendation 8); competitive 
neutrality policy (see Recommendation 15); and government policies governing commercial 
arrangements (see Recommendation 18).  
Nevertheless, the Panel recommends collaboration and co-ordination across jurisdictions as more 
likely to deliver lasting benefits to Australians (see Box 29.2). 
                                                          
786 Council of Australian Governments, Conduct Code Agreement, National Competition Policy. 
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Box 29.2: Collaboration and co-ordination: the example of the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (NDIS) 
Notwithstanding that disability services were the province of state and territory governments, in 
2011 ‘all governments recognised that addressing the challenges in disability services will require 
shared and co-ordinated effort’.787 The NDIS was created to provide insurance cover for all 
Australians in the event of significant disability. 
Implementing the NDIS will be informed by a number of trial sites around Australia. The NDIS trial 
in Western Australia is unique because two different disability service models will be tried in 
separate locations. The Australian Government NDIS trial site (in the Perth Hills region) will run in 
parallel with two Western Australian Government trial sites (the Lower South West region and the 
Cockburn/Kwinana region).  
The trial arrangements will: 
… allow for the assessment and comparison of the merits of the different approaches to 
disability services and help determine and inform the national roll-out of disability 
reform.788 
The Western Australian and Australian governments have established a jointly-chaired steering 
committee to share information and provide advice on the comparative evaluation of the two trial 
models. 
In recognition of the work already undertaken by Western Australia, the bilateral agreement 
establishes that an aim of parallel trials is to ‘preserve and enhance the investments that WA has 
made in its disability sector’.789 This example illustrates how progress towards a national agenda 
need not entail individual jurisdictions compromising their existing policies and can incorporate 
different approaches. 
Cost-reflective road user–charges (see Recommendation 3) can be introduced by jurisdictions 
unilaterally. However, the Panel’s recommended approach of revenue-neutrality would require 
co-ordination to secure the Australian Government’s agreement to reduce fuel excise. 
The recommended review of potentially anti-competitive regulation against a public interest test 
(see Recommendation 8) is a key area for collaboration and co-operation among jurisdictions. 
Priority areas for review will differ across jurisdictions and their identification should remain the 
responsibility of each government. COAG is currently engaged in a process of regulatory review and 
jurisdictions should benefit from continued collaboration.  
The Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) (see Recommendation 43) will provide a forum 
for all governments to share and learn from their respective experiences.  
The Panel recommends that the Australian Government discuss the Panel’s Final Report with the 
States and Territories as soon as practicable to enable all governments to make considered 
                                                          
787 Council of Australian Governments Meeting 2011, Communique 19 August 2011, Canberra, page 4. 
788 Council of Australian Governments 2014, National Partnership Agreement on Trial of My Way Sites, Canberra, page 2. 
789 Council of Australian Governments 2014, Bilateral Agreement for NDIS Trial between the Commonwealth and Western 
Australia, Canberra, page 3. 
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responses. This would also allow governments to consider aspects of the reform agenda where they 
might see value in collaboration.  
It will also be important for progress on implementing reforms to be monitored and further analysis 
to be available to jurisdictions as they initiate plans, develop pilots and assess the results of trials. 
The ACCP should provide a formal mechanism for encouraging and assisting collaboration. 
Recommendation 55 — Implementation 
The Australian Government should discuss this Report with the States and Territories as soon as 
practicable following its receipt.  
Mechanism for progressing reform 
Progress in priority areas of reform across the Commonwealth and the States and Territories will 
benefit from a number of ancillary processes:  
• advocacy for, and education, in competition policy; 
• independent monitoring and public reporting of progress in implementing agreed reforms; 
• independent analysis and advice on potential areas of competition reform across all levels of 
government; 
• continual review of regulations and regulatory compliance arrangements to ensure they meet 
the public interest test (as set out in Chapter 10), particularly with regard to barriers to entry 
for new competitors; 
• orchestrating co-ordination and co-operation on projects; 
• making recommendations to governments on specific market design and regulatory issues; 
and 
• undertaking research into competition policy developments in Australia and overseas. 
The Panel recommends that these responsibilities be assigned to its proposed ACCP (see 
Recommendation 44), which would be accountable to the Australian Government and state and 
territory governments. In the Panel’s view, early establishment of the ACCP would catalyse the 
reform agenda. 
Once each jurisdiction has developed its implementation plan, the PC should be tasked with 
modelling the benefits of proposed reforms to determine whether the benefits enjoyed by each 
jurisdiction are commensurate with its reform effort. The ACCP might then be invited to recommend 
the mechanism for competition payments with a view to matching reform effort with the benefits of 
reform across jurisdictions (see Recommendation 48). 
The ‘road map’ in Section 29.3 illustrates recommendations that fall into one of three categories: 
recommendations that can be led by the Australian Government; recommendations that can be led 
by state and territory governments individually; or recommendations that would most benefit from 
the Australian Government and state and territory governments working in collaboration. 
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The Panel’s view 
Although a number of the Panel’s recommendations can be implemented in large part by 
individual jurisdictions, in many cases their benefits will be enhanced by co-operation or 
collaboration across jurisdictions. The proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) 
should provide a formal mechanism for encouraging and assisting co-operative and collaborative 
reform effort. Early establishment of the ACCP would catalyse the reform agenda. 
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30 BENEFITS OF REFORM 
As noted in Section 25.5, the Panel recommends that the Productivity Commission (PC) be tasked 
with modelling the revenue effects, in each jurisdiction, of reforms agreed by the Australian 
Government and state and territory governments in the wake of this Review (see 
Recommendation 48). This modelling would help inform the need for, and magnitude of, any 
competition payments, including taking account of assessments of reform effort made by the 
Australian Council for Competition Policy (ACCP) based on actually implementing reform measures, 
not on undertaking reviews. 
Prior to that modelling exercise, the Australian Government should task (within six months) the PC 
with modelling the proposed recommendations from this Review as a package (in consultation with 
jurisdictions) to support discussions on policy proposals to pursue (see Recommendation 56). 
Economic modelling of the impact of competition reform can serve various purposes. Attempts to 
quantify the impact of reform can provide guidance to the general community about the relative 
significance of particular reforms, giving a sense of magnitude and priority to particular reforms. 
Modelling can also address concerns about reforms, such as whether they are likely to have positive 
or negative regional or distributional effects.  
The Panel recognises that modelling the Review’s proposals will, in some instances, require adopting 
a range of alternative assumptions about implementation. For example, the Panel’s recommendation 
on delivery of human services envisages further work by governments, including developing 
implementation plans that reflect the unique characteristics of providing human services in each 
jurisdiction.  
Economic modelling is only one tool that can be used to illustrate the relative significance and 
priority attaching to particular reforms. By its nature, modelling requires making assumptions and 
judgments, which may not capture the finer detail and specifics of certain sectors or markets. In 
addition, economic modelling is often focused on measuring improvements in productivity and gross 
domestic product (GDP), which fail to capture the full range of benefits from reform. 
GDP is a measure of the total monetary value of the goods and services that a country produces. 
Productivity measures how effectively a country uses resources (labour and capital) to produce 
goods and services. Productivity will improve if we are able to produce more goods and services 
using the same (or fewer) resources. The benefits of productivity improvements flow into higher 
living standards for Australians. 
GDP and productivity are both important aspects of a country’s capability and progress, and they are 
generally chosen for modelling tasks because they are well-defined and measurable. But these 
concepts fail to capture some important benefits flowing from increased choice and competition, 
such as increases in convenience, satisfaction and personal wellbeing. They also fail to capture 
reduced inequality and/or improved access to goods and services that may flow from reforms. These 
potential improvements in people’s lives are crucial in building public acceptance of the case for 
reform. 
In addition, productivity is often poorly measured in the services sector, particularly in human 
services where there is significant government provision and most of the outputs produced are not 
sold at market prices. This may make it especially difficult to quantify the benefits of reforms to 
human services, such as those proposed in Recommendation 2, pertaining to improved quality and 
responsiveness of service provision. However, the improvement in people’s lives that can be 
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generated by better services, including better healthcare, education and disability care, is a major 
reason for pursuing reform, even if it is not possible to measure these benefits precisely. 
The Panel’s view 
The Panel considers that modelling the impact of the Review’s recommendations can provide 
guidance as to the relative significance of particular reforms, giving a sense of magnitude and 
priority for policy decision making. The Panel recognises that modelling the Review’s proposals 
will, in some instances, require a range of assumptions about implementation and, for this reason, 
modelling options should be specified in consultation with jurisdictions. 
Implementation 
The Australian Government should task (within six months) the PC with modelling the Review’s 
package of recommendations (in consultation with jurisdictions) to support discussions on policy 
proposals to pursue. The timing of this first-pass modelling exercise, and its links with modelling 
associated with Recommendation 48 on competition payments, is outlined below. 
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First-pass modelling (potential gains) 
of Competition Policy Review 
recommendations
Modelling undertaken in consultation with 
jurisdictions – to scope particular reforms
Inter-jurisdictional discussions on reforms 
to pursue
Second-pass modelling 
of agreed Commonwealth, State and 
Territory reforms, 
analysing any disproportionate revenue 
flows by jurisdiction
 
 
Recommendation 56 — Economic modelling 
The Productivity Commission should be tasked with modelling the recommendations of this 
Review as a package (in consultation with jurisdictions) to support discussions on policy proposals 
to pursue. 
Economic impacts of NCP reforms 
The impacts of the economic reforms flowing from the last major review of competition policy, the 
1993 Hilmer Review, were modelled at the request of governments on three occasions.  
First, in 1994 COAG requested that the then Industry Commission (the predecessor to the PC) assess 
the benefits to economic growth and revenue from implementing the Hilmer and related reforms. 
This was partly to assist in determining the magnitude and direction of competition payments.  
Benefits of Reform 
Part 6 — Implementation  495 
B
en
efits o
f R
efo
rm
 
 
B
en
efits o
f R
efo
rm
 
 
B
en
efits o
f R
efo
rm
 
 
The Industry Commission reported in 1995, suggesting that, in the long run, the Hilmer reforms 
would lead to a gain in real GDP of 5.5 per cent.790 This was an ‘outer envelope’ or ‘maximum effects’ 
estimate, which assumed that the proposed reforms were fully implemented and the economy had 
fully adjusted to the reforms. 
Importantly, the PC’s 1995 report noted that modelling is one way to provide support for reforms, 
but it is not the only way, and modelling cannot provide a complete measure of the worth of 
reforms: 
… it is clear that no single number can be produced to capture accurately the full benefits 
and costs of these reforms — no matter how much time might have been made available. 
Some of the reforms being considered are broad strategies rather than specific policy 
changes; or may even have the important but intangible effect of locking in gains from 
changes that have already been introduced. Moreover, some of the big gains from reform 
are likely to be of the dynamic kind that are difficult to predict, let alone measure… 
The best they [technical modelling exercises] can do is provide general indications of the 
direction and magnitude of the benefits that flow from these reforms of different sectors 
of Australian society.791 
Second, in 1999, the PC modelled a smaller sub-set of NCP reforms to determine their likely regional 
impacts. This report found that, at the regional level, implementing NCP reform was estimated to 
raise output higher than otherwise in all of the 57 regions tested, except one (Gippsland in Victoria). 
The report also found that, although the estimated impact of NCP differed across regions, there was 
no apparent bias against rural and regional areas, at least in output terms.792  
Third, in 2005, 12 years after the Hilmer Review, the PC completed another modelling exercise, 
which calculated that some selected reforms delivered under NCP were estimated to have raised 
GDP by around 2.5 per cent.793 The reforms modelled covered major parts of the infrastructure 
sector (including utilities, telecommunications and parts of transport) but did not pick up dynamic 
efficiency gains. The PC noted that the implication of this was that ‘the total boost to GDP from the 
reforms will ultimately be considerably larger than the [2.5 per cent] figure emerging from this 
particular modelling exercise’.794 
The PC’s 2005 report also included a distributional analysis, which showed that the benefits from the 
reforms flowed broadly among Australians, with real incomes rising across all income brackets. It also 
noted some of the specific changes brought about by NCP, such as: 
• directly reducing the prices of goods and services, such as electricity and milk; and 
• stimulating business innovation, customer responsiveness and choice.795 
                                                          
790 Industry Commission 1995, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms, Final Report, 
Canberra, page 53. 
791 Ibid.  
792 Productivity Commission 1999, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia: Modelling the 
Regional Impacts of National Competition Policy Reforms, Canberra, pages 9-10. 
793 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report no. 33, Canberra, page XVII. 
794 Ibid., page XVIII. 
795 Ibid., page XII. 
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A study of the impacts of the Panel’s recommendations in this Final Report as proposed, could allow 
specific policy proposals to be quantified using appropriate assessment tools. This could be helpful in 
determining the gains available from implementing proposals and the prioritisation of reforms.  
Overall benefits of competition policy reform 
As noted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it can be 
challenging to measure and find evidence of the link between competition policy and 
macroeconomic outcomes, such as productivity, innovation and growth as well as other 
determinants of wellbeing, such as inequality and employment.796 
In addition, productivity alone is insufficient to guide attention to areas where prospective gains to 
the economy are large and growing. For example, while it is difficult to measure productivity in 
industries such as health and education, given their size and share of the economy, and their likely 
growth over time, even relatively modest gains to productivity in these sectors could yield large gains 
to the economy. Also, if we allow productivity in these sectors to stagnate, their growing share of the 
economy will mean that Australian living standards decline over time. 
Another aspect of a sector’s contribution to the economy is its capacity to affect the performance of 
other industries. Some industries supply important inputs to other businesses, which are necessary 
for them to operate. While these sectors often supply directly to end-point consumers or for export, 
since they provide inputs to other businesses, they can also cascade good or poor performance 
through many other sectors of the economy. 
Many infrastructure and utilities industries are instrumental to the performance of other sectors that 
draw upon their inputs in the production process. Increasingly, service industries such as professional 
services (accounting/legal) or human services (health care and life-long education) also have a 
significant role to play in the productivity of other sectors of the Australian economy.  
Participants in consultations also suggested that there are many sectors, particularly in the services 
industries, where exposure to competition has been limited. This is in contrast to many goods 
industries, which have been increasingly opened to competition over the past decade or two and will 
be further exposed as globalisation continues.  
Technology and increasing use of global supply chains in the provision of services (e.g., incorporating 
offshore inputs such as outsourced call-centre functions or early-stage engineering services) is 
beginning to expose more services industries to competition. However, many services that require 
domestic contact with customers, including where regulatory restrictions limit domestic or 
international competition through various standards or professional certifications, may dampen 
Australia’s productivity and living standards over time if they are not exposed to greater competitive 
forces. 
There is also a range of sectors where unfinished business remains from earlier reforms proposed 
under the NCP framework. These include key markets with extensive interface with end-point 
consumers, such as taxis, pharmacies and book importers. These remain areas of keen interest to a 
wide range of consumers, with considerable potential for improvements in convenience, pricing and 
accessibility. 
                                                          
796 OECD 2014, Factsheet on how competition policy affects macro-economic outcomes, OECD, Paris. 
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Existing estimates of the benefits of specific competition reforms 
While the Panel suggests that the PC undertakes modelling of this Report’s recommendations, this 
section notes some previous work to quantify the benefits of various proposed competition reforms. 
These estimates are included for illustrative purposes only. The Panel does not endorse, nor has it 
verified, the results or findings from these studies. The studies do not represent a quantification of 
the likely impact of implementing any of the recommendations. Rather, they are included to give 
some sense of the gains which can flow from various competition reforms.  
Overall, the OECD has noted that the quality of competition policy is positively linked to productivity, 
and a substantial easing in anti-competitive regulation can raise a country’s productivity growth rate 
by over 1 per cent per annum.797 Raising productivity growth and hence Australian living standards is 
an important area of focus for this Review.  
In the area of human services (see Recommendation 2), it can be very difficult to measure 
productivity and to estimate the impact of policy changes on the economy. However, the benefits of 
reform are likely to be large and to extend beyond the individual — having a healthy, well-educated 
population benefits us all. At the individual level, having more choice and access to human services is 
likely to increase personal wellbeing, dignity and freedom, which is hard to measure but very 
important nonetheless. These services also make up a large and growing area of the economy. As an 
indication, the PC has noted that an efficiency improvement of 10 per cent in service delivery in the 
health care sector would deliver cost savings equivalent to around 1 per cent of GDP at the present 
time, and as much as 2 per cent by 2050.798  
With regard to road transport (see Recommendation 3), modelling the costs of road congestion has 
been attempted by various organisations, including the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and 
Regional Economics (BITRE). BITRE estimates that the avoidable costs of road congestion were 
around $9.4 billion in 2005 (comprising $3.5 billion in private time costs, $3.6 billion in business time 
costs, $1.2 billion in extra vehicle operating costs and $1.1 billion in extra air pollution costs).799 
With respect to the regulation of coastal shipping, a report commissioned by the Cement Industry 
Foundation modelled the impacts of the Shipping Reform Package introduced in 2012, which 
increased the regulatory burden on foreign ships in particular, including by imposing minimum 
voyage requirements and restricting the duration of certain licences. The report found that this 
regulation would reduce GDP by $242-466 million over the period from 2012 to 2025 and lead to an 
increase in freight rates of up to 16 per cent.800 In contrast, the Panel’s recommendation (see 
Recommendation 5) seeks to reduce regulation around coastal shipping and boost competition in the 
sector.  
In the area of taxis (see Recommendation 10), the Western Australian Economic Regulation 
Authority has estimated there would be a net benefit to the Perth community of up to $39 million 
per annum from reform of the Western Australian taxi industry (being a $70 million benefit to 
                                                          
797 OECD 2014, Factsheet on how competition policy affects macro-economic outcomes, OECD, Paris, page 22. 
798 Productivity Commission 2005, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report no. 33, Canberra, page XLIII. 
799 Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 2007, Estimating urban traffic and congestion cost trends 
for Australian cities, Working paper 71, Canberra, page XV. 
800 Report for the Cement Industry Foundation by Deloitte Access Economics 2012, Economic Impacts of the Proposed 
Shipping Reform Package, page iii, Cement Industry Federation. 
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consumers partly offset by a loss to taxi plate owners).801 IPART has found that between 15 per cent 
and 20 per cent of Sydney taxi fares is received by taxi plate owners as economic rent (sub, page 7).  
In respect of parallel imports (see Recommendation 13), the PC found that, in 2007-08, a selection of 
around 350 books sold in Australia were on average 35 per cent more expensive than like editions 
sold in the US. In many cases, the price difference was greater than 50 per cent.802 
In regard to planning and zoning (see Recommendation 9), in New South Wales, a recent study 
commissioned by the state government into the potential benefits of comprehensively reforming 
planning and zoning in that state showed net benefits ranging between $569 million and $1,482 
million per annum, depending on the reform option considered.803 
In respect of retail trading hours (see Recommendation 12), the Queensland Competition Authority 
recommended full deregulation of retail trading hours in 2013. It found the net potential benefit to 
Queensland of removing the current restrictions was as much as $200 million per annum, noting that 
the ‘potential benefits of the reform include an increase in retail productivity, more shopping 
convenience for the broader community and lower prices’.804 
 
                                                          
801 Western Australian Economic Regulation Authority 2014, Inquiry into Microeconomic Reform in Western Australia: 
Final report, Perth, page 294. 
802 Productivity Commission 2009, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Books, Research Report, Canberra, 
page XVIII. 
803 Centre for International Economics 2013, Reform of the NSW planning system, Better Regulation Statement, prepared 
for NSW Planning and Infrastructure, Sydney, pages 6-7. 
804 Queensland Competition Authority Office of Best Practice Regulation 2013, Measuring and Reducing the Burden of 
Regulation, Final Report, Brisbane, pages 33 and 39. 
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APPENDIX A — COMPETITION AND CONSUMER ACT 2010 — 
MODEL LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Part I—Preliminary 
2A Application of Act to Commonwealth and Commonwealth 
authorities 
 (1) Subject to this section and sections 44AC, 44E and 95D, this 
Act binds the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in so far as 
the Crown in right of the Commonwealth engages in trade or 
commerce, either directly or by an authority of the 
Commonwealth. 
 (2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, this Act 
applies as if: 
 (a) the Commonwealth, in so far as it engages in trade or 
commerce, otherwise than by an authority of the 
Commonwealth; and 
 (b) each authority of the Commonwealth (whether or not 
acting as an agent of the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth) in so far as it engages in trade or 
commerce; 
were a corporation. 
 (3) Nothing in this Act makes the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth liable to a pecuniary penalty or to be 
prosecuted for an offence. 
 (3A) The protection in subsection (3) does not apply to an authority 
of the Commonwealth. 
 (4) Part IV does not apply in relation to the Commonwealth 
developing, and disposing of interests in, land in the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
2B Application of Act to States and Territories 
 (1) The following provisions of this Act bind the Crown in right of 
each of the States, of the Northern Territory and of the 
Australian Capital Territory, so far as the Crown engages in 
trade or commerce, either directly or by an authority of the State 
or Territory: 
 (a) Part IV; 
 (b) Part XIB; 
 (c) the other provisions of this Act so far as they relate to the 
above provisions. 
 (2) Nothing in this Act renders the Crown in right of a State or 
Territory liable to a pecuniary penalty or to be prosecuted for an 
offence. 
Recommendation 24 
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 (3) The protection in subsection (2) does not apply to an authority 
of a State or Territory. 
2BA Application of Part IV to local government bodies 
 (1) Part IV applies in relation to a local government body only to 
the extent that it engages in trade or commerce, either directly 
or by an incorporated company in which it has a controlling 
interest. 
 (2) In this section: 
local government body means a body established by or under a 
law of a State or Territory for the purposes of local government, 
other than a body established solely or primarily for the 
purposes of providing a particular service, such as the supply of 
electricity or water. 
2C Activities that are not in trade or commerce 
 (1) For the purposes of sections 2A, 2B and 2BA, the following do 
not amount to engaging in trade or commerce: 
 (a) imposing or collecting: 
 (i) taxes; or 
 (ii) levies; or 
 (iii) fees for licences; 
 (b) granting, refusing to grant, revoking, suspending or 
varying licences (whether or not they are subject to 
conditions); 
 (c) a transaction involving: 
 (i) only persons who are all acting for the Crown in 
the same right (and none of whom is an authority 
of the Commonwealth or an authority of a State or 
Territory); or 
 (ii) only persons who are all acting for the same 
authority of the Commonwealth; or 
 (iii) only persons who are all acting for the same 
authority of a State or Territory; or 
 (iv) only the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and 
one or more non-commercial authorities of the 
Commonwealth; or 
 (v) only the Crown in right of a State or Territory and 
one or more non-commercial authorities of that 
State or Territory; or 
 (vi) only non-commercial authorities of the 
Commonwealth; or 
 (vii) only non-commercial authorities of the same State 
or Territory; or 
 (viii) only persons who are all acting for the same local 
government body (within the meaning of 
section 2BA) or for the same incorporated 
company in which such a body has a controlling 
interest; 
Recommendation 24 
Recommendation 24 
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 (d) the acquisition of primary products by a government 
body under legislation, unless the acquisition occurs 
because: 
 (i) the body chooses to acquire the products; or 
 (ii) the body has not exercised a discretion that it has 
under the legislation that would allow it not to 
acquire the products. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the things that do not amount to 
engaging in trade or commerce for the purposes of sections 2A, 
2B and 2BA. 
 (3) In this section: 
acquisition of primary products by a government body under 
legislation includes vesting of ownership of primary products in 
a government body by legislation. 
enactment means an Act or an instrument (including rules, 
regulations or by-laws) made under an Act. 
government body means the Commonwealth, a State, a 
Territory, an authority of the Commonwealth or an authority of 
a State or Territory. 
licence means a licence, permission, authority or right granted 
under an enactment that allows the licensee to supply goods or 
services. 
primary products means: 
 (a) agricultural or horticultural produce; or 
 (b) crops, whether on or attached to the land or not; or 
 (c) animals (whether dead or alive); or 
 (d) the bodily produce (including natural increase) of 
animals. 
 (4) For the purposes of this section, an authority of the 
Commonwealth or an authority of a State or Territory is 
non-commercial if: 
 (a) it is constituted by only one person; and 
 (b) it is neither a trading corporation nor a financial 
corporation. 
4 Interpretation 
 (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears: 
competition includes competition from goods imported or 
capable of being imported into Australia, or from services 
rendered or capable of being rendered in Australia, by persons 
not resident or not carrying on business in Australia. 
contract includes a covenant and a lease or licence of land or 
buildings. 
Recommendation 25 
Recommendation 23 
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5 Extended application of this Act to conduct outside Australia 
  Each of the following provisions: 
 (a) Part IV; 
 (b) Part XI; 
 (c) the Australian Consumer Law (other than Part 5-3); 
 (d) the remaining provisions of this Act (to the extent to 
which they relate to any of the provisions covered by 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c)); 
extends to the engaging in conduct outside Australia by any 
person in so far as the conduct relates to trade or commerce. 
Note: Section 4 defines trade or commerce to mean trade or commerce 
within Australia or between Australia and places outside 
Australia. 
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Part IV—Anti-competitive conduct 
Division 1—Cartel conduct 
Subdivision A—Introduction 
45 Simplified outline [currently section 44ZZRA] 
  The following is a simplified outline of this Division: 
• This Division sets out parallel offences and civil penalty 
provisions relating to cartel conduct. 
• A corporation must not make, or give effect to, a contract, 
arrangement or understanding that contains a cartel 
provision. 
• A cartel provision is a provision relating to: 
 (a) price-fixing; or 
 (b) restricting outputs in the production and supply 
chain; or 
 (c) allocating customers, suppliers or territories; or 
 (d) bid-rigging; 
 by parties that are, or would otherwise be, in competition 
with each other. 
45A Definitions [currently section 44ZZRB] 
  In this Division: 
annual turnover, of a body corporate during a 12-month 
period, means the sum of the values of all the supplies that the 
body corporate, and any body corporate related to the body 
corporate, have made, or are likely to make, during the 
12-month period, other than: 
 (a) supplies made from any of those bodies corporate to any 
other of those bodies corporate; or 
 (b) supplies that are input taxed; or 
 (c) supplies that are not for consideration (and are not 
taxable supplies under section 72-5 of the A New Tax 
System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999); or 
 (d) supplies that are not made in connection with an 
enterprise that the body corporate carries on; or 
 (e) supplies that are not connected with Australia. 
Expressions used in this definition that are also used in the A 
New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 have the 
same meaning as in that Act. 
Recommendation 27 
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benefit includes any advantage and is not limited to property. 
evidential burden, in relation to a matter, means the burden of 
adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable 
possibility that the matter exists or does not exist. 
production includes research, development, manufacture, 
processing, treatment, assembly, disassembly, renovation, 
restoration, growing, raising, mining, extraction, harvesting, 
fishing, capturing and gathering. 
45B Cartel provisions [currently section 44ZZRD] 
 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a provision of a contract, 
arrangement or understanding is a cartel provision if: 
 (a) (price fixing) the provision has the purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect, of fixing, controlling or 
maintaining the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate 
or credit in relation to, goods or services that are supplied 
or acquired by any party to the contract, arrangement or 
understanding in competition with any other party; 
 (b) (restricting output) the provision has the purpose of 
preventing, restricting or limiting: 
 (i) the production or the supply by any party to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding of goods or 
services that are supplied by that party in 
competition with any other party; 
 (ii) the acquisition by any party to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding of goods or services 
that are acquired by that party in competition with 
any other party; 
 (c) (market allocation) the provision has the purpose of 
allocating to or from any party to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding: 
 (i) the persons or classes of persons to whom that 
party may supply, or from whom that person may 
acquire, goods or services in competition with any 
other party; or 
 (ii) the geographical areas in which that party may 
supply or acquire goods or services in competition 
with any other party; 
 (d) (bid rigging) the provision has the purpose of restricting 
whether, or the terms on which, or the extent to which, 
any party to the contract, arrangement or understanding 
may bid in competition with any other party in response 
to a request for bids for the supply or acquisition of goods 
or services. 
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Competition 
 (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a party to a contract, 
arrangement or understanding supplies goods or services in 
competition with another party if and only if: 
 (a) those parties or any of their respective related bodies 
corporate are, or are likely to be, in competition with 
each other; or 
 (b) but for the provision of any contract, arrangement or 
understanding, those parties or any of their respective 
related bodies corporate would be, or would be likely to 
be, in competition with each other, 
  in relation to the supply of the goods or services in trade or 
commerce. 
Note: Section 4 defines trade or commerce to mean trade or commerce 
within Australia or between Australia and places outside 
Australia. 
 (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), a party to a contract, 
arrangement or understanding acquires goods or services in 
competition with another party if and only if: 
 (a) those parties or any of their respective related bodies 
corporate are, or are likely to be, in competition with 
each other; or 
 (b) but for the provision of any contract, arrangement or 
understanding, those parties or any of their respective 
related bodies corporate would be, or would be likely to 
be, in competition with each other, 
  in relation to the acquisition of the goods or services in trade or 
commerce. 
Note: Section 4 defines trade or commerce to mean trade or commerce 
within Australia or between Australia and places outside 
Australia. 
 (4) For the purposes of subsection (1), a party to a contract, 
arrangement or understanding does not supply or acquire goods 
or services in competition with another party if those parties are 
related bodies corporate. 
Immaterial whether particular circumstances or particular 
conditions 
 (5) It is immaterial whether the cartel provision only applies in 
particular circumstances or on particular conditions. 
Considering related provisions 
 (6) For the purposes of this Division, a provision of a contract, 
arrangement or understanding is taken to have the purpose, 
effect or likely effect mentioned in subsection (1) if the 
provision, when considered together with: 
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 (a) the other provisions of the contract, arrangement or 
understanding; or 
 (b) the provisions of another contract, arrangement or 
understanding to which at least one of the parties to the 
first-mentioned parties is a party, 
  has that purpose, effect or likely effect. 
Subdivision B—Offences etc. 
45C Making a contract etc. containing a cartel provision [currently 
section 44ZZRF] 
Offence 
 (1) A corporation commits an offence if: 
 (a) the corporation makes a contract or arrangement, or 
arrives at an understanding; and 
 (b) the contract, arrangement or understanding contains a 
cartel provision. 
Note: Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code sets out the general principles of 
criminal responsibility. 
 (2) The fault element for paragraph (1)(b) is knowledge or belief. 
Penalty 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction 
by a fine not exceeding the greater of the following: 
 (a) $10,000,000; 
 (b) if the court can determine the total value of the benefits 
that: 
 (i) have been obtained by one or more persons; and 
 (ii) are reasonably attributable to the commission of 
the offence; 
  3 times that total value; 
 (c) if the court cannot determine the total value of those 
benefits—10% of the corporation’s annual turnover 
during the 12-month period ending at the end of the 
month in which the corporation committed, or began 
committing, the offence. 
Indictable offence 
 (4) An offence against subsection (1) is an indictable offence. 
45D Giving effect to a cartel provision [currently section 44ZZRG] 
Offence 
 (1) A corporation commits an offence if: 
 (a) a contract, arrangement or understanding contains a cartel 
provision; and 
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 (b) the corporation gives effect to the cartel provision. 
Note: Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code sets out the general principles of 
criminal responsibility. 
 (2) The fault element for paragraph (1)(a) is knowledge or belief. 
Penalty 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction 
by a fine not exceeding the greater of the following: 
 (a) $10,000,000; 
 (b) if the court can determine the total value of the benefits 
that: 
 (i) have been obtained by one or more persons; and 
 (ii) are reasonably attributable to the commission of 
the offence; 
  3 times that total value; 
 (c) if the court cannot determine the total value of those 
benefits—10% of the corporation’s annual turnover 
during the 12-month period ending at the end of the 
month in which the corporation committed, or began 
committing, the offence. 
Pre-commencement contracts etc. 
 (4) Paragraph (1)(a) applies to contracts or arrangements made, or 
understandings arrived at, before, at or after the commencement 
of this section. 
Indictable offence 
 (5) An offence against subsection (1) is an indictable offence. 
45E Determining guilt [currently section 44ZZRH] 
 (1) A corporation may be found guilty of an offence against 
section 45C or 45D even if: 
 (a) each other party to the contract, arrangement or 
understanding is a person who is not criminally 
responsible; or 
 (b) subject to subsection (2), all other parties to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding have been acquitted of the 
offence. 
 (2) A corporation cannot be found guilty of an offence against 
section 45C or 45D if: 
 (a) all other parties to the contract, arrangement or 
understanding have been acquitted of such an offence; 
and 
 (b) a finding of guilt would be inconsistent with their 
acquittal. 
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45F Court may make related civil orders [currently 
section 44ZZRI] 
  If a prosecution against a person for an offence against 
section 45C or 45D is being, or has been, heard by a court, the 
court may: 
 (a) grant an injunction under section 80 against the person in 
relation to: 
 (i) the conduct that constitutes, or is alleged to 
constitute, the offence; or 
 (ii) other conduct of that kind; or 
 (b) make an order under section 86C, 86D, 86E or 87 in 
relation to the offence. 
Subdivision C—Civil penalty provisions 
45G Making a contract etc. containing a cartel provision [currently 
section 44ZZRJ] 
  A corporation contravenes this section if: 
 (a) the corporation makes a contract or arrangement, or 
arrives at an understanding; and 
 (b) the contract, arrangement or understanding contains a 
cartel provision. 
Note: For enforcement, see Part VI. 
45H Giving effect to a cartel provision [currently section 44ZZRK] 
 (1) A corporation contravenes this section if: 
 (a) a contract, arrangement or understanding contains a cartel 
provision; and 
 (b) the corporation gives effect to the cartel provision. 
Note: For enforcement, see Part VI. 
 (2) Paragraph (1)(a) applies to contracts or arrangements made, or 
understandings arrived at, before, at or after the commencement 
of this section. 
Subdivision D—Exceptions 
45I Joint ventures [currently section 44ZZRO] 
 (1) Sections 45C, 45D, 45G, and 45H do not apply in relation to a 
contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel 
provision if: 
 (a) the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding 
are in a joint venture for the production, supply, 
acquisition or marketing of goods or services; and 
 (b) the cartel provision: 
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 (i) relates to goods or services that are acquired, 
produced, supplied or marketed by or for the 
purposes of the joint venture; 
 (ii) is reasonably necessary for undertaking the joint 
venture; or 
 (iii) is for the purpose of the joint venture. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in 
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code) and 
subsection (2) of this section. 
 (2) A person who wishes to rely on subsection (1) in relation to a 
contravention of section 45G or 45H bears an evidential burden 
in relation to that matter. 
45J Restrictions in supply and acquisition agreements [currently 
section 44ZZRS] 
 (1) Sections 45C, 45D, 45G and45H do not apply in relation to a 
contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel 
provision in so far as the cartel provision: 
 (a) is imposed by a person (the supplier) in connection with 
the supply of goods or services to another person (the 
acquirer) and relates to: 
 (i) the supply of the goods or services by the acquirer 
to the acquirer; 
 (ii) the acquisition by the acquirer of goods or services 
that are substitutable for or otherwise competitive 
with the goods or services from others; or 
 (iii) the supply by the acquirer of the goods or services 
or goods or services that are substitutable for or 
otherwise competitive with the goods or services; 
 (b) is imposed by a person (the acquirer) in connection with 
the acquisition of goods or services from another person 
(the supplier) and relates to: 
 (i) the acquisition of the goods or services from the 
supplier; or 
 (ii) the supply by the supplier of the goods or services, 
or goods or services that are substitutable for or 
otherwise competitive with the goods or services, 
to others. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in 
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code) and 
subsection (2) of this section. 
 (2) A person who wishes to rely on subsection (1) in relation to a 
contravention of section 45G or 45H bears an evidential burden 
in relation to that matter. 
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45K Collective supply or acquisition of goods or services by the 
parties to a contract, arrangement or understanding [currently 
section 44ZZRV] 
 (1) Sections 45C, 45D, 45G and 45H do not apply in relation to a 
contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel 
provision, in so far as: 
 (a) the cartel provision has the purpose, or has or is likely to 
have the effect, mentioned in paragraph 45B(1)(a); and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) the cartel provision relates to the price for goods or 
services to be collectively acquired, whether 
directly or indirectly, by the parties to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding; or 
 (ii) the cartel provision is for the joint advertising of 
the price for the re-supply of goods or services so 
acquired. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in 
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code and 
subsection (2) of this section). 
 (2) A person who wishes to rely on subsection (1) in relation to a 
contravention of section 45G or 45H bears an evidential burden 
in relation to that matter. 
45L Acquisition of shares or assets [currently section 44ZZRU] 
 (1) Sections 45C, 45D, 45G and 45H do not apply in relation to a 
contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel 
provision, in so far as the cartel provision provides directly or 
indirectly for the acquisition of: 
 (a) any shares in the capital of a body corporate; or 
 (b) any assets of a person. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in 
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code and 
subsection (2) of this section). 
 (2) A person who wishes to rely on subsection (1) in relation to a 
contravention of section 45G or 45H bears an evidential burden 
in relation to that matter. 
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Division 2—Other provisions 
45M Prohibited conduct [currently section 45] 
 (1) A corporation shall not: 
 (a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an 
understanding, if a provision of the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding has the purpose, or would 
have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition; 
 (b) give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding if that provision has the purpose, or has or 
is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition; or 
 (c) engage in a concerted practice with one or more other 
persons if the concerted practice has the purpose, or has 
or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition. 
 (2) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(a) and (b), competition 
means competition in any market in which a corporation that is 
a party to the contract, arrangement or understanding or would 
be a party to the proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, or any body corporate related to such a 
corporation, supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or 
acquire, goods or services or would, but for the provision of the 
contract, arrangement or understanding or the proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, supply or acquire, or be 
likely to supply or acquire, goods or services. 
 (3) For the purposes of the application of paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) 
in relation to a particular corporation, a provision of a contract, 
arrangement or understanding or of a proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding shall be deemed to have or to be 
likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition if 
that provision and any one or more of the following provisions, 
namely: 
 (a) the other provisions of that contract, arrangement or 
understanding or proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding; and 
 (b) the provisions of any other contract, arrangement or 
understanding or proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding to which the corporation or a related body 
corporate is or would be a party; 
  together have or are likely to have that effect. 
 (4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(c), competition means 
competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party 
to the concerted practice, or any body corporate related to the 
corporation, supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or 
acquire, goods or services or would, but for the practice, supply 
or acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or services. 
Recommendations 
28, 29 
Note: Section 45 has 
been renumbered 
45M, as a 
consequence of 
renumbering 
Division 1. 
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 (5) This section does not apply to or in relation to a contract, 
arrangement or understanding in so far as the contract, 
arrangement or understanding provides, or to or in relation to a 
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding in so far as the 
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding would 
provide, directly or indirectly for the acquisition of any shares 
in the capital of a body corporate or any assets of a person. 
 (6) This section does not apply to or in relation to a contract, 
arrangement or understanding, or a proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding, or a concerted practice, the only 
parties to which are or would be bodies corporate that are 
related to each other. 
45X Prohibition of contracts, arrangements or understandings 
affecting the supply or acquisition of goods or services 
[currently section 45E] 
Prohibition in a supply situation 
 (1) A person must not make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at 
an understanding, with an organisation of employees, an officer 
of such an organisation or a person acting for and on behalf of 
such an officer or organisation, if the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding contains a provision included for 
the purpose, or for purposes including the purpose, of: 
 (a) preventing or hindering the person from supplying goods 
or services to a second person; or 
 (b) preventing or hindering the person from supplying goods 
or services to a second person, except subject to a 
condition: 
 (i) that is not a condition to which the supply of such 
goods or services by the person to the second 
person has previously been subject because of a 
provision in a contract between those persons; and 
 (ii) that is about the persons to whom, the manner in 
which or the terms on which the second person 
may supply any goods or services. 
Prohibition in an acquisition situation 
 (2) A person must not make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at 
an understanding, with an organisation of employees, an officer 
of such an organisation or a person acting for and on behalf of 
such an officer or organisation, if the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding contains a provision included for 
the purpose, or for purposes including the purpose, of: 
 (a) preventing or hindering the person from acquiring goods 
or services from a second person; or 
 (b) preventing or hindering the person from acquiring goods 
or services from a second person, except subject to a 
condition: 
 (i) that is not a condition to which the acquisition of 
such goods or services by the person from the 
Recommendation 37 
Note: Section 45E has 
been renumbered 
45X, as a 
consequence of 
renumbering 
Division 1 
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second person has previously been subject because 
of a provision in a contract between those persons; 
and 
 (ii) that is about the persons to whom, the manner in 
which or the terms on which the second person 
may supply any goods or services. 
Situations to which section applies 
 (3) This section does not apply unless the first or second person is a 
corporation or both of them are corporations. 
No contravention if the other person gives written consent to 
written contract etc. 
 (4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a contract, arrangement 
or understanding if it is in writing and was made or arrived at 
with the written consent of the second person. 
Note: Conduct that would otherwise contravene this section can be 
authorised under subsection 88(7A). 
45Y Provisions contravening section 45X not to be given effect 
[currently section 45EA] 
  A person must not give effect to a provision of a contract, 
arrangement or understanding if, because of the provision, the 
making of the contract or arrangement, or the arriving at the 
understanding, by the person: 
 (a) contravened subsection 45X(1) or (2); or 
 (b) would have contravened subsection 45X(1) or (2) if: 
 (i) section 45X had been in force when the contract or 
arrangement was made, or the understanding was 
arrived at; and 
 (ii) the words “is in writing and” and “written” were 
not included in subsection 45X(4). 
Note: Conduct that would otherwise contravene this section can be 
authorised under subsection 88(7A). 
46 Misuse of market power 
 (1) A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market 
shall not engage in conduct if the conduct has the purpose, or 
would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition in that or any other market. 
 (2) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for 
the purposes of subsection (1), in determining whether conduct 
has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market, the court must 
have regard to: 
 (a) the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, or would 
have or be likely to have the effect, of increasing 
competition in the market including by enhancing 
Recommendation 30 
Recommendation 37 
Note: Section 45EA 
has been renumbered 
45Y, as a consequence 
of renumbering 
Division 1. 
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efficiency, innovation, product quality or price 
competitiveness in the market; and 
 (b) the extent to which the conduct has the purpose, or would 
have or be likely to have the effect, of lessening 
competition in the market including by preventing, 
restricting or deterring the potential for competitive 
conduct in the market or new entry into the market. 
 (3) If: 
 (a) a body corporate that is related to a corporation has, or 2 
or more bodies corporate each of which is related to the 
one corporation together have, a substantial degree of 
power in a market; or 
 (b) a corporation and a body corporate that is, or a 
corporation and 2 or more bodies corporate each of which 
is, related to that corporation, together have a substantial 
degree of power in a market; 
  the corporation shall be taken for the purposes of this section to 
have a substantial degree of power in that market. 
 (4) In determining for the purposes of this section the degree of 
power that a body corporate or bodies corporate has or have in a 
market, the court shall have regard to the extent to which the 
conduct of the body corporate or of any of those bodies 
corporate in that market is constrained by the conduct of: 
 (a) competitors, or potential competitors, of the body 
corporate or of any of those bodies corporate in that 
market; or 
 (b) persons to whom or from whom the body corporate or 
any of those bodies corporate supplies or acquires goods 
or services in that market. 
 (5) In determining for the purposes of this section the degree of 
power that a body corporate or bodies corporate has or have in a 
market, the court may have regard to the power the body 
corporate or bodies corporate has or have in that market that 
results from any contracts, arrangements or understandings, or 
proposed contracts, arrangements or understandings, that the 
body corporate or bodies corporate has or have, or may have, 
with another party or other parties. 
 (6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not limit the matters to which regard 
may be had in determining, for the purposes of this section, the 
degree of power that a body corporate or bodies corporate has 
or have in a market. 
 (7) For the purposes of this section, a body corporate may have a 
substantial degree of power in a market even though: 
 (a) the body corporate does not substantially control the 
market; 
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 (b) the body corporate does not have absolute freedom from 
constraint by the conduct of: 
 (i) competitors, or potential competitors, of the body 
corporate in that market; or 
 (ii) persons to whom or from whom the body corporate 
supplies or acquires goods or services in that 
market; 
 (c) one or more other bodies corporate have a substantial 
degree of power in that market. 
 (8) In this section: 
 (a) a reference to power is a reference to market power; 
 (b) a reference to a market is a reference to a market for 
goods or services; and 
 (c) a reference to power, or to conduct, in a market is a 
reference to power, or to conduct, in that market either as 
a supplier or as an acquirer of goods or services in that 
market. 
47 Exclusive dealing 
 (1) Subject to this section, a corporation shall not, in trade or 
commerce, engage in exclusive dealing conduct. 
 (2) A corporation (supplier) engages in exclusive dealing conduct 
if the corporation supplies, or offers to supply, goods or 
services to another person (acquirer), or does so at a particular 
price or with a particular discount, allowance, rebate or credit, 
subject to a condition (supplier condition): 
 (a) relating to the supply of those or other goods or services 
by the supplier to the acquirer; or 
 (b) preventing, restricting or limiting: 
 (i) the acquisition by the acquirer of goods or services 
from others; or 
 (ii) the supply by the acquirer of goods or services to 
others. 
 (3) A corporation (supplier) also engages in exclusive dealing 
conduct if the corporation refuses to supply goods or services to 
another person (acquirer), or refuses to do so at a particular 
price or with a particular discount, allowance, rebate or credit, 
for the reason that: 
 (a) the acquirer has not agreed to a supplier condition 
referred to in subsection (2); or 
 (b) the acquirer has previously acted inconsistently with a 
supplier condition referred to in subsection (2). 
 (4) A corporation (acquirer) engages in exclusive dealing conduct 
if the corporation acquires, or offers to acquire, goods or 
services from another person, or does so at a particular price or 
Recommendation 32 
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with a particular discount, allowance, rebate or credit, subject to 
a condition (acquirer condition): 
 (a) relating to the acquisition of those or other goods or 
services by the acquirer from the supplier; or 
 (b) preventing, restricting or limiting the supply by the 
supplier of goods or services to others. 
 (5) A corporation (acquirer) also engages in exclusive dealing 
conduct if the corporation refuses to acquire goods or services 
from another person (supplier), or refuses to do so at a 
particular price or with a particular discount, allowance, rebate 
or credit, for the reason that: 
 (a) the supplier has not agreed to an acquirer condition 
referred to in subsection (4); or 
 (b) the supplier has previously acted inconsistently with a 
acquirer condition referred to in subsection (4). 
 (6) Subsection (1) does not apply to exclusive dealing conduct 
unless: 
 (a) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct has the 
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market; or 
 (b) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct, and the 
engaging by the corporation, or by a body corporate 
related to the corporation, in other conduct of the same or 
a similar kind, together have or are likely to have the 
effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
 (7) Subsection (1) does not apply to exclusive dealing conduct if 
the only parties to the conduct are related bodies corporate.   
 (8) In this section: 
 (a) a reference to a condition shall be read as a reference to 
any condition, whether direct or indirect and whether 
having legal or equitable force or not, and includes a 
reference to a condition the existence or nature of which 
is ascertainable only by inference from the conduct of 
persons or from other relevant circumstances; 
 (b) a reference to competition shall be read as a reference to 
competition in any market in which: 
 (i) the corporation engaging in the conduct or any 
body corporate related to that corporation; or 
 (ii) any person whose business dealings are restricted, 
limited or otherwise circumscribed by the conduct 
or, if that person is a body corporate, any body 
corporate related to that body corporate; 
  supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, 
goods or services or would, but for the conduct, supply or 
acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or 
services. 
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Part VI—Enforcement and remedies 
83 Finding or admission of fact in proceedings to be evidence 
  In a proceeding against a person under section 82 or in an 
application under subsection 51ADB(1) or 87(1A) for an order 
against a person, a finding of any fact by a court or an 
admission of any fact by that person made in proceedings under 
section 77, 80, 81, 86C, 86D or 86E, or for an offence against 
section 45C or 45D, in which that person has been found to 
have contravened, or to have been involved in a contravention 
of, a provision of Part IV or IVB, or of section 60C or 60K, is 
prima facie evidence of that fact and the finding or admission 
may be proved by production of: 
 (a) a document under the seal of the court from which the 
finding or admission appears; or 
 (b) a document in which the admission was made. 
 
Recommendation 41 
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Part VII—Authorisations, notifications and block 
exemptions 
Division 1—Authorisations 
87ZP Definitions 
  In this Division:  
merger authorisation means an authorisation under subsection 
88(1) to a person to: 
 (a) acquire shares in the capital of a body corporate or to 
acquire assets of a person to which section 50 would or 
might apply; or 
 (b) acquire a controlling interest in a body corporate within 
the meaning of section 50A, 
  but does not include an authorisation where the conduct 
specified in the application includes conduct to which one or 
more provisions other than section 50 or 50A would apply.  
88 Power of Commission to grant authorisations  
 (1) Subject to this Part, the Commission may, upon application by 
or on behalf of a person, grant an authorisation to the person to 
engage in conduct specified in the application to which one or 
more provisions of Part IV would or might apply. 
Effect of authorisation 
 (2) While an authorisation under subsection (1) remains in force the 
provisions of Part IV do not apply to the applicant and any 
person referred to in subsections (8) and (9) engaging in the 
conduct specified in and in accordance with the authorisation. 
Note: The references to conduct and engaging in conduct in subsection 89(1) 
include the actions set out in subsection 4(2).  
Authorisation test 
 (3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), the Commission must not 
make a determination granting an authorisation under 
subsection (1) to engage in conduct specified in the application 
unless the Commission is satisfied in all the circumstances: 
 (a) that the conduct would not have the effect, or be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or  
 (b) that the conduct would result, or be likely to result, in a 
benefit to the public and that the benefit would outweigh 
the detriment to the public that would result, or be likely 
to result, from engaging in the conduct.  
 (4) Paragraph 3(a) does not apply to an application for 
authorisation for conduct to which [the cartel provisions], [the 
secondary boycott provisions] and the [resale price 
maintenance provisions] would apply. 
Recommendations 35 
and 38 
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 (5) In respect of a merger authorisation, in determining what 
amounts to a benefit to the public for the purposes of paragraph 
(3)(b): 
 (a) the Commission must regard the following as benefits to 
the public (in addition to any other benefits to the public 
that may exist apart from this paragraph): 
 (i) a significant increase in the real value of exports; 
 (ii) a significant substitution of domestic products for 
imported goods; and 
 (b) without limiting the matters that may be taken into 
account, the Commission must take into account all other 
relevant matters that relate to the international 
competitiveness of any Australian industry.  
Single application may deal with more than one type of conduct 
 (6) The Commission may grant a single authorisation in respect of 
all conduct specified in an application for authorisation or may 
grant separate authorisations in respect of any of the conduct. 
Conditions 
 (7) The Commission may grant an authorisation subject to such 
conditions as are specified in the authorisation. 
Other and future parties 
 (8) An authorisation granted by the Commission to a person to 
engage in conduct has effect as an authorisation in the same 
terms to every other person named or referred to in the 
application for authorisation as a party or proposed party to the 
conduct. 
 (9) An authorisation may be expressed so as to apply to particular 
persons or classes of persons who become a party to the 
conduct as specified in the authorisation.  
Past conduct 
 (10) The Commission does not have power to: 
 (a) grant an authorisation to a person in respect of any 
conduct undertaken before the Commission makes a 
determination in respect of the application; and  
 (b) in respect of a merger authorisation, grant authorisation 
in respect of an acquisition that has occurred. 
Withdrawal of application 
 (11) An applicant for authorisation may at any time, by writing to 
the Commission, withdraw the application.  
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Division 2—Notifications 
93 Notification of exclusive dealing or resale price maintenance 
 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a corporation that engages, or 
proposes to engage, in conduct of a kind referred to in sections 
47 or 48 or both may give to the Commission a notice setting 
out particulars of the conduct or proposed conduct. 
 (2) Where a corporation has given notice under subsection (1), 
section 47 or section 48 (as the case may be) does not prevent 
the corporation from engaging in the conduct referred to in the 
notice, unless: 
 (a) the Commission has given notice under subsection (3) 
and the conduct takes place more than 30 days (or such 
longer period as the Commission by writing permits) 
after the day on which the Commission gave the notice; 
or 
 (b) the notice has been withdrawn and the conduct takes 
place after the notice was withdrawn. 
 (3) If the Commission is satisfied in all the circumstances that a 
corporation engaging in conduct of a kind described in section 
47 and referred to in a notice given by the corporation under 
subsection (1): 
 (a) has, or would have or be likely to have, the effect of 
substantially lessening competition; and 
 (b) would not result, or is not likely to result, in a benefit to 
the public that would outweigh the detriment to the 
public constituted by any lessening of competition that 
has resulted, or is likely to result, from engaging in the 
conduct, 
  the Commission may at any time give notice in writing to the 
corporation stating that the Commission is so satisfied including 
a statement setting out its reasons for being so satisfied. 
 (4) If the Commission is satisfied in all the circumstances that a 
corporation engaging in conduct of a kind: 
 (a) described in section 48; or 
 (b) described in both section 47 and 48,  
and referred to in a notice given by the corporation under 
subsection (1) would not result, or is not likely to result, in a 
benefit to the public that would outweigh the detriment to the 
public from engaging in the conduct, the Commission may at 
any time give notice in writing to the corporation stating that 
the Commission is so satisfied including a statement setting out 
its reasons for being so satisfied. 
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Division 3—Block exemptions 
@XX Block exemptions 
 (1) The Commission may exempt particular conduct or categories 
of conduct from the provisions of Part IV (a block exemption) 
if the Commission is satisfied that: 
 (a) the conduct would not have the effect, or be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or  
 (b) the conduct would result, or be likely to result, in a 
benefit to the public and that the benefit would outweigh 
the detriment to the public constituted by any lessening of 
competition that would result, or be likely to result, from 
engaging in the conduct. 
 (2) A block exemption may apply generally or be limited such that 
it applies: 
 (a) to specified persons or classes of persons; 
 (b) in specified circumstances; or 
 (c) on specified conditions. 
 (3) A block exemption must provide that the exemption is to cease 
to have effect at the end of a specified period. 
 (4) While the block exemption is in force, the provisions of Part IV 
do not apply to a person to whom the block exemption applies 
engaging in conduct to which the block exemption applies in 
accordance with the terms of the block exemption. 
 (5) The Commission must maintain a public register that includes 
all block exemptions that have been granted, including those 
that are no longer in operation. 
 (6) In this Division “specified” means specified in a block 
exemption. 
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APPENDIX C — TERMS OF REFERENCE 
OVERVIEW 
An effective competition framework is a vital element of a strong economy that drives continued 
growth in productivity and living standards. It promotes a strong and innovative business sector and 
better outcomes for consumers. 
The Government has commissioned an independent ‘root and branch’ review of Australia’s 
competition laws and policy in recognition of the fact that the Australian economy has changed 
markedly since the last major review of competition policy in 1993. 
The key areas of focus for the review are to: 
• identify regulations and other impediments across the economy that restrict competition and 
reduce productivity, which are not in the broader public interest; 
• examine the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) to 
ensure that they are driving efficient, competitive and durable outcomes, particularly in light 
of changes to the Australian economy in recent decades and its increased integration into 
global markets; 
• examine the competition provisions and the special protections for small business in the CCA 
to ensure that efficient businesses, both big and small, can compete effectively and have 
incentives to invest and innovate for the future; 
• consider whether the structure and powers of the competition institutions remain 
appropriate, in light of ongoing changes in the economy and the desire to reduce the 
regulatory impost on business; and 
• review government involvement in markets through government business enterprises, direct 
ownership of assets and the competitive neutrality policy, with a view to reducing government 
involvement where there is no longer a clear public interest need. 
SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 
1. The Review Panel is to inquire into and make recommendations on appropriate reforms to 
improve the Australian economy and the welfare of Australians, not limited to the legislation 
governing Australia’s competition policy, in regard to achieving competitive and productive 
markets throughout the economy, by identifying and removing impediments to competition 
that are not in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest, having regard to the 
following principles and the policy priorities: 
1.1. no participant in the market should be able to engage in anti-competitive conduct 
against the public interest within that market and its broader value chain; 
1.2. productivity boosting microeconomic reform should be identified, centred on the 
realisation of fair, transparent and open competition that drives productivity, stronger 
real wage growth and higher standards of living; 
1.3. government should not be a substitute for the private sector where markets are, or can, 
function effectively or where contestability can be realised; and 
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1.4. the need to be mindful of removing wherever possible, the regulatory burden on 
business when assessing the costs and benefits of competition regulation. 
2. The Review Panel should also consider and make recommendations where appropriate, aimed 
at ensuring Australia’s competition regulation, policy, and regulatory agencies are effective in 
protecting and facilitating competition, provide incentives for innovation and creativity in 
business, and meet world’s best practice. 
3. The Review Panel should also consider whether the CCA and regulatory agencies are operating 
effectively, having regard to the regulatory balance between the Commonwealth and the 
States and Territories, increasing globalisation and developments in international markets, 
changing market and social structures, technological change, and the need to minimise 
business compliance costs, including:  
3.1. considering whether Australia’s highly codified competition law is responsive, effective 
and certain in its support of its economic policy objectives;  
3.2. examining whether the operations and processes of regulatory agencies are 
transparent, efficient, subject to appropriate external scrutiny and provide reasonable 
regulatory certainty; 
3.3. ensuring that the CCA appropriately protects the competitive process and facilitates 
competition, including by (but not limited to): 
3.3.1. examining whether current legislative provisions are functioning as intended in 
light of actual experience and precedent;  
3.3.2. considering whether the misuse of market power provisions effectively prohibit 
anti-competitive conduct and are sufficient to: address the breadth of matters 
expected of them; capture all behaviours of concern; and support the growth of 
efficient businesses regardless of their size; 
3.3.3. considering whether areas that are currently uncertain or rarely used in Australian 
law could be framed and administered more effectively;  
3.3.4. considering whether the framework for industry codes of conduct (with reference 
to State and Territory codes where relevant) and protections against unfair and 
unconscionable conduct, provide an adequate mechanism to encourage 
reasonable business dealings across the economy—particularly in relation to small 
business;  
3.3.5. whether existing exemptions from competition law and/or historic sector-specific 
arrangements (e.g. conditional offers between related businesses and immunities 
for providers of liner shipping services) are still warranted; and  
3.3.6. considering whether the National Access Regime contained in Part IIIA of the CCA 
(taking into account the Productivity Commission’s recent inquiry) is adequate; 
and,  
3.4. whether competition regulations, enforcement arrangements and appeal mechanisms 
are in line with international best practice, and: 
3.4.1. foster a productive and cost-minimising interface between the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and industry (for instance, 
through applications for immunity or merger clearances) that is simple, effective 
and well designed;  
3.4.2. provide appropriate mechanisms for enforcement and seeking redress including:  
Appendix C — Terms of Reference 
528 
• whether administration and enforcement of competition laws is being carried 
out in an effective, transparent and consistent way;  
• whether enforcement and redress mechanisms can be effectively used by 
people to enforce their rights—by small businesses in particular; and 
• the extent to which new enforcement powers, remedies or enhanced penalties 
might be necessary and appropriate to prohibit anti-competitive conduct, and 
3.4.3. can adequately address competition issues in emerging markets and across new 
technologies, particularly e-commerce environments, to promote 
entrepreneurship and innovation. 
4. The Review Panel should inquire into and advise on appropriate changes to legislation, 
institutional arrangements and other measures in relation to the matters below, having regard 
to the impact on long-term consumer benefits in relation to value, innovation, choice and 
access to goods and services, and the capacity of Australian business to compete both 
domestically and internationally. In particular, the Review Panel should:  
4.1. examine the structure and behaviour of markets with natural monopoly characteristics 
with a view to determining whether the existing regulatory frameworks are leading to 
efficient outcomes and whether there are opportunities to increase competition; 
4.2. examine whether key markets — including, but not limited to, groceries, utilities and 
automotive fuel — are competitive and whether changes to the scope of the CCA and 
related laws are necessary to enhance consumer, producer, supplier and retailer 
opportunities in those markets and their broader value chains; 
4.3. consider alternative means for addressing anti-competitive market structure, 
composition and behaviour currently outside the scope of the CCA;  
4.4. consider the impact of concentration and vertical integration in key Australian markets 
on the welfare of Australians ensuring that any changes to the coverage and nature of 
competition policy is consistent with national economic policy objectives;  
4.5. identify opportunities for removing unnecessary and inefficient barriers to entry and 
competition, reducing complexity and eliminating administrative duplication; and  
4.6. consider ways to ensure Australians can access goods and services at internationally 
competitive prices, including examining any remaining parallel import restrictions and 
international price discrimination. 
5. The Review Panel should also examine whether government business activities and services 
providers serve the public interest and promote competition and productivity, including 
consideration of separating government funding of services from service provision, 
privatisation, corporatisation, price regulation that improves price signals in non-competitive 
segments, and competitive neutrality policy. 
6. The Review Panel should consider and make recommendations on the most appropriate ways 
to enhance competition, by removing regulation and by working with stakeholders to put in 
place economic devices that ensure a fair balance between regulatory expectations of the 
community and self-regulation, free markets and the promotion of competition. 
The Review Panel should consider overseas experience insofar as it may be useful for the review. 
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The Review Panel may, where appropriate, draw on (but should not duplicate or re-visit) the work 
of other recent or current comprehensive reviews, such as the Commission of Audit and the 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Review for the National Broadband Network. 
The Review Panel should only consider the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 of the CCA) and 
corresponding provisions in Part 2, Division 2 of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001, to the extent they relate to protections (such as from unfair and 
unconscionable conduct) for small businesses. 
PROCESS 
The Review Panel is to ensure thorough engagement with all interested stakeholders. At a minimum, 
the Review Panel should publish an issues paper, hold public hearings and receive written 
submissions from all interested parties. 
The Review Panel should subsequently publish a draft report and hold further public consultations, 
before providing a final report to the Government within 12 months. 
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APPENDIX D — LIST OF NON-CONFIDENTIAL SUBMISSIONS 
All non-confidential submissions can be accessed at: http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au.  
DRAFT REPORT SUBMISSIONS 
ABB Australia Abdulla, I Accessible Publishing Systems Pty 
Ltd 
ACM Parts ACT Health ACT Policing 
Action for Public Transport NSW Advisory Council on Intellectual 
Property 
AGL Energy 
Aguiar, A AIPPI Australia Aldi Stores 
Alexander, D Alinta Energy Allen, R 
ALM Group Altman, G American Bar Association 
Anglican Church Diocese of 
Sydney 
Anglicare Sydney Anonymous 
Anonymous Retailer APA Group Applied Medical 
Arblaster, M Argyropoulos, S Arnold Bloch Leibler 
Asciano ASTRA Ashurst 
Australasian Association of 
Convenience Stores Limited 
Australasian Performing Right 
Association Limited & Australasian 
Mechanical Copyright Owners’ 
Society 
Australasian Professional Society 
on Alcohol and other Drugs 
Australian & International Pilots 
Association 
Australian Automobile Association Australian Automotive 
Aftermarket Association 
Australian Automotive Dealer 
Association 
Australian Booksellers Association 
Inc 
Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Australian Charities and 
Not-for-Profits Commission 
Australian Chicken Growers 
Council 
Australian Communications 
Consumer Action Network 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
Australian Copyright Council Australian Corporate Lawyers 
Association 
Australian Council of Trade Unions Australian Dairy Farmers Australian Dental Association 
Australian Diagnostic Imaging 
Association 
Australian Digital Alliance & 
Australian Libraries Copyright 
Committee 
Australian Drug Foundations 
Australian Education Union Australian Energy Market 
Commission 
Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
Australian Energy Regulator Australian Food and Grocery 
Council 
Australian Forest Products 
Association 
Australian Health Promotion 
Association 
Australian Imported Motor 
Vehicle Industry Association 
Australian Industry Group 
Australian Information Industry 
Association 
Australian Institute of Company 
Directors 
Australian Liquor Stores 
Association 
Australian Local Government 
Association 
Australian Logistics Council Australian Motor Industry 
Federation 
Australian National Retailers 
Association 
Australian Newsagents Federation Australian Peak Shippers 
Association 
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Australian Petroleum Production 
& Exploration Association 
Australian Pipeline Industry 
Association 
Australian Pork Limited 
Australian Private Hospitals 
Association 
Australian Property Institute 
(NSW Division) 
Australian Publishers Association 
Australian Rail Track Corporation Australian Recording Industry 
Association 
Australian Retailers Association 
Australian Screen Association Australian Society of Authors Australian Sugar Milling Council 
Australian Taxi Industry 
Association 
Australian Union of Students Australian United Retailers 
Australian Unity Australian Wagering Council Australian Water Association 
Auto Services Group Bain, D Baker & McKenzie 
Baking Association of Australia Ball, G Beaton-Wells, C and Fisse, B 
Benedetti, J Bhagwati Australia Bhela, A 
BHP Billiton Bi-Rite Roma Board of Airline Representatives 
of Australia 
Bond University Boral Brandrick, C 
Bridge, H Brimbank City Council Brisbane City Council 
Brooks, L Brown, D Brown, D C 
Brown, J Brown, P Brown, T 
Brownlie, P Business Council of Australia Business Council of Co-operatives 
and Mutuals 
Business SA Byrne, de Roos and Beaton-Wells Caldwell, D 
Cameron, S Campervan and Motorhome Club 
of Australia 
Cammarata, M 
Camp, R Cancer Council NSW Canegrowers 
Carr, E Carter, R Casper, Z 
Catholic Social Services Cement Industry Federation Central Markets of Australia 
Association 
Centre for International Finance 
and Regulation 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Queensland 
Chemist Warehouse 
Childers IGA CHOICE City of Melbourne 
City of Port Phillip City of Sydney Council Clarke, J 
Clarke, Professor P Colac Otway Shire Council Coles Group Limited 
Colhoun, D Comino, A Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
Communications Law Centre, UTS Community and Public Sector 
Union 
Community Employers WA 
Consult Australia Consumer Action Law Centre Consumer Utilities Advocacy 
Centre 
Consumers Federation of 
Australia 
Consumers Health Forum Copyright Agency 
Corones, S Costa, P Council of Private Higher 
Education 
Council of Small Business Australia Council of Textile and Fashion 
Industries of Australia 
Cowley, J 
Cox, A CPA Australia Crawford, C 
Appendix D — List of Non-Confidential Submissions 
532 
CropLife Australia CSIRO CSR Limited 
CSR Limited (submission 2) Cunningham, M Customer Owned Banking 
Association 
Daly, W Davis, T Denehy, M 
Department of Communications Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development 
Djokov, A 
Dodgshun, B DomGas Alliance Duke, A 
Dunbar, A eBay Economic Regulation Authority 
Edge, P Electronic Frontiers Australia EnergyAustralia 
Energy Networks Association Energy Supply Associations of 
Australia 
Entwistle, B 
Ergas, Professor H and Fels AO, 
Professor A 
Ergas, Professor H & Pincus, 
Professor J 
Family Business Australia 
Federal Chamber of Automotive 
Industries 
Financial Services Council  Ford Australia 
Foundation for Alcohol Research 
and Education 
Foxtel Francis, A 
Frontier Economics G4S Australia G&T Security 
Garland, A Glencore Coal Australia Global Shippers’ Forum 
Goldsworthy, J Google Grain Producers SA 
Greenpeace Greeve, K Growcom 
Guppy, D Hachette Australia Hackett, M 
Hamelink, F Harper Collins Publishers Australia Health Insurance Restricted and 
Regional Membership Association 
of Australia 
Heaton, L Heerey AM QC, P Heiller, J 
Helmore, B Hoad, R Hobson Bay Council 
Hogg, N Holden, A Holiday and Short Term Rental 
Industry Association 
Housing Industry Association of 
Australia 
HoustonKemp Ice Box Liquor 
Iddon, K IGA Cashmere IGA Tugun Beach 
IGA Walloon IGA X-Press Alexandra Hills IGA X-Press Kangaroo Point 
iiNet Independent Contractors 
Australia 
Independent Schools Council of 
Australia 
Independent Schools Victoria Industry Super Australia InfraShare Partners 
Ingham Family Medical Practice Institute of Patent and Trade 
Mark Attorneys of Australia 
Institute of Public Accountants 
Insurance Australia Group Insurance Council of Australia International Chamber of Shipping 
IPART Jacobs, A Jemena 
Jepson, P Jepson, P (submission 2) Jesuit Social Services 
JMP Parties Johnson, R Joint Councils of Social Service 
Jones Day Jones, P Just Vacuums 
Just Vacuums (submission 2) Justice & International Mission, 
Synod of Victoria & Tasmania, 
Uniting Church in Australia  
Kay, D 
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Kemp, K Kennedy, J Kepnock Residents Action Group 
Kiernan, T King, T Klerks, G 
Kosta, P Kouris, P KPMG 
Kypri, K Lacey, J Lanzon, R 
Large Format Retail Association Lateral Economics Law Council of Australia — 
Competition & Consumer 
Committee 
Law Council of Australia — 
IP Committee 
Law Council of Australia — 
SME Committee 
Lawrence, J 
Lawrence, J (submission 2) Leschen, R Leslie, P 
Local Government Association of 
Queensland 
Local Government Association of 
Tasmania 
Long, M 
Long, P Lynch Group QLD Lynch, T 
Mair, P Maleli, V Manly Council 
Manson, A Maribyrnong City Council Marks Supa IGA 
Marsden Jacob Associates Master Builders Australia Master Electricians Australia 
Master Grocers Australia and 
Liquor Retailers Australia  
MasterCard Mattingley, R 
McCusker Centre for Action on 
Alcohol and Youth 
McDougall, G McInnes, R 
Mclean, G McLeod, M McManus, J 
Medical Technology Association 
of Australia 
Melbourne Airport Menzies, G 
Minter Ellison Mitchelton IGA Express Moir, H 
Monash Business Policy Forum Morgan, W Morrison, C 
Motor Trades Association of 
Queensland 
Municipal Association of Victoria Myer Holdings 
National Alliance for Action on 
Alcohol 
National Centre for Education and 
Training on Addiction 
National Competition Council 
National Disability Services National Drug and Alcohol 
Research Centre 
National Employment Services 
Association 
National Farmers’ Federation National Insurance Brokers 
Association of Australia 
National Irrigators’ Council 
National Organisation for Fetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorders 
National Retail Association National Roads and Motorists’ 
Association 
National Seniors Australia Neal, J New Generation Earthmoving 
Fabrications 
New Zealand Commerce 
Commission 
Nick’s Supa IGA Nolan, R 
Noonans IGA Express/BP 
Ashgrove 
Northern Territory Government NSW Business Chamber 
NSW Government NSW Irrigators’ Council NSW Small Business 
Commissioner 
NSW Taxi Council O’Donnell, C Office of the Australian Small 
Business Commissioner 
Office of the Gene Technology 
Regulator 
Om Mahalaxmii Pty Ltd Optus 
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Origin Energy Orr, K Our Children, Our School 
Packer, B Palmer, M Parrella, R 
Partnering for Transformation Pattenden, B Pedersen, M 
Penguin Random House Pharmaceutical Society of 
Australia 
Pharmacy Guild of Australia 
Phibbs, P Piercy, D Planning Institute of Australia 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries 
Association 
Poulier, M Pratap, R 
Priestley, C Prince Supermarkets Printing Industries Association of 
Australia 
Public Health Association of 
Australia 
QBE Queensland Competition 
Authority 
Queensland Consumers 
Association 
Queensland Government Queensland Hotels Association 
Queensland IGA State Retail 
Board 
Queensland Law Society Queensland Nurses’ Union 
Queensland Writers Centre Quinn, N Raitt, G 
Ramsay Health Care RAWS Association RBB Economics 
Real Estate Institute of Australia Regional Victorian not-for-profit 
agencies 
Retail Guild of Australia 
Rio Tinto Ritchies Stores Robin Room 
Rodger, I Rose, G Roseworne, D 
Roy Hill Infrastructure Royal Australasian College of 
Physicians 
Rushbuey, G 
Russell Family Fetal Alcohol 
Disorders Association 
Ryans Supa IGA Rykris Pty Ltd 
SA Network of Drug and Alcohol 
Services 
Sandeva, V Sandeva, V (submission 2) 
Sandham, J Santos Retail Seafood Industry Victoria 
Seddon, N Shipping Australia Limited Shop Distributive and Allied 
Employees’ Association 
Shopping Centre Council of 
Australia 
Sidney, J Sigma Pharmaceuticals 
Slaughter, T Small Business Development 
Corporation 
Smith, D 
South Australian Freight Council 
Inc 
South Australian Government South Australian Independent 
Retailers 
Spier Consulting Legal Spinifex Press Standards Australia Ltd 
Stanley, M Steensby, W Steinwall, R 
Stevenson, H Stevenson, H (submission 2) Stewart, I 
Suncorp Group Supa IGA Maryborough Supa IGA Pialba 
Surf Beach IGA Sydney Alliance for Community 
Building 
Tack, S 
Tasmanian Government Tasmanian Small Business Council Taxi Council Queensland 
Ted Noffs Foundation ACT Telstra Text Publishing Company 
The Australian Chamber of Fruit 
and Vegetable Industries 
Toys and Things Thomas, R 
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Thompson, G Thurley, D Trad, K 
Transport Reform Network Tree Contractors Association 
Australia 
Turner, I 
Tyro Payments Limited Uber Unions NSW 
Uniting Care Australia UnitingCare Queensland Urban Development Institute of 
Australia 
Van de Zandt, A Vector Limited Vellenoweth, L 
Ventura Health Veryzer, J VicHealth 
Victorian Alcohol and other Drug 
Association 
Victorian Caravan Parks 
Association 
Victorian Local Governance 
Association 
Victorian Small Business 
Commissioner 
Virgin Australia Vodafone Hutchison Australia 
WA Independent Grocers 
Association 
Walton, F Water Services Association of 
Australia 
Watson, T Wesfarmers Westbury’s Mundingburra IGA 
Western Australian Local 
Government Association 
Western Australian Network of 
Alcohol and other Drug Agencies 
White’s Grocers 
Whitehead, R Whittaker, J Whitten, M 
Williams, S Wilson, J Woodward, L & Rubinstein, M 
Woolley, K Woolworths Limited Wright, D 
Wright, J Wright, J (submission 2) Wylie, I 
Zodins, K   
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ABB Australia Accountants and More ADJ Consultancy Services 
Agforce QLD AIMIA Digital Policy Group ALDI Stores 
American Bar Association AMMA Workplace Consultancy Anglo American Metallurgical Coal 
Anonomous, P Anonymous childcare Anonymous retailer 
Appco Group Australia Applied Medical Arblaster, M 
Arnold Bloch Leibler Asciano ASX 
Aurizon Holdings Limited AURL (FoodWorks) AusBiotech 
Australasian Association of 
Convenience Stores 
Australasian Performing Right 
Association Limited and 
Australasian Mechanical 
Copyright Owners’ Society 
Australia Marketing Pty Ltd 
Australian Airports Association Australian Automobile Association Australian Automobile Association 
(updated submission) 
Australian Automotive Dealer 
Association 
Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Australian Chicken Growers’ 
Council Limited 
Australian Clinical Psychologists Australian College of Theology Australian Communications 
Consumer Action Network 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
(submission 2) 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
(submission 3) 
Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
(submission 4) 
Australian Conservation 
Foundation 
Australian Copyright Council 
Australian Corporate Lawyers 
Association 
Australian Council of Trade Unions Australian Dairy Farmers Limited 
Australian Dental Association Inc. Australian Dental Industry 
Association 
Australian Diagnostic Imaging 
Association 
Australian Digital Alliance and 
Australian Libraries Copyright 
Committee 
Australian Education Union Australian Energy Market 
Commission 
Australian Energy Regulator Australian Food and Grocery 
Council 
Australian Forest Products 
Association 
Australian Friendly Societies 
Pharmacies Association 
Australian Healthcare and 
Hospitals Association 
Australian Hotels Association 
Australian Industry Group Australian Information Industry 
Association 
Australian Institute of Petroleum 
Australian International Movers 
Association 
Australian Lawyers for Human 
Rights 
Australian Liquor Stores 
Association 
Australian Motor Industry 
Federation 
Australian National Retailers 
Association 
Australian Network of 
Environmental Defender’s Offices 
Australian Newsagents’ 
Federation 
Australian Organisation for 
Quality 
Australian Payments Clearing 
Association 
Australian Peak Shippers 
Association Inc. 
Australian Petroleum Production 
and Exploration Association 
Australian Physiotherapy 
Association 
Australian Pipeline Industry 
Association 
Australian Prawn Farmers 
Association 
Australian Private Hospitals 
Association 
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Australian Recording Industry 
Association 
Australian Retailers Association Australian Society of Authors 
Australian Subscription Television 
and Radio Association 
Australian Taxi Industry 
Association 
Baker and McKenzie 
Baxt, B AO Beadman, B Beaton-Wells, C 
Beaton-Wells, C and Fisse, B Beck, K R Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, BOQ, 
ME Bank and Suncorp Bank 
BHP Billiton (updated submission) Birve, A Board of Airline Representatives 
of Australia 
Bond University Border, A Brewers Association of Australia 
and New Zealand Inc. 
Bright, S Bus Industry Confederation Business Council of Australia 
Business Council of Australia 
(submission 2) 
Business Council of Cooperatives 
and Mutuals 
Business SA 
Cabfare Callaghan, J Caltex Australia Limited 
Canegrowers CBH Group Cement Concrete and Aggregates 
Australia 
Cement Industry Federation Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Queensland 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (WA) 
Chemist Warehouse Chi-X Australia CHOICE 
Cider Australia City of Whittlesea Clarke, G 
Clean Energy Council Coles Group Limited Collins, C 
Combined Small Business Alliance 
of WA 
Community and Public Sector 
Union 
Community Employers WA 
Complementary Healthcare 
Council of Australia 
Construction Material Processors 
Association 
Consult Australia 
Consumer Action Law Centre Consumers Health Forum of 
Australia 
Consumers Health Forum of 
Australia (supplementary) 
Consumers SA Consumers SA (updated 
submission) 
Consumers’ Federation of 
Australia 
Copyright Agency Council of Private Higher 
Education Inc. 
Council of Small Business 
Organisations of Australia 
CPA Australia Credit Ombudsman Service 
Limited 
CSR Limited 
Customer Owned Banking 
Association 
Direct Selling Association of 
Australia 
Discover Murray River 
Drakes Supermarkets Duke, A eBay 
Edge, P EnergyAustralia Energy Networks Association 
Energy Retailers Association of 
Australia 
Energy Supply Association of 
Australia 
Eqalex Underwriting Pty Ltd 
Federal Chamber of Automotive 
Industries 
Federation of National 
Associations of Ship Brokers and 
Agents 
Fels AO, Professor A 
Fels AO, Professor A, Taylor, N J 
and Smith, P J 
Fletcher, M Forest Industries Federation (WA) 
Fortescue Metals Group Limited Foundation for Alcohol Research 
and Education 
Foxtel 
Fraser, B Friends of Hawker Village Gale, N 
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Glencore Coal Australia Global Shippers’ Forum Google Australia 
Government of South Australia GrainGrowers Greenpeace Australia, Wilderness 
Society, OXFAM Australia, GetUp!, 
Voiceless, Friends of the Earth, 
AidWatch 
Griffith and District Citrus 
Growers’ Association 
Griggs, L & Nielsen, J Hawkins, M 
Henderson MP, S Herbert Smith Freehills Housing Industry Association 
Hutchison Ports Australia in tempore Advisory Independent Supermarket 
Retailers Guild of SA 
Industry Super Australia Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Australia 
Institute of Public Accountants 
Institute of Public Accountants 
(submission 2) 
Insurance Australia Group Insurance Council of Australia 
(updated submission) 
International Bar Association 
(Antitrust Committee) 
International Chamber of Shipping International Container Lines 
Committee (NZ) 
IPART ITS Global Jedlickova, B 
Jewellers Association of Australia Jones Day Jones Day (submission 2) 
Kagome Australia Kelly, V Kemp, K 
Kepnock Residents Action Group Kudis, R Large Format Retail Association 
Laskowska, M Law Council of Australia — 
Competition & Consumer 
Committee 
Law Council of Australia — 
IP Committee 
Law Council of Australia — 
SME Committee 
Law Council of Australia — 
SME Committee (submission 2) 
Lawson, C 
LCH.Clearnet Lloyd, J Lottery Agents Association of 
Tasmania 
Mair, P Margetts, D Master Builders Australia 
Master Builders Australia 
(submission 2) 
Master Builders Australia 
(submission 3) 
Master Grocers Australia 
McCusker Centre for Action on 
Alcohol and Youth 
Medibank Private Merger Streamlining Group 
Metcash Limited Miller, I Minerals Council of Australia 
Minter Ellison Momentum Energy Monash Business Policy Forum 
MTA Queensland Municipal Association of Victoria Narulla, H 
National Alliance for Action on 
Alcohol 
National Australia Bank National Competition Council 
National Disability Services National Electrical and 
Communications Association 
National Farmers’ Federation 
National Insurance Brokers 
Association of Australia 
National Roads and Motorists 
Association 
National Seniors Australia 
NBN Co Nehme, M and Laman, J Nelson, D 
News Corp NPS MedicineWise NSW Business Chamber 
New South Wales Government NSW Taxi Council O’Donnell, C 
Office of the Small Business 
Commissioner 
Optometry Australia Origin Energy Limited 
Palermo, V A Papworth, A Pharmacy Guild of Australia 
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Paramedical Services Pty Ltd Pharmaceutical Society of 
Australia 
Phonographic Performance 
Company of Australia 
Planning Institute of Australia Plastics and Chemicals Industries 
Association 
Priestley, C 
Priestley, C (submission 2) Printing Industries Association of 
Australia 
Productivity Commission 
Proud, K QBE Queensland Competition 
Authority 
Queensland Dairyfarmers 
Organisation 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation Queensland Law Society 
Raitt, G RBB Economics Recruitment and Consulting 
Services Association 
Restaurant & Catering Australia Retail Guild of Australia Rhydderch, A 
Rio Tinto Ron Finemore Transport Rosenwald, A 
Routledge, J RSPCA Australia Runacres, S 
Seddon, N Shipping Australia Ltd Shop Distributive and Allied 
Employees Association 
Shopping Centre Council of 
Australia 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited SingTel Optus Pty Ltd 
Slavery Links Australia Small Business Development 
Corporation, WA 
SP AusNet 
Spalding, N SPAR Australia Limited Spier Consulting 
Spier Consulting (second 
submission) 
Standards Australia Stanley, M B 
Stern, S Stewart, I Summerfield, M 
Suncorp Group Sydney Airport Corporation 
Limited 
Symbion Pharmacy Services 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers 
Association 
Tasmanian Government Tasmanian Small Business Council 
Telstra Corporation Limited Terceiro Legal Consulting The Australia Institute 
The Co-Op The Industry Group The Infrastructure Group 
Truman Hoyle United Energy and Multinet Gas United States Federal Trade 
Commission 
Uniting Church in Australia Urban Development Institute of 
Australia 
Urban Taskforce Australia 
Victorian Branch of the Australian 
Dental Association 
Vodafone Hutchison Australia Voiceless 
WA Independent Grocers 
Association 
Walker, M Water Services Association of 
Australia 
Wesfarmers Limited Wildlife Tourism Australia White’s Grocers 
Wills-Johnson, N Wishart, D Woodward L & Rubinstein M 
Woolworths Ltd Zoo and Aquarium Association  
 
 

